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SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY.



II
SPIRITUAL PHILOSOPHY:

FOUNDED ON

THE TEACHING OF THE LATE

SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE:

BY THE LATE

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EDITED,

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PART THIRD.

TRUTHS OF RELIGION.

CHAPTER I.

DEVELOPMENT OF SPIRITUAL INDIVIDUALITY, OR MAIN TRUTHS OF IDEAL INTEGRATION.

§ 1. IN the preceding part of this work the Will has been shown to be the true base of a philosophy of Realism, and, so far as the argument required it, has been described both ideally and empirically; both as the ideal Will, in whose light all actual Wills are to be contemplated, and as actual Will evincing its declension from the ideal condition. We have herein found the elements of a rational psychology; and the reader's recollection of my last chapter is particularly appealed to, for the establishment of the important distinction between the spiritual and natural man, and for the admission in the latter of an inherent tendency to moral pravity.

Our next business will be to trace the further indispensable work of the Speculative Intellect; to explain the *Growth of the Soul*, from its rudimental strivings under the predicament of its original pravity to the development of its spiritual capabilities; and to assign the cause

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which may and does lead to the integration of its spiritual state—namely the *Idea of God*.

§ 2. In order to facilitate the further exposition of our scheme of Spiritual Philosophy, it may be advisable to advertise the student that the object of this and the following chapter is to show that the main *truths of ideal integration* (or, as we have named them, *Ideas*) are revealed in and through our spiritual nature; and by “spiritual nature” I mean the Will more or less enlightened and potentiated by the Reason. I call *Ideas truths of ideal integration*, because by them whatever is tends to attain its highest state of being, its consummate excellence and most perfect realization;—a state, which indeed all derivative Wills can only realize approximatively and ideally; but to which, as its goal, every Will by its very nature cannot but tend, and which it may ever approach though never reach. And it will be hereafter shown that this tendency to absolute integrity of being is derived from the Absolute Will, who alone eternally realizes the Idea. He communicates it to all derivative Wills in and by the *Word*, the perfect pattern of the Humanity in its highest spiritual integrity, and, as the divine light of Reason, the universal power and process of spiritual integration.

Reason, so conceived, is both power and light. It is that by which man is enlivened and enlightened to contemplate and know the *mundus intelligibilis* or supersensuous world, *eternal*

Verities, τὰ ὄντως ὄντα, 'Truth, very Being, Truth which is subjective Being, and Being which is objective Truth. Reason is the one universal power and light of *Integration*; objectively operative to realize in all and each the highest excellence of Being; and subjectively operative to potentiate every conscious intelligence to the apprehension and conception of the Idea by which that reality is attained. The actuation of the light of Reason is that which constitutes the rationality of man, and thereby confers on him "the power, instinct and inherent tendency, of contemplating whatever may be the object of his thoughts, himself included, in its perfection, integrity, unity, universality, totality." And if the more or less conscious possession of the light of Reason, by which man ever tends to achieve the integrity of his moral being, contemplative and practical, constitutes his rationality, it constitutes also the distinguishing character and excellence of the essential Humanity.

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But here we have to consider what the term Integrity implies, and what spiritual Integration means, as the process by which this result is obtained. And it will be found that it involves all the conditions which have been exhibited in the "Axioms of Spiritual Integration,"—that, as true being cannot be said to have been fully attained except as perfect being, so nothing deserves the name or vindicates the character of spiritual life and being, unless it partakes of the

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tendency to and is animated by the Idea of spiritual integrity,—hence, that Spiritual Integrity implies unity and universality, permanent, abiding, immutable, eternal, absolute, &c.

“The philosopher of Königsberg, following Seneca—and both inspired by the same Idea which gave birth to the nineteenth psalm, has said that the two sublimest contemplamina for the human mind are the starry firmament without, and the moral law within; on the one hand the image of that which transcends the sensuous imagination, the Idea of the material universe in all the order and beauty of the Kosmos; on the other, the overwhelming sense of the presence of God, acknowledged by a responsible and immortal spirit in the depth of his own conscience. They bring before us indeed the Ideas which, inseparable from our rationality, and wholly unaccountable by the faculty judging only according to experience, at once *integrate*, and carry us to the utmost limits of human speculation:—the Universe, as the absolute totality of all nature, the boundless sphere of possible experience, which can in no respect be a part of any larger whole:—the Soul, as the absolutely real in our personal being, which, above all chance or change, belongs eternally to a spiritual sphere of abiding power and imperishable causality:—and God, as the absolute cause of all reality, Supreme Being, containing all perfection, excluding all want,

privation or negation, in the plenitude of goodness, truth and love.”

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“Gifted with Reason, man, amid all that is transient, imperfect and uncertain within and about him, casts his look at once to the Permanent, the Absolute, and the Perfect;—and if, in meditating on the facts of his consciousness, he ask for the *source of those eternal Verities*, that are the life and reality of his spiritual being, where shall he find it but in the Supreme Will causative of all reality, and how name it but the Living Truth,

Whence the Soul

Reason receives ; and Reason is her being.”

But thus conceived there neither is, nor can be, but One Reason :—and, in truth, it is a statement of the christian doctrine, that the “Word,” by whom all things were made, is essential Light and Life to his creatures;—it is the sublime doctrine, revealed by St. John, that the Reason is the light and spiritual presence of the Logos, τὸ φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν, ὃ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον.

One other explanation may be necessary. I have said above that the Truths which we name Ideas are revealed in and through our spiritual nature,—that they, being spiritual truths, are, as St. Paul says, “spiritually discerned.” They are disclosed in and by the facts of every man’s spiritual experience. I would however use the

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term "spiritual experience" to designate somewhat more than is meant by a notice of the psychological facts which are offered by our consciousness. I would refer the student to an investigation of his *self-consciousness*, that is, to the study of what constitutes the very ground of his own being; and if I am not greatly mistaken he will find, as I have endeavoured to show in Appendix B of Mental Dynamics, that "within ourselves we become cognisant of a causative and originant, of a somewhat deeper and beyond that which is the *object* of our thoughts;—it is the *subject*, the *Will*." "In every complete act of self-consciousness I not only contemplate myself as an Object, that is, my thoughts, feelings, volitions, but I know that *I* think, feel, will:—but more than this, I can abstract from these thoughts, feelings and volitions, Myself as the Subject—I know Myself. Now in saying this, What do I affirm? clearly this: I have attained to the knowledge of Substance, of Spiritual Being, of a Noumenon, of my own being as a Spirit or Will, I recognise in myself the identity of Being and Knowing:—I have reached the point in which I find my personal being in affirming that I am." Any further proof of the reality of will cannot be given than the evidence, which each man has, and can alone have, in and by his spiritual experience of the fact. "And so primary is the fact, that, if we resolve it into anything else, it ceases to be what we mean by

Will," or that which, essentially and primarily originative and causative, is the very ground of our spiritual life and being, under all the modifications of impulse, affection, feeling, passion, and resolve.

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Proceeding then from the cognisance of the above fact of our spiritual experience, which belongs to the unique instance of self-consciousness, and which each man can and must test in himself, we may now unfold in successive Propositions the main truths of *Ideal Integration*, which are implied in or grounded on it.

Prop. i. Will by its very nature is the inherent and inalienable tendency to be *absolute*. Will cannot but will itself as absolute Will. In every act of Will, full, perfect, and unconditional accomplishment is intended. A Will which would will itself less than absolute in each and every act would virtually contradict itself, since it would *will* to be and at the same time *not will* that which it would be:—it would become self-abortive. The truth of this is self-evident and *à priori*; but experience illustrates and confirms it, wherever the energy of the Will lapses under the aspect of difficulty and discouragement.

I say then that all Will wills itself as absolute;—and we need here only remark anticipatively, what will be made clearer as we proceed, that the tendency to be absolute is in truth the operance of the Reason; and that although in the lower stages of spiritual life the Reason may

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work latently and unconsciously, or reveal its presence only in the impulses, tendencies and instincts of will, yet in the higher development of spirit to conscious light and life, the same operance becomes the ideal *aim at spiritual integrity*; that the *nisus* of the will to will itself as absolute becomes in the enlightened Will the moral purpose of absolute spiritual self-integration. It follows, however, that we have to consider the tendency to the Absolute in a two-fold aspect:—for (first) every Will strives to be absolute in its own self-particularity, or as a particular Will; but (secondly) every Will is enlightened and enlivened to its absolute spiritual integration:—and, as we shall see hereafter, the light of Reason, which wakes in the Will the tendency to be absolute, at the same time inevitably works to its conviction that the striving to be an absolute particular, or in other words the striving of each and every particular Will to be an absolute and universal Will, is vain, nugatory and self-contradictory.

Prop. ii. Man, whose essential nature as we have seen is Will, awakes to the sense, and more or less consciousness, of this his spiritual nature, with, and indeed by, the tendency to be absolute. But, by his unavoidable intercourse with other like spirits (not to mention the powerful agencies of the natural world in which he is placed) he is soon made to feel his utter weakness and incapacity to realize the impulse

which possesses him, of asserting himself as the absolute Will which he desires and strives to be, and of enforcing on others that submission to its mandates which he claims. Conceive a moral or spiritual world in which each and every agent strives to realize and enforce its own selfish particularity, and (according to our unavoidable premiss) to vindicate its title to absolute Will: conceive, if it be possible, a chaos of moral or spiritual atoms, under the influence of burning concupiscence in all its forms, of rage and fear, of fierce cruelty, pride, revenge, and all the tumultuous passions and violent promptings which would be the necessary consequence of unmitigated *selfishness*:—and you might realize for yourself the image of the internecine strife and universal warfare, in which man would be hopelessly plunged, were each and every human will to be engaged in the self-destructive and self-contradictory attempt to realize itself as an absolute and universal Will. But although the moral Governor of the world forbids the realization of this suicidal conflict and its awful consequences, yet the spirit and tendency of the world are too manifest to leave us in doubt that the principle is ever at work, which produces these evils, and cannot but involve every man more or less in the wretchedness and misery which they entail.

But if man suffers, and by that suffering is made to feel his weakness and inability to with-

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stand the injuries which are inflicted on him by the universal selfishness of his kind, he cannot also but connect with the ills which he experiences the sense of *wrong* which is done to him by others, and haply of the wrong which by his own selfishness he does, or would do, to them. Suffering, disappointed, oppressed, afflicted, and unavoidably contrasting his wretchedness with the happiness and felicity which he desires and wishes, man—whatever may be his degree of conscious insight—must, in some form or other, recognise the *evil* and *pravity* of the world. Forced back upon himself by the uncongenial or even hostile outward, he will find too in the recesses of his inward being the same dispositions to wrong which he condemns in others, or, if the delusions of selfishness blind him, will still not be able altogether to shut out that craving which betrays and is the confession of spiritual imperfection.

I interpose here a remark. It is not supposed in the above, or what is to follow, that all men or most men reason upon these matters, and follow up a train of philosophical thought. The philosopher must be the interpreter and exponent of the process, which in the far greater number of men is carried on unconsciously, and of which they are the subjects rather than the agents. He has to vindicate the principles; but the mode in which they come into operation will necessarily vary; and the statement above

adopted must be regarded only as a probable explanation of the psychological connexion.

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Prop. iii. Under the sense of weakness and pravity, engendered by the utter failure of all attempts to assert his Will as absolute, man will inevitably crave for the supplement and complement of the spiritual integrity which he wants in order to spiritual life and being. I am not indeed supposing that, in any such stage of spiritual development, man will or can recognise consciously his *moral* destination. The postulate implies only that man, under the sense of his utter spiritual inadequacy to realize as absolute his own Will in any form of selfish particularity—which tendency to the absolute is of the very nature of Will and inseparable from it, feels, or is more or less brought to recognise, the indispensable need of a spiritual integrity, which his own Will must ever crave, and yet can never supply;—a spiritual integrity, which (whatever else or higher it may be) is at least indispensable in order that any Will may be in its adequate sense and import a Will, and be capable of realizing by a self-originant act the full and complete individuality of any moral being.

Corollary. It may be that in this stage of spiritual development there arises a nascent consciousness of the distinction, already adverted to, as the antagonism of the *natural* and *spiritual man*. At all events the distinction offers

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itself here to our notice, and requires for the elucidation of our view a brief comment. Let me then repeat that the inherent tendency of every human Will is to be absolute in its own selfish particularity. Now looking to psychological experience of the affections of the Will, which are prominently spiritual, or of the nature and character of Will, we shall find, as I have elsewhere shown in detail, that they consist in four tendencies, to which we may refer respectively all human emotions and passions, and under which the human Will is subjected to the condition of being excited to act, and at the same time of repelling or appropriating the excitant (Compare *Vital Dynamics*, p. 30). Thus *Concupiscence* exhibits itself as the unbounded lust of possession, of having as our own and for our particular self whatever has excited the desire of the concupiscent self—"who enlargeth his desire as hell, and is as death, and cannot be satisfied." In the revulsion from this outward tendency, *Aversion* shows itself in the utter disgust of all that had seduced the spirit and disappointed its vain wishes and expectations, in the promised felicity of the outward world, and seeks its solace in the delusive guise of stubborn pride and self-worship. Again, a third phase of psychical life displays *Rage* with its kindred passions, as the irresistible impulse to seize and destroy whatever interferes with the passionate self-

will and its capricious moods, or has become the object of its vindictive hate. But, although the fit of rage be violent, the soul betrays only its weakness; and Rage is ever alternating with *Fear*; the latter, ever ready to wing the flight of the spirit from the danger it apprehends or imagines, or, worse, to paralyse all the energies of the spirit. Meanwhile in every mood the spirit, obeying the tendency which is proper to its nature, or as we may call it the “natural man,” is moved only by his selfish lusts, and would have his selfish Will absolute:—from the very necessities of his nature he wills his particular will to be a self, and would have that self-will to be universal, absolute and autocratic:—under the conditions proposed, without modifications and restrictions, the aim of every human Will is pure and unmitigated *Selfishness*. It is true that we are contemplating the tendency ideally, or what it is in principle and in aim; but it requires but little acquaintance with the actual world to know that selfishness is the ineradicable fault of human nature, and maintains its influence on all mankind. What its result would be, if allowed its full scope by the absence of all law human and divine, we have endeavoured to express by saying that society would be dissolved into a conflicting chaos of spiritual atoms under the predicament of a suicidal self-contradiction. But without attempting here to establish the

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countervailing power, which ever works to remedy that state of false life and potential death, it may be observed by way of anticipative explanation that the exposure of the disease renders the remedy self-evident. If the attempt of every Will or Spirit to realize its selfish particularity as absolute be vain, contradictory and (except as mutually destructive and suicidal) impossible:—so it will be at once apparent, on the other hand, that—if every one seek to fill and integrate his own sphere of act and being only so far as may be done with the due observance of the same or a similar integrity of the sphere of each and of all others in the same social and spiritual whole,—if every man concede to another what is justly his due, treats him as he himself would desire to be treated under similar circumstances, and is ever prepared and ready to regard another human being as himself in the relation of alterity,—if, in short, *self-denial* be the rule of conduct, together with the unhesitating sacrifice of all self-lust and self-worship, in all their rapacious, violent, fraudulent, hostile, and vindictive propensities and practices,—then, without yet casting our thoughts to a divine source, we have a glimpse of the law of moral order, and learn at once, by the very contrast of the disastrous results attending its absence, to discern the healing principle of universal *Love*. Hence too we shall acknowledge, at least anticipatively, the difference of the “Natu-

ral" and the "Spiritual" Man, or say rather the antagonism in every man of two principles; according to the predominance of the one or other of which, he either gives way to the selfishness of his nature, or cultivates and practises that principle of *self-denial* which (as we shall presently see) obedience to the *idea of absolute spiritual integrity* indispensably implies and requires. And we now propose to show that the growth or conversion of the natural man to the spiritual man implies the revelation of, and the actuation by, the Idea of the absolute spiritual integrity, contemplated at once as the causative power, ultimate aim, and perfect realization of spiritual integration.

Prop. iv. We may state the proposition thus:—The spiritual development of man—that is, the development of his capacity to apprehend and to aim at realizing the highest excellence of his spiritual being, or in other words the integrity without which his spiritual being would not be full and complete and could only be abortive and imperfect,—the *spiritual development* of man, I say, *depends upon the revelation to him of, and his actuation by, the Idea of the absolute spiritual integrity.* And I may repeat that by "Idea" is here and elsewhere to be understood the *power*, which *enlightens* him intuitively to the apprehension of the nature of spiritual integrity, and at the same time *enlivens* and actuates him in and to the process of self-

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integration, of which the Idea is the beacon and goal.

It is evident that what we intend to convey is that the spiritual development of man is the operance of God; and that the operance consists in the self-revelation of God in and as the Idea of absolute spiritual integrity. But the work is to be achieved in man by the concurrence of man's Will, and by his conviction as a rational being, and cannot therefore be effectually accomplished except in so far as man is sufficiently willing and enlightened to receive the divine Idea, which is ever at work to dispose and guide, to potentiate and aid, him to the process of spiritual integration in himself. In meditating on this profound and awful mystery of the communion of rational man with God, we may however remind the student that all mysticism may be removed by due attention to the character of the Reason as we have already had occasion to describe it. He will find (as we have stated, ante, § 2) that the Reason is the one universal power and light of *Integration*, that which, in conferring on man his *rationality* as the distinguishing character of his Humanity, enables him to apprehend whatever constitutes the *integrity* of truth and being, and to achieve—at least approximatively—the *integration* of his own spiritual being according to the Idea. We have said indeed (compare p. 10 ante) that, under the inherent and universal tendency of

all Will to be absolute, the tendency may be either *false* or *true*;—false, when the Will strives to be absolute in its own self-particularity;—true, only when enlightened and enlivened to seek willingly its absolute spiritual integration in and by the light of Reason, which reveals the divine Idea, and infuses the spiritual energy to emulate the divine pattern. Nevertheless under whatever aspects we may view the power and light of spiritual integration, it is evident that we are speaking of the Reason, considered as the *divine Idea*, who sets forth eternally the *pattern and paradigm of spiritual integrity* in all its transcendent perfection, and is the perpetual source of the *power and light*, by which all derivative being is potentiated to its *spiritual integration*.

Now, as affirmed in our previous proposition, man, under the sense of his weakness and pravity, and of his utter spiritual incapacity to realize his Will as absolute in any selfish particularity of being, will inevitably crave for the supplement and complement which he needs in order to his spiritual life and being. That the craving does arise, and is evoked in the human spirit, is authenticated by the fact, adverted to in Prop. ii., that the Reason, though latently, is at work in every will or Spirit destined to, or rendered capable of, spiritual integrity. In other words, Reason as the Idea of spiritual integration works in the yet unconscious Will as the instinct and inherent

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tendency of absolute self-affirmation; though the aim, by reason of the blindness of the Will, may be the mere concupiscence of an absolute self. Thus man, as indeed has been already noticed, derives the susceptibility, disposition and tendency, to realize in himself the Idea of spiritual integrity by the influx of Reason; and man, awakened by the downshine of the Light, is made to feel his own incapacity to realize the spiritual integrity which he needs, and at the same time to desire and crave for the complement and supplement which is necessary for his spiritual life and being. That which the spirit of man needs, wants and desires, is the light and power of spiritual integration; and it will be in the moment of the recognition of his own weakness and pravity, and under the craving for the spiritual integrity which he needs, that he will be brought to apprehend and acknowledge the power and light which have been at work in him, and to behold with more or less conscious insight the Idea of spiritual integrity which reveals to his conscious intelligence the presence of God. It is a truth, which vindicates its reality in and by the fact, is not arrived at or to be proved by logical reasoning, is demonstrative and intuitive as any sensuous fact, seen in and by the light of its own evidence; and man finds in it all that he means, or can mean, by God.

That the idea, thus discovered, of a fact operative within the sphere of our spiritual experience,

fulfils all that we can conceive or postulate of the idea of God is plain and self-evident;—since God is for us the idea of absolute spiritual integrity, —“the absolute cause of all reality, Supreme Being, containing all perfection, excluding all want, privation, or negation, in the plenitude of goodness, truth, and love.” But although the above position may and perhaps ought to be sufficient to satisfy the student of the adequacy of the terms by which we have described the Idea of absolute spiritual integrity, to designate the high contemplation and Idea of God, yet we warn him that a further exposition will be necessary in order to raise and arm the human mind to contemplate the scarcely less than infinite perfections which the Idea in either of its expressions suggests and contains. But do we say, or mean to imply, that all men under all circumstances come alike to the conscious knowledge of the Idea of God? Alas! facts and experience leave us in no doubt of the ignorance of the major part of mankind of this fundamental article of religion, but also show us that a large part of the human race have utterly perverted the idea to cruel and degrading superstitions unworthy of any who aspire to the name of rational beings. Nevertheless it may be safely asserted that the light of Reason is co-extensive with the humanity, that it never deserts man except by his own wilful abnegation, and that, even in the aberrations of the human mind to false and

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wicked idolatries, the operance of the Idea may be traced in the still perceptible attempt to worship whatever man in his degradation may deem to be the highest and best, and values as his *Supreme Good*. Meanwhile, in all who do not wilfully reject the divine light, the position we have assumed of the universal presence and operance of the light of Reason is sufficiently justified by the fact that the Idea of God, as absolute spiritual integration, will be always in the ratio of their spiritual development, and will ever increase in clearness and brightness in proportion as the soul becomes purified and elevated.

Prop. v. *The conditions, under which man receives effectually the revelation of the Idea of God, as the power and light of spiritual integration to his soul's health and life, are primarily moral, and although inclusively intellectual, belong to the Conscience.*

Now although man cannot behold the Idea here in question except by the aid of the light of Reason as Speculative Intellect, yet the Idea will want the life and power which are essential to its reality, nay, he cannot become truly cognizant of its nature and efficacy, unless it enlivens as well as enlightens his spiritual Being. All speculative knowledge is founded on moral truth. In order to apprehend effectually the Idea of God, every man must in and for himself feel and more or less know the presence and actuation of the Divine Spirit. And this he will only do when

his *Conscience* is duly awakened to light and life, under the sense of his moral and spiritual relations, by the divine voice, which, though felt as alien and compulsive, is recognised as authoritative and obligatory. And notwithstanding the various views which have been taken with regard to the significance of the term, corresponding to the grounds which have been severally adopted for different schemes of ethical doctrine, I venture to say that the true meaning of what is rightly to be understood as “the Conscience,” is an individual Will when duly enlightened and enlivened by the Reason; that is, the spiritual Reason, or divine Spirit, which proceeds from the Word of God. And it may be added that the consciousness of a rational being is founded on his conscience,—namely, that any true knowledge of a Self consists in the recognition of the Self in relation to, and in connection with, the relations of the Self to other like beings and to God.

It does not accord with the design of this essay to examine in detail the principles of the ethical systems, which from time to time have been proposed for the guidance of mankind. But I may say that—whether the aim and object enforced be Happiness, either selfish or universal, and the means of its accomplishment, or the alleged existence of a moral sense and the benefit of cultivating moral sentiments, or even the worth and dignity of virtue and the obligation

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to practise it,—they one and all fail in establishing a rational principle of morals, adequate to command the obedience of the individual Will, and to be the guiding light of his moral conduct. For a system, fulfilling such requirements, we must turn from merely human teachers and their works to that Jesus, who revealed the *Law of Righteousness*, vivified by spiritual interpretation, and declared himself to be the Word of God, “the Truth, the Light and the Way,” that is, the living, divine and eternal Reason, and therein the Law, the Pattern, and the *Idea of all Righteousness*.

Taking then the principle of ethics and morals to be Reason enlightening and enlivening the soul or Will of man, it follows that moral truth, as far as the Will is so actuated, is intuitive, universal and self-evident; and I proceed to expound briefly the propositions involved in the principle of ethics so affirmed. I take for granted, in agreement with the previous exposition, the truth of the axiom, that “all Will cannot but strive after its individual integration;” and I unhesitatingly connect with it the following corollaries.

i. Every individual Will, seeking the supplement and complement of its spiritual needs, as far as it is enlightened and enlivened thereto, recognises the *Idea of God* (in whatever degree attained) as the Idea of absolute spiritual perfection, as the power, process, and paradigm of

integrity, and as that which every Will desires as its Supreme Good.

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ii. Every Will cannot but seek what it deems its supreme good, and cannot but aim at that in which it imagines its greatest happiness and highest beatitude to consist; and that the light of Reason shows that this supreme Good is and can only be the highest moral or spiritual excellence, or that by which the Will may obtain its absolute integration.

iii. Recognising its own pravity as a fallen creature, every creaturely Will, so fallen, but enlightened by Reason, will acknowledge its own pravity on the one hand, and its ideal destination on the other, and will hence recognise the *obligation* of conforming itself to, and of integrating itself by, the *Idea of absolute spiritual integrity*, according to the rule, "Be ye perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect."

iv. Recognising the selfish particularity of the fallen Will, and the self-contradictory impossibility of rendering itself absolute in its own particularity, in the false striving to which *Selfishness* essentially consists, the Will will be brought to acknowledge the necessity of *Self-denial* in its unavoidable intercourse with other Wills or Spirits, and will have taken the first lesson in *Love*, as that which essentially consists in living for another and others. Hence, viewed by the intellect as truth, and regarded by the

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Will as law, the creaturely Will acquires the consciousness of himself as a *Conscience*; and there arises the conception of a rule of Ethics or Morals, as the exposition of the *Obligations*, religious, social and personal, of man as a rational being.

v. Every violation of the moral law, which selfishness prompts under the various forms of inordinate concupiscence and unholy desires, betrays its immoral character by inherent self-contradictory absurdity. The unmistakeable character of all moral agency is its universality, and its universal test and warrant is contained in the maxim: *That that only may be thought, done, or said, which is valid for every rational being under like circumstances.* And the rule is especially binding in respect of the conduct of one towards another, as is happily expressed in the never-to-be-forgotten maxim, amongst other not less precious lessons, "All things, whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets." Matt. vii. 12. I have added the last words only as a reminder of our Saviour's peculiar teaching; it must be reserved for a future occasion to show that He who taught authoritatively, and not as the scribes, was the same true Light, which enlightens every man. But as I have said, every immoral act stands self-convicted by its own absurdity. If every man lied, nobody would be believed:—if every

man cheated, nobody would be trusted:—if every man sought to attain his ends by violence, human society would be destroyed. If any man have committed an offence, he can only defend it upon one of two grounds, either that it is an exception to an universal rule, or that it ought to be the universal; but if he only admits his crime as the exception, he thereby proves the validity of the rule against his offence; and if he boldly avers that the crime ought to be the universal rule, he tacitly avows a principle which would be destructive to society and to the very conditions under which any moral rule would be available. Thus, as I have said, to a Conscience (that is, a Will enlightened by Reason) the Law of Righteousness is the truth, intuitive and immediate, that what is willed must be universal; for that which is not universal can be no law for all like rational agents;—and it is no less certain and self-evident, for to will otherwise would be self-contradictory and absurd.

vi. It will be observed that the argument here employed implies man in a state of *social community*:—nor indeed can a moral rule be conceived otherwise than as contemplating the individual in relation to others of the same kind, and as the condition of the interagency and intercommunion of a society of rational Beings. And it is equally plain *à priori* that the components of such a society would, without mutual concession,

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forbearance, and the exercise of self-denial, cease to form an association in any proper sense of the term; and that, whenever the lust of selfish gratification at the expense of others supersedes the rule of Christian charity, which directs us to love not only our neighbours but our enemies, society cannot but tend to resolve itself into jarring elements, and to become a chaos of conflicting atoms, instead of a union of moral individuals. Under blindness or defiance of the Moral Law, human society must become suicidal and self-destructive:—it is selfishness and selfish particularity which loosen, and self-denial and charity which bind and enduringly strengthen, the foundations of human society.

vii. and last. Recognising the truth, that every Will is to be integrated as Will or is destined to be spiritually integrated, but at the same time is required to be self-integrated and to be restored to its spiritual integrity *willingly* and by its own agency—as far as this may be safely affirmed without ignoring or curtailing the idea of the indispensable aid which the fallen creature derives from the grace and mercy of a Divine Redeemer,—it follows unavoidably that every creaturely Will must be submitted to a temporal *state of probation*, must be tested and tried as metal in the fire, must undergo the probation necessary to vindicate the conformity of its spirit to its spiritual destination, and to the reality of Will striving God-

ward. But the further prosecution of this subject, touching the conditions of the *Redemptive Process*, may be conveniently left for future consideration. It may be here observed, however, that from the point of view which regards our worldly sojourn as a state of probation, we derive the more than consolatory assurance that the *calamities and afflictions* of life, so often bewailed as the wretched lot of human mortality, may be converted into inestimable *blessings*, if taken advantage of as suitable trials for the purpose of exercising and strengthening the virtues which they call forth for their meek sufferance, and which contribute largely and effectually to our spiritual growth and integration.

CHAPTER II.

THE IDEA OF GOD.

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§ 1. IN the foregoing parts of this treatise it has been incidentally inculcated, and throughout assumed, that the operance of the divine Idea is essential to the spiritual Being of man and its integration; that God actuates man by a real and indwelling presence; and that the test and evidence of such actuation of the human spirit is the light of Reason, enlightening and enlivening it,—not as a merely human faculty or “*natural* reason,” but as a *spiritual* Reason—even the downshine of the true Light, of Him who is ever Life and Light to His creatures.

This ground of Realism will require more to commend it to the reader’s judgement than I yet have had an opportunity to offer within the prescribed limits of this work:—but, previously to a larger exposition of the argument on which it is founded, and as the especial object of this chapter, it will be necessary to exhibit the work of the Speculative Intellect or Reason in attaining to the insight of the Idea of God and of the conditions of its gracious revelation. And,

to prevent misunderstanding, let me add that the Reason in man is at once the revelation of the Idea, and that by which the power is conferred of apprehending, receiving, and consciously appropriating the revelation. This transcendent Idea is only then effectually revealed to human intelligence and consciousness, when, as a power intelligent and causative, it does actually both enliven and enlighten the spirit of man.

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§ 2. Let me, however, as preparatory to the explanation of the evolution of this unique idea by the Speculative Reason, recapitulate some of the main positions at which we have arrived in behoof of the object contemplated. Thus the following may be accepted:—"That which the spirit of man needs, wants and desires, is the light and power of spiritual integration; and it will be in the moment of the recognition of his own weakness and pravity, and while craving for the spiritual integrity which he needs, that he will be in a condition to be brought to apprehend and acknowledge the power and light which have been already at work in him, and to behold with more or less conscious insight the *Idea of Spiritual Integrity* which reveals (however imperfectly) to his Conscience and conscious Intelligence the indwelling presence of God."

Of the truth of this Idea, as far as it represents a power really and effectually operative in himself, he cannot but have the most positive

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subjective assurance ; since with all the certainty of self-evidence, derived from the very nature of the Will of which he is conscious, he will know that he cannot but crave for absolute integrity, though, in attempting to secure it, he be ever baffled by the impossibility of realizing his own particularity as absolute. But the Idea of Absolute Integrity, already infused by Reason, cannot but be recognised by the Will on which it acts, as far as the Will is consciously enlightened and enlivened to its own moral integration ; and this idea of absolute integrity and integration can be no other than the Idea of God.

§ 3. The objective reality of the Idea of God—that is, the verity of the Being of God, independent yet inclusive of man's thoughts, and the verity of God's operance in man, as the integrative power which is in him though not of him, working in him as the needful process of spiritual integration,—is what man will feel bound to acknowledge, when he beholds the truth of the Idea by the light of its own evidence, and is conscious of being actuated by its indwelling presence and operance. This kindling of the soul is by the agency of Him who is light and life to His creatures, and is the common birthright of our humanity :—but the *intellectual and conscious possession of this divine Idea* is the work of the speculative intellect, when, quickened by the divine Reason, it is inspired to contemplate

the Idea in all the fulness and clarity of its sublime features, and in all the distinctness of its majestic proportions.

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In raising itself to this transcendent contemplation, the speculative intellect of man, still struggling with the imperfections of his fallen nature, will still however have to observe with reverential attention the *conditions under which the gracious revelation of the idea* is vouchsafed; and to such we call the notice of the reader in the following paragraphs.

§ 4. First, it is the revelation to man of an Idea of spiritual integrity, or process of integration, which is not only different from the drift and tendency of his will, but *contrary* to what he would will;—since it forbids the selfish particularity which he in respect of his natural disposition desires to be absolute, and imposes on him by the very necessity of the case the obligation of self-denial, in order to the attainment of the spiritual being, not to say spiritual integrity of being, which he, as a Will, cannot but aim at. Hence then the natural man—or what we shall hereafter find to be the fallen and unregenerate spirit—cannot but feel or know that the light and power of integration to true being, which acts upon him, is *ab extrâ* or alien, though at the same time auxiliary and congeneric;—for it is a power against which his will strives and contends. At the same time he cannot but be made sensible, in the very striving

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against it, that the idea of spiritual integrity, considered as the universal law of spiritual agency in each and all, offers the only condition under which he individually can realize his spiritual being;—and thus he feels or acknowledges the *obligation* to conform himself to an alien power or law, which, as the natural man under the condition of his pravity, he cannot but hate and detest.

§ 5. Meanwhile in whatever degree his spirit has become enlightened and enlivened to accept the gracious actuation by “the true Light,” whose downshine into his benighted soul he may recognise, he will in the same degree, in raising his contemplation to the *highest form* of spiritual integration—namely, to the idea of the Absolute Will in its spiritual perfection and integrity absolute,—acknowledge that he receives the actuation of light and life, not only *from without*, but *from above*; yea, from the indwelling presence and operance of God.

§ 6. If then the Idea of absolute spiritual integrity, contemplated objectively, or as a reality independent of the human mind that apprehends it, is what by the very necessity of our rational nature we call *God*; and if we recognise God, as the Idea of absolute spiritual integrity, inasmuch and in as far as we find ourselves actuated by His operance and indwelling presence; it is evident that what is commonly called the “proof” of the existence

of God is *demonstrative*, δεικτικὸς, and not the result of logical reasoning; in other words, that the existence of God is no matter of inference or proof, but is a fact of spiritual experience, and intuitively apprehended by our rational and spiritual nature—in short, an immediate revelation, communicated in and by the *Light of Reason*. If, as we cannot doubt, such is the case, it may serve to explain the utter failure of all the so-called proofs of the existence of God, in which, whether they be attempted *à priori* or *à posteriori*, we inevitably detect a *petitio principii*, or find that what is meant to be proved has been already taken for granted. It would divert us from our main purpose to enter upon a critical investigation of these proofs; but it may assist the student if, as most connected with our subject and the position we have assumed, we briefly advert to the celebrated “ontological proof” which was introduced into the theological schools of the middle ages by Anselm of Canterbury, and to the doctrine propounded by Kant in consonance with his views of the “regulative” nature of Ideas.

§ 7. Anselm’s so-called ontological proof, though anticipated by Augustin, was the first clear statement of a proof based upon the Pure Reason. He says:—The conception of God is that of a Being than which nothing greater can be conceived, “*quo majus cogitari non potest*.” This, he observes, must be admitted even by

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those who deny God's existence, for in denying it they cannot but admit that they thus think of the divine Being, namely as "*quo majus cogitari non potest.*" Now, adds he, we distinguish between the thought of the thing, and the thing thought of, between what is "*in solo intellectu*" and what is "*in re:*" and what is not only in the intellect but also in reality, we necessarily regard as greater and more excellent than the thought of the same. *That*, therefore (he concludes) beyond which nothing higher or greater can be conceived, must be conceived not only *in intellectu*, but as *in re* and as an existing reality;—and such is the conception of God.

Anselm's view amounts then to this proposition:—That the conception of God as the conception "*quo majus cogitari non potest*" inalienably and inseparably involves the conception of God's existence and objective reality. It will be seen, however, that, whatever its value as vindicating a necessary connexion of thought, it fails in demonstrating the reality of the object of our thoughts; it may prove that God cannot be thought of, or conceived, except as really existing, but it leaves the student still inextricably limited to the subjective sphere of his intellect.

This ontological proof may be stated thus:—
 whatever Being includes in its conception
 every attribute of reality and perfection
 must include the attribute of existence;

the conception of God includes, as Ens PART III.
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therefore the conception of God must include the attribute of existence:—

or, to whatever Being we attribute every reality and perfection, we attribute inclusively a real existence; and therefore we attribute it to God. But the fallacy will be easily detected, namely, that the *attribution* of reality is passed off as the *demonstration* of the reality. Compare Bretschneider's *Dogmatik*, vol. i. p. 464. Ritter (*Hist. of Ph.* vol. vii. p. 336) adopts a similar view when he says that the fault lies in mistaking the reality of the predicates for the reality of the subject of these predicates. He adds that Anselm's aim, and that which gave the proof value to him, was the aim of establishing a doctrine of God as Absolute Being and universal truth. And he believes that Anselm's view so considered is intimately associated with his *Realism*, and connects itself with the doctrine of Plato, that every particular truth and every particular conception are only such by partaking of universal truth and conception.

I will not pretend to have given in the above short summary the exact meaning of Ritter, but I think it will be admitted on reflection that Anselm wanted to establish on the ground of Reason, and as inseparable from rational thought, a *Transcendent Absolute*, which includes, and

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risers above, both Truth and Being:—he apprehended the necessity of reaching that point of contemplation, at which Being becomes Objective Truth, and Truth becomes Subjective Being. It is this sublime “Idea,” which was more or less consciously working in him, and which has induced many noble minds to be satisfied with his so-called ontological proof. He was aiming at, and succeeded in bringing into view, this highest contemplation of the human mind, if only as a “speculative” Idea, yet as the noblest effort of man’s reasoning powers:—and doubtless rational man, however low his reasoning powers may be, can never be satisfied with less than the *assumption* of the Idea of God:—but still the Idea of God, even when most glorified by philosophical ability, will remain, and ever must remain, mere speculative or ideal truth, until the operation of God is acknowledged in the *Conscience*, and thereby the speculative truth converted into a moral reality and spiritual life.

§ 8. Kant—who reduces the “proofs” of the existence of God to three, namely the ontological, the cosmological, and the physico-theological, and shows that they are fundamentally the ontological and partake of its inherent defects as the results of mere logical reasoning,—conceives that the *existence of God* is to be regarded as a *Postulate* of the Practical Reason. It would be unjust to this celebrated philosopher to pre-

tend to exhibit adequately his argument in the brief space to which we must here necessarily confine ourselves; but the nature of his reasoning may be thus stated:—The summum bonum or highest good, to which man aspires, is the union of the strictest morality and of the highest happiness. The former is required by his spiritual, and the latter by his sensuous nature. Man can, however, only realize his moral being, and, in giving it reality in his own person by unswerving virtue, he often only succeeds by the sacrifice of his physical well-being. Nevertheless, as the desire of happiness is in no respect irrational or unnatural, he infers rightly, either that there is a Supreme Being, who so rules the course of the world that virtue and happiness will be ultimately reconciled in every moral agent, himself included,—or that the voice of conscience is wrong and irrational. But the latter judgement is morally impossible, and he is therefore compelled to accept the former as true. (Conf. Reine Vernft, “Ideal of the Highest Good.”) In his work on the Practical Reason, p. 238, he describes the “Postulates” as necessary *assumptions* for the practical purposes of our moral existence, and, although not augmenting our knowledge, yet, as conferring objective reality on the Ideas of the Speculative Reason. And in accordance with this view he enumerates three as essential, viz. :—1. *Immortality*; as supplying the condition of adequate duration for moral

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completion. 2. *Freedom*; as the power of the self-determination of the Will according to spiritual laws, or those of a *mundus intelligibilis*. 3. The *existence of God*; as supplying the condition of the reality of a spiritual sphere, or *mundus intelligibilis*, as the highest Good, by the assumption of the highest self-dependent Good as its author and ruler.

§ 9. According to Kant, then, we have no knowledge of God as an objective reality; and we have to content ourselves with what amounts to no more than a *rational belief* in his existence, arising out of the demands of our moral and physical nature. He calls this assumption of God a "moral postulate;" but we cannot but think that it fails in securing to man the actual possession of the Idea of God in its true meaning and full efficacy. It will be observed, namely, that the epithet "moral" is hardly applicable to an assumption, which derives its motive from the wish to gratify our sensuous nature, though the gratification may be compatible with the claims of morality. Kant seems to have overlooked the important distinction between moral bliss and the felicity desired by the natural man or *ψυχικός*. He says indeed: "Happiness is the state of a rational Being, whose every wish and will is fulfilled, in accordance with his nature in its aim and end, and with the proper objects of his Will." (Paraphrase from Pract: Vernft, p. 224.) It includes

therefore a high or perfect state of morality ; and Kant's moral ideal was too high and too pure to have permitted him to admit less : but at the same time we cannot but feel that no desire of happiness, which has its ground in the concupiscence of the natural man, is capable of union or fusion with the heavenward aspirations of the spiritual man, "whose conversation is in heaven," unless the psychical and carnal lusts have been precipitated and cast off, as wholly incompatible with that state of bliss which has its joy in unalloyed spiritual excellence. And again, according to Kant, had happiness in this world been the uniform reward and result of virtue, there is no ground for supposing that any thought of God would have ever intruded itself into the human mind. For, according to his view, the law of morals and the moral ideal of man do not require the assumption of the divine Will and operance in and on man, but are the work and result of human reason, acting in and by the postulate of the freedom of the human Will, and appearing in the form of the universality of all moral obligation. God may be the height of moral excellence, but He is not the law-giver, still less the absolute source and Author of all moral excellence ; he may be himself the subject of a moral law, which controls him by a stern necessity ; and for man he appears only as the Disposer of the world in order to the compensation of virtue by ultimate happiness.

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It cannot be denied that Kant's doctrine represents correctly a certain stage or moment, when man attempts by logical reasoning to reach the "Idea," and marks the failure of an attempt, which he cannot forego, by leaving it under the name of a postulate as a something yet requiring to be done: but the religious inquirer must ever feel how inadequate is that attempt to come up to the reality, and to act upon mankind as from the ground of a living faith. God, as a postulate or hypothesis of the mere reasoning intellect, is not acknowledged as the living God "in whom we live and move and have our being,"—is not the God on whom we rely in unwavering faith, as ever and essentially the divine Spirit indwelling and in communion with us,—is not the Absolute Cause of all moral perfection, and Himself the Idea and Paradigm of absolute spiritual integrity,—is not the God of all goodness, who, in spite of our pravity, yet condescends to impart to us his spiritual gifts and perfections, and to teach us how to ask and to obtain them. But if we have been right in averring that God is revealed to us in and by the light of Reason, and that we *know** Him in as far as we are thereby actuated to contemplate Him as the

* To "know" may, however, be rightly considered to mean more. Thus St. John, xvii. 3:—"And this is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom thou hast sent." Here "knowledge" is used as equivalent to "life eternal;" and must be considered *spiritually*, as the knowledge derived from His presence in, and communion with, the human soul.

power and pattern of absolute spiritual integrity working in us and aiding us to assimilate ourselves to His divine Image,—then we may safely dismiss Kant's "moral postulate;" having in its stead the clue, not only to behold God as the glorious object of our beatific vision in all the reality of His infinite spiritual perfections, but no less to acknowledge His gracious presence in the secret recesses of our hearts and bosoms.

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§ 10. On the *Pantheistic views of the Idea of God* and the nature of Deity it is not necessary for our purpose to enlarge. The fundamental error of this scheme of philosophy, which has exerted a seductive attraction on many of the highest intellects, consists in confounding God and the world. Or, if we contrast it with the christian doctrine according to a dry formula which we have already adopted after Coleridge, the pantheistic scheme may be represented by "God *minus* World = 0," the christian doctrine by "God *minus* World = absolute perfection and reality." In the school of Hegel (who contemplates God as the absolute process of thought, which first attains its consciousness in the human mind) the antagonism to the position, that God is a self-dependent reality, distinct from, and above, nature, is prominently maintained in the often-repeated assertion, that God is *immanent* but *not transcendent*, indwelling throughout the whole ascent of nature, but inconceivable without it.

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Now if this reasoning, which we denounce as false, be traced to its origin, we shall be at no loss to see that the fallacy, introduced by Spinoza, consists in conceiving that all existence and all modes of existence are by the *limitation* or *negation* of *absolute Being*, and consequently that God is lost or altogether absorbed by the totality of the forms of existence. But we unhesitatingly oppose to this unwholesome view, calculated as it is to undermine the very foundations of morality, the doctrine of the *positive* nature of all reality, and the primary and essential truth of the self-ponency of God as the Absolute Will causative of all reality, and inclusively of His own.

If we consult the facts of our own consciousness—and where else can we seek for the evidence of truth?—we find that in order to conceive anything permanent in ourselves, anything real in being or agency, it is unconditionally necessary that the Will should will itself. If the Will did not will itself, as a somewhat abiding under change, it would resolve itself into a succession of fragmentary and unconnected phases. In order “to be” it must continuously and permanently will its Self; and this we recognise in ourselves as the constant act of Self-affirmation, expressed by the verb substantive “I am”—an act, which tacitly supports and invariably accompanies every other act, and virtually expresses the individuality of every moral agent.

In order to be a Will, in any proper sense of the word, the Will must will, what it cannot otherwise than will, its own Being as one undivided Will;—it must will itself continuously, permanently, invariably, self-consistently;—and this is what we mean by an *individual Will* or a *Person*.

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But if we cannot conceive any Being in ourselves without this continuous act of self-affirmation, which constitutes our *individuality*, and which we designate our *personality*, so neither can we conceive any Will except under the same conditions, and even the notion of Absolute Will would escape us except under the conception of Personality. The very term "Will" loses all force and significance, when divided from conscious predetermination, intention, deliberation, judgment, and the like attributes of conscious mind and personality; and we only cheat ourselves by a mere abstraction, when we assume the reality of a causative process, implying intelligence, apart from a conscious subject, or self-ponent Will, required to give any intelligible conception of the unity, purpose, and final aim of the agency contemplated. The Absolute Will causative of all reality, and therefore of its own, is the eternal act of self-affirmation or self-ponency; and this act, which we dare not divide (as any stage in a process) from the Absolute Will causative of reality, is, in this relation, the essential act of Personcity, and may be designated

PART III. *Deus Subjectivus*, Ipseity, the Absolute Subject,
 Chap. II. "I am."

And we entreat the reader's attention to this all-important relation, as the very ground and foundation of all morals, and as the only effectual antidote to the demoralizing influence of Pantheism, with its necessary consequence of confounding God with the world. The school of Hegel—following the systems, which from the most ancient times have propounded the doctrines of Pantheism, and all based on the misconception of the position expressed by the *ἐν καὶ πᾶν* (Compare Jacobi on Spinoza)—rejects the Personality of God; because, as it appears to them, personality is necessarily "finite," and the attribute of "infinite," which necessarily belongs to Deity, cannot be predicated of that which is essentially "finite," as personality is;—in short, they regard the position of an "infinite Person" as a contradiction in terms. Now it is to be observed that this school, adopting the view of Spinoza, regards all finition as limitation, and all limitation as *negation*; consequently, that the finition implied in personality is a limitation by negation of the divine nature, which is essentially boundless, limitless, infinite and absolute, and can by no possibility be conceived as suffering negation without contradiction to the essential character of Deity. Now, without stopping here to refute, but protesting against, the position that all

finition or limitation is negation, and at the same time reminding the student that an act of the Will or other central power implies a self-determination *ab intrâ*,—I freely admit that the above objection to the personality of God might be deemed valid, if by the term “finite” any limitation *ab extrâ* of a Will conceived as Absolute were really expressed or asserted, if thereby a Will, conceived as the absolute cause of all reality, were falsely and surreptitiously admitted to be shorn of omnipotence or curtailed in the infinitude of creative act. But if the position here assailed be “that Absolute Will ceases to be absolute because self-affirmed as Absolute Will and the cause of its own reality,” then I say unhesitatingly, the objection is invalid and falls to the ground. For, as I have already shown, all Will in order to be a Will must will itself, and cannot be morally conceived otherwise than as a continuous act, which constitutes what we mean by “Personality.” Moreover, a Will, in order to be causative of reality, in order to predetermine acts necessary thereto, in order to have any definite aim or purpose, any Will, I say, and even the Absolute Will, cannot be otherwise conceived than as *se finiens*, or so far finific and finite as by its own Will it determines itself to be. The essential character of Personality consists, I say, in the continuous act of Self-ponency, or in the act of Self-affirmation, expressed by the verb substantive “I am ;” and

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doubtless the act may be subject to all the limitations and negations incidental to the nature of a finite Will under the conditions of pravity attached to its moral agency; but the Absolute Will in the act of self-ponency, which constitutes the personality of the divine nature, does not and cannot affirm Himself to be finite but in that act affirms himself to be The Absolute Will. The character of Absolute Will is no otherwise changed than by the eternal act of the self-ponency of Absolute Will, without which, except by a wilful abstraction, Absolute Will would be inconceivable as Will in any proper sense of the word. The Absolute Will, I repeat, eternally affirms himself to be the Absolute Will, and in this act of Personality, never to be divided in our contemplation of God from absolute Will, we apprehend Him, not merely abstractedly as absolute Will causative of all reality, but personally as the Divine Author, causative of all reality. In eternally becoming causative of Himself, *αὐτογενής*, as the Almighty "I am" in supreme Being, He becomes, by this continuous act of self-ponency, the Omnipotent Author and Creator of all reality; but, by the very nature of the ideal act, He becomes such without any conceivable forfeiture of any part of the infinite and illimitable power which Absolute Will implies. No portion of that power is exhausted, bounded, or negated, in consequence of its being derived from a personal

centre of agency. It is, in short, a self-evident truth, that the Absolute Will is Absolute Will causative of all reality by affirming His own reality as Absolute Will. On the other hand Pantheism, by denying to the Causative, as divine Will and Power, such as the spiritual ground of the universe must be assumed to be, the primary act by which the Causative secures and maintains its own being as *Causator Ipse Supremus*, denies, in truth, the ground of all permanence and the very substance of all reality. The ground itself is carried away in the whirling eddies of existence, always changing, but having, as the abiding supporter of the flux and current, nothing. But the human mind (except for a brief period of self-intoxication by its own ingenuity) will ever, and cannot but, reject a doctrine so utterly irreconcilable with the laws of conscious thinking and the facts of consciousness. The human mind requires the permanent and abiding under all change;—and this it finds in the fact (revealed by consciousness) of Personality, the continuous act of Will by which every rational Will affirms and maintains its individuality as an “I am.” And the very process, by which the individual becomes cognizant of his spiritual being and abiding spirituality, reveals to him the higher truth of the eternal “I am,” without whom he cannot affirm his own being.

§ 11. We claim then for the character of the Idea of God, according to the principles of our

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spiritual philosophy, that it is a truth revealed by the light of its own self-evidence, and that it admits of no other proof than that of being intuitively felt and beheld whilst acting in and upon the human spirit;—that it is not only a truth, but a truth containing its own evidence—as much so as a truth of sensible experience, but here deriving its evidence from a fact of spiritual experience inseparably connected with the constitution of our spiritual nature;—that it is not only a truth containing its own evidence, but an objective verity and a power; of which the evidence is afforded by its agency *ab extrâ* in and upon us, independently of and underivedly from our Will; a power, acting in and upon the inmost and very spiritual principle of the soul, namely the Will, by infusing into it light and life, and by quickening it to its spiritual self-integration.

I affirm that the Reason, considered as the light and spiritual presence of the Word of God in His creatures, is in and for them the idealizing power—the power, instinct and inherent tendency, to contemplate all their thoughts, feelings, and strivings in their integrity and perfection. I repeat that the Reason, so conceived, and so accepted by the Conscience, as the transcendent Idea of Spiritual Integrity, and as the universal and absolute power of integration, is and can be no other than the “Idea of God.”

I say then that the only logical proof of the

being of God is the self-evidentness of the truth-power, which actuates man to his moral self-integration; that it is an immediate revelation to him; and that, in quickening the human soul, the Idea reveals itself in the unmistakeable character of Reason or Spiritual Integration. It is not however to be supposed that, whilst we claim for man universally the gift of Reason, we attribute to any and every man the power of contemplating this transcendent Idea in its perfect integrity, still less of comprehending its absolute excellence; if indeed it be at all possible for the human mind under the present conditions of its knowledge to fathom so profound a mystery. Happy for us, if the most enlightened of our race so teach us to know the Idea of the Divine Being, as far as its gracious revelation has been vouchsafed, that it may be recognised and accepted by all men as a principle of light and life inseparable from our humanity, and by the operance of which we may ever aspire and approximate to the pattern of spiritual integrity and moral perfection implied in the Idea.

In order to know God, as far as we are permitted to do so,—and to know God is to have communion with Him,—we have to meditate on Him as the Idea of Spiritual Integrity, which He is eternally in truth and power: in order to behold Him as the Prototype and living source of spiritual perfection, as the Absolute Will causative of all reality in the eternal self-

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ponency of the "I am," we have to contemplate the Idea in the light of Reason, which reveals his presence in the soul. And if, as is doubtless the case, the aid of discursive Reason or logical reasoning be requisite to purge the mental sense, and to clear away the mists that in a finite mind obscure the brightness of the Idea, this still ever vindicates its claim to be a truth of Reason, an immediate beholding and intuition, against any false assertion of the power of a merely human faculty to produce, construct, or logically prove, what is unattainable except by divine Revelation. But in order to "know" God in the light of the Idea, and to have effectual communion with Him, we must *feel* His quickening power, and become conscious of His spiritual agency and indwelling presence. And this requirement implies the fact of an awakened *Conscience*; under which, man, with the overwhelming sense of his own pravity, cannot but feel the need of and craving for his spiritual integration, and cannot but acknowledge that the power of integration is working in him:—he will know, or learn to know, that the spiritual integration which he needs and craves cannot be supplied by his own weak, sin-prone, and depraved nature; and if, as he cannot but be conscious, he is actuated by the Idea of integrity, he must acknowledge that it is derived from a Power, which, though in him, acts upon him from without and above him. What then more appropriate than to designate

this unique power, this moral causator and quickening supplement of his spiritual Being, by some name which is equivalent to "God"?—what more consonant with the history of our race, notwithstanding its many grievous religious aberrations, than to discover therein a *consensus gentium* in the acknowledgement "that there is verily a God?" How far, and in what degree, man individually will be actuated by the Divine Spirit, must depend upon the individual's Will to accept willingly, or to resist, the gracious boon of life and light which is incessantly proffered to him. Hence, in respect of the differences which confessedly exist among men in their spiritual condition, it unavoidably follows that we have to expect, as to note, the utmost difference of Degree in their spirituality and spiritual life; though it is always to be understood that the gift of Reason—however in many cases dimmed, obscured or latent—is the inalienable attribute of our Humanity, and that, as Reason is the divine influx, so the divine and spiritual actuation is co-extensive with its operance.

We may then in conclusion offer as a Truth of Reason (which as such contains its own evidence, and is indivisibly united with the constitution of man's moral nature, and with the conditions of his self-affirmation as a moral Being) the following:—"Whoever wants, but by reason of his pravity cannot supply, and

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yet finds at work within him, in order to the complement of his spiritual Being, the Idea of Spiritual Integrity, becomes conscious of the power and presence of the living God."

Now I know of no legitimate major premiss of which the above is the conclusion, and of no middle term, which could be supplied in aid of the argument, and I am therefore under the necessity of considering the proposition as an immediate judgement derived from facts of the consciousness enlightened by Reason. It might be said, doubtless:—

"Whatever has the sense of incompleteness
 strives after completion;

The human soul has the sense of incompleteness;

Therefore it strives after completion."

Or,

"All complete integrity is of God;

What the soul wants is integrity;

Therefore what the soul wants is of God."

These and a variety of similar arguments might be easily supplied, but it will be acknowledged that all such attempts may be modes of elucidating or explaining the proposition, but are not *proofs* of the truth advanced, and the conviction of which is derived immediately from self-conscious examination.

I rest then finally in the assurance that man's spirit is only, yet constantly, enlivened and enlightened by the Divine Spirit, and this

revealed in and by the Reason as the Idea of Spiritual Integrity. We distinguish indeed in this divine operance, as mutually indispensable co-efficients, the Light and the Life;—but in their indivisible unity and co-operation we give the priority, in the order of efficiency, to the Life, as though requiring yet including Light in order to the total spiritual reality: and thus the human Spirit, in order to be a living soul and enlightened thereto, must have its living principle, namely the Will, awakened to its pravity and quickened to its needs, and, once enlightened, will then seek its integration in and by the Idea revealed. And I close the chapter by saying that, after all the failures in proving the Idea of God, and although the speculative Intellect is necessary to the construction and explanation of this high, nay highest, contemplamen of the speculative Reason, man only realizes the Idea, and only knows, yet certainly knows, the Idea, by its agency on and in himself, and so far as he is actuated by it, as the spiritual ground in which “he lives and moves and has his being.”

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CHAPTER III.

THE BLESSED TRINITY.

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§ 1. WE trust that in the foregoing, in behoof of the student's insight into the true nature of Ideas, we have rescued the all-important truth of the *divine Personality*. But in order to arrive at a just conception of the nature of Ideas he must meditate further on the Idea of God, who is at once the origin and the archetype of all Ideas, and contemplate *Deity in the three Relations*, which are essential to the idea of the Triune God. He will learn, however, that these are not mere Relations, but Realities; not only Realities, but the highest Realities; and again, that they are not dividuous entities, such as three individual men, but one and the self-same Spirit in distinctive *self-hypostatic* acts. And should he have attained to this high contemplation, he will acknowledge the value of a doctrine which preserves for us the Idea of God in its integrity: first, the one self-affirmed Absolute Will, above and unconfounded with nature and the world, as the safeguard against Pantheism;—secondly, the Divine

Alterity, the divine principle in all and through all derivative being, the Humanity which worketh in all men and is the light and life of the world, as the effectual antidote against degrading anthropomorphism and the misty and unintelligible notions of abstract theism;—thirdly, the divine Life, which, in preserving the distinctness of the Relations, unites and perpetuates them, as the necessary integration of the Idea, and the corrective to the possibility of contemplating God other than as indivisible Unity.

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§ 2. It is not our purpose here to investigate the doctrine of the Trinity as a dogma of Theology, for which a more fitting place will be found hereafter; but it will be incumbent on us to render it intelligible as a doctrine of Spiritual Philosophy, and as a Truth of Reason, so far as may be requisite to find in it the Paradigm of those universal truths which we have named Ideas. We have seen that the first Relation of the Deity has its ultimate ground in the act of Personëity, by which God eternally affirms Himself as Absolute Will causative of all reality, and inclusively of His own. But we have now to turn our attention to the second relation. And if the former self-hypostatic act be the eternal act of self-affirmation, the correspondent Relation, if the causality is to be conceived as absolute, can be no other than the *utterance of the same Absolute Will in Alterity*: a personal relation indeed, but a personal relation which contains

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the plenitude of the same Absolute Will, though in the altered relation of alterity. It is namely the *Alter Ego*, another "I am," and the *Person* of the Godhead in its absolute utterance and fulness of manifestation. If the former be the archetype of all *self-derivative* reality, the latter is the archetype of all *communicated* reality. We may interpret the truth here aimed at, by attending to the relations which we find in our own conscious being. For, as in our consciousness we are under the necessity of distinguishing the relations of the Myself—now as the *Subject* thinking, and now as the *Object* contemplated in the manifold of thought,—so we might express the relations in the divine instance as *Deus Subjectivus* and *Deus Objectivus*: that is, the Absolute Subjectivity or Supreme Will, uttering itself as, and contemplating itself in, the Absolute Objectivity, or plenitude of being, eternally and causatively realized in His Personality.

§ 3. It needs but little more to show that in the second relation of the Godhead we are contemplating Him, whom we call under his most pregnant name the *Logos*. How shall we, however, comprise within the limits, to which we must confine ourselves, the inexhaustible riches of the Idea! We can only pretend to give here a faint sketch of the main points, which are essential to contemplate the Deity in Him as the source, exemplar and eternal form of all Ideas—*Idea Idearum*. In respect of His divine Rela-

tions, He is, as we have just seen, the *Divine Alterity*;—the Absolute Will, at one and the same moment concentrates itself in the Ipsëity, and, flowing over as it were, co-eternally utters itself in the filial Alterity. And in order to be ideally all that we mean, the Alterity must be the full and sole recipient of the causative Relation, the reciprocator of Him, who gives without any withholding, and the exegesis of His perfections—He is the *Alter Ego*. That which is subjectively affirmed in the Paternal relation is uttered and objectively realized in the Filial Alterity. The religious mind has endeavoured, namely, to express the relation by the figure, sanctioned by Scripture and probably the most appropriate that could be chosen, of Father and Son; calling the act the “eternal generation,” and the second relation of the Godhead “the only begotten Son,” who is said to be the express image of the Father, the brightness of His glory, the sole object of His love and of His plenary satisfaction;—since less would detract from the integrity of the act and the perfection of the Idea.

§ 4. But before we proceed to consider the Logos in his relations to derivative being, we must notice the third relation, necessary to complete the Idea of the triune Godhead; and if we have succeeded in securing the distinctions of Ipsëity and Alterity, we have now to contemplate in the distinctions, that, which, whilst it

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preserves the distinctions, affirms their eternal Unity. We may call this third Relation the *Community*. We do not however propose to use the term in the sense of a mere bond or vinculum, and we see no reason to differ from the orthodox view of the church, that the Relation in question is a like personality to the two personal relations, out of which it proceeds under the name of the Holy Spirit. In other words the Idea demands that we contemplate the Godhead as Absolute Will thrice uttered, and self-substantiated in tri-personal reality;—and the third relation as inevitably “personal,” since, as in the former instances, it is the self-affirmation of Absolute Will, though here combining the relative distinctions in that of the eternal *Life* of the One indivisible Godhead. It is not necessary to enlarge upon a theme, which we have elsewhere considered in detail;* but the student in reflecting on the fact of his consciousness, which discloses to him the unavoidable opposition of Subject and Object in the Self, of which he is conscious, cannot fail to see that the conscious mind requires not only the distinction in order to the act of reflexion on itself, but the continual sense of the relative nature of the distinctions, and of the essential oneness of the mind itself.

§ 5. Thus then if we have obtained sufficient insight into the nature of the Godhead to enable

* [Mr. Green here particularly refers to his unpublished work, entitled “Spiritual Being.” J.S.]

us to contemplate the true Relation of the Filial Alterity in the eternal self-sufficing beatitude of the Divine Life, we may now consider the Relations of the same Alter Ego, as the Logos, to the Non-Absolute and all derivative being.

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According to the Idea, the Absolute Will causative of all reality is transmitted wholly and undivided from the Paternal Ipsëity to the Filial Alterity; the Power unabated, and the Relation only altered insomuch as the Son utters the will of the Father, and becomes, as His vicegerent, the Author of all derivative being. Contemplate Him, however, once again as the self-affirmed Personality, in whom, as the only begotten Son, it hath pleased the Father that all fulness should dwell, and be thereby the all-sufficing Object of his paternal love. And viewing him in the *moral relations* which the Idea implies, we cannot fail to acknowledge that the Son, so conceived, must realize in his own Person the Idea of perfect spiritual integrity; and that Holiness, Goodness, Righteousness, and Love can have no other standard, exemplar, pattern and author than in the Son by His self-affirmation in and by the will of the Father. He is indeed the eternal *Idea*, the *act and perfect actuality of Spiritual Integration*. But do we not want some word, which may give life and reality to the conception, and bring it nearer to our own hearts? And is not this word—which is to convey to us the conception of the living personal

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reality, who is the hypostasis of absolute *moral worth*, and the “express image” of all that we reverence as divine in man—is not this potent word the *Idea of the Humanity*? And is not the only begotten Son the realization in Himself, and the power for all others, of the Humanity; of that, namely, which man was destined to be, and which the divine Son is as the Archetype and Author of perfect spiritual integrity?

We say then that the filial Alterity is *The Man*, the absolute exemplar of human perfection, the power of the Humanity, and its eternal realization. And I add that it is the necessary preconception for founding philosophically the Idea of Jesus Christ, as Mediator and Saviour; that is, as eternal Idea, and implied already in the idea of Will and spiritual regeneration.*

* That this view (coinciding as it does with the doctrine of the Scriptures, as shewn particularly in St. John’s language concerning the Logos, in St. Paul’s position that “the second man is the Lord from heaven,” and in the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews) is the necessary preconception for founding philosophically the Idea of Jesus Christ as Mediator and Saviour, that is as eternal idea and contained antecedently in the idea of Will and Spiritual Regeneration, I cannot doubt:—but the view will no doubt be impugned on various sides. To one party it may appear too much allied to the Oriental philosophy in its various forms, Greek, Alexandrian, Cabbalistic and Gnostic, and to propose a revival of the system of Emanation, with its Ensoph, Adam Kadmon, Seir Anpin, and the like;—conf. Baur, Christl. Gnosis;—whilst to another party it may be objectionable from a supposed Anthropomorphism, whether under the refinements of Swedenborg’s spiritual mysticism, or the grosser forms of popular mythology. Yet, let it be recollected, the universality of an idea notwithstanding its manifold distortions, and the obstinate hold of an idea on the human mind, are indications of truth and reality. Take for instance the disinterested, if not uninfluenced, evidence of Plato in the *Timæus*, or

§ 6. The Son, as the Deus alter, contains, and affirms Himself to be, the Absolute Will, with unabated power causative of all reality, though in the relation of the eternal Delegate of the Paternal Will, and the omnipotent Expositor of the divine perfections in the plenitude of the infinite distinctions of derivative being. If we ask for a term which may appropriately express the causative act here in question, I answer unhesitatingly "*Genesis*," or that act by which Will produces itself in alterity, or as another.*

If then we take the genetic act of the Son in

the speculations of Philo Judæus; and I think it will be evident how inseparably, though not indistinguishably, the notion of the Logos or *δημιουργός*, of exegesis, a revealing Word, or artificer, is associated with that of a primal causative in the supersensuous and intelligible world. On the other hand, in answer to a charge of anthropomorphism, let it be recollected that we are speaking of the *spiritual*, the absolute and universal Man, who is the Idea of the Humanity in its eternal power and perfection of act and being; and that Man cannot conceive anything, which is not the analogon of his own powers and affections. If God were not in some sense human, He could be no object of interest for man, and would stand in no relation to his fears, hopes or duties. "Anthropomorphism" is the converting of God into man such as we know him to be in his degraded and fallen state: while the object of religion is to raise man to, or rather to recreate him in, the spiritual image of God. And is this other than the Idea of the Humanity, in which he was originally created?

* It implies the like in alterity,—the like, because Will cannot but will itself,—another, because otherwise it would be no realisation in alterity. There is no objection to the term "Creation," if intended to mean—"to produce by self-derived power what had no previous existence;" but if meant to signify—"to produce out of nothing," where "nothing" is used as if it were a non-existent object or material to be fashioned into something, the term seems to me to be unfit, and is certainly not in accordance with the Hebrew genesis.

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its highest and primary instance, we shall see, in accordance with the explanation above, that He, by His absolute Will, wills or begets Wills or Spirits like Himself; who, affirming themselves as persons and moral agents, may be the Objects, Recipients and Reciprocators, of His moral love and goodness, and through Him of His divine Father. And it is thus that we find realized a *heavenly Community* of blessed Spirits, of which the Logos is the eternal Prototype, and the ever present Spirit, the Idea in each and all of the individual and total *Humanity*.

§ 7. Having enunciated in this family of heaven the eternal Idea of the Community, we shall not dwell further on the subject, relating as it does more to theological and ethical considerations than to the object, which we have now in view, of exhibiting the Logos as the Idea absolute, *κατ' ἐξοχήν*, and the paradigm or *forma formans* of all Ideas. Nevertheless the student will bear in mind that in the heavenly community there is realized once and for ever the idea of an *Organic Whole of Parts* in that highest excellence in which the Parts are moral integers, united to a Whole by an all-pervading spirit of divine Love; each willingly affirming himself as an individual Humanity in and by the heavenly Type of the Son of God, who is his Genitor; and all in their manifold relations conspiring to the divine Harmony, which corresponds to the Will of God. And it may be useful

here to notify to the reader, that although such be the Sons of God, and the Spirits who kept their first estate in union and ever live in the blessed communion of the divine life and love, yet the Idea of Absolute Will involves the postulate of Eternal Possibilities; which, though forbidden to be willed as actual, were so [*i.e.*, as possibilities] willed; and that the result was the *Apostasy* and *Fall* of Spirits, who, asserting their self-dependency, fell into the abyss or *condition below being*. I propose in my next chapter fully to describe this unique and transcendent act, in which we find the *mystery* of *Evil*, and to show on the other hand that the *Supreme Good* as such cannot but will the reduction of evil to a mere possibility, and therewith the *Redemption* of the fallen Will from Hades, and its restoration to distinction and being in union with the divine life.*

This *Redemptive Process*—of which the whole creation is the exposition, and man's salvation the crowning grace, will be the work of the Logos, in whom all derivative being has its source; and it follows that, doing the will of the Father, He will willingly condescend in His infinite love and mercy to the lost and refractory

* It is not a mere analogy, for it is the operance of the Logos in a lower sphere, that what has been called the *vis medicatrix nature* acts as a *law of integrity*, which, in all life, having produced a whole, ever tends to *preserve* and *restore* that which it has produced. Conf. Vital Dynamics, App. p. 86.

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§ 8. It is also evident that our main interest here is that of obtaining the ideal forms, which belong to the *Anastasis* or process, creative and redemptive, of the fallen world. And in order thereto, let the student once again contemplate the Logos as the fulness of communicated power and being, the Word uttered eternally, the exegesis and vicegerent of the Godhead self-affirmed as the "I am," the Alter Ego and the filial Thou of the Father, the Alterity of the Ipsëity, combining absolute Will and eternal Reason, unific and distinctive, genetic of the Universe in its infinite plenitude of powers and forms, immeasurable simultaneity, exhaustless succession, and yet ever a living totality in the repose of present perfection.

But with the object we have in hand, it behoves us to consider the distinctive character and excellence, which, under the name of the Logos, mark Him as the Absolute Idea of all communicated being and (as such) the eternal font of all derivative Ideas. This view will be found, I think, to be justified by re-considering the *nature of Reason* and *that of Ideas*. Our argument is—"that Reason (used as equivalent to the Logos, and as a Living, Personal Reason) is the one universal power and light of Integration; opera-

* [Mr. Green here refers to his unpublished "Method of the Spiritual Philosophy." J. S.]

tive objectively, to realize living wholes of parts in which each and all may attain to the highest excellence of being; and subjectively operative, to potentiate every conscious intelligence to the apprehension and conception of the Idea by which the reality is attained." It will be seen then that we ascribe to the Logos or Reason a genetic or creative power. This implies doubtless the acts and operance of Will;—but as we have elsewhere said: Will and Reason, although they may and must be distinguished, cannot be disjoined except by abstraction, and, when spoken of as distinct under any condition of real existence, are but distinguished as to their relative predominance. What then, it may be asked, is to be understood by *genetic Reason*? In order to answer this question, let us turn to the genesis of the heavenly Community of the Sons of God. It has been seen (§. 6 ante) that the Logos, having affirmed Himself, by virtue of His divine nature, as in His own Person *the type* of the Humanity and the exemplar of the highest moral worth and excellence, begets, under the simultaneous contemplation of the moral whole, of which the final aim is the eternal life and love of all the members by their union with Himself and communion with God—begets, I say, the plenitude of Spirits, Sons of God, Humanities, who are the living integral parts or members of this organic whole;—a plenitude, which would be ever full though perpetually under decrease, and

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which may ever increase without superfluity;*—
an organic Whole of Parts, in that highest excellence, in which the Parts are Moral Integers, united to a Whole by an all-pervading Spirit of divine Love; each willingly affirming himself as an *individual* Humanity after the exalted type and perfect pattern of the only begotten Son of God, who is his Genitor; and all in their manifold relations conspiring to the divine *Harmony*, which corresponds to the Will of God; and so that the Divine Spirit, through and from the Logos, operates totally in the whole and in every part.

This, I venture to say, is the norm and canon of the operance of the Logos or the Personal Reason, whom we have described as “the one universal power and light of Integration,” here contemplated in His relation to the non-absolute in union with God. And it will be seen that the act and process of Integration consists of the several moments above recited, viz.:—i.) as integral *prototype*:—ii.) as *genetic* of all the possible relations and distinctions of moral excellence by which the Prototype may be infinitely manifested in Humanities, the like and alterity of Himself:—iii.) as the continual influx of the *integral power into each* member of the community, by which every one may morally integrate himself:—iv.) as the power of *harmonizing* to a living Whole, provided from the beginning, all

* [In connexion with this passage, Mr. Green again refers to his unpublished “Method of the Spiritual Philosophy.” J. S.]

in the unity and perfection of spiritual Integrity. But this account of the Reason, as the power and light of Integration, is the description of the nature of the process of the Logos in relation to the non-absolute, when the Logos is contemplated as *Idea*, and as the norm, type and font, of all Ideas, or as the universal *forma formans* of ideal Integration. We are disposed, however, to make this distinction between "Reason" and "Idea;"—that *Reason*, considered always in inseparable union with Will, is the *causative* and *genetic* in all Ideas; and that *the Idea*, and thence all derivative *Ideas*, are the *acts and process* by which Reason is manifested.

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§ 9. But there are other distinctions, connected with our present subject, which the student is exhorted to bear in mind. I have said that "the Logos, or Reason, is the one universal power and light of Integration;—operative *objectively*, to realize wholes of parts in which each and all may attain to the highest excellence of being; and operative *subjectively*, to potentiate every conscious intelligence to the apprehension and conception of the Idea by which the reality is attained." Here the Reason appears in two distinct *functions*, the one *subjective* and the other *objective*. In other words, in respect of the non-absolute, the Reason is to be contemplated in its relations to *Truth* and *Being*;—though, as we propose to show, the diversity of relation is reconciled in the fact that Truth is subjectiv

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Being, and Being is objective Truth; both Truth and Being, though different aspects and relations, being identified in and by the Reason. If namely we take Reason in its ordinary acceptation as the power of *Intelligence*, which, according to its peculiar kind and excellence, elevates and distinguishes man from all the brute creation, we are viewing it in its subjective aspect; but if we contemplate it as Supreme Intelligence in the transcendent height of its perfection, we have to consider it as *Omniscience*, and in connexion with Absolute Will as *Omnipotent Wisdom*, in those energetic acts, Ideas, Laws, which (whether genetic and conservative of that which remains in union with God, or creative and redemptive of that which had fallen and is in the process of restoration to its primal estate) are the *formæ formantes* of all non-absolute Being. If we contemplate them as thoughts of the Divine Intelligence, they are archetypes and pre-existing models in the Divine Mind; and if we call them Ideas, the student, in humbly raising his apprehension to their source, must never forget the divine Unity, nor the identity therein of unerring intelligence, which transcends choice, with omnipotent will, causative of all reality, in eternal act transcending all pause of deliberation. It is however in meditating on the distinction of the subjective and objective operance of Reason, to which the finite form of the human intellect compels man, that the mind of man comes to

apprehend Reason as *Truth*, even as the personal reality of the Logos, the living Truth, and only differing from Reason as Light may differ from its lucific cause;—truth, real and objective, and recognisable as of divine source by the attributes, universal, immutable, intuitive, self-evident, absolute; truth, which enables man to behold a One in the infinitude of its relations and distinctions, and to reduce the infinite to the unity which preserves their totality. And such we must conceive the divine Mind of the Logos to be; but we dare not conceive it as separate from those Acts which combine the foresight of Wisdom and the power of irresistible Will as immutable purpose and persistent function. It implies a legislative act; and “that (saith the judicious *Hooker*) which doth assign unto each thing the kind, that which doth moderate the force and power, that which doth appoint the form and measure of working, the same we term a *Law*.” (Conf. Vital Dynamics, p. 18 and preface.)

On the other hand, “Man finds in examining the facts of his consciousness, and as the essential character of his rationality, the capability of apprehending truths universal, necessary, and absolute; the grounds of which, being underived from, must be antecedent and pre-supposed in order to experience.” Ibid. p. 19. “And it is in meditating on this capability, that man becomes conscious of an operance in and on his own mind, of the downshine of a light from

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above, which is the power of Living Truth, and which in irradiating and actuating the human mind becomes for it Reason ;—yea, which is the revelation of those divine acts, at once causative and intelligential, which he recognises as First Principles, Ultimate Truths, as *Ideas* for the human mind and constitutive *Laws* in nature.”

Ibid. If then such truths exist, they constitute for man the substance and reality of his intellectual being ; and if the reality of outward nature and of the universe consists, not in the material and phenomenal, but in the Laws which give permanence and regularity, in the eternal Ideas which are the regulating types and standards of a nature ever tending to lapse into the imperfect and arbitrary, then the objective being and reality of nature are the same Truth which we regard as the eternal work of the Logos. Conf. Pref. Vital Dynamics, p. 28.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FALL AND REDEMPTION.

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—In Mr. Green's manuscript of the present work, his intended chapter on the doctrine of the Fall and Redemption had not been written out in readiness for publication. But, in its place, reference was made to the sources from which it was to be constructed,—viz. to certain sections of his manuscript work entitled "Spiritual Being," and to one of the chapters of another manuscript work entitled "Religio Laici."

Not feeling confident that, if I attempted to make the intended combination of these materials, I could do full justice to the Author's intention, I have thought it best to print the materials themselves in extenso, and to subjoin them at the end of this volume, as Appendices.

As they are sections of other works, and as I have not attempted to trim them into the exact logical form which would fit them for intercalation here, it results that occasionally, where their argument extends beyond the precise limits intended for this chapter, certain of their paragraphs re-state to some extent, or, as it were, overlap, those parts of the main text which they are now used to unite. And for similar reasons, parts of the first Appendix are to some extent repeated (though also much developed) in the second. These unavoidable repetitions will doubtless be excused by the reader.—J. S.]

CHAPTER V.

CHRISTOLOGY, OR THE PERSON AND OFFICES OF THE SAVIOUR.

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§ 1. HITHERTO the relation between Spiritual Philosophy and Christianity has not been specially investigated. The reader cannot fail to have observed, as the result of our inquiries, that the two are intimately connected; and I propose to show that Spiritual Philosophy in its highest aim and function is the recognition of Religious Truth. The reader, however, may be reminded, in accordance with the principle of *Realism* throughout professed in this work, that the truth here intended is not merely subjective. It has been well said by Coleridge that Religion must be both Idea and Fact. It must be eternal verity, and this verity must be realized in history and revealed as actual fact. We have seen in the foregoing that by the spiritual illumination of the Logos, as the universal Reason, Ideas are revealed to the human mind, as truths which are intuitively beheld by the light of their own evidence; and we have seen also that the Logos is not only Light, but pre-eminently Life, and

that in acting on human intelligence he actuates the Will, Spirit or Soul of man;—that in fact the spiritual illumination, which we call the gift of Reason, not only enlightens but enlivens the human spirit, and that the spirit of man only when so actuated is fitted to attain to its spiritual integrity.

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§ 2. Under these conditions it would be evidently a mere pleonasm, as Coleridge has happily said, to speak of Religion as “revealed,” in contradistinction to a Religion, supposed to be attainable by what has been called “natural” Reason:—since, as we have seen, all the truths of Religion are revelations of the Word of God; nor can we conceive the possibility of man’s receiving and apprehending them, unless he were gifted so to do by the spiritual illumination which we call the Reason. Endowed with this divine light, man becomes essentially a religious being, and intuitively apprehends religious truth. And by “religious truth” I mean, as my sequel will show, the truth of Christianity; for whatever of religion belongs to other modes of belief and worship can only be considered as declensions from the Idea.

§ 3. It may not be unreasonable to introduce here a few words on the subject of “Faith,” considered as an element of religious individuality. It is often confounded with “Belief;” but it is not, as is belief, the passive acceptance of a doctrine or fact for true. It is the act

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of the individual Will to conform itself to the light which it has received, and to rely wholly and solely for its spiritual integration on the Logos, as the Principle of Light and Life, and as containing therein all the supernatural aids and graces which are necessary for our re-union with God.

§ 4. It is not to be supposed from the foregoing that we abate a single iota of the condition, stated in § 1, that Religion must be both Idea and Fact. And we cannot consider it otherwise fulfilled than by the realization of the Idea, as attested in the history of the world, and in the proofs, so far as we are permitted to comprehend them, of the economy of God's Providence in the world. I need hardly say that such evidence must be largely, or in the larger part, derived from the scriptures of the Old and New Testament; but I would beg to remind the reader, that, although I shall not hesitate to point out where any recorded fact or truth coincides with the Idea, yet that I strictly decline the office and responsibilities of a critic of those records, and once for all absolve myself from any imputed obligation of giving an opinion on their trustworthiness as historical documents. I deal here with Facts only as symbols of Ideas; not conceptions drawn from historical events; but Ideas, such as I have represented them to be, and as far as I apprehend them to be, "Revelations" of God's eternal Truth.

§ 5. Now, passing from these preliminary explanations, and taking here for granted that Christianity is the only true religion, I venture to affirm that the central Idea, which offers the secure standing-point from whence all other religious truth may be profitably surveyed, is Redemption and the salvation of man; and hence, that the fundamental Idea of Christianity is the *salvation of the world by the Logos in Christ*.

§ 6. In order to convey the full import of the truth so stated, let me remind the reader that it has been incontestably shown that man comes to the knowledge of himself as a Will, under the insatiable desire of securing his sphere of spiritual being by absolute self-ponency, but under the predicament of a divided Will. On the one hand, he betrays a tendency to absolute self-particularity; on the other, he evinces the need of absolute spiritual self-integration; a distinction noted by St. Paul in his contrast of the *ἄνθρωπος ψυχικός* and *πνευματικός*, the “natural” and the “spiritual” man:—and we have found that they stand so opposed to each other, that the former betrays its false and evil character by its self-contradiction and suicidal disposition, and that the latter guarantees its truth by aspiring to the possession of the real “complement” of all that man spiritually can want or desire—namely the Idea of Spiritual Integrity. Under the goading impulse of his craving for spiritual being, man cannot satisfy himself with less than

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that which may be the *absolute* fulfilment of his desires; and meanwhile the Idea of absolute Integrity is itself already ever present and at work within him, and, in revealing itself in and by the light of reason, reveals itself as that absolute pattern of integrity and that absolute power in aid of human self-integration, which we reverentially name and adore as the One living God.

The difficulties which man, by his self-willed ignorance and by his resistance to the spiritual illumination graciously offered him, opposes to the conscious possession of the Idea, are sufficiently exposed by a reference to religious history. But however imperfect man's knowledge of God may be, the divine voice in his *conscience*, which commands him to eschew the promptings of evil selfishness, and to obey the law of righteousness and of moral integrity to his soul's health, is what he must acknowledge to be derived from a Superior Power acting in and upon him. Thus far he knows, or comes to a knowledge, of his Divine Teacher;—as far, namely, as he is actuated by the Idea. He, indeed, knows God; but he knows Him only so far as He acts on his soul, and his soul is a willing and enlightened recipient of the divine agency. But, surmounting the hindrances and obstructions which are interposed by his wilful pravity, man will at length, though perhaps tardily and imperfectly, come to a knowledge of God, as the absolute power and pattern of Integrity, of

perfect Holiness and Righteousness, "of eyes too pure to behold iniquity." And conscience-stricken man, thus apprehending the contrariety of good and evil, and fearing the just wrath of a holy and offended God, cannot but desire deliverance from the evil consequences of a guilty self-will, and restoration to God's favour.

§ 7. If haply now the "instincts of Reason" are so far awakened that he feels the misery and hatefulness of Sin, and, recognising the obligation to submit himself to "the divinity that stirs within him," is prompted to regard the divine power and operance of Spiritual Integration as his "*Summum Bonum*," his Supreme Good, he will—even though unconsciously possessed by the Idea—strive to know and hold communion with that source of Life and Light, which offers itself as the supplement to all the needs of his sinful nature, and as the gracious though indispensable help to the attainment of his Humanity.

§ 8. And we have found that the Idea of God implies *the Blessed Trinity*. The Idea has been exhibited in its dry logical formula, in conformity with the rules of the Polar Logic as Identity, Ipsëity, Alterity, and Community. For these relations, the moral or spiritual equivalent may be assumed to be (that is, as far perhaps as human language permits any adequate utterance to this profound mystery) the following distinctions;—
1) God, as Absolute Will, causative of all reality

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and therefore inclusively of His own, we may designate as *the Good* in the eternal act of bountiful giving and communicating without any withholding. But if we thus distinguish the relation of the Causative in the Godhead we dare not separate it from the act of Self-ponency and Personality; that is, God affirming Himself as the absolute Will and self-constituted sole Author of all Being, containing subjectively all the perfections of Deity, and in respect of spiritual integrity eminently claiming the attribute of *Holiness* and the title of the *Holy One*. But (2) in the very act and moment of self-ponency, God can only be contemplated as manifesting Himself in Alterity, as the *Deus alter*, *Deus objectivus*, in whom is eternally uttered and realized the fulness of the Godhead. In the *Deus Alter* God beholds Himself as the *alter Ego*, as the "Thou," who is the sole and sufficient object of His regard, the adequate recipient of His fulness, and the realization of His Will as the declared exemplar of divine Righteousness. We cannot rest, however, on these distinctions of the subjective and objective relations of the One God. We acknowledge the necessity of a third relation, in which the distinctions are perpetuated by the Unity which combines them. And (3) we venture to call this synthetic unity of the personal relations of the Trinity *Love*; as the union and communion of two Persons, who each seek and find in the other

the complement of their Being, and therein disclose the Idea of that transcendent *Life* which in every living form of nature is the perpetual renovation of the same in alterity and the permanent reciprocation of *idem et alter*.

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We have no difficulty in assimilating the doctrine of the Trinity above proposed to that of the Catholic Church derived from Scripture. It is true indeed that nothing is said herein of the prothetic relation, in which is contained the distinction of the Hypostases, or personal relations, of the Father and of the only begotten Son; but in stating Absolute Will as the identity, it is to be observed, we only state it as the causative ground, which must be presupposed, but not as claiming any prior, or possible, separate existence; and it therefore never can interfere with the truth of the doctrine of the tri-une personality of the One living God. In respect of our use of the terms "Love" and "Life" as equivalents for "Holy Ghost" or "Spirit," it should be noticed that no new meaning is intended; and that, as the distinctive operation of the Holy Spirit is described pre-eminently as that of *Comforter* (cumfoveator) and in the offices of *Sanctification* and of promotion to *fellowship* in the community of Saints and Blessed Spirits, we cannot err in assigning to him the character of divine Love in the beatitude of the divine Life.

I may here repeat what I have elsewhere

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written on this subject* :—"Conceive the doctrine of the Trinity as affirming that the Deity must be contemplated in three Relations;—that these, however, are not mere Relations, but Realities;—not only Realities, but the highest Realities, namely personal Realities;—and again that these are not dividuous entities, such as three individual men, but one and the self-same Spirit, in distinctive self-hypostatic acts;—and that in each relation the whole Godhead is operant and efficient, so that, whilst the three relative Realities constitute the plenitude of distinction, all is each and each is all;—conceive, I say, the doctrine as such, and you may then at least begin to acknowledge the value of a doctrine, which preserves for us the idea of God in its integrity :—first, as One above and unconfounded with nature and the world; as the safeguard against Pantheism;—secondly, as the Divine Alterity, the divine principle in all and through all derivative being, the Idea of the Humanity, which worketh in all men; as the effectual preventive against degrading anthropomorphism and the misty and unintelligible fancies of abstract theism;—thirdly, as the divine Life, which in preserving the distinctness of the Relations unites and perpetuates them; as the necessary integration of the Idea, and the corrective to the possibility of contemplating God other than as indivisible Unity."

* Mental Dynamics, App. p. 61.

The student of spiritual philosophy should, however, never allow himself to forget, whilst devoting his attention to *Distinction* and all this distinctive in the system, that the correspondent and correlative factor, namely *Unity*, is no less indispensable, and that any breach of unity would be disruption and confusion. There can be only a One and indivisible Spirit, which is above all, in all, and through all, if such Unity is to be preserved in its indispensable integrity:—and thus when we speak of individuations or distinctions, whether human or divine, we cannot but mean that they are acts of the Universal Spirit, operant totally in each. And thus there can be, as the work of the One Spirit throughout the universe spiritual and physical, but one Truth, one Righteousness, one Law, one Spiritual Integrity, one Love, one source and cause, even The Absolute Will self-affirmed as the one living God.

§ 9. But in making the summary retrospect here proposed of religious thought, and therefore of the elements of christian theology, the principle was found in the Idea of the Logos, as the Deus alter, the only begotten Son, the Idea of the Author of all communicated and derivative Being. He is the exegesis of the fulness of the Godhead; but, with the full and unabated power of Deity, he becomes the Author and Progenitor of the *Heavenly Community*, of those whom we have been accustomed to hear called “Angels,”

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“angelic Beings,” and the “Children of God;” but of whom we could have no conception, except that in the said designation it is implied they are *Humanities*, that is, men with the abstraction of all that belongs to a fallen nature and under the condition of spiritual integrity. They partake indeed of the divine Life out of which they proceed, and of the spiritual being of their divine Author, though themselves non-absolute, derivative and, as such, unessential to the integrity of the divine life;—for, as we have seen, we can in no other way safely attain to the Idea of “the only begotten of the Father,” as being He who “hath declared Him,” than by contemplating Him as the eternal and heavenly Pattern, who in revealing the divine perfections, exhibited the spiritual integrity for which man was destined,—by contemplating Him, in short, as the *Divine Humanity*. We say then that the heavenly community consisted of “Humanities” as “the children of God,” born of the Will of the Logos, to severalize infinitely the ideas and spiritual perfections which were concentrated in him eternally, and constituting the spiritual “pleroma,” in which there is ever fulness without superfluity, and in which there may be ever increase without excess, and perpetual decrease without loss. I have said “born of the Will of the Logos,” in order to avoid the mischievous ambiguity of the term “Emanation,” used as it has been to signify a process of deterioration in

a pantheistic genesis, of which God is only the centre and beginning. And thus, in the Heavenly Community so conceived, the Logos, as the Divine Humanity, eternally remains as Prototype and Protoplast, as Spirit, Soul and living Principle. And we may add—" *Ubi anima est, tota est, tota in toto, et tota in qualibet parte.*" It is indeed in this idea that we find the transcendent of every living organic Whole.

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I dare not say—nor indeed can it be strictly said of the doctrine of the Trinity—that this doctrinal truth of the *Angelic Community* is a part of what is commonly considered to be revealed religion, or an essential component of the Church doctrine:—but it is impossible to overlook the fact that it underlies and gives significance to whatever is affirmed of a Community of Saints, of the Blessed Spirits in union with God, or of a Church in Heaven. It is, in short, the Idea of a Spiritual Community essential to the conception of Christ's Kingdom, βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ, as at once temporal and eternal.

§ 10. In like manner the incontestable fact of *Evil* in the world urges us irresistibly to investigate its *nature* and *origin* in respect of its influence on man. And, though we may be unable to solve so awful a mystery, we can scarcely do otherwise, in acknowledging the fact, than refer it to a supramundane condition, in conformity with which it may be truly affirmed that the remedy was provided in "the Lamb slain from

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the foundation of the world." It may be right to observe, as we have shown elsewhere at large, that this view, derived from the sphere of Ideas, not only does not interfere with, but may help to explain, the account in Genesis of the fall of man. According to the Idea, we refer Evil and its origin to the necessary postulate of the possibility, in a non-absolute Will or Spirit, of willing in contrariety to the divine Will;—nor can we avoid the consequence of such contrariety when willed, namely, that the disobedient Spirits were "the Angels which kept not their first estate" (Jude 6). Whatever the act or agency otherwise might have been, it was a rebellious lifting up, a wilful heresy, in the satanic pride of Self-will, in which the hitherto angelic Will declared itself to be from and of itself, and independent of the divine Will; and thus in the words of Milton says Satan to Abdiel:—

"We know no time when we were not as now;
 Know none before us, self-begot, self-raised
 By our own quickening power."—

Paradise Lost, Book v.

But in this fatal severance of their necessarily derivative and communicated being from the source of true being and the sole font of life, the angelic Spirit died a spiritual death, and lost a Self wherein to be;—a death or perpetual dying under the false, self-contradictory and impossible, condition of being at once an Absolute

and a Particular Will. And the act was not only a suicidal lie;—"He was a murderer and a liar from the beginning;"—(John, ch. v.) but it was *diabolical*, that is, evil for its own sake and from sheer wilfulness, without any other aim than that of securing the absolute lawlessness of selfish pride and power.

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The doctrine of the "Devil and his Angels," which in the above exposition is made to rest, or have its ground, in a truth of Reason, is evidently founded on the necessary postulate that, while a Will in order to be a Will must willingly elect to be concurrent with the Absolute or Divine Will, it may possibly choose to be contrariant and hostile to the Divine Will; but that in the latter vain and delusive attempt it necessarily forfeits the conditions of Being, and becomes a mere spiritual potentiality, that is a multitude below distinction, of which we can predicate neither one nor many, neither unity nor distinction, whose name is "Legion," and whose spiritual state (as we have seen) can only be described as that of Death and Hades. The consciousness, nay, the rational instincts of man, have been found to attest readily this doctrine of the "Devil and his Angels," deformed though it has been by degrading superstitions; since, in accounting for the undeniable fact of the presence of Evil, it explains evil as an invasive alien to the proper humanity. It has been unavoidably admitted into the Creed of the Church as founded

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on the authority of Scripture; and we may add, after the foregoing disquisition, brief though it be, that Reason and Conscience cannot but respond to the scriptural statement as an essential article of faith.

§ 11. The importance of the doctrine cannot however be over-estimated, when we consider it with reference to the spiritual capabilities of man in his present state of existence. In accounting for the origin of Evil, we find an adequate solution of the problem of a fallen and corrupt nature, as originating in the supra-mundane condition of the angelic fall, and as the explanatory pre-condition of what in man is called *Original Sin*, that is of the *proneness* to sin, and to disobey God's commandments, which constitutes what we have called "the natural man." The doctrine of "Original Sin" so understood is necessarily involved in this, or any, scheme of which "Will" forms the ground and essence; and no less the whole system of christian theology would lose all meaning, or evaporate into empty metaphors, without this idea as its base, constituting as it does the very necessity of christian faith.

Now, considering the subject in relation to Man, and in connexion with outward revelation, the fact of his fallen and corrupt nature is *historically* accounted for in the narrative with which the great drama of the ways of Providence to man opens itself to us. Our first

Parents, as the representatives of the Race, are found placed under all the circumstances that are favourable and congenial to their well-being, moral and physical, and having therefore neither necessity nor cause for living otherwise than with a Will in conformity with the Author of all Good. They were placed in the garden of Eden upright and innocent:—but if man is to be assumed to possess a “Will” at all, there must be some occasion or opportunity for withdrawing his allegiance from the Good, and this is implied in the command “of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it.” In this command we find the type and symbol of all disobedience incident to universal man; namely (as we venture to interpret it) the forbidden act of the human Will, separating itself from the spiritual illumination of the Reason—the principle of its spiritual integration, and choosing for its guide and counsellor the understanding, the *φρόνημα σαρκος*, as the pandar to the lusts of the flesh, appropriately designated under the symbol of the “Serpent,” “more subtil than any beast of the field.” This mind of the flesh under the figure of the “Serpent” is first represented as a Tempter and then as the successful Seducer:—the fall is accomplished, as would have been the case universally with all the descendents of Adam; and the threatened penalty is pronounced as the judgement for the transgression. “Thou shalt surely die:”—that

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is, *spiritual* death is the inevitable consequence of being a traitor to Him, in whose image thou wast created, and who is the pattern and power of spiritual integrity. It would be superfluous to enlarge here upon the subject; but it is evident that we have before us, not merely a particular fact of history, but a truth of universal import to mankind, derived from the pre-historic idea of an always impending lapse of the Will under the inevitable condition of its possible contrariancy to the integrity of the Divine Will.

§ 12. We have thus had incidentally brought before us the *issues of Life and Death*, that is of *spiritual* Life and Death; and it will not be out of place to interpose here some observations on these spiritual states. But if we have been at all successful in giving intelligibility to the Idea of a Spiritual Philosophy, it will not be difficult for the student to evolve what is implied therein in respect of the consequences here contemplated.

As preliminary to the discussion, it may be assumed that *Spirit is immortal*, or perhaps more properly stated *indestructible*. That is, for adequate reasons, not necessary to repeat, we have adopted as the unalterable ground of our system the Idea of "Will;" and considering "Spirit" as Will in actual or potential Being, only different from Will in this respect, it would be impossible, we affirm, to conceive "Spirit" so understood

otherwise than as *one and indivisible*. For, as has been said elsewhere, any presumed division or divisibility of the principle, under which the unity of a system is secured, would leave the author obliged to account for a duality or manifoldness of principles without the possibility of assigning their original union or the conditions of their reunion. Doubtless the one primary principle may admit of *contrary* agents or agencies, but still they must be shown to have some *common* ground of operance;—even in the Zend religion, the hostile and incompatible agents of good and evil Ormuzd and Ahriman have respect to a supreme though not easily defined Deity, Zervan-akarana;—and thus it is said in Psalm cxxxix. “Whither shall I go then from Thy Spirit: or whither shall I go then from Thy presence? if I climb up into heaven thou art there: *if I go down to hell, thou art there also.*” But it might be said: If, as is admitted in the Spiritual Philosophy, there are individuations of a one and self-same universal Spirit, why do not such perish, drop off, and become eliminated? The answer is: Because the Spirit, thus conceived universally, is whole and entire, whole in each and all in perfect entirety. The words of Jesus (John xviii. 9) might be introduced by way of illustrating the spiritual truth: “Of them which Thou gavest me I have lost none.”

It will be comparatively easy, then, after the

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foregoing observations and our previous inquiries, to render intelligible what is meant in the spiritual philosophy by spiritual Life and Death. Spiritual Life can mean only union and communion with God, and, in respect of all subordinate and derivative spiritual Beings, is their participation in the spiritual Integrity of the Divine Life, and the unchangeable beatitude which it ever and eternally bestows. This participation in, and perpetual renewal of, divine life and bliss must, however, in consonance with our doctrine of the Trinity, proceed from the Father as absolute Will, through the only begotten Son as the pattern and worker of all Righteousness, and have its completion in and by the sanctification, or integration, derived from the Holy Ghost, as the eternal bond of Life and Love in the unity of the Godhead. But observe: in meditating on the relation in question of any individual spiritual being, of any man in this world, to the perennial font of his spiritual life, it is not necessary to suppose that he shall have cast off the garb of his mortality. It is true, indeed, that whilst cumbered with a mortal and perishable body, weighted by the needs and inordinate desires of the flesh, he cannot but crave to rid himself of the bondage to a "body of death" in order to enjoy fully the freedom of spiritual life:—but if, during his earthly sojourn, the spiritual man is ever struggling to free himself from the pravity of his lower nature, he

so far becomes a denizen of heaven, a member of the community of blessed spirits, and partaker of the divine life in union and communion with God.*

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In like manner, by calling to mind what has been formerly stated with regard to the consequences and results of the "Angelic Fall," it will not be difficult—profound as the mystery of Evil cannot but be—to apprehend that Evil must be spiritual death, or a perpetual dying and perishing. We have found, namely, that Evil is the vain, delusive and suicidal attempt to realize a lie; ψεύδος ποίειν; to realize what is self-contradictory and impossible; that is, to make a mere particular Will absolute in its wishes, whims, and caprices; and in its egotistical pride and self-worship to resist or oppose, or even to destroy, that which runs counter to its wayward selfishness; without any thought for another and like spirit, except to bind and enslave it and to master it by violence, fraud and every iniquity, which unbounded selfishness and self-will bring in their train. This is but the imperfect sketch of a spirit, who, in asserting its Self in contrariety to the divine and absolute Will of spiritual integrity, is creating itself to evil and taking the easy road to death and Hades. We

* Having incidentally mentioned the subject of *corporeal* or *natural death*, I cannot pass it by without directing the reader's attention to St. Paul's admirable exposition of the truths connected with it, 1 Cor. xv. and used in our Burial Service.

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see it daily, more or less, in the various forms and stages of its downward progress in this world, without the hope even of arresting its fearful descent;—it is in vain even that heaven utters its warning voice, and stretches forth a strong arm to save the child that inexorably dooms itself to perdition. No Saviour can help a Will that obstinately refuses His proffered aid; and the reprobate and unrepentant sinner, already dying and perishing spiritually in this state of being, must inevitably lapse into the spiritual state, where there is no place more, and where there only remain for his self-pronounced doom the anguish of bewailing what is lost and the fiery thirst of craving for what it loathes. “With God,” indeed, “nothing is impossible;” but meanwhile we are bound to believe that the *individual being* of the irreclaimable sinner is for ever lost, and can only await, if it be possible, a new *individuation* of the fallen spirit under the spontaneous mercy of God in a new sphere of creation.

§ 13. Our concern and interest are however sufficiently occupied with the *present state of Grace* in which we are living according to the divine scheme and economy of Redemption. But it follows, as it needs must, that, if the heavenly Spirits fell into that state of spiritual death and perishing which we call Hades, the boundless nature of divine Love in the Absolute Will should of its own spontaneous necessity assign

the office of Grace and Mercy to the only begotten Son, who had been their progenitor ; in order to restore them to their pristine condition—the image of God, now de-featured, in which they had been originally created, and to integrate the community of which He still remained the *principium vitæ* and, implicitly, the *vis medicatrix*. It is unnecessary to add that, of His infinite love to His otherwise lost creatures, He undertook the vast and astounding task of Redemption, and of saving sinners by the conquest and destruction of evil. How vast the task and how great the plan, it is as unnecessary as it is impossible to state ; since the conflict by the very nature of the case was to be carried on in every child of man, from Adam to the end of time, under all the various forms of states, communities, and peoples, into which the human race has been gathered together for effecting the designs of Providence, and under all the circumstantial agencies of nature which are appropriate to the unity of the plan emanating from divine Wisdom.

But it will be said : Is this doctrine of the Resurgency of the fallen spirits, and therewith the previous statement that the creation of the world is in effect the redemptive process undertaken by the Son of God, and the work of divine grace and mercy which He announced to fallen man,—is this doctrine the language of revelation uttered in Scripture ?

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does Apostle or Evangelist, or does our Saviour himself, suggest such a view ?

I can only answer that the records of Scripture confessedly do not state the doctrine ; nor perhaps can it be truly said that they necessarily imply the doctrine, at least in the form here adopted. Nay, taking the description of the fall of man from the narrative in Genesis, not merely as a first instance, but as a full and adequate account of the *origin* of sin and death, and coupling this with St. Paul's comment that "in Adam all die," and with our Saviour's silence on the subject, it might be admitted that the view we have ventured to submit on this subject is at least discountenanced as scriptural teaching.

But without appealing to omissions of truths, of which under the circumstances of the omission the purposes of revelation may not have required the expression, let us meditate further on the economy of *God's Providence* in the world. Now we can be in no doubt that evil existed before the creation of the world, for how else could there have been, according to the testimony of Genesis, a Tempter and Seducer to Evil in the form of the Serpent introduced into Paradise ? And this with the emphatic adjunct, which marks the conquest of Evil as the essential feature and primary character of God's Providence throughout the whole history of the world—namely, the bruising of the Serpent's head by the seed of the woman. The conquest

of Evil was to be the appointed work of a Redeemer; and the long-promised and long-anticipated Saviour was in the fulness of time revealed in the person of the incarnate Christ, in whom "all shall be made alive." But to assert that, as the only begotten Son, He had not from the foundation of the world assumed the redemptive office He had undertaken, that He had not been from the very beginning at work in the world by converting evil into good, that He had not been throughout engaged in the process of redeeming it from the wretchedness into which it had fallen, would be to deny the whole of God's providential working in the economy of the world. And who but the only begotten Son, the Author of all derivative and communicated being, could have been, or can be, the *Providence of the world*—the Power divinely armed to quench the fiery darts of Evil, and to wrest the conquest from the evil Principle, sometimes called the Prince of this world, or in other words the Devil?

We find, indeed, in the first chapter of St. John's Gospel the fundamental elements of a larger and profounder view of the mystery of redemption and of the relation of the Logos to man. And in the Apocalypse the remarkable expression, "The Lamb slain from the foundation of the world," can scarcely fail to induce us to adopt a meaning, more real than it has yet generally received; a meaning more in conso-

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nance with the spiritual philosophy; and which appears to countenance, as the doctrine of Scripture, that of a Saviour at work and actively engaged from the beginning in defeating evil, in order to the restoration of the world, and of its noblest creature man, to their pristine and originally destined spiritual integrity. Why this truth should not have been plainly written in the oracles of God, would be as difficult to explain as that the promise of everlasting life, though not altogether lost sight of, should have been withheld from the Israelites in the Mosaic legislation. But it can hardly be denied that Redemption is a doctrine which is founded on, and immediately flows out of, the *Idea of Divine Love*—of a Love, which, in contemplating the misery of a fallen world, is at once and without pause prompted to begin the work of restoration. And the inattention to the value of this truth may perhaps rightly be attributed, partly to the exclusive interest attached to the fall of *man*, and partly to the predominant importance of that portion of the fulfilment of the scheme of redemption, which was perpetrated on Calvary:—and we may perhaps add that this predominant importance was in a great measure due to the doctrine of *sacrificial types* inveterately implanted in the Jewish mind. How far the doctrine of the “sacrifice” of Christ in a strictly Jewish sense was applicable to Christ’s cross and passion and was necessary to the teaching of

Christianity to the Gentile world, it may be difficult to say; although the attentive student of the spiritual philosophy will not hesitate to admit that Christ's death on the cross is necessary to the intelligibility of the total efficacy of His work in the world, and that Christ was so far a Sacrifice for Sin that He consecrated Himself by His sufferings and death in order to the salvation of mankind. Though it would be profitless to pursue the discussion here, it may be observed that, notwithstanding the higher and more spiritual teaching of the Hebrew Prophets, the tendency of the Jewish mind was to believe that by the offering of a sacrifice, the transgression for which the sacrifice was made was wiped out, and that the sinner was thereby restored to God's favour; but, while doubtless it is true that Christ was the victim, and so the sacrifice, for man's transgression, and suffered the penalty for man's sins, yet it is equally clear that the *divine* agency could not have been mere passive suffering—could only have been that “new and living way,” by which the indwelling presence of the Logos in Christ became the spiritual life and light of every man coming into the world for his regeneration from the pravity of his fallen estate.

To return to the question which has occupied us in this paragraph:—If it be assumed that God is the Absolute Good, and that nothing evil can be derived from Him; and yet that evil is a

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fact only to be accounted for by a power or principle of evil throughout the world; it necessarily follows that the origin of evil is a lapse from that which God wills, and no less that God of His absolute goodness and infinite love cannot but will to *transmute evil into good*, and to redintegrate that which had lapsed from its original integrity. But whatever transmutes evil into good is a redemptive process; and therefore the work of Divine providence in the creaturely which is at issue with evil, being the transmutation of evil into good, is a redemptive process.

It might be objected, however, to this argument, that God may have created a new kind of creature, namely Man, differing from Angels and not included in those who lost their first estate; and that this new creature may have been the only subject of Redemption;—as if, to say it with reverence, the experiment with Angels had failed, and a new trial had been made with Man. But why should that have been done for man, which had not been done for angels? and how is it that God's love, yea, absolute love, should have halted when the "sons of God" required it? If Angels fall, *absolute* love must have been moved to their restoration:—and if Angels were the children of God, they were essentially akin to man, had been created in the image of God, and therefore bore the same essential characteristic of Humanity. It would,

indeed, introduce gratuitous and unnecessary difficulties to consider man otherwise than a part and parcel of the fallen heavenly community.

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§ 14. Having now considered most of the fundamental truths of Christianity, as grounded on Ideas which are inseparable from man's spiritual nature, and which as truths claim assent as soon as they are conceived and understood, though utterly unintelligible when considered only as generic conceptions derived from empirical observation and experience, our time will probably not be mis-spent, if we briefly recapitulate the truths of which we have obtained conscious possession. They may be comprised in the seven following heads, viz:—

i. The recognition by man of himself as a Will, or individual Will, with the craving for a sphere of spiritual being.

ii. The sense, or consciousness, of the divided tendencies of his Will, with the felt incapacity of realizing a particular self as absolute, and yet with the selfish impulse so strong as to mark the proneness to evil by futile attempts to realize lawless selfwill and unbounded selfishness.

iii. The corresponding hostility to, and alienation from, all other Wills; with the disregard of self-denial, and the unwilling acknowledgement of the power and light of spiritual self-integration which is offered to him *ab extra et de supra*. But this light of Reason, working upon, and with, man's insatiate desire of spiritual being, is calcu-

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lated to awaken his Conscience, to induce him to confess his moral obligations in respect of Right and Wrong, and to raise his mind, however inadequately, to the pattern and power of spiritual integration which is already actuating and enlightening him.

iv. He may be thus led, in questioning the conditions of spiritual integrity, to meditate on the Idea of God, as its pattern and power, and may, by the aid of divine revelation, happily attain the recognition of the Idea of the divine tri-unity and tri-personality inseparable from the Godhead.

v. But should he have obtained conscious possession of this idea, or indeed any reasonable measure of insight into the great mystery, he cannot fail to contemplate in the second person or *Deus alter*, the only begotten Son, the Logos or eternally uttered Word, the Author of all communicated and derivative Being, pre-eminently the Idea of the Humanity in the glorious pattern of worth and righteousness which renders Him the full and sufficing object of the Father's love.

vi. In the Idea of the only begotten Son, thus conceived, he cannot fail to find the inexhaustible derivation of a heavenly community of the children of God, call them Angels or Humanities, who repeat in infinite diversity of forms the absolute and suprarrelative perfection of their progenitor and divine parent. But he will see also,

if those heavenly beings are to be *willing* recipients of God's favour, and *willingly* observe the allegiance due to Him, they must be able likewise to refuse obedience and to set at nought the divine behests; and our student must perceive that the pride of self-willed being, independent of the author of all true being, can only have as its result the fall of the rebellious Spirits and the loss of a Self, wherein to be, in the dark void of Hades.

vii. But the meditative student will also see, as intimately connected with the interest of salvation from spiritual death, and with man's hope of regeneration in "the image of God" in which he was originally created, and no less as essential to the character of the Logos or divine Word, that He must have been from the beginning the pre-ordained and self-devoted Restorer of the fallen spiritual Race, and that His appointed work is that of Creation and Redemption.

§ 15. It may be convenient, in connecting the links of the argument into the chain of truths which constitute Christianity, to advert briefly to the *Names* and *Offices* of the *Logos in Christ*. It may be observed, however, that the course here indicated is that of tracing, to the best of our ability, how the *Idea* of the divine Agent in the process of *Redemption* is *realized in time*. We have already dwelt on the relation of the Logos to the Godhead; and now the predominant object of our investigation will be that of ascertaining, as far as the light of Reason may disclose

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it, the relation of the Logos in Christ to Man.

The success of this attempt cannot but mainly depend upon a right conception of the binding link, between the eternal and temporal, of which the *divine Humanity* is the perpetual exponent. Having then already stated the main conditions, under which we unavoidably conceive, according to the *Idea*, that the Logos, as the *Deus alter*, is the Mediator and Redeemer, we have to justify the following propositions, viz.:—

i. The *Logos in Christ* was, and is, the *Divine Humanity*. We have contemplated Him as the absolute finite in the idea of all communicated and derivative being, and thus as pre-eminently the personal “I am” in the tri-une Godhead. But He is also the Idea of the Humanity, as the immediate source and power of all which man cannot but believe to be essential to his spiritual integrity—is that in perfected evolution, of which the germ exists in man as a spiritual nature. We have seen that the Logos is also the Reason; and as such He is the Finite and the Finific, the source and ground of all Distinction. Regarding the Logos as Reason, we find the ground for identifying the being of all non-absolute Wills, that of man included, with the being of the Logos in Christ; that is, so far as they partake of true being, or of the spiritual being, of which the sole source is the divine Reason or Logos. Christ is therefore not only to be considered as “the Son of Man” engaged

in an earthly mission, but as containing, in the eternal idea of the Logos and the only begotten Son of God, the idea of Man—namely, the perfect type of the Humanity which exists ideally for every man as the goal of his exertions. He was also not only the Saviour but the “Captain of our Salvation;” for, according to the Idea, He realizes eternally that act and exemplar in its completion, of which man is indeed conscious, but only in its incipency and under the imperfections of a fallen spirit.

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ii. The *Logos in Christ* was, and is, the *Light*, the *Truth*, the *Law*, and very *Righteousness*. Though these attributes of Christ belong to the divine nature of the Logos, and indeed have been already assigned to Him, yet the reader requires to be reminded of them here in exhibiting the human relations of the Redeemer to His fallen creatures. This relation, as indeed all other relations, are founded on the divine idea, of which the Logos is the eternal exponent, and in this instance the attributes above enumerated might be expressed by the one term “Reason.” But we have here to take “Reason” in its highest dignity and potence;—not only as in man the communicated Faculty of apprehending ideas or truth, eternal and absolute; not only as Intelligence, though divine and universal; not only as the spiritual Illumination, “which lighteth every man that cometh into the world;” not only as the Logos, whose personal Being

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is very Truth; not only as the Legislator and legislative Act, which throughout the universe pre-determines every result, compels implicit obedience, and excludes all contingency—"combining the foresight of wisdom and the power of irresistible Will as immutable purpose and persistent function;"—but, beyond all these characters, and potentiating all, we have to contemplate the Logos as Legislator in the sphere of spiritual order and moral freedom—to contemplate His legislative act and agency glorified into the eternal Law of Righteousness, and Himself as the power and pattern of Spiritual Integrity.

Nor, in saying this, do we remove the result from the inevitable consequences of the first principles of our system; for we assume as established truth that Will, in order to be all that we can properly call such, must be guided and governed by Intelligence, which in its highest form is Reason. But, in thus pointing to the Logos in His august character as the Idea of eternal Righteousness, whose being is universal Reason and Truth, and who as such only could be the sole object of His Father's love, it necessarily follows—if the unity and integrity of our, or of any, rational system of philosophy are not to be wantonly dissipated, that there can be only one Reason, one Light, one Truth, one Law, one Righteousness, namely the Logos or only begotten Son; and therefore that Man can not

partake of these, nor be enlightened and enlivened by them, except so far only as the "Spirit of Truth," even the divine Logos, dwelleth in him.

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And, it may be added, that, where the Will or Spirit of man is alienated from the divine Will, namely, where the divine Will is acting upon the unregenerate spirit of the natural man, the operance of the Logos may be apprehended, not merely as the Law of Righteousness which is to guide and teach the wayward spirit to conform itself to the Supreme Will, but as the stern and threatening command of God's retributive Justice to sinners, to which the sinner's conscience involuntarily responds in testimony of his obligation to obedience. But, whether the Law of Righteousness be willingly or unwillingly received, it is the condemnation of Sin, the purifier of the corrupt nature of the fallen Will, the death of the merely carnal life:—and thus the Logos in Christ, as "our Righteousness," acting in and by the light of Reason on the Will of the fallen creature, becomes for it a Law in order to the condemnation of Sin by rendering Sin exceeding sinful.

iii. The *Logos* in *Christ* was the Light, *φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν*; but He was also *the Life* and the *Way*, or as St. John expresses it (ch. i. 4), *ἐν αὐτῷ ζωὴ ἦν, καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἦν τὸ φῶς τῶν ἀνθρώπων*. We have already seen that the necessary correlative of the Reason is the Will, nay, that the Reason cannot be conceived without assigning priority to the Will;

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and in like manner the Reason could not be Reason, unless Will animated it, converted it into Life, and rendered it truly spiritual. The Law of Righteousness is dead, unless it produce conviction; unless it so act upon the Will as to cause it to desire and to make some effort to realize that which is in conformity with the Law, to love and do for its own sake whatever may be requisite in order that the unregenerate Will may become, or aspire to become, a holy Will in a life of spiritual integrity. To this end the Law is but the aid and means, and as we have seen the Will of the Natural Man is insufficient to adopt the Law as the means of Justification, and to discipline himself to Righteousness. Christ must act in and with his Will, yea, actuate him in order to transmute the psychical to a spiritual Will, so that, if even enlightened, its light may become *a Life*. This, however, reverses our former order, and restores the Will to its supremacy. For assuming the spiritual order, which is proper to a non-absolute spirit, or to a creaturely Will in conformity with the divine or absolute Will, the Will has not to be conformed to the Law;—that which the law commands is merged in the spontaneity of the Will;—and so, in the regenerate creature the end aimed at is, not that he should be righteous in order to love the Good, but that he should love the Good in order to be righteous, and thus that the works of the Law may be the fruit and the natural

growth of the Will as the disinterested love of the good. The idea of a "holy" Will, whether original or attained, would destroy itself, unless in its first nascency and movement it tended towards the Good as a pure act of Love. The accomplishment of this new birth of the fallen creature is, however, the mystery of the redemptive agency of the Logos in Christ; who, acting on and in the will of man without destroying his individuality, creates in him a new Will, and regenerates the carnal to a spiritual Will. And thus according to the report of John iii. 3, our Lord says:—"Except a man be born again, he cannot see the Kingdom of God:"—*ἐὰν μή τις γεννηθῇ ἄνωθεν, οὐ δύναται ἰδεῖν τὴν βασιλείαν τοῦ Θεοῦ*. Herein then was manifested the Love of God;—"for God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life:" (ibid.)—and thus was sent the Christ, that by free grace and love He might lead the will of sinful man willingly unto the Father, to become united with the Holy Will as the condition of perfect bliss.

And, it may be repeated, we cannot contemplate Absolute Will except under two relations, which are yet very realities, and are necessary distinctions, though of an indivisible unity;—namely, the absolute Will, who as the Holy Will remains ever for our meditation Subjective Deity; and the absolute Will, as the eternally Objective

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Deity, in whom all derivative being has its sole reality, the efficient and sufficient cause of all and every being, and in whom we contemplate the eternal and effective Mediator between all Wills of whatever name or degree and the Supreme Will in His eternal Self-affirmation. In His Son, and only in His Son could God-Father love a fallen world:—and if we would preserve the idea of God distinct from the world, yet permitting a reunion of the world with Himself; in other words, if we seek to establish a system of boundless love and pure morality; we must contemplate as the crown and consummation the Holy Will, self-affirmed in His absolute holiness and spiritual integrity; to whom intercession is made by a no less Holy Will, the power and pattern of spiritual integration; intercession for Wills, which, deficient in holiness, are yet integrants of His Being, and, though fallen, may not be abandoned to perdition by absolute divine Love.

CHAPTER VI.

CHRISTOLOGY CONTINUED, AND THE REDEMPTIVE OFFICE OF CHRIST.

§ 1. IN the foregoing *tentamen* it has been our object to find, for whatever may be requisite to an adequate and full conception of the Divine Humanity as the incarnate Saviour, its significant correspondent in the eternal Idea of God, and in the Truth which we contemplate as necessarily derivative from the Idea of absolute Will realized in its transcendent spiritual Integrity. But we have now to contemplate the *Logos in Christ* under the aspect of the *Crucified Saviour*. And it may be reasonably asked, whether we are competent to supply according to the divine Idea, or are capable of beholding in the Idea, the eternal truth which enables us to conceive the Logos in Christ as the suffering and crucified Saviour, the *Deus patiens*, and to explain the remarkable saying, “the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world.” Notwithstanding the difficulty of the problem, I proceed to attempt the solution by the aid of, and in conformity with, the principles of the Spiritual Philosophy.

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The Logos in Christ is then, I say, contained in the eternal Idea of the crucified Saviour. It would be but a carnal view of His power and functions to take the symbol for the thing signified, a part for the whole, and to suppose that the real mystery of the sufferings and crucifixion of Christ is contained in the folly and wickedness of the Jews who persecuted Jesus to the death. No! it exists as an integral part of the *Idea* of an eternal Redeemer. It was necessary for any effectual redemption of a Will, that He should act *in and with* it; in order not simply to change it, but to convert, transmute, regenerate, create it to a new Spirit, accepting *willingly* the gracious offer which it loathed. For this purpose, recollect, that He was to act in and with a *fallen and evil* Will:—not certainly that He was to become evil, for this would have robbed Him of all efficiency as the remedial agent; but He was under the necessity of participating in the consequences and penalties of the transgression of the fallen spirits, in order to remove them; He was under the necessity of feeling the load in order to lift the burthen. The fulness of the divine Life, though not diminished, was hidden as the dark cloud of Apostasy passed across the full orb of its glory. The divine Love could not be quenched or abated by the futile wrath of malignant spirits; but it suffered a *pang*, which, though but for a moment invading its bliss, and though to be requited by the conversion

of suffering into triumphant joy, yet for the time must have been felt as sorrowing regret and pity for those who had wrongly caused the dark chasm in the bright community of heaven. Nay, the loving and all-merciful Saviour seated sorrow on His own regal throne, and bade the Angels bow down to it, and worship it. It was comparatively an easy task to work by His power, and issue His omnipotent commands for the mitigation of evil, and so to temper all the circumstances and accompaniments as to render the approach of evil well-nigh impracticable, or to facilitate the warfare by granting the most favourable conditions to the combatant;—and He created the world in all its beauty and order, in consonance with man's needs and wants, and placed His new creature relatively regenerate in innocence in a terrestrial paradise. But the spiritual Evil remained. The Evil that was to be self-restrained and self-subdued, the evil of the lust of Self-will, broke forth afresh; and man fell spiritually under the dominion of the principle, or prince, of Evil. It was necessary for the conquest and extinction of Evil that the world should have the spiritual aid and personal presence of the Redeemer; even this astounding act of redemptive love was not refused; and the Son of God, working, according to the will of His heavenly Father, from the foundation of the world, in the whole of its providential economy, took upon Himself in

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 Chap. VI. man.

Meanwhile, in order to the achievement of the vast scheme embraced in the process of *redemptorial Grace*, it is indispensable to the conception of the transcendent Idea at work therein, that the Logos in Christ should be actually present in every individual born to share its benefits. Without the idea of the omnipresence of the Redeemer—without the idea which Pascal expressed by saying (and with no possible taint of Pantheism) that God is a circle whose centre is everywhere, and circumference nowhere, it would be inconceivable that He should act where He would not be. And we have provided for the difficulty of the conception, in respect of every rational being, by affirming the principle of the universal Reason in the Logos, which, relieving the mind of all mysticism in respect of the mode of the actuation of the Logos individually and universally, must be regarded as the power of life as well as of light, as the power of spiritual illumination which enlivens and enlightens every man that cometh into the world—even the Logos as described by St. John in the first chapter of his Gospel. Without this precious idea how vain would be the words of the divinely-inspired Psalmist:—“Whither shall I go then from thy Spirit: or whither shall I go then from thy presence? If I climb up into heaven, thou art there: if I go down to hell,

thou art there also." Psalm cxxxix. Again, in the same psalm, "Thou understandest my thoughts long before. Thou art about my path, and about my bed, and spiest out all my ways. For lo, there is not a word in my tongue, but thou, O Lord, knowest it altogether." How vain would be the Idea of God, and how contrary to sound reason, unless He were contemplated as working by the Logos by His power and wisdom in producing and sustaining by His ubiquitous presence every form of Being. In Him "we live and move and have our being:" to which St. Paul adds, "as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring." (Acts xvii. 28.)

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Now, in order to conceive the universal presence of the Logos in Christ, in order to the battle à l'outrance which He had to wage in every individual, we have to consider that for every such individual He had, has, and will have to the end, to supply the *susceptibility* or *recipency* on which He has to act;—He is in truth both Agent and Patient, and all that the human individual can contribute to the process of his own redemption is the *concurrence* of his will with the gracious operance and the "prevenient" grace of the Redeemer. And if we attempt to describe the character of the agency of the Saviour, I do not know any more appropriate terms, in which to suggest and convey it, than Love as the motive, Good as the aim and end, and Suffering and

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Sorrow as the means and conditions, by which the Lord our Righteousness becomes the Deus patiens and suffering Saviour for the salvation of mankind unto that life everlasting, wherein the true joys of perfect bliss and spiritual integrity are inseparably and for ever united. But what shall we say of the work which the gracious Redeemer has to achieve in the individual, in order to the *μετάνοια* and new birth? Analogies, indeed, are not wanting as aids to our imperfect imagination:—A bar of iron, in order to become magnetic and receive the capability of polar activity, must be acted upon by the loadstone, and the loadstone in order to impart the power must not only act but be acted upon. In order to consolation under affliction the friend must sympathize with the sufferer—must feel with him in order to apply the effectual remedy to his grief. The good man, who desires to convert a sinner, must for a time suffer his inward peace to be dimmed and disturbed, in order to know the evil that he has devoted himself to remove, and to induce the sinner to break the bonds in which he is enthralled. In any case of moral love for another no higher attestation of the love can be offered than self-denial and self-sacrifice, or in other words to become a sufferer for the sake of the beloved object:—and we speak here of the transcendent love of the Saviour, which is to give intelligibility to all instances. For the sake of those who bore Him implacable enmity, He

voluntarily devoted Himself to partake of their state of spiritual death and perdition; in order that by His self-sacrifice He might restore them to the conditions of spiritual being which they had forfeited, and might regenerate them to eternal life.

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In a former chapter (Ch. I.) I have endeavoured to express the foregoing with more philosophical precision to the following effect:—that the Will of the fallen spirit, awakened to new life and being by the call of the Logos as the divine Reason, at once aims at being absolute in its own self-particularity and, in its lawless self-will, as far as its sphere of being permits, strives to gratify its lusts of pride, covetousness and vicious propensities, with iniquitous disregard of others like himself; but that the spiritual illumination of the divine Reason, in ordering the affairs of the world, plainly shows the wicked attempt at absolute self-particularity to be an impossible lie and mere self-delusion, and thereby tends to induce the wayward spirit to listen to the voice of conscience, and aspire to spiritual integrity by obedience and conformity to the Will of God revealed in and as the universal and sole absolute Reason. The work of the Logos, as the divine Life and Light of the world, may be regarded as the process of converting the *self-lust* of the creature into *self-denial*, in proving by intelligible facts that so only can a Will acquire a

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sphere of spiritual being, and in producing the requisite *μετάνοια* which is the pledge and commencement of the spiritual regeneration of the creature.

After all, however, it would be difficult, if it were possible, to sound the depth of the profound mystery of the operance of the Saviour in actuating every individual renitent soul, fortified by the evil passions of a wicked selfwill to resist the gracious influence of the Redeemer. But it will be recollected that the *Idea* of a *Deus patiens* requires that He should act in and with the fallen Will. And how shall we express more intelligibly the conditions of the process than by saying that the Redeemer lends Himself to the fierce lust of Being in the beingless spirit, and offers that which the spirit really though unknowingly craves for, by substituting for the false, self-contradictory and impossible, the true and only conditions under which the spirit may obtain its desire of absolute self-assertion in the full integrity of spiritual Being?

But there is still a difficulty, which remains to be removed. The Logos in Christ, or the Redeemer, must, in order to be such, have the character of Divine or Perfect Act; but, in order to fulfil His redemptorial office, He must be contemplated also, as we have just seen, supplying that which is acted upon in the fallen spirit and as furnishing its susceptibility and recipiency. He must be the communicant of Being both as

Giver and Receiver; and it is only by the potentiation and actuation of the Will of the Recipient that it becomes receptive without ceasing to be a Will and acted upon as such. Meanwhile the Logos, in thus supplying what is acted upon in the creaturely, cannot be regarded otherwise than as *passive* in this relation; and the idea of God forbids us to conceive the Logos otherwise than a Perfect Act. But the difficulty is more apparent than real, since contemplated here as *Deus patiens* He is only passive in relation to Himself and the subject of His own Divine agency;—His passivity is real, but self-originated, and His own act.

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CHAPTER VII.

CHRISTOLOGY CONTINUED.

The Advent or Epiphany of the Incarnate Christ.

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§ 1. HAVING in the preceding chapters exhibited the main Ideas which are the foundation of the truths of Christianity, I have now to proceed to the realization of these Ideas in time, and to the aspects they assume in relation to the life and belief of man in his present temporal state, considered as a state of probation preparatory to a final judgement. It would appear then that, according to the previously quoted opinion of Coleridge—" *that Religion must be both Idea and Fact,*" the course now indicated to us is to investigate how far the Ideas already contemplated have been revealed and realized in the facts of history. But I have here to warn the reader, that, if the historical facts on record are regarded only as events which belong to the sphere of our sensible experience, without the interpretation by Ideas which they require as exponents or symbols of a supra-natural or spiritual order of the universe, they will inevit-

ably forfeit their claim to be regarded as truths of Religion. Such cannot fail to be the result, if religious truth is made wholly or mainly dependent upon what are called "Evidences;" that is, inferences drawn from facts of history or from fulfilled prophecy; instead of being founded on Ideas, which are the sure testimony of God himself to our reason and conscience. It is true that whatever facts are appealed to, as evidences of the divine operance in the economy of the world, they must be proved to be actual occurrences, so far at least as our means of investigation permit. But we ought to remember that they are ever to be regarded as exponents of higher truths, which have their own *spiritual* evidence; that we cannot attain to the Idea by means of the Fact; but that we assure ourselves of the significance of the Fact by the possession of the Idea.

In now proceeding to consider the records of Christianity, it is my purpose to adopt the principle just enunciated, and to study the gospel narrative in order to discover the Idea, or Truth *à priori*, by which the recorded facts are to be interpreted. It may be proper however to remind the reader, that my object is neither critical nor controversial, but purely philosophical; that is, to reconcile the doctrinal truths of Christianity with Reason,—with Reason, namely, when understood to be the spiritual illumination shed into the human soul by the Logos or Word

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Chap. VII. truths which lead to eternal life in union with
 God.

§ 2. The success of this attempt cannot but mainly depend upon a right conception of the binding link, between the eternal and temporal, of which the *divine Humanity* is the perpetual exponent. All the main conditions, which indicate, *according to the Idea*, that the Logos, as the Deus alter, is the Mediator and Redeemer, have been brought under the notice of the reader. And our philosophy is now called upon to give a sufficient reason for his *Incarnation*, for the recognition of Jesus of Nazareth as the Lord and Saviour already known as the Logos, and for our belief in His full and perfect efficiency to perform the offices assigned to Him in the economy of human redemption.

§ 3. The *necessity of the Incarnation*, of the Logos assuming the manhood and of becoming truly a man, will be at once apparent when we consider that under no other condition could the Idea of a Redeemer and of Redemption become historical, that is, true in fact, and actually realized for the apprehension of mankind. It is also evident that under no other condition could the Son of God have become the Pattern and Exemplar of the holy life which He came to enforce by His teaching, and which, confessedly obligatory on all men, still needs the shining example, which He alone could furnish, for the

imitation of those who aspire to spiritual integrity, and acknowledge Him as the leader and captain of their salvation. And it is evident too that if, according to the Idea, He was the Truth, the sole universal light of the world, He should have the opportunity of attesting it personally to human hearers, by proclaiming with the self-derived authority of Reason—and not as the Scribes with the borrowed authority of written statutes—the eternal laws of Righteousness.

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It is no less evident that if, according to the Idea, He was the Lord of life, the universal principle of spiritual life, He should prove by a fact intelligible to all that He bore within Himself the life-giving power of resurgency from the vain terrors of the grave. But He came also, as the Idea of a spiritual order of the universe requires, to found amidst the degeneracy and corruption of the kingdoms of the world an everlasting spiritual kingdom; a kingdom of heaven; which, under the reign of the Lord our Righteousness, should renew the Idea of a Theocracy; and which, banding together His faithful followers, should wage unceasing warfare until the enemies of God should be destroyed.

§ 4. But what were the *credentials of Jesus of Nazareth* as a divine Envoy armed with full powers from heaven? What was the proof of the legitimacy of His title to be the head of the new Theocracy, as the Christ, the anointed King and Messiah? We know, indeed, that the Jews

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were at that time anxiously expecting their long-promised Messiah of David's lineage, and were eagerly watching for the "signs" which were to be the evidences of His personal advent: and without dwelling here upon the particulars of the required attestation of the claims of Jesus, we may quote, in lieu of any detailed account of these "Messianic Signs," the words in which our Lord described Himself to the disciples of John:—"Now when John had heard in the prison the works of Christ, he sent two of his disciples, and said unto him, Art thou he that should come, or do we look for another? Jesus answered and said unto them, Go and shew John again those things, which ye do hear and see: the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, the dead are raised up, and the poor have the Gospel preached to them." (Matt. xi. 2.) And in addition to the instances of undoubted forecast in the prophetic writings with regard to the person and circumstances of Christ, we may refer with unhesitating belief to His own repeated declarations, not only of His divine mission and authority, but of His divine nature and unity with God: as in the striking instances, which may here stand for all: "I and my Father are one;" John x. 30; "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father;" *ibid.* xiv. 9;—declarations, which, unless Jesus had been an enthusiast or impostor (suppositions quite inconsistent with the whole context of His

life on earth) could have been uttered only in the full consciousness of their truth. PART III.
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But will the Sayings and Doings of Jesus, marvellous as they are recorded to be, account for the still greater marvel of the *spiritual* impression which He produced, and the *spiritual* influence which He exercised, on those who approached Him,—nay, for the lasting spiritual influence which He still continues to exert, and which explains and can alone explain the ever widening area of the spiritual kingdom, *civitas Dei*, which He founded, and in which He ever reigns supreme in the mind and affections of its citizens? Surely, to account for His spiritual power, something more and deeper than His Sayings and Doings is required. Take all the *external evidence* afforded by the example of His blameless and godly life, take the effect of His divinely-inspired teaching, nay, take as undoubtingly admitted the astounding miracles which He performed;—all these might have been evidence of superhuman power and wisdom and goodness, but they could not *prove* that He was, or contained within the narrow bounds of His human nature, the Word of God, who is eternally the Life, the Truth, and the Way, even God the Saviour:—take, I say, the *Miracles* as accredited facts, and it may be at once admitted that they were well calculated to awaken from spiritual torpor men whose consciences had been benumbed by the deadening influence of worldly

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lusts and affections : but Miracles can hardly be supposed to possess any proper and inherent efficacy to stir the hearts of unregenerate sinners to repentance and faith; and, in order to produce such fruits, it can scarcely be doubted that they need the associated belief of their being extraordinary manifestations of the power of God in aid of His divine purposes. To him who entertains this belief, the Miracle can be of little value in respect of his spiritual state, though he willingly accepts it as an aid to his faith : but to a person who does not contribute this inward conviction derived from a higher source, the miracle will have been in vain ; the strange and surprising impression on the senses may remain for him an astounding and incomprehensible sensuous fact, but as such not calculated to promote spiritual improvement, and assuredly not suited to be made or received as a credential and pledge of the divine character of the worker of the Miracle.

This view of Miracles, here only briefly adverted to, as regards their claim to be considered “credentials” or warrants for belief in the divine authority of Jesus, will be found to coincide in the main with the account of the effects said to be produced by them in the Gospel narratives. And thus John (ch. xii. 37) bears record : “ But though he had done so many miracles before them, yet they believed not on him.” The strongest argument, perhaps, that Miracles were

intended to be “credentials” of Jesus’ divine authority and power, will be found in His own words, recorded by John, ch. x. 37: “If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works: that ye may know, and believe, that the Father is in me, and I in him.” This I understand to mean, taking “works” in the sense especially of miracles, “If ye believe not me, that is, believe not [what he had just said] that ‘I and my Father are one,’ believe at least that the good works I do are works of God and belong to the spiritual order of His providence, and that, they being such, I am the divinely empowered agent by whom they are performed.” It is not to be denied that miracles are signs of God’s immediate operance, and therefore of Christ’s divine agency; nor is it to be gainsaid that the wonderment they excite may be the means of stirring the minds and hearts of those who are beneficially affected by them; but, I repeat (as is shown by the very instance above adverted to) that they are not likely to be regarded as satisfactory “evidences” of the divinity of our Lord, unless by persons who come with a duly prepared and spiritually disposed mind. In short, in order that a “miracle” be regarded as a work of God, the faith that God is at work in the world is already implied. And I cannot but think that our Saviour himself was not disposed to set a higher value on the marvellous works He achieved

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than that of being subordinate means of drawing attention to His divine character and office. To those who were only curiously watching for the "signs" which should declare Him to be the political King and Messiah of a new Jewish state, He says "An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign." Matt. xii. 39. To those who followed Him only for their own selfish profit, He says: "Verily, verily I say unto you, Ye seek me, not because ye saw the miracles, but because ye did eat of the loaves, and were filled." John vi. 26. To Thomas, after removing his unbelief, He says: "Because thou hast seen me, thou hast believed: blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed." John xx. 29. In the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, He says, in remarkable connexion with certain of His own miracles: "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead." Luke xvi. 31.

We shall be induced, then, I apprehend, to seek for some more satisfactory evidence than that which is merely addressed to the senses for the extraordinary impression produced by the personal presence of Jesus, and the marvellous power it exerted of effecting instantaneous conviction of His divine nature:—such, for instance, as the call of the Apostles; the reply of Nathanael, "Rabbi, thou art the Son of God, thou art the King of Israel," John i. 49; Simon

Peter's answer, "Lord to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life. And we believe and are sure that thou art that Christ, the Son of the living God," John vi. 68; and the passionate exclamation of Thomas, so late cured of his unbelief, "My Lord and my God." Such instances do not seem like the results of reasoning, or mere ebullitions of feeling, but far more like the sudden recognition of a revelation seen by the flash of a divine light. But, although in these and similar cases we have to appeal for evidence to the inward work which belongs to the needs, affections and peculiar lights, of our proper humanity, I acknowledge the obligation of supplying from the records of the institution of Christianity *Facts*, which may corroborate the here alleged necessity of the inward work of faith, and vindicate the claim of religion to have its ground and foundation in the Reason and Conscience.

§ 5. In adverting then to the significant *Facts*, which revealed the divinity of Jesus as the Saviour of the world, do we not find it recorded in the Gospel narrative that John, who announced himself as "the voice of one crying in the wilderness," and prepared Judæa for the advent of the Saviour, instituted a Baptism of repentance and declared his mission in the awful words: "Repent ye, for the Kingdom of Heaven is at hand?" Matt. iii. 2. And did not the Baptist accompany the tidings with the terrible

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denunciation: "And he will thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into the garner, but he will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire?" Ibid. verse 12. It is not difficult to imagine—for alas! we are only too conscious of our sinful nature, what must have been the effect of John's warnings and threats, consonant as they were with the expectation of the coming Messiah, on the now quickened and terror-stricken consciences of auditors, whose spiritual faculties had been utterly benumbed by the deadening formalism of Judaism, and whose death-like life consisted only in the gratification of worldly lusts. Out of John's mouth pealed the thunder of God's wrath against sinners; and the divine power made itself felt, not by flattering the vain expectations of the Jews in the advent of a Messiah who was to restore Israel and become a worldly king and triumphant conqueror of its enemies, but by its operance on the conscience of sinful man, and as the power of Him, who, as the Lord of Righteousness, is of eyes too pure to behold iniquity.

Thus heralded came Jesus of Nazareth filled with the same divine power, but in the meek majesty of the Saviour, as the Christ, the anointed and true King of the spiritual realm which He came on earth to found and establish. Of this realm He is pleased to say, in answer to the Pharisees' question, when the Kingdom of God should come: "The Kingdom of God

cometh not with observation :* neither shall they say, Lo here, or lo there ! for behold the Kingdom of God is within you :” Luke xvii. 20 :—as if He meant to say, The Kingdom of God is not an object of the senses, and is not to be appreciated by the faculty judging according to sense ; but it is a state of the spirit ; its evidence is inward, and is only to be judged of by the things of God in the spiritual order of the moral world. It is scarcely possible to deny that Christ’s mission on earth was to realize the Idea of a heavenly Kingdom, in which the will of God was to be the supreme law and governing spirit. Did not Christ teach us to pray : “Thy Kingdom come ! Thy will be done” ? And no candid reader of the New Testament will withhold his assent from the position, that the ministry of Jesus had for its end and aim the re-establishment of a spiritual influence which had well-nigh become effete in the world, and the opening out of a new and living way, wherein, by repentance and faith, man might be rescued from evil, and might become a new creature in Christ.

§ 6. If then I have argued to any effect in the foregoing exposition of my views, it was the obtrusive need of salvation, and the Idea of a divine Redeemer whose love and mercy were necessary to the rehabilitation of our humanity, which brought sinners to Jesus, led them to

* “With observation,” *μετὰ παρατήρησεως*, i.e. ita ut oculis possit observari. See Wahl in verbo.

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listen to the self-evident truths of Reason which He uttered, and induced their faith in Him as the personal presence and revelation of the Light and Life of the spiritual world. But if, as I am disposed to affirm, the conversion of sinners depends upon an antecedent Idea which is the work of God in man (and as Jesus said: "No man can come to me except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him") it will not be difficult to solve the question originally proposed: namely, What were the "credentials" of Jesus, that He should be accepted as the divine Humanity, and incarnate Saviour?

But if the paramount influence which He exerted was that of awakening the *Conscience* to a sense of pravity in those who were attentive to His exhortations and pregnant words,—if they were "sore pricked in their hearts" under the grievous burthen of their wretchedness produced by sin,—and if they craved for a relief and remission which they dared not hope to derive from themselves,—their case would be the same as that which has been already described, according to the Idea, as common to all men in their fallen estate. See Part III. chap. I. And the like condition could not but have been attended by a like divine interposition; namely, the spiritual illumination of Reason; "which lighteth every man that cometh into the world," and which would engender in each the *Idea of Spiritual Integration* as the indispensable supplement to

his needs and cravings for spiritual or true being, though imperfectly intelligible to him:—"For we know not what we should pray for as we ought: but the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings, which cannot be uttered." Romans viii. 26. And would the want of spiritual integrity be less strongly felt under the actual and personal presence of the same divine Reason, who, while He was revealed in the person of the man Jesus, and was appearing in the form and creaturely reality of a "Son of man," was nevertheless at the same time actuating them from heaven in the full and undivided power of the Godhead? It was the need of the supplement to their pravity which induced them to recognise Jesus, as the pattern of holiness vouchsafed to them for the example of their lives, and as the visible proof that holiness might be attained under all the hindrances of a carnal nature:—it was the Idea of Spiritual Integrity, thus actually presented to them in the person of Jesus of Nazareth, that satisfied them they had found the Idea realized and embodied in one like themselves:—it was the evidence of the Idea realized, of truth that declared itself in the Light of its own evidence, that led Peter (John vi. 68) to exclaim,—“Lord, to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of everlasting life:—” it was this that stirred the same zealous Apostle to declare, “thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God;” a declaration, which called forth

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the approving remark of our Lord (according with and confirming our account of the operance of the Idea) “Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona, for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father, which is in heaven.”

§ 7. I hold it then to be of no slight importance to a right view of the orthodox faith, nay essential to a right faith, to hold that the Idea of Christ’s divine character was, and is, the operance of the spiritual illumination of the divine Reason, which we have called the Idea of Spiritual Integrity, and is the immediate work of God in the human soul ; aided though it was, at the epoch in question, by the cherished hope of a prophetically announced Messiah who should “deliver Israel.” The Idea of Christ’s divine character, once awakened in connexion with the felt and acknowledged need of redemption from the effects of the spiritual Fall, would lead at once, with more or less conscious recognition, to the apprehension of those characters and attributes, associated with the Divine Word and only begotten Son, which especially qualify Him for carrying into effect the redemptive process and for fulfilling His mission on earth ; attributes, which have been earlier in this work insisted on as aspects of the one great Idea of the triune God, and which may be summed up in describing the incarnate Saviour, the Christ, as the *Deus patiens*, “the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world.” And the reader will be pleased to observe that the main

object of the theological portion of this essay is to show that *Christianity is an Idea*, inseparable from the gift to man of divine Reason. The ideal conception is, that the Logos, as the *Deus alter*, containing the fulness of the triune Godhead, and Himself the Idea of Righteousness or absolute spiritual integrity, has condescended of His infinite Love and mercy to redeem those who fell from their first estate, and to restore them in the regenerated image of God to union with Himself in the beatitude of the divine and eternal life; and that, in order to reveal and realize His great work of self-denial and Love for man, He came amongst us as the Christ and incarnate Saviour:—an idea, be it observed, not to be derived by induction from matters recorded in the Scriptures; though such are to be received, in so far as they are verifications and historical evidences of a religion which is at once Fact and Idea. Nor in saying this am I to be unjustly charged with derogating from the due authority of God's holy Word. Its records explain the necessary steps and gradual process of the revelation, wherein man was educated and disciplined to conscious insight of that divine Idea which had been from the beginning at work within him as the light of Reason.

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§ 8. The above may perhaps sufficiently indicate the view, which ought to be taken of the divinity of Christ whilst on earth. But as the doctrine of a *God-man* is so essentially a central

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feature of man's salvation and of the redemptive process, I may be pardoned perhaps for dwelling on the subject. We may be asked, namely, whether the divine and human nature were reciprocally modified, and, if modified, how so modified as to constitute *One Person*? In order to frame a satisfactory answer, the reader may be reminded, in consonance with our previous investigations, that the two natures are not only not originally opposed to each other, but that they have a like or common ground of being in the divine life. Thus it cannot be doubted that, whatever otherwise the divine principle might be, it was the power of the Logos, which was in Christ, and therefore, as we have seen, the eternal prototype of the Humanity and the only begotten Son of the Father; but if we contemplate man *spiritually* he is also "a Son of God;" and although with the important difference that he is such only in, by, and through, the eternal Son, he is nevertheless one with the same divine spirit which actuates both. It may then be admitted that man, considered ideally, does not differ *in kind* from Christ on earth, though in the former the divinity is derivative and in the latter original. And thus according to St. John (x. 36) Jesus himself says: "Is it not written in your law, I said ye are Gods? If he called them Gods unto whom the word of God came, and the Scripture cannot be broken; say ye of him, whom the Father hath sanctified, and sent into

the world, Thou blasphemest, because I said, I am the Son of God?" In short, if, as must be confessed, according to the Idea, the Christ was intended to be the exemplar of a perfect man, He must be regarded both as divine and human in indivisible union and in single personality. In the language of polar logic we might say that the Christ is the "Indifference" of the divine and human natures; in relation to man He was God, and in relation to God He was Man.

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§ 9. The foregoing relieves us of the main difficulty connected with the human nature of Christ; for, judging by our conscious Self, we, like Him, require the presence and continual operance of God in us in order to our perfect humanity. But it follows necessarily that Jesus as the Son of God could only partake of man's nature as far as it was untainted by the Fall, and that, possessing in every respect the properties of man, He could not share, or be infected by, the pravity and evil which the spiritual fall introduced and occasioned. There is nothing in the "spiritual man" (and whatever is else than spiritual is adventitious) which may invalidate his claim to complete manhood: and as may be seen in the short summary of psychology (Part II., ch. V.) where the *Will as Life* is described, it is enough that Reason should exercise its legitimate sway, in order to convert the *Passions*—terrible as they are when untamed—into affections and sentiments, without which indeed

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no living reality could be imagined to exist, and which, when thus purified and transfigured, contribute to exalt the merely human nature, and nowise detract from the divine character of Christ. "To us let this be sufficient"—says South, in his excellent discourse entitled *Adam in Paradise, or a view of Man in his first estate as he came out of the hands of his Maker*—"to us let this be sufficient, that our Saviour Christ, who took upon Him all our *natural* infirmities, but none of our *sinful*, has been seen to weep, to be sorrowful, to pity, and to be angry."

§ 10. According to the Idea, Christ was that *eminenter* which every "Son of God," that is every man, ought to be, and might be by the gracious aid of the same divine Spirit which dwelt in Christ. But here arises a question, namely, whether we are justified in using the terms "*perfect God and perfect Man?*" And the objection would relate to the use of the term "perfect God" as designating correctly the divine nature of Christ. Doubtless the Idea implies that Jesus of Nazareth contained the fulness, or was fulfilled by the Spirit, of the Logos—even as all Spirit must be conceived to act *totally*. See Part II., ch. III. But, if we are to avoid the heresies of the Docetæ and Monarchians, we cannot affirm that Jesus of Nazareth was the Deus alter, and the second person of the triune Godhead. He was necessarily subject to the conditions, which the limited sphere of man's

temporal being on earth implies. We may attribute to Him in kind, though relatively to man's estate, all the spiritual perfections, which belong to the Logos *absolutely*—the same will, wisdom, love, goodness, righteousness and self-denial; for in truth he was spiritually the same divine being as the Logos, and was the *human exponent* of the only begotten Son and second person of the Trinity. But surely we are not bound to attribute to the incarnate Christ as man what properly belongs to Deity. We cannot attribute to Him as man, or to the Logos in the state of manhood, "omnipresence" for instance; we dare not call Him the absolutely "Good," since as we find recorded (Matt. xix. 17) He repudiated the title, "Why callest thou me good? there is none good but one, that is God." And shall we call Him "omniscient" in the face of His own declaration (Matt. xxiv. 36)—"But of that day and hour knoweth no man, no, not the angels of heaven, but my Father only"? Do we not then misuse the term when we say of Jesus that He was "perfect God?" When we call Him "God," and attribute to Him the divine nature, does it not properly mean that the whole divine power of the Logos did indeed actuate Him, but acted in Him so far only as the condition of the temporal humanity required or permitted it? Jesus Christ was certainly divine, was the exponent of the Logos in a fleshly tabernacle; but assuredly the Godhead was never abated,

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divided or diminished, by the sojourn of Christ on earth, as would have been the case if the term "perfect God" should be understood to mean the *translation* of the Godhead, or of the Logos, to earth. It must be conceded then, I think, that Jesus, as the human exponent of the Logos, has no just claim to such attributes of Deity as omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence, or what belongs to Absolute Will.

In raising the conception of Christ to the utmost height compatible with the idea of a divine manhood, or God-man, we must ever be mindful that we do not elevate Him beyond the conception of the humanity, of which we ourselves partake. We have to recollect that as the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews (ii. 16) says, in accordance with the Idea:—"He took on him the seed of Abraham. Wherefore in all things it behoved him to be made like unto his brethren"—and he adds the reason (ver. 18), "For in that he himself hath suffered, being tempted, he is able to succour them that are tempted." And again the same writer says (ch. iv. 15): "For we have not an High Priest, which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin." And I will conclude this paragraph by stating that the belief in Jesus' manhood, as distinguished from the nature of "perfect God" though fully actuated by it, is necessary to the conception, that, as the divinely actuated "Son of Man," He

was fully equipped to serve as the example for us that sin might be conquered in the flesh. PART III.
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§ 11. It will not, however, be out of place to inquire what we are to understand, according to the Idea, by the sinlessness and temptability of the Saviour, as affirmed in the above quotations from the Epistle to the Hebrews. That the *Saviour* should be *without sin* is a doctrine so necessary to our faith, that its assertion has been repeated in various forms by Scripture writers and by fathers of the Church:—and yet what outward evidence can be adequate to lay bare the heart and afford the requisite and certain assurance of its truth? Few even of the avowed enemies of Christianity have had the audacity to impugn the blamelessness of our Saviour's life, or to raise a question as to His integrity and purity of mind; but still the doctrine of His sinless nature has been, and must ever be, taken upon trust. This trust and assurance are not, however, without sufficient warrant—a warrant that we are entitled to act upon, if, as is the case, the *Idea of spiritual integrity* plainly enforces the adoption of a sinless Christ, untainted by the Fall, as even the ideal Adam would have been had he not succumbed to temptation. And that the Idea does enforce the adoption is plain from the self-evident truth that a sinning Christ could not have been the Saviour. Suffering Himself under the infirmity of sin, and rendered powerless by the infection

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of evil, He could not have come as the triumphant conqueror of sin and the irresistible destroyer of evil. And as little, except as Divine Spirit pervading all hearts, could He have carried on the warfare with evil, which is necessary to emancipate each and every soul from its thralldom. Moreover, whosoever has felt himself actuated by the Divine Spirit of absolute integrity, even by the Spirit of God, and who, confessing its influence under the terror of an awakened conscience, has received Jesus as the Saviour, cannot but have faith in His purity, integrity and sinless nature.

I may here observe in passing that the same idea has been expressed in the Jewish Scriptures by calling Christ the sacrificial Lamb without spot or blemish. To the process of redemption considered as a propitiatory sacrifice, I shall have occasion to return: but I cannot avoid remarking, that, unless the phrase be accepted figuratively, it puts the sign for the thing signified, that is, for the true agent and causative power of the redemptive process.

§ 12. Again, what light, may we ask, does the Idea throw upon the statement quoted above, that Jesus "*was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin*" ? That He was exposed to the same temptations as His brethren, and that no record exists of infirmity in yielding to them, is a statement that hardly suffices to establish the important fact above insisted upon. It is

true that the Idea of Christ's spiritual integrity requires the faith that it was duly tested, and rose unscathed from the trial; and it is also true that the argument used above in respect of Christ's sinlessness might be employed with equal effect to show that the Idea of a Saviour, implying unimpeachable spiritual integrity, vouches effectually for His having been proof against temptation: but at the same time we should in vain seek for a demonstrative fact of Jesus' power of resistance to the seducements of worldly lusts, were it not that the traditionary Gospels have preserved the account of His *temptation in the wilderness*. Any attempt to verify historically this remarkable narrative (of which Luke and Matthew furnish the details) is out of the question; but whether fact, vision or parable, it is impossible not to see that it supplies exactly the form or semblance of the fact which was required, to prove the power of Christ to resist the assaults of the Devil or principle of Evil.

We may suppose, what perhaps is most probable, that our Saviour related to His disciples the inward working of His mind, when, after His baptism, He retired into the desert to meditate on the mission into which He had just been inaugurated, and was led to contrast the two courses which offered themselves for His choice and decision; namely, either to realize the worldly hope of the Jews by proclaiming Himself their expected Messiah, or to disappoint their carnal desires by

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founding a “ kingdom not of this world : ”—that in weighing the proposals He convinced Himself that, in order to establish the spiritual kingdom which He projected, He was bound to exclude whatever of evil taint belonged to the restoration of Israel under a political Messiah ; for that, notwithstanding all the kingdoms of the world might be the reward of His apostasy, the lust of power was but the worship of evil, backed by pride, presumption and vain-glory :—and, finally, that rising, with the majesty derived from the divine Spirit acting in Him, He chased away the tempter with the words : “ Get thee hence, Satan : for it is written, Thou shalt worship the Lord thy God, and him only shalt thou serve.”

Until disproved by the fact and actual trial, there might have been a latent possibility of human infirmity ; and if Jesus’ temptability mean anything real, we must suppose that as man He had the susceptibility to be seduced from His moral integrity. But whatever the narrative may in truth be, it was the profound intuition of the Idea of spiritual integrity of Christ, which produced, or accredited, this otherwise inexplicable story. It furnished the requisite proof that, fulfilled by the divine spirit of the Logos, the will of Jesus could not have succumbed to the temptations offered to Him ;—that He had actually withstood and conquered whatever the power of evil in the world could do to seduce Him from the duty, which He had undertaken, of

establishing a kingdom of God, which, though not of this world, was henceforth to be its effectual antagonist.

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§ 13. A deeply-interesting question in connexion with the foregoing remarks here attracts our attention,—one perhaps not essential to the Idea of Christianity, but which has no unimportant bearing on the completeness of its doctrinal truth. In what consisted the Epiphany of Christ as the incarnate Saviour and plenipotentiary of heaven? Did His office date from the baptism which He received from John, or shall we look further back for the commencement of His operative career as the Christ of God? The accounts given by the Evangelists differ in some remarkable particulars. The narrative of Mark—and if, as has been supposed, he was the amanuensis of Peter, the record would be enhanced in value—begins with the baptism of Christ, or with what may be considered His inauguration into the ministry, at the age probably of thirty, or at the period assigned by the Jews for ordination to the office of teacher and Rabbi—an act expected to be authenticated by a Bath-Kol or approving voice from heaven. In each of the other Evangelists we find an introduction; in Matthew and Luke the interest therein expressed seems to have arisen principally from the desire of tracing His lineage to David, and of deriving His birth by an immaculate conception from a pure virgin; in St. John the

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introduction, declaring the Christ to be the incarnation of the Logos, is apparently designed to secure to Jesus eminently His divine character without further reference to His advent. But all the Evangelists agree in giving prominence and importance to the Baptism and its accompaniments. Take for instance the account given in Mark's Gospel:—"And straightway coming up out of the water he saw the heavens opened, and the Spirit like a dove descending upon him: and there came a voice from heaven, saying, 'Thou art my beloved Son in whom I am well pleased.'" In John's Gospel there is no less emphatic testimony, see ch. i. 32. "And John (the Baptist) bare record, saying, I saw the Spirit descending from heaven like a dove, and it abode upon him. And I knew him not: but he that sent me to baptize with water, the same said unto me, Upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending, the same is he which baptizeth with the Holy Ghost." And it is further to be observed that he is reported to have previously said:—"Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world."

I am not at all disposed to criticise, to explain or to dispute, the account given by the Evangelists; but whatever may have been the actual facts which revealed the Will of God in respect of the mission of our blessed Lord, I am strongly disposed to think that the Christian doctrine according to the Idea would gain by considering the

Baptism as the period at which the influx of the divine Spirit or Logos became *actual* in Jesus, and that the Baptism was at the same time His solemn inauguration into the office of the Christ with its powers and functions. At all events, what occurred previously to this ceremony may be regarded as a mere blank in spiritual significance. Like the Baptist, we, till that time, “knew Him not” as the divine functionary He was sent to be; the only trustworthy evidence of the facts must have been derived from John; and whatever he may have seen, or meant to describe, it was tantamount to the declaration that he in some way knew that the Holy Ghost had descended on Jesus. So much the Christian Idea may be said to require and authenticate; namely, some fact which might be appealed to, as the authoritative and public appointment of the Christ to His office.

But this view of the baptismal initiation does not relieve us of the difficulty, felt by those who have adopted the “immaculate conception” for the purpose of accounting for the sinless nature of our Lord in the flesh. But setting aside, what indeed is obvious, that the miraculous conception in a pure virgin could not rescue Him from the taint entailed upon all Adam’s descendants, of whom His mother was one, we have yet to ask what the Idea requires? Assuming the necessity of the sinlessness of the incarnate Saviour (as indeed has been already

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established) shall we say that the sinlessness was the inevitable consequence of Christ's divine nature, which made it *impossible for Him to sin*? or that, although divine, He was under the conditions of a sinful nature, and that the sinlessness was the result of His constant and effectual *resistance to all temptation*? It cannot be doubted, I apprehend, that the Idea requires the latter solution of the problem;—for otherwise the phrase “being tempted like as we are” would have no real meaning, and Christ would become for us a mere sham, and not truly a man like ourselves and a pattern for sinful mortals. This view, it may be noticed, is congruous with what is implied in the Gospel of John (well called *κατὰ πνεῦμα* or according to the Idea) in respect of the incarnation of the Logos as the Christ:—it implies that the Will of Jesus was the same as that of the Logos, yet distinct so far as Christ's human individuality required it; and that the divine Will actuated Christ always and throughout His human existence, with no contrariant or divisive agency derived from a carnal Will. It is manifestly incompatible with the Idea of the spiritual integrity in his human personality to suppose a double or divided Will;—it was the same Will both in Jesus and the Logos, and the only possible distinction is that this same Will acted humanly in Jesus, and divinely in the Logos.

The above view, accredited both by the Church

and Scripture, cannot but imply also that the divine Will acting in Jesus was the same as that acting in every man, and which might in all men have the same effect, namely that of producing holiness or Spiritual Integrity, provided that each human Will supplied the requisite concurrence. And this doctrine is one of the grand truths of Christianity according to the Idea,—that all men, if they would accept the gracious aid of the divine Spirit, unceasingly proffered to them, might achieve the holiness or spiritual integrity of which Jesus Christ is the standing example. The question of the difference of the operance of the Logos in Jesus and in other men does not relate to a difference in kind, *in genere*: for the whole power of the Logos is at the service of every man who exerts his spiritual energies to obtain the boon, and, where ineffectual, is only so by the defect of the subject acted upon. (See § 8 ante.)

§ 14. *Christ as Teacher.* Any account of the Epiphany would be justly deemed imperfect in respect of the Idea of Christianity, were we to pass over the pre-eminence of Christ as Teacher, and to omit the proof by the fact that He was the Logos or Divine Reason, who had condescended to utter, as it were with His own lips, the words of eternal wisdom. We find it recorded of the impression produced on His hearers that they said: “Never man spake like this man:” (John vii. 46) and again, “When Jesus

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had ended these sayings, the people were astonished at his doctrine: for he taught them as one having authority, and not as the Scribes." (Matt. vii. 29.) And how should it have been otherwise, since He *revealed eternal truths in the light of their own evidentness*. He appealed boldly and at once to facts of consciousness and to the experiences of conscience in His hearers; and it will be found that Christ taught the self-same doctrine as that contained in the Idea propounded by the Spiritual Philosophy. Thus says Mark (ch. i. 14): "Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom of God, and saying, The time is fulfilled, and the Kingdom of God is at hand: repent ye, and believe the Gospel:" and again (Luke, xiii. 4) as if to impress His hearers with the fact of the universality of sin and of the need of repentance, Jesus says: "Or those eighteen upon whom the tower in Siloam fell, and slew them, think ye that they were sinners above all men that dwelt in Jerusalem? I tell you, Nay; but, except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." Thus He calls men everywhere to Repentance under the sense of their pravity: but He likewise points out the remedy, as (John iii.) where He tells Nicodemus, "Except a man be born again he cannot see the Kingdom of God;" and, in order to this regeneration, He speaks of himself as "the Son of man" capable of so saving the world "that whosoever believeth in him should not perish

but have eternal life. For God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world; but that the world through him might be saved.” (Ibid.) If then Repentance in consequence of the universal pravity of man, and Regeneration to the image of God by Belief (that is, by firm reliance on the indwelling power of Christ) are no less Gospel truths than truths of Reason; and if, as we further learn, He is the Truth, the Light and the Way; we may claim for the Spiritual Philosophy the conscious possession of that Idea of Christianity which is the foundation of Christ’s teaching.

But further let me direct the reader’s attention to the sublime discourses, which we only find in St. John’s Gospel. Thus, chap. vi. 51, “I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live for ever: and the bread that I will give is my flesh, which I will give for the life of the world.” And further on, “Verily, verily, I say unto you, Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you.” The quotation might be properly continued to the words—(verse 63) “the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life.” But enough has been said;—or if more be required, let the reader turn to John xv. where our Lord says “I am the true Vine,” and pronounces the exhortation, “Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself,

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except it abide in the vine; no more can ye except ye abide in me;”—enough has been said, I repeat, in these passages to show that the doctrine taught by Jesus is that *the spiritual light and life of man is the actuating and indwelling presence of the one and selfsame divine spirit of Truth and Righteousness*—even the Logos, who was revealed in and by Himself, and is the indispensable constituent of the ideal Humanity. This too is the doctrine of the Spiritual Philosophy; and it might easily be inferred that the latter is merely a representation of the truth revealed by the divine teacher of the Gospel. Such, however, would not be an accurate statement of the fact:—the Gospel and the Spiritual Philosophy have, it is true, drawn from the same well of the water of everlasting life—since there can be only one font of truth universal and immutable;—but, though the truth portrayed by the Spiritual Philosophy has been derived from the same Idea as that revealed in the Gospel of Jesus Christ, it has been traced by philosophy to its living germ in the spiritual principle of the Will, and has been developed by a process of reasoning to that truth, which is found ultimately to be intuitive, self-evident, and coincident with the truth of the gospel. And thus the demonstrative proof is furnished, that the light of Reason in man is the downshine of the divine Reason, even the Logos, which enlivens and enlightens him; that the truths of

religion, inseparable from humanity, are original constituents of man's spiritual being, implanted *à priori* by the inalienable influx of divine Reason; and that they, though only latent and potential, were appealed to and evoked by the preaching of Christ in the promulgation of the Gospel. This mode of teaching could not fail to be more effectual than that of any esoteric philosophy. And hence His exclamation: "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes." (Matt. xi. 25.)

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It would not be compatible with the object of this essay, nor is it my intention, to enter into the details of so large a subject; but as Christ's teaching is one of the essential features of Christianity according to the Idea, as part of a Spiritual Philosophy, I will select a few examples for the purpose of exhibiting further His mode of teaching lessons of practical wisdom, "as one having authority" to reveal eternal truths in the light of their own spiritual evidentness. Thus (Matt. v. 48) He says, "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect." It is manifest that Christ here inculcates the principle set forth in the Spiritual Philosophy as the Idea of *Spiritual Integrity*; and we have justified the operance of this idea as the inevitable tendency of all will, conscious of its pravity, to realize completely its own being. (Comp. Pt. III.

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ch. i.) This would seem to be a trying and but a tantalizing precept to frail and sinful mortals: but if, as we have shown, the germ of the humanity, and therewith of spiritual integrity, is implanted in every one by the enlivening and enlightening presence of the divine Reason; and if, by its perpetual actuation, man seeks only that which by the very nature of his Will he cannot but strive to achieve, namely, the being of his Will in its perfect integrity, and without which completeness it would be but an abortive Will; then, indeed, it follows that the precept is founded on the eternal Idea of Spiritual Integrity:—the obligation urged is identified with the desire, inalienable from all Will, of realizing itself in its fullest development of being; and the precept will be seen in the light of its self-evident truth. It is, however, not to be forgotten that man, amid all the damaging infirmities and vicious propensities that beset his spiritual career, may well need and pray for the aid of Him, who is the complement and supplement of his wants, and who as the perfect pattern of all spiritual Integrity, is the beacon and light which is to guide man's wayward course, and give vigour to his faltering progress. (Compare above, 4th Proposition of ch. i.)

2. "As ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise." (Luke vi. 31.) That only is to be willed which may be universally willed, under similar circumstances and

like conditions, in relation to our fellow-men. In this simple lesson, so easily intelligible to all, and happily expressed in the Stoic maxim "Bear and Forbear," is implied the fundamental and essential *principle of Ethics*; and I have earlier shown that it contains the universal, immutable and self-evident truth, which is to regulate all human intercourse. Wilfully to ignore it is a self-contradiction, *ψευδος ποιεῖν*, to follow out the primal falsehood of unregenerate Will; that is, to strive to make a *particular* Will *absolute*. Were the rule set at naught which this truth of Reason imposes, the whole framework of human society would inevitably fall to pieces, and resolve itself into a chaos of jarring and conflicting elements. In a former chapter (compare ch. i.) we have seen that the perfect *law of Love* implies that every Will should find its supplement and complement in another and others, and should feel under the obligation of practising *Self-denial* towards them. If each were to seek only his own selfish gratification with unscrupulous disregard of the welfare of others, and with utter recklessness in the choice of means by which his own desires should be attained, it is almost needless to say that the result would be a state of internecine strife, in which Hobbes's state of nature would realize itself as a state of hell.

But, coupling the law of love with the principle of spiritual integration, it will be found

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that every rational being cannot but seek the complement of his spiritual needs in the divineness of the Logos, and in the community of which He is the spiritual head and progenitor. Hence man is taught to love his neighbour as himself; that is, as derived from the same Father which is in heaven, with the same aims and privileges; and to love God above all as the source of all spiritual life and reality.

It will be found too that our Lord, proceeding upon the same principle, enlarges its application, and in the spirit of Leviticus (xix. 18—"Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself") tells the Jews, what they appear to have forgotten: "Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven; for he maketh the sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust." (Matt. v. 43.) Thus this great moral Teacher exhorts His hearers to drive away the spirit of alienation and disintegration as unworthy of their heavenly descent; to conciliate their brethren, even when opposed to them, by acts of charity; and to treat them as children of the same Father and potentially at least members of the same community. Even as He did,

when, persecuted to the death, He prayed: PART III.
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“Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do.” (Luke xxiii. 34.)

I will add another illustration to show that our Saviour fully adopted the principle which the Spiritual Philosophy sets forth, as the primal ground and ultimate aim of the Idea which is to develop and perfect our Humanity;—namely *the Will*, as that out of which all that is good or evil proceeds, and as that which tends by the light of Reason to the fulness and integrity of its spiritual being as its ultimate aim. Thus (Matt. xii. 35.) “A good man out of the good treasure of the heart bringeth forth good things: and an evil man out of the evil treasure bringeth forth evil things.” Again (ibid. xv. 18), “Those things which proceed out of the mouth,” (opposed to “whatsoever entereth in at the mouth”) come forth from the heart; and they defile the man. For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies: these are things which defile a man.” And it will be seen that our Lord attributes the reality of an offence to the intent, not to the act, and thus (Matt. v. 27), “Ye have heard that it was said by them of old time, Thou shalt not commit adultery: but I say unto you, that whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart.”

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But if in such instances He exposes the source whence the desire and purpose proceed which constitute the good or evil in any moral act, and consequently urges His hearers in the same sense as Proverbs iv. 23, "Keep thy heart with all diligence, for out of it are the issues of life," He exhorts them to wean their affections from the corruptible things of this world, and to place them on the enduring realities of the spiritual world. "Lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven" (Matt. vi. 20); for, says He, "*Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.*" And it is self-evident that whatever the heart of man is set upon will infallibly engage his affections, absorb his thoughts, and animate all his energies to its attainment. It is unnecessary to prove that whatever the soul deems its *highest good*, it will yearn for and sacrifice everything to possess. Yielding to the temptations of pride, power, wealth, pleasure, or the carnal enjoyments of the world, the natural man, in choosing what is transient and corruptible, takes the broad and easy road which leads to spiritual death; but the spiritual man, mindful of his true aim, and preferring the "strait path," however rugged and difficult, will seek his chiefest good where only true joys are to be found—in communion, namely, with the divine Power and Pattern of spiritual integrity in whom is life eternal.

The foregoing instances, though of course

utterly inadequate to exhibit the store of wisdom contained in the Sayings, Exhortations, Parables and various discourses, of our divine Master, will suffice for the purpose kept in view ; namely, that of showing the character which I have assigned to Christ's teaching, in saying that uniformly, and with the confidence of being understood, He appealed, *immediately and without discursive reasoning*, to the principles, moral and intellectual, which constitute our proper humanity. And I have no hesitation in adding that a candid perusal of the Gospels will not fail to convince the student that the doctrine delivered by Jesus Christ, as there recorded, and especially by John, is essentially the same as that sought to be established by the Spiritual Philosophy. The highest problems for the human intellect can only be solved by adopting the same principles as those upon which Christian truth is founded, and by which Christianity has approved itself to be the Truth.

§ 15. *Christ's Works*, and the marvels attached to His history. The Epiphany of our Lord, as recorded in the Gospels, was attended by many signs, wonders and miracles. They mainly consisted in the manifestation of His power to control the powers of nature, to heal sickness, to cure infirmity, to restore those suffering under demoniacal possession, and even to raise again to life those who had become victims of death and the grave. To these are to be added the intima-

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tions from heaven; such as that heard at His baptism, that spoken of by John (ch. xii. 28), the impressive scene of the Transfiguration, and finally the deeply-interesting account of His Resurrection from the tomb, and intercourse with His disciples during the forty days which terminated with His Ascension.

In reviewing facts of so astounding and inexplicable a character as the *Miracles*, we are struck with them not only as manifestations of power, but as *acts of mercy*; and we might expect that some at least would furnish striking instances of the conversion of sinners, who were witnesses or subjects of Christ's superhuman power. But it would be difficult, I apprehend, to find a single case, in which a reprobate had been induced to repent and believe purely in consequence of the miracle which had been wrought before or upon him. It is true that such acts were anxiously looked for as *signs of the Messiah*, and would be hailed as proofs of the advent of the desired deliverer of Israel; but their spiritual significance seems to have been overlooked or disregarded; and, so far as I know, it is only in the single instance recorded by Luke (ch. v. 24), that our Saviour makes any pointed allusion to the connexion between a miracle and His divinely-appointed mission:—"But that ye may know that the Son of man hath power upon earth to forgive sins (he said unto the sick of the palsy), I say unto thee, Arise, and take up thy couch, and go unto

thine house. And immediately he rose up before them, and took up that whereon he lay, and departed to his own house, glorifying God." It will be recollected that this miracle was brought about as an answer to the charge made by Pharisees and Scribes of blasphemy, when Jesus had said "Man, thy sins are forgiven thee;" and it appears as if our Lord had used the miracle as a proof of His divinity. That He exercised His privilege of forgiving sins under other circumstances is undoubted; and no more touching or graceful instance can be adduced than that of the woman, with the alabaster box of ointment, to whom He says, "Thy sins are forgiven." (Luke vii. 37.)

It is perhaps worthy of notice, as has been remarked, that the "Demoniacs" of the traditional Gospels are spoken of by John as Epileptics and Maniacs. But although remarkable, it does not follow that demoniacal possession is an irrational belief. I am disposed to hold it to be sound philosophy to attribute all evil, corporeal or mental, to the Principle of Evil acting by possession as an alien power invading the healthy life. It would be but gross superstition to assume that for every case of possession there is a particular and nominally distinguishable demon or devil:—but, according to the Idea, it may be safely admitted that such are cases of diabolical possession, that is of a power at work in the world to mar its integrity, of a spirit whose

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agency is to introduce falsehood, disorder, death and disintegration, wherever the conditions exist which favour or permit its invasion.

But it is time that we turn to the arguments, which may be used in favour of the acceptance of Miracles, as part and parcel of the accredited history of Christianity; and it is to be understood that I am here in no wise undertaking to test the genuineness of the particular facts narrated, but to ascertain how far miracles *in genere* are compatible with, or required by, the Idea which is the foundation of the Christian doctrine. I may here however observe, as the principal question, in respect of their character as facts, has been made to turn upon the *trustworthy testimony* of the narrators or their informants, that the evangelist John can scarcely be denied to be a competent and reliable witness to the truth of the events he has recorded, and that the authors of the traditional Gospels, agreeing with him in various points of evidence, have the sanction of his authority both for the truth of the miraculous agency in question, and for the particular instances in which they are in accordance with him.

I have already stated my reasons (see § 4) for thinking that Miracles, considered merely as supernatural events, cannot be justly deemed adequate credentials of Christ, nor efficacious means to the conversion of sinners; and that, in order to a due consideration of their claims to

our regard, as manifestations of divine power in the economy of the world, they must be understood to imply the existence *à priori*, in the minds of those to whom they are addressed, of the Idea which they have been erroneously supposed to originate—the Idea, namely, of the incarnate Son of God, “who taketh away the sin of the world.” To this view it may be objected that the Jews were duly prepared for the recognition of Christ as a worker of miracles by the writings of their prophets from Moses to Daniel, and by the received “Signs,” including miraculous agency, by which He was to be known as the Messiah. And this would be a valid objection could it be shown that these “Messianic signs” were universally acknowledged as implying the belief that the expected Messiah was God the Saviour of mankind, the Destroyer of sin and death, and the founder of an everlasting spiritual Kingdom: but the fact is notoriously otherwise; for, although a part of the Jewish nation looked for “the Son of Man” described by Daniel as one of a divine character, yet it may be said that none were disposed to regard the meek Jesus as the deliverer of Israel, or capable of conceiving Him as the power of God for the spiritual regeneration of the whole human race. And therefore, though it may not be denied that the miraculous works of Jesus contributed, perhaps largely, to the personal credit and authority which were required to promote the success of

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His earthly mission,—yet, I venture to repeat that, although Miracles were *attestations* of the power and dignity of Christ, they were not *evidences*, except to those who were already believers in His redemptive might and mercy. Then, as now, the “natural” man could not comprehend them; and the “spiritual” man did not want them for assurance of his faith. But if they are not “evidences” of the truth as it is in Christ, and more or less necessary for its acceptance, may they be deemed *superfluous accessories*? Not so, however; they were and are indispensable, as *confirmations of belief*. However strongly a spiritual Idea may operate in order to produce and promote faith, without being realized as historical fact, it would not become the property of mankind at large, but remain the possession of the enlightened few as an esoteric and comparatively barren principle. Such was the case with the systems of philosophy of antiquity: but a mundane religion, such as Christianity, vindicates its truth by being at once Idea and Fact. And so, in respect of Miracles:—they are the facts and vouchers, which confirm the belief already anticipated by the Idea, and are the tangible and visible realities which manifest a spiritual and divine agency at work in the world of sense. But, observe, although we need the fact to confirm the Idea, we cannot infer the Idea from the Fact.

Something more, however, may be required in

order to vindicate fully the truth of the principle upon which we have to accept the Miracles recorded in the New Testament. Now, as I have already said, a spiritual philosophy, such as that which now engages our attention, cannot fail to recognise in the world a twofold order of agency, that is a *Natural* and a *Spiritual Order*; whereof the God-man, the Logos incarnate in Christ, is the perpetual bond and unity. And I may add that the *principle of a spiritual order* is an Idea, which, although it may work more or less unconsciously in the minds of men according to their light, is co-extensive with our Humanity, and never wholly leaves the heart and mind of man however low in the scale of intellect:—it is the Idea, namely, of an ever-present operance of God as the Providence and ruling power of the world. By the *Natural Order* is to be understood the invariable concatenation of cause and effect, a necessity (derived from law) in every succession of changes, a constant antecedency of some indispensable condition under which every observed change must be supposed to have taken place:—in other words, by the natural order the physical universe is resolved into an adamant chain of necessitated events. By the *Spiritual order* is to be conceived whatever is above and beyond the sphere of sensible experience, and not to be comprehended in the generalized conceptions of sense; namely, whatever belongs to Absolute Will, manifested in the

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eternal Ideas of Reason, and especially in the work of Spiritual Integration, carried on in the human Conscience. And it is in this spiritual order, if anywhere, that we are to find the legitimate evidence of the truth we are seeking in respect of Miracles; of miracles, considered as *acts for the purpose of showing the primacy of Will in its function of vindicating the governance of a moral or spiritual principle* in human affairs, where belonging to the sphere of freedom, as opposed to the natural order of necessity; of miracles, considered as *immediate* acts of Will, divinely empowered for moral purposes. Man belongs, in respect of his Reason and Conscience, to the spiritual, and not to the natural, order of the universe: he belongs to the sphere of Providence; not as a thing but as a free and moral agent; to a sphere in which moral law supersedes natural law, and in which it is left to the choice of the individual to concur with or to resist (ineffectually indeed) the Divine Will. Hence it is scarcely less than self-evident that Christ, filled by the spirit of the Logos, and sent to work on the Reason and Conscience of mankind, should have been empowered to attest His mission by miraculous deeds of love and mercy. And it is no less evident that, without such acts—acts which reveal the otherwise hidden order of a spiritual agency beyond and above that of a necessitated dependency, the moral providence

of the universe would be ignored for want of the facts which realize the Idea of the Absolute causative of all reality. Miracles are then at least a postulate involved in the Idea of the epiphany of the Logos in Christ, who came to reveal and found the Kingdom of God on earth.

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§ 16. Among the works of Christ, that which is most importantly connected with the main object of His mission, namely the salvation of mankind, will be acknowledged to be the foundation and establishment of the *Kingdom of God*, βασιλεία τοῦ Θεοῦ, and the announcement of Himself as the Head and King of this spiritual empire amid the nations of the world. In order to comprehend its importance and its connexion not only with Christianity, but with the economy of the spiritual universe, the reader's attention may be advantageously recalled to the *Idea of the heavenly Community* described above in chapter V. By the Idea of Spiritual Integrity, essential to the contemplation of the full perfections of divine Being, we found ourselves unavoidably committed to regard the *Deus aller*, the Logos, or only begotten Son and filial Deity, as the Author of all communicated reality, and, in respect of the exegesis of the Father and the utterance of the paternal Will, as the progenitor of the Family of the Sons of God:—spiritualities, whom, called by whatever name, we can conceive only as Humanities; as men differenced from ourselves by their spiritual

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integrity; and as forming a Community or Whole of Members, of whom each and every individual has derivative being in and by the Logos, who is the Head of all and the animating Spirit of the One and heaven-born Whole.

It will be readily conceded that, if heavenly realities were to be revealed on earth, if the task committed to Christ, as to Moses before Him, was to mould earthly facts to the pattern which was showed them in the mount (Exod. xxv. 40), it would have been a part of Christ's work to reveal and realize the Idea of the heavenly community. But it had likewise the practical and essential aim to call out of the world and its sinful seductions all who would in any way listen to the voice of their heavenly Father speaking by their shepherd Christ,—exhorting them to separate themselves from the busy throng who are misled by their lusts and passions, and urging them by the promise of eternal life to join the corporate body which He was in the act of establishing, and in which they might cultivate whatever belongs to their spiritual integration and soul's health, as Christians, with all the aids derived from association and organization. Herein was to be realized what is so beautifully expressed by the symbol of the "true Vine." (John xv. 1.) Our Lord says: "I am the true vine, and my Father is the husbandman."—"Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the

vine, no more can ye, except ye abide in me. I am the vine, ye are the branches: he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit; for without me ye can do nothing." It is plain, indeed, that in the term "spiritual Kingdom" the Idea is enunciated that beyond all the ties of parentage, kindred and nationality, there is to be a bond of spiritual fellowship, an unity and community of godly love, as between the children of a common Father, which corresponds to the Idea of the *Christian Church* universal. And as in the instance of "the true vine" the requisite unity is made intelligible by an organic life of which Christ is the principle, so the higher and moral relation between Christ and His Church is elsewhere represented as that between a Bridegroom and his Bride—at once familiarizing the heavenly and spiritual by the image of domestic love, and at the same time elevating and sanctifying the relations of marriage life. Thus in the mystical language of the Apocalypse,—"And I John saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband. And I heard a great voice out of heaven, saying, Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and he will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself shall be with them, and be their God. And God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes; and there shall be no

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more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away." (Rev. xxi. 2.) And thus, according to the Idea of spiritual integrity, in the consummation of all things, the heavenly will blend with the earthly, when its evil is precipitated and itself purified; and the Blessed, who "are they which are called to the marriage supper of the Lamb," arrayed in "the fine linen" which is "the righteousness of saints," (ibid. xix. 9) shall unite with "the communion of Saints" which is in heaven, and partake of the life which was ordained to them from the beginning, in union with God evermore.

It must be confessed, however, that Christ did not delay the process of realizing the heavenly community here on earth, and that those who are regenerate in Him, and so become citizens of His spiritual Kingdom, already anticipate "the communion of Saints," and only await the perfect consummation in the final restoration of all things. In the Gospels the process of founding and extending the Kingdom of God is exhibited under various similitudes: Such are the parables, contained in Matt. xix., and amongst them that in which it is said "The Kingdom of heaven is like unto leaven," which strikingly illustrates by a sensuous symbol the quick and contagious assimilation of a spiritual operance. Again, in the parable of the Net, the diverse character of those who are brought under the conditions of

conversion is instructively brought out: "The Kingdom of heaven is like unto a net, that was cast into the sea, and gathered of every kind: which when it was full, they drew to shore, and sat down, and gathered the good into vessels, but cast the bad away. So shall it be at the end of the world." PART III.
Chap. VII. Necessarily among all "who profess and call themselves Christians," the good and the bad are mixed. And in the Kingdom of Christ, whilst at work on earth, this mixture must continue, until the final separation of the "few chosen" from the "many called;" when (as in this and in other parables is shown) "He will thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into the garner, but will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire." (Matt. iii. 12.)

This account of "the Kingdom of God," divested of all Millennial fancies, I cannot but consider as a true and simple explanation of the great spiritual institution, in which Christ, as King and Legislator, was to reign supreme; not as the earthly "Messiah" of Judaism; but as the divine chief and spiritual potentate of the whole Humanity—an institution, which, as the Church, was to work in disseminating and establishing Christianity, and which, like a living organism, was to assimilate to itself all that was or might be capable of regeneration, and to reject whatever was self-alienated and worthless. But the Idea, like all other Ideas, belongs to Christianity only as significant of the universal Humanity;

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for what would man become without society? and what would society be without the restraint of law, without institutions for the promotion of civilization and moral cultivation, and without those social conditions which Christ in His Church has shown to be essentially spiritual and religious? Christianity is the Idea of the Spiritual Integration of man, or the process of the development of his proper Humanity;—it implies necessarily a social community, constituted for the purpose of enlightening and enlivening each and all by the power and pattern of absolute integrity whom we name the Logos, and who as the principle of life and light of the community is its indwelling soul. “Ubi anima est, tota est, tota in toto, et tota in quâlibet parte.” Compare category of “Whole and Parts.”

Not an uninteresting question connected with this subject is that which regards the commencement of the reign of our Lord in His spiritual Kingdom. Both Reason and Scripture indicate, as far as I can judge, that it was *de facto* begun at the period of Christ’s official advent, that is, as soon as He entered upon His ministry. It would seem but a narrow interpretation of the idea of a Kingdom of God, which our Saviour came to reveal and realize, to suppose that His advent was only a preparatory teaching for an event postponed to the final thousand years before the destruction of the world and the last judgement. Nay, I confess that the saying of our Lord, which

has been religiously preserved by Luke (xvii. 20), and the highly spiritual character of which (though it vouches for its authenticity) does not altogether harmonize with that of the traditional Gospels, would not be intelligible to me, unless under the assumption that the spiritual Kingdom had begun and was a thing of the present. Indeed it might be truly said that, although unrevealed, Christ's Kingdom had been operative from the beginning of the world. The remarkable passage alluded to runs thus:—
 “And when he was demanded of the Pharisees, when the Kingdom of God should come, he answered them and said, The Kingdom of God cometh not with observation: neither shall they say, Lo here! or, Lo there! for, behold, the Kingdom of God is *within you*.”

It is not a little remarkable that the passage in Luke here referred to is followed by a sort of prediction of awful events, which were to usher in “the day when the Son of man is revealed” (v. 30). That the question touching the “Kingdom of God” should have been mixed up with the reign of Messiah in the Millennium, and with the end of the world, may be perhaps best explained by the inveterate prejudices of the Jews: but it is also connected with the remarkable prophecies attributed to our Saviour in the traditional Gospels. Thus in the twenty-first chapter of Luke, after speaking of the terrible signs in the heavens and on earth, He is made to say: “And

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then shall they see the Son of man coming in a cloud with power and great glory." And further on (verse 31), "So likewise ye, when ye see those things come to pass, know ye that the Kingdom of God is nigh at hand. Verily, I say unto you, This generation shall not pass away, till all be fulfilled." Now it is clear that this remarkable prediction commenced with that of the fall of Jerusalem. In verse 20 we find : "And when ye shall see Jerusalem compassed with armies, then know that the desolation thereof is nigh." It is manifest then that the prediction, attributed to our Saviour, connects the fall of Jerusalem with the end of the world, and with the inauguration of the Kingdom of God by the advent of the Son of man in power and glory. And so literally did the disciples of Christ understand the saying, "This generation shall not pass away till all be fulfilled," that the fulfilment was expected, long after the fall of Jerusalem, by all the early Christians; St. Paul included. And yet how are we to reconcile with truth a prediction that has not been verified to this day? To Christ we dare not attribute the failure, and it is noticeable that the prediction is not to be found in John's Gospel;—indeed the combination of the fall of Jerusalem with the triumphant entrance of the Son of Man into his Kingdom, as an event belonging to the end of the world, is peculiar to the collection of traditions which constitute the Gospel of Luke; and in the other traditional

Gospels the prediction is confined to the destruction of Jerusalem. And in order to account for the discrepancies which encumber the question, I venture to hazard the conjecture that what Jesus really predicted was the fall of Jerusalem with its attendant circumstances, and that this was confounded by his disciples with other sayings relating to the Kingdom of God and spiritual concerns, which they imperfectly comprehended.

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§ 17. The most astounding fact narrated in the Gospels, accredited by the unanimous testimony of the Evangelists, and made the foundation of the preaching of the Apostles, was the *Resurrection of Jesus*, and His converse with His disciples after His death on the cross. Compared with this, all other miracles sink into comparative insignificance; and we may learn the value attached to it in the diffusion of Christianity by a perusal of St. Paul's, 1 Cor. chap. xv., in which he says, verse 14, "And if Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain." It was the demonstration by the fact, and by a "prerogative" instance, that there is a life beyond the grave, nay a resuscitation of the same individuality; but that in order to attain to a true spiritual and everlasting life, we must change the ground, and throw off the obstacles which our carnal and perishable body interposes. But are we bound to believe on the last-mentioned account that a true spiritual being precludes corporeal life? Far from it; and St. Paul

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has taught us a doctrine more in consonance with the realism of the spiritual philosophy which we uphold, and the religion which we profess. The corpse is, indeed, but the dendrite, the perishing unreality of that which has no longer corporeal life and being. It were worse than Egyptian superstition to connect aught permanent and enduring in respect of our future being with the integrity of remains that hasten into decomposition, the worn-out garment and slough of our mortality. And hence St. Paul, in answer to the supposed question, "How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come?" indignantly answers:—"Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die. So also is the resurrection of the dead; it is sown a *natural* body, it is raised a *spiritual* body." And thus, in accordance with the Christian doctrine, and no less with sound physiology, we are truly taught that the reality of our corporeal being consists not in the helpless body of infancy, in the decrepit forms of age, in the wasted relics of suffering and disease, still less in the spoils of the grave, but is that which, amid all its successive changes and varying phases, is both now and hereafter the enduring principle of our bodily life; that this shall be "raised in power;"—"for as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly," "and this mortal must put on immortality:"—as it is the same bodily life, which in the insect

connects, with marvellous power and by subtle and invisible links, the corporeal existence of the larva, the chrysalis, and the winged butterfly, so, in the blessed hope of man's immortality, we believe that the emancipated Psyche shall hereafter soar away in renovated corporeal being, *the same and yet another*, in undying power and beauty.

It is hardly necessary to state formally that the Idea of Spiritual Integrity claims *Immortality* as its own great and reliable truth. The Idea, which is the corner-stone and foundation of spiritual philosophy, necessarily implies, as we have seen, the Being and Existence of One universal Spirit—even God, self-affirmed from eternity as the alone and absolute Will causative of all reality, and in that Self-affirmation uttering Himself in and as the perfection of Being whom we adore as the only begotten Son ; of One divine Spirit, of whom human personalities are *individuations*, and in whom these “live and move and have their being.” We have true Being, inasmuch, and inasmuch only, as we live spiritually in and for God here, and in so far as we may obtain by the grace and power of the only begotten Son the spiritual regeneration, which fits us for everlasting life hereafter. But, these conditions fulfilled, we discard our earthy body “in sure and certain hope of the *resurrection to eternal life* through our Lord Jesus Christ,” and look forward with confidence to living with him evermore, as children

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of God and as indivisibly one with the divine Spirit. "For I am persuaded" (as the holy Paul saith) "that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." (Rom. viii. 38.)

Whoever has conscious possession of the Idea cannot fail to see that his immortal "life is hid with Christ in God" (Coloss. iii. 3);—namely, that the indispensable unity of systematic truth requires One indivisible and eternal Spirit, which, proceeding from One absolute Will, comprehends all diversity in the absolute unity of a Whole and its Parts;—and that, in respect of mankind, every individual is inseparably One in life and being with the Absolute Will, self-affirmed in the Father, and uttered in the only begotten Son, as the Author of all derivative being. Whoever has no life through the Son is *ipso facto* by that condition (though indestructible as spirit by reason of the power of the One eternal and universal Spirit) spiritually dead: he forfeits all true being: he passes unavoidably into the state of Hades, into the unceasing torment of an unappeasable lust of the being he wants.

But how was mankind at large to be relieved from the vain terrors of a natural death, dreaded and lamented as the extinction of the joys of life? How was man to be taught the con-

solatory lesson of a sure hope beyond the grave? PART III.
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 How was he to be convinced of the vanity of the transitory pleasures of the world, how weaned from a sensuality which seeks its excuse in the maxim—"Eat and drink for to-morrow we die?" And how was man to be induced to take the sterner path of duty and virtue, to bear with uncomplaining patience the trials and afflictions which were to ensure to him the future state in which alone "true joys are to be found," and to exclaim with the faith of St. Paul: "I reckon that the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us"? (Rom. viii. 18.) Surely man could only have been convinced of the truth by a demonstrative and sensible fact, which should announce to sinners and sceptics, not a metaphysical argument for its probability, but the reality of a Resurrection of the dead. And who could have better supplied the requisite proof than the same Jesus of Nazareth, who had lived amongst men as a man like unto themselves? even He who by raising up others from the dead had approved Himself to be the Lord of life, and who now bursting the bonds of the grave vindicated the truth of His declaration:—"I am the resurrection and the life: he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live: and whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die." (John xi. 25.)

§ 18. In considering *Redemption* as an act of

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free grace and of spontaneous love, without any admixture of wrath or retributive justice as the condition of salvation, and as attended with no more suffering on the part of the Saviour than was implied in His contact with evil, and His necessity of animating in order to quench it: and therefore adopting a view which is opposed to that of considering it as a propitiatory act for appeasing God's wrath, the whole load of which fell upon the innocent victim of His offended majesty: there is perhaps a difficulty in reconciling the latter view with the scriptural account of Christ's agony in the garden, prior to His death on the cross as a malefactor, and His passionate cry on the cross, "Why hast thou forsaken me!"

Without insisting on the account of the "bloody sweat" which is peculiar to one Gospel, and comparing it especially with the narrative of St. John, it still must be admitted that Christ's feelings were different from those which we might expect from a heroic martyr, who, with the immediate prospect of glory, was on the eve of ascending to heaven, where He was to be welcomed to His Father's bosom, under the jubilee of angels, as the triumphant conqueror of sin and death. He is represented as weighed down by sorrow and anxiety as the catastrophe approaches, and as praying for deliverance from the dreaded event which is to terminate His earthly career and its sufferings:—for anything narrated, He seems to be

absorbed in fastings which indicate only selfish abstraction and strange forgetfulness of His high and glorious mission. How is this to be explained and the Saviour's character duly vindicated? I cannot accept the view that He was then under the sense of being forsaken of God, and of being the pitiless object of God's anger as a reprobate and criminal;—He must have been deprived of intelligence if He could have forgotten the circumstances in which He was placed, the retrospect and prospect of the assured accomplishment of His mission. Nay, so far from being self-succourless at His extremity, we are told that after the agony He received evidence of His Father's commiseration and help, in that angels came and ministered to Him.

We can indeed understand that the body of the man was fatigued and exhausted, that its languishing state favoured the predominance of sad feelings, and was calculated to breed gloomy thoughts; but still we cannot forget the divinity, which could not abandon Him and which shed a halo round His last actions. But if we dare intrude on His thoughts—and the obligations, which Reason imposes, induce us to do so, it may be observed that, in order to quench sin and evil, He had been compelled to revive them from the Hades, to which they had been banished and where they would have remained innocuous everlastingly; and that, although all the conditions for man's salvation had been or were

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about to be accomplished, yet, with every exertion on His part of warning and encouragement and needful help, a considerable portion of the fallen creatures could not but relapse into the spiritual death from which they had been temporarily extricated. If they obstinately resisted and refused the aid of the Word of Life, and remained hardened, impenitent and reprobate sinners, what miracle could save them? Death was inevitable, not as punishment but as consequence. Heaven itself would have been transmuted to a state of unutterable torment; and the heavenly bliss, which consists of Love and all its moral and spiritual fruits, would have been for them for ever a horrible curse.

“The mind is its own place, and can make
A heaven of hell, a hell of heaven.”

Such thoughts could not fail to make a profound and heart-stirring impression on a sensitive mind. Here were pity and grief. With them there might or would have been a sense of guilt, as far as provoking and giving activity to evil was concerned; except that the Saviour could not but be convinced that the work was one of Love, whose object and ultimate aim was for the unqualified good of mankind,—one that His Father necessarily approved,—one during the course of which His Father had cheered and encouraged Him, saying—“This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleased!”

To the Sinner, no doubt, God’s love must

appear as wrath, because it is wholly incompatible, and can have no fellowship with evil, as the Sinner's conscience cannot but testify. But to attribute wrath to God is wholly to mistake the character of a God of Love. His hatred is to sin and evil, and not towards the Sinner whom He desires to purge of his sins in order to make him meet for heaven and everlasting life. We believe then that Christ's agony was not produced by a sense of God's wrath against Him or of abandonment. We regard it as the effect of a sublime pity for the self-inflicted woes of man, and of Christ's consciousness that His self-denial and self-sacrifice could not fully achieve the aim of eternal love. We see in it the heavy weight He experienced in pondering before His departure on the extent of the malady by which man was afflicted, on the deep-rooted and uneradicable nature of evil, the consequent wretchedness of mankind, the perversity and depravity and ever-lapsing of the fallen creature, and the partial failure of the remedy which had been applied at His own cost. These sad thoughts might indeed appal a God-man: but they could not weaken nor turn aside the divine will which was in Christ the Saviour. For it ought not to be forgotten that Christ, as the Logos, was ever during His whole career as much in heaven as on earth. It is inconceivable that He should have left a void in the Trinity, one and indivisible, Jesus was a man like others, but full of God.

CHAPTER VIII.

CHRISTOLOGY CONTINUED.

The Benefits of Christ's Death.

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§ 1. WHAT we affirm of the Logos in Christ, we affirm primarily and essentially *according to the Idea*; that is, not merely according to subjective laws of the human mind, but according to truths of Reason, which are revealed and inspired by God, and of which the historical facts of Christ's Epiphany are "Symbols;"—and by a "Symbol" we mean "a sign included in the Idea which it represents." (See Aids to Reflection, note, p. 254, Ed. 1.) His acts belong essentially to the spiritual order of the world. And we have therefore to meditate on what the "Idea" of His agency demands.

i. It fully accords with the Idea that the Logos in Christ should have been the agent to restore the integrity of the heavenly community, which had been partially disintegrated by the fall of the rebellious spirits, and that in order to the reintegration He should create anew the fallen spirit. It is to be observed, however, that His task was not to reanimate the individuals

of the heavenly community who had forfeited their spiritual being; for this would have tended to paralyze their energy by the revival of their guilty and conscience-stricken memory. He had to *re-individuate* the spiritual chaos, or Hades, into which "the children of God" had been disintegrated, or in which they were perishing. Hence, as has been already said, the work of the Logos in Christ from the foundation of the world was that of raising up the fallen spirit or spirits, and of regenerating them according to the heavenly type in the "image of God," or according to the idea of His own divine Humanity.

ii. We have no less to affirm, according to the Idea, that, in order to the process of redemption, conceived as above, the Logos in Christ must needs *suffer*;—on the one hand, by defeasance of the plenitude or integrity of the divine life; on the other, by voluntarily partaking of the self-inflicted penalty of the fallen spirits, ever perishing under the torment of loss and lust of being.

iii. We affirm, further, that this work of the Logos in Christ was a work of spontaneous love, of self-denial for others, and the instance *eminent* of the abnegation of Self. And this, as we believe, is the true meaning and real significance of the term "Sacrifice:" or rather the act of Christ so characterised is the reality of which all other sacrifices are the shadows. In the economy of the Hebrew theocracy a trans-

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gressor was deemed to procure civil immunity and to propitiate the favour of the divine Ruler by an offering, which, to signify the entire will of the offender, was to be without spot or blemish; and the prophets revealed the inward and spiritual meaning, by calling sternly the sinner to repentance in order to the renewal of a right spirit. But in the economy of Christianity, the Redeemer himself was at once the sacrificial Victim and the Priest, if we adopt the language of Judaism. And *in reality* by His sublime act of self-sacrifice, He not only offered Himself for the sins of the world by taking on Himself their grievous burthen, but at the same time destroyed the very ground of sin, and became Himself the "Way" to eternal life, for all such as willed to be regenerate in Him by reliance on His grace and power. He destroyed, I say, the ground of sin; namely, by substituting for the evil lust of lawless selfishness the only true ground of spiritual being, which He was, as the truth, the light, and the way. It was the act of self-sacrifice, which was to be hereafter consummated and published to mankind; and we believe that the true significance of Christ's death on the cross is that, as crown and "symbol," it revealed and completed that work of self-abnegation for the salvation of man which commenced with the creation of the world.

iv. That the work in question was essentially grounded in the self-denial of Christ has been

already noticed above, in considering that the Suffering Saviour, according to the Idea, being one of the persons of the triune Godhead, must needs forego His sphere of being in the beatitude of divine life, and participate, in order to remedy, the evil state of the fallen spirits. But the final aim and end of this great work of grace and mercy we have to contemplate in the restoration of Sinners, and the atonement offered for their sins, or their At-one-ment with God. And here we have a difficulty to deal with, which, so far as I see, does not properly belong to the subject, whether regarded in relation to Reason or Scripture:—I mean the belief (probably derived from insufficient insight of the true conditions of Hebrew sacrifice) that the sacrifice offered by Christ, in His voluntary abnegation of self, was for the purpose of propitiating the wrath of God, as the penalty required for His offended justice, and as necessary to the reconciliation of God with man. Now it may be admitted that Christ's sacrifice may be rightly deemed to be *expiatory*, since it was offered in order to avert from the transgressor the just penalty which he had incurred; and so also it may be called *propitiatory*, since it was to remove the bar to God's favour, which cannot consist with evil. But how is it possible to reconcile so palpable a contradiction as that the God, who is essentially Love, is a God of wrath, and whose wrath is only to be appeased by the

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sacrifice of His only begotten Son? It is surely forgotten that the Logos in Christ could not have undertaken the task of redemption, unless it had originated in a spontaneous act of merciful love towards His rebellious creatures:—it is surely forgotten that the will of the Logos in Christ, as one of the triune Deity, must necessarily be one with the Will of the Father and the Holy Spirit; and therefore that the work of salvation, if the will of One, must be the Will of the whole Godhead, and grounded in that absolute and perfect love, which is ever ready to be reconciled even with those who have alienated themselves without any other causes than their own hatred and malignity. It is true indeed that God's love, deeply rooted as it is in holiness and spiritual integrity, is utterly incompatible with iniquity and evil; it is true also that fallen creatures, laden with sins, and giving way to evil passions and vicious propensities, can have no fellowship or community with heaven. Nevertheless it was divine love that suggested the remedy and wrought the cure; not by penalties and punishments which might satisfy eternal justice, not by the sacrificial death of an innocent son in order to appease and propitiate the wrath of an offended deity; but by the work of love, spontaneously rendered by Christ and sanctioned by the triune love of the Godhead,—the work of redemption, which was to render the fallen spirits, raised from Hades to their worldly state, worthy

of divine love and acceptable to God's Holiness, by being purged of their sins and by being made new creatures in Christ and regenerated in His divine image.

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But it will be said perhaps, "Is there no wrath, or tantamount affection, in God; when (as admitted) there is such enmity between man and God, that in consequence of man's sins God can have no communion with Him?" I answer, Do not be betrayed into any degrading anthropomorphism of God by any such catch-question. God hates the sin, not the sinner, and never shows His love more than by making holiness the condition of His favour. But the sinner hates God. He, by reason of the divine holiness, alienates himself from God, who loves him, and would save and restore him to his spiritual integrity. Man, however, is of himself utterly helpless to will or to do what is right. And in order that the fallen spirit might attain to his spiritual integrity, God sent His only begotten Son; by whose operance man might have everlasting life—an operance not to appease the wrath of God, but to avert the wrath of Hell.

v. Thus, in accordance with the Idea, the death of Christ on the cross may be fitly regarded as a *Sacrifice*:—in it was that which gives the only real significance to all sacrifices, self-denial for others:—it was the instance *eminenter* of the abnegation of Self. It was, moreover, "*expiatory*;" for it was suffered in order to

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remove that inevitable curse, which was the necessary and self-inflicted penalty (not statutory punishment) of the Will's absolving itself from dependence on God. It may be said further that in this act the Logos in Christ did what man could not do for himself—namely, regenerate the evil Will; and so far He acted for and instead of man. Fulfilling the conditions which justice required of man, He so far acted *vicariously*. Had not Christ suffered, the fallen spirit of man had remained eternally in Hades; but He broke the bonds of death and hell, and approved Himself the “Way” (power and operance) to life eternal.

§ 2. By a careful consideration of the foregoing paragraph it will be found, I venture to think, that the view, which the Spiritual Philosophy offers, is no less in accordance with Scripture than with Reason. It is no doubt difficult to present, in the form of a concise and well-defined theory, the teaching of the Apostles in respect of the work of Christ, as completed by His death and resurrection. At the same time it may be safely admitted that the dominant view was that familiar to them, of contemplating the work of the pardon of sinners in the light of the “sacrifices” of the Old Testament instituted for that purpose in the theocracy. And it may be said that the common object of such sacrifices was to purge the transgressor of his offence (that is, under a theocratical constitution, his sin) and to

restore him to communion with God. Nor ought we to forget, according to the purer teaching of prophets and psalmists, that such sacrifices, in order to be effectual, implied repentance and a change of heart: "The sacrifices of God are a broken spirit: a broken and a contrite heart, O God, thou wilt not despise." Psalm li. 17.

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Taking this view for our guide, we shall not be surprised to find that in the gospel of John i. 29, the Baptist is recorded as saying "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world." And whatever may be the difficulties, which a sceptical criticism has interposed, it would be scarcely possible to deny that a reference is here made to the 53d chapter of Isaiah, in the 7th verse of which it is written: "He was oppressed, and he was afflicted, yet he openeth not his mouth: he is brought as a lamb to the slaughter, and as a sheep before her shearers is dumb, so he openeth not his mouth." This is spoken of the same, who in verse 5 is described in the words: "he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon him; and with his stripes we are healed."

It cannot be doubted that the doctrine delivered by St. John and other Apostles was that Christ is the sacrificial victim, by the shedding of whose blood our offence is condoned, the offender pardoned, and reconciled with God;—not forgetting to lay it to the hearts of converts

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that, by the bestowal of so great a mercy as the atonement derived from Christ's cross and passion, God would require them to walk as children of light, worthy of their high calling and mindful of their privileges as sons of God. That Christ's death on the cross, as a sacrifice and covenant of peace, was the basis of apostolical teaching may be gathered from various important passages of the New Testament. Thus, as in the institution of the Passover the Israelites were saved by the instrumentality of the Paschal Lamb, so the new and living covenant is ratified at the celebration of the feast by the words of our Saviour recorded by Matthew (xxvi. 28): "For this is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins." And so the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews (ix. 22) teaches in the same spirit: "And without shedding of blood there is no remission;" that is to say, without an expiatory sacrifice there can be no remission of sin. And this argument he applies to the sacrifice of Christ, who not as a High Priest "entereth into the holy place every year with the blood of others," but "now once in the end of the world hath appeared to put away sin by sacrifice of himself;" and in this point of view, peculiar to the writer of this epistle, on grounds mentioned in the preceding chapters, he considers Christ "the Son, as a High Priest who is consecrated for evermore," (vii. 28) and "is set on the right hand of the

throne of the Majesty in the heavens" (viii. 1). PART III.
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 The same view of the saving work of Christ, as of the nature of an expiatory sacrifice, we find in 2 Cor. v. 19, 21: "To wit, that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them;"—"for he hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him." Again, Rom. iii. 25: "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins." And so Peter: "Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree, that we being dead to sins, should live unto righteousness: by whose stripes ye were healed." (1 Peter ii. 24, comp. Isaiah liii.)

It would be a mere work of supererogation to furnish further proofs, that the teaching of the Apostles inculcated no other doctrine than that Christ's work of salvation was of the nature of expiatory sacrifice, offered for the sins of mankind; or as we should say, in accordance with the Idea, that He consecrated Himself to this work of divine mercy by self-sacrifice (that is to say, by self-denial, by the abnegation of self) for those who otherwise had been lost for evermore, but who thereby were and are restored to their forfeited privileges and spiritual powers as Sons of God.

I venture to think also that it would not be edifying to trace the dogmatic teaching of the early Church in those various phases of thought

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which are presented in patristic theology: but it may deserve notice that an attempt was made to give a philosophical interpretation of the mystery of salvation. It was not however till near the close of the eleventh century that any definite theory was framed. At that period Anselm of Canterbury, in his celebrated work "*Cur Deus Homo?*" propounded, with the general approbation of his contemporaries, his doctrine that Christ's death was the "satisfaction" rendered to God's justice for man's violation of His laws:—namely, that divine justice necessarily requires the punishment of mankind for insulting the divine majesty by their sins; but that God has granted a remission of the penalty which man cannot pay, and has accepted as acquittal the voluntary offering of His Son; who, as God and Man, can render due "satisfaction" for man's delinquency. Hugo Grotius endeavoured to amend this theory. He urged that God should not be considered as aggrieved; but that, as the moral Governor of the world, He could not, without abandoning the holiness of His legislation, dispense with the punishment due to man for his transgressions, unless the punishment were borne by another, and so "satisfaction" rendered to the law, and its authority vindicated:—further that Christ, being without sin, and therefore not subject to punishment, had, by His voluntary surrender of Himself to suffering and death, offered the required "satisfaction;" and that

God had of His grace accepted it as a full and plenary acquittal of man's debt :—but he adds that Christ did not suffer the same punishment, nor so much as man ought to have done ; He did not suffer the pains of Hell, and was only subject to punishment in general.

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It would be worse than useless to devote any detailed criticism to these theories ; but as, in both of them, the main argument turns upon the force of the term “ equivalent,” and in a manner calculated to mislead those who might rely upon it as a help to religious truth, I feel bound to offer some remarks on the point here mooted. Now it is admitted, we will say, that the penalty of unrepented and obdurate sin is spiritual death ; and that the universal state of man was such as to render him obnoxious to this inevitable consequence of his natural pravity and its evil effects, unless an adequate remedy could be found to relieve his wretchedness and to restore him to the conditions of righteousness. Such a remedy, we believe, was found in Christ as the suffering Saviour. According to the Church-doctrine, “ Christ has made satisfaction for the sins of all those who repent of their sins, and return to God in the way of sincere though imperfect obedience.” . . . “ Such a sense of the word satisfaction, though not in strict propriety of speech amounting to the payment of a debt, is agreeable to the use of the word in the Roman *law* ; where it signifies *to content a person aggrieved*,

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and is put for some valuable consideration, substituted instead of what is proper payment, and consistent with the remission of that debt, or offence for which such supposed satisfaction is made." * It is plain then that the term "satisfaction," in relation to the work of Christ in question, is used in the sense of "equivalent," as that which was equal in value, or deemed to be equal in value, with the debt incurred by man. But the debt here signified was the necessary penalty of sin, and the penalty of sin is death, spiritual and eternal. Now what can be deemed the "equivalent" of spiritual perdition, and how can the amount of its value be assessed? It is most certain that Christ did not pay the debt of man in kind, since the penalty would have robbed Him of His saving power; and how can it be shown that His death on the cross, or all His temporal sufferings together, were "equivalent" to that which man ought to have suffered?

It is true, as we have noticed, that the term "equivalent" needs not always mean that which is of equal value, but may be used to signify "in exchange for" as an equitable compensation for somewhat disparate. But how dare we apply this low view in a case in which the question relates to divine justice? Divine justice is perfect justice, and cannot depart from its inexorable rule "*cuique suum tribuere*," to assign to every one his due without fear, favour or par-

* Hooker, Church Dictionary, p. 508.

tiality. And can we attribute to the God of justice that He accepted as a compensation the temporal sufferings of Christ for the eternal sufferings due to guilty man, or that He inflicted the punishment of sin on One who was sinless and innocent? We have doubtless heard that in China, a criminal condemned to death may for a sum of money obtain a substitute, who is executed instead of him; but surely no civilized person can regard the death of the innocent victim as the equivalent for the death of the culprit, or otherwise than as contrary to the principle of justice. Again, the Anglo-Saxon laws allowed the criminal in many cases to purchase exemption from the penalty; that is, the punishment was commuted to a fixed sum of money: but, although the remains of the custom still exist, and such commutation may be regarded as an equivalent, yet it could have been deemed such only by a rude people, still little enlightened on the subject of criminal justice. Another example is furnished in the *expiatory sacrifice* of the Hebrews; and, as we have had occasion to notice, the death of the animal on whom the transgression was laid was deemed the "equivalent" for the punishment incurred by the offender:—but in this instance, it is to be recollected that the sacrifice was not the price at which a pardon was bought; the pardon was the free gift of Jehovah, and, as we learn from their prophets, in consideration of the

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offender. In short, it may be safely said that, for a spiritual act, there can be no true "equivalent" in the world of the senses except in so far as the phenomenal is the outward sign or symbol of the inward and spiritual agency at work therein.

But let us look at the subject in another aspect. A man's offended honour, or injured character, may be restored by the confession of the offender that the charge was untrue or unintentional. Here the confession may be justly considered as an "equivalent" for the offence. But if the offender has injured a man in what cannot be restored, and for which there can be no compensation, all that the offender can do is to implore of the injured person pardon and forgiveness. And this instance brings us nearer to the case we are considering:—for if, as has been throughout maintained in this essay, spiritual death, or perishing, is the necessary consequence of sin and guilt, and its only remedy spiritual regeneration, then the work of Christ, whatever sufferings may have been incidental to it, was not to bear a punishment due only to iniquity, but was to make *intercession* for those who were indeed worthy of death, and to present them under conditions of grace which justified their pardon.

It is quite true that God cannot permit sin and evil in his moral government, and that He of His holy Will cannot but eradicate and exter-

minate them. But the “satisfaction,” not to be bartered for any “equivalent,” cannot but be the “satisfaction” of a God of love and mercy, and cannot but consist in extirpating evil by restoring sinners to the condition of original righteousness from which they had fallen. And such we conceive to have been the purpose of God in the redemptive work of Christ Jesus;—“to wit, that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself.” (2 Cor. v. 19.) On the other hand the term “justice,” as used by Anselm and Grotius, expresses a mere abstract conception; and though abstractly justice implies retribution, and retribution requires punishment for transgressions against the moral law, yet the Idea of a God of unqualified love and mercy obliges us to reconcile in Him the attributes of justice and mercy; and this, I venture to say is achieved when we contemplate His work in Christ as ideally the conversion of Evil into Good:—for although, as St. Paul says,* “the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness,” yet, as we have seen, He qualifies it by the message of mercy “that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself.”

It would be unpardonable to omit here some


* Rom. i. 18. I have no hesitation in assuming that the “righteousness of God” in this verse includes the conception of “justice,” and that the expression “wrath of God” is not to be understood anthropomorphically, but as implying a holy zeal intolerant of iniquity.

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reference to Coleridge's luminous exposition of the doctrine of Redemption contained in the "Aids to Reflection," especially in the "Comment" which begins at p. 241, 4th Ed. But having hereafter to quote parts of that exposition (see *infra*, Part IV, ch. iii. § 4) I may here content myself by referring to it in a single point of view. Coleridge particularly insists on the metaphorical character of the expressions which St. Paul uses with reference to the consequences of Christ's death, and argues that the too literal acceptance of St. Paul's language has led to an unscriptural doctrine of Redemption. I would however observe with respect to Coleridge's whole argument, admirable as it is, that St. Paul would scarcely have admitted that, in speaking of the "sacrifice" of Christ, he was using a "metaphor;"—"the purpose of which is to illustrate a something less known by a partial identification of it with some other thing better understood, or at least more familiar." And, while admitting that the terms and phrases which Coleridge considered as "metaphors" are (whether singly or collectively) but partial expressions of the whole truth, I yet, under the guidance of spiritual philosophy, venture to think it more in accordance with the Idea, and with the teaching of the Apostles, to contemplate the Redemptive Act itself, though a transcendent mystery, as a *Sacrifice*—indeed as the most real of sacrifices, namely self-sacrifice; and to contemplate the

Divine Agent as the “quicken- ing (ζωοποιοῦν, life- making) spirit,” who, in and by that redemp- tive act, infused life and light into His fallen creatures in order to their regeneration as children of God.

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PART FOURTH.

THE IDEA OF CHRISTIANITY IN RELATION TO
CONTROVERSIAL THEOLOGY.



CHAPTER I.

RETROSPECT AND SUMMARY, WITH REGARD TO THE
FIRST ARTICLE OF THE CHURCH.

§ 1. It is now intended more explicitly to show that the Principles of Christianity are essentially part of the original constitution of the human mind, and are implied in the gift of Reason, considered, as has been throughout inculcated, as the divine Logos, who, in revealing Himself, enlivens and enlightens man to the apprehension of those eternal truths which are essential to his Spiritual Integration, according to that Idea of Spiritual Integrity of which the Logos is the eternal pattern in the heavens. It is not to be supposed, however, that any attempt will be made to place the evidences of Christianity on a purely speculative or philosophical basis, or to deny the reality and necessity of the outward revelation recorded in sacred history. It can scarcely be doubted that the design of Providence, to educate and train mankind to the spiritual and mundane religion which Christianity was intended to be, would have been frustrated, but for that supernatural light which He has graciously vouchsafed to man, in order to

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make known to him from time to time the purposes of the divine economy. The gift of Reason denotes the aptitude of the recipient for instruction, the human spirituality which is to be developed into distinct consciousness and holy living:—the supernatural process is the providential interposition which unfolds to man his spiritual destination.

§ 2. In behoof of the proof and demonstration of this crowning result of spiritual philosophy—namely, that the *Principles* of Christianity are essentially part of the original constitution of the human mind, it will be necessary to state the essential Articles of the Christian Faith, according to the doctrine held by the Catholic Church, as derived from its divine Head and Founder, and propagated by His Apostles under the guidance of the Spirit of Truth;—it will be necessary, I say, to state the essential Articles of Christian Faith, in order to show, by comparison with the principles of the spiritual constitution of man, that both represent the same truths of Reason, the same Ideas.

In undertaking the delicate task, if it may not rather be called the over-bold attempt, of furnishing an exposition of the doctrine of the Church Universal, I trust, considering the controversies that have existed and still continue to divide the churches of Christendom, that I may presume on the forbearance of the reader not to expect more than that succinct account, which our

purpose requires, of the fundamental doctrines of the Christian religion :—though the attempt, if it succeeds, may go far to show “*quod semper, ubique et ab omnibus, credendum est.*”

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First, however, the reader may inquire whether the *Rule of Faith*, upon which the Church proceeds, is at variance with that which the spiritual philosophy adopts. It may be said, I think, that the Church affirms unconditionally that the Christian Religion is an immediate communication from God, which human Reason could not have attained, and has no claim to criticise ; and that its truths are contained in Holy Scripture, which, as the word of God, is its own interpreter and their sole criterion. Now it is not to be supposed that the Spiritual Philosophy sets the Church at defiance ; for, assuming that the above citation of the judgment of the Church be correct, the attentive student will know that no such claim for “human” Reason has been set up by our philosophy as that of inventing or discrediting religion ; and that wherever “Reason” has been described, it has been spoken of as a spiritual illumination poured into the heart and mind of man by the Divine Logos himself ; who, according to the Gospel of St. John, is the source of life and light to every man that cometh into the world. We cannot, therefore, be under any considerable or dangerous error, when we believe and affirm that, as there is an *outward revelation* recorded in the scriptures, so, by the actuation of

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the Logos, as the divine source of Truth, there is also an *inward revelation*;—the first, an outward revelation by *Facts*, which realize in the sphere of sensible experience the Idea of which they are representatives; the second, an inward revelation by *Ideas*, the work of divine Reason in the soul of man, by which divine truth is apprehended and recognised. And I cannot but add, that if revealed truth were merely of the nature of a *datum*, it would be difficult or impossible to conceive how, without any corresponding faculty of apprehension, it could become intelligible to mankind. To “reveal” a mystery of religion is surely to disclose and to make it known as standing in some intelligible and ostensible relation to the spiritual being of man. In the Scripture, so far as I am aware, we do not find language used, which would place religious truth above Reason or Knowledge. It is true that spiritual mysteries are not to be conceived or comprehended by the mere logical understanding; but as St. Paul (1 Cor. ii. 10) says, “God hath revealed them unto us by His Spirit; for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God;” and we are partakers of that Spirit through the Logos, who is for us the light, the truth, and the way. Now, in the sense in which the Spiritual Philosophy employs the term “Reason,” I do not hesitate to affirm that the truths of the Christian religion are addressed to the “Reason” and Conscience of

man, and that Conscience is human Will when enlivened and enlighthened by *divine* Reason.

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§ 3. Proceeding then upon this fundamental proposition, which I believe is perfectly scriptural, and upon the sure ground that the Christian religion eminently challenges the most searching investigation of Truth so immutable “that the gates of hell shall not prevail against it,” I venture to affirm, that the end and aim of the *Christian Religion*—and that is, of *Religion* in the only proper sense of the word, is to promote the *spiritual integration* of mankind, individually and collectively.

§ 4. In order to see the force of the last position, it will be necessary to revert once more to the *nature of Man*; and it is hardly necessary to observe that the Scripture, the Church and the Spiritual Philosophy, are in perfect accordance on the important distinction of the *Natural* and *Spiritual* man; namely, of the tendency of man by nature to moral pravity, and, on the other hand, of his capability to be spiritually enlightened and enlivened by Him who is the power and pattern of holiness, righteousness and spiritual integrity.

It would be idle to repeat here what has been fully considered at an earlier stage of the argument; but I may refer the reader, who is desirous of refreshing his memory, to Part III. chap. i., where he will find the due exposition of the principles, upon which the Spiritual Philo-

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sophy professes to give intelligibility to the realization of the Idea of Spiritual Integration, and meanwhile the following *Propositions* recapitulate the chief results:—

i. That *the Will* is the fundamental principle of a philosophy of Realism.

ii. That *every Will* by its very nature tends to be *absolute*, but, in striving to be absolute in its own selfish particularity, must, according to the light of Reason, confess that the striving of a particular Will to be absolute is *self-contradictory*.

iii. That man is thereby brought to recognize his *natural pravity*, and, by the awakening of the *Conscience* under the actuation and influx of divine Reason, is induced to crave for the supplement and complement necessary for the integration of his spiritual being.

iv. That the pravity, which consists in the tendency of every Will to be absolute in its own particularity, persistently remains, and constitutes *Selfishness*, *Self-will*, and all the forms of self-lust that belong to this root of *Evil*. And that the aim of self-integration is, on the other hand, *Self-denial shown in love for others*.

v. That the spiritual development of man depends upon the revelation to him of the Idea of Spiritual Integrity, that is, upon the immediate operance of God on and in man's soul or Will, by the Logos, who, as the divine Reason, is the power and pattern of absolute Spiritual Integrity.

vi. That the organ of communion between God and Man is the *Conscience*, that is, the individual Will when duly enlightened and enlivened by the divine Spirit or spiritual Reason; and that, in order to apprehend effectually the speculative Idea of God, every man must in and for himself feel, and more or less know, the presence and actuation of God's Spirit.

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And thus, having made intelligible the primary distinction in the nature of man of an inherent tendency by nature to pravity, and at the same time of a spiritual capability dependent upon his actuation by divine Reason and Truth, the Spiritual Philosophy may not only claim to be in accord with the Christianity of the Church and Scripture, but to have enunciated this fundamental truth as the common and universal principle of *Humanity*; namely, that man attains to his proper dignity by the influx of the light and life of the divine Reason.

§ 5. But it is said above that man's spiritual development depends upon the revelation of, and actuation by, *the Idea of God*; and no less the Church Catholic demands of every christian the acknowledgment of the Idea in the prescribed form of the Holy Trinity. See 1st Article of the Church of England. And if any doubt has existed with regard to the scriptural authority of the dogma, it may be safely asserted that if the Scripture does not express, it throughout implies the Tri-unity; and that, in the language of the

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Chap. I. that we worship one God in Trinity, and Trinity in Unity."

How the Spiritual Philosophy deals with this Mystery may be more fully learnt by reference to other parts of this Essay ; from which, however, I shall repeat here the most noteworthy results. And before I do so, it may be convenient to the reader to follow up what has been above said in respect of man's spiritual development, by reminding him how man has the "Idea of Spiritual Integrity" lighted up in his soul. The main points may be comprised in the following statement :—

i. Under the sense of his own utter spiritual incapacity to realize that which as a Will he cannot but ardently desire—namely, his spiritual being, and this absolute, man becomes more or less cognizant of a Power which reveals itself by acting in and upon him, and which, when contemplated in the brightness of its own evidence, is the Idea of God.

ii. This revelation to man is the Idea, and process of the Idea, of Spiritual Integrity, or that which is to empower him to integrate himself and perfect his spiritual being. This truth he may apprehend with more or less favour ; but he will perceive that it is not only independent of his Will, but is contrary to what he would will ; since it forbids the selfish particularity of Will, which he desires to be

absolute, and imposes on him the restraint and obligation of self-denial in order to that integrity of spiritual being which, as a Will, he cannot but desire to realize.

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iii. Hence, then, the natural or unregenerate spirit cannot but feel and know that the Idea of Integrity, which acts upon him, is alien, ab extra; for it is a power against which his Will strives and contends. But, at the same time, he cannot but be made sensible that it offers the only conditions under which he can realize his spiritual being. And thus he becomes cognizant of the Moral Law, and therewith of his *Obligation*, as a rational being, to conform himself to an alien power, which, as a natural and unregenerate spirit, he must hate and detest.

iv. Meanwhile in whatever degree man's spirit has become enlightened and enlivened to accept the gracious actuation of "the true Light" revealed to him, he will acknowledge, so far as his growing powers of contemplation permit, that, in raising his mind to behold with dazzled gaze the Idea of absolute spiritual perfection and integrity, or even the highest form of integration to which his yet unpractised speculation may have attained, he derives the actuation of spiritual light and life *from above*—yea, from the indwelling presence of God in and by His eternal Son.

v. It may be added that, in order to conscious possession, the Idea must be contemplated

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abstractly as speculative truth, which is the business of Philosophy; but that in order to spiritual life, which is Religion, the Idea must also actuate, enliven, and become the very principle of the life of the spirit and its affections.

§ 6. In continuance of the all-important subject proposed at the commencement of the last paragraph, I have now to remind the student of the results obtained by the Spiritual Philosophy—here set down with philosophical candour, though, I trust, not without observing due reverence—for rightly contemplating the Idea of God. And they may be briefly comprised in the following Propositions:—

i. If the Idea of absolute spiritual integrity, contemplated objectively or as an object, is what by the necessity of our rational nature we call *God*; and if we recognize God, as the Idea of absolute spiritual integrity, inasmuch and in as far as we find ourselves actuated by His operance and indwelling presence, it is evident that what is commonly called the “Proof” of the existence of God is *demonstrative*, and not the result of logical reasoning;—in other words, that “the existence of God” is no work of inference or proof, but is a fact of spiritual experience, and is intuitively apprehended by our rational and spiritual nature—in short, is an immediate revelation communicated in and by the *Light of Reason*. (Comp. § 6, chap. ii. Part III.)

ii. But an essential condition of the conscious

possession of the Idea of God is that of ever contemplating Him in *Personal Being*. If we consult the facts of our own consciousness (and where else can we seek the evidence of truth?) we find that, in order to conceive aught permanent in ourselves, anything real in being or agency, it is unconditionally necessary that the Will should will itself. In order "to be," it must continuously and permanently will its Self; and this we recognise in ourselves as the constant act of self-affirmation expressed by the verb substantive "I am." In order to be a Will in any proper sense of the word, the Will must will, what it cannot otherwise than will, its own being as one undivided Will, must will itself continuously, permanently, invariably and self-consistently;—and this is what we mean by an individual Will or a "Person."

But if we cannot conceive any being in ourselves without this continuous act of Self-affirmation or Self-ponency, which constitutes our individuality, and which we designate as our *Personality*, so neither can we conceive any Will except under the same conditions; and even the Idea of Absolute Will would escape us except under the conception of Personality. The very term "Will" loses all force and significance when divided from conscious predetermination, intention, deliberation, and the like attributes of conscious mind and personality; and we only cheat ourselves by a mere abstract figment, when

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we assume the reality of a causative process implying intelligence, or of a self-established law, apart from a conscious subject or self-ponent Will; required as this is, to give any intelligible conception of the unity, purpose and final aim, of any agency, contemplated or in progress. The Absolute Will, causative of all reality and therefore of its own, is the eternal act of Self-affirmation or Self-ponency. And this act, which we dare not divide, as any stage in the process of realization, from the Absolute Will causative of reality, is in this relation the essential act of Personëity, and may be designated *Deus subjectivus*, Ipsëity, the Absolute subject, "I am."

It is not true, as the disciples of Spinoza assert, that the finition, supposed to be implied in personality, would be a limitation by negation of the divine Being, which is essentially infinite, boundless, illimitable, absolute, and can by no possibility, without contradiction to the essential character of Deity, be conceived as suffering negation. And without stopping to refute, though protesting against, the position, that "all finition is negation," I have to remind the reader that, as above shown, the essential character of Personality consists in the continuous act of Self-ponency or Self-affirmation, expressed by the verb substantive "I am;" and I venture to affirm that even the Absolute Will cannot be otherwise conceived than self-ponent and affirm-

ing the divine personality; for, although necessarily *se finiens* (that is, so far finific as by His own Will He determines himself to be) He cannot affirm Himself to be other than "The Absolute Will." The character of Absolute Will is no otherwise changed than by the eternal act of the self-ponency of Absolute Will, without which, except by a wilful abstraction, Absolute Will would be inconceivable as Will in any proper sense of the word. The Absolute Will, I repeat, eternally affirms Himself to be the Absolute Will; and in this act of Personality, never in our contemplation of God to be divided from absolute Will, we apprehend Him truly; not merely and abstractedly as absolute Will, but *personally* as the Divine Author and Creator causative of all reality. (Compare the fuller exposition, Part III. chap. ii.)

§ 7. After the exposition which I have elsewhere given of the *Idea of the Blessed Trinity* (Part III. chap. iii.) it will not here be necessary to do more than compare the two points of view in which the doctrine may be seen;—viewed, namely, as a dogma of the Church Catholic; and viewed as a truth of Reason, which the Spiritual Philosophy affirms it to be.

I have urged that, in order to arrive at a just conception of the Idea of God, the student must meditate on God as at once the origin and archetype of all Ideas, and must contemplate Deity in the three relations which are essential to the

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idea of the tri-une God ; that these, however, are not mere relations, but realities, and indeed the highest realities ; and again, that they are not dividuous entities, such as three individual men, but one and the self-same Spirit in distinctive self-hypostatic acts. And I have pointed out what is the value of this doctrine, as preserving for us the Idea of God in its integrity :—“ first, the one self-affirmed Absolute Will, above and unconfounded with nature and the world, as the safeguard against Pantheism ;—secondly, as the Divine Alterity, the divine Principle in all and through all derivative being, the Humanity, which worketh in all men and is the Life and Light of the world, as the effectual antidote against degrading anthropomorphism, and the misty and unintelligible notions of abstract theism ;—thirdly, as the divine Life, which, in preserving the distinctness of the relations, unites and perpetuates them, as the necessary integration of the Idea, and the corrective to the possibility of contemplating God other than an indivisible Unity.”

In order to understand that the idea of the Trinity may be legitimately accepted as a truth of Reason, the reader is referred to the *Axioms of Rational or Spiritual Integration*, which will be found in Part II. chap. iii. of this work.

§ 8. Pursuing the exposition of the idea of the Holy Trinity, to which we have already referred (Part III. chap. iii.) the student's atten-

tion is called again to the following Propositions,* PART IV.
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viz.—

i. “The first relation of the Deity has its ultimate ground in the act of Personēity, by which God eternally affirms Himself as Absolute Will, causative of all reality, and inclusively of His own.”

ii. But “if the former self-hypostatic act be the eternal act of self-affirmation, the correspondent relation, if the causality is to be conceived as absolute, can be no other than the *utterance of the same Absolute Will in Alterity*: a personal relation indeed, but a personal relation which contains the plenitude of the same Absolute Will, though in the altered relation of alterity. It is, namely, the *Alter Ego*, another “I am,” and the *Person* of the Godhead in its absolute utterance and fulness of manifestation. If the former be the archetype of all *self-derivative* reality, the latter is the archetype of all *communicated* reality.” In this second relation of the Godhead we contemplate Him whom we call under His most pregnant name the *Logos*; the inexhaustible birth-place, the perfect pattern, and the eternal form (*forma formans*) of all Ideas, *Idea Idearum*. “In respect of His divine relations, He is, as we have just seen, the *divine Alterity*:—the Absolute Will, at one and the same moment concentrates itself in the Ipsēity,

* [Mr. Green, in transcribing the propositions, has made a few verbal differences, which generally I have thought it best to preserve.—J. S.]

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and, flowing over as it were, co-eternally utters itself in the filial Alterity. And in order to be ideally all that we mean, the Alterity must be the full and sole recipient of the self-affirmed all-causative relation, the reciprocator of Him who gives without any withholding, and the exegesis or expositor of His divine perfections:—the Logos, or Word of God, is, I repeat, the *Alter Ego*. That which is *subjectively* affirmed in the Paternal Relation is uttered and *objectively* realized in the Filial Alterity. The religious mind, namely, has endeavoured to express the relation by the figure, sanctioned by Scripture, and probably the most appropriate that could be chosen, of *Father and Son*; calling the act, by which the relation is produced, the “eternal generation,” and the second relation of the Godhead “the only begotten Son,” who is said to be the express image of the Father, the brightness of His glory, the sole object of His love and plenary satisfaction;—since less would detract from the integrity of the act and the perfection of the Idea.”

iii. But there is a “third Relation, necessary to complete the Idea of the tri-une Godhead; and if we have succeeded in securing the distinction of the Ipsëity and Alterity, we have now to contemplate in these distinctions that, which, whilst it preserves the distinctions unconfounded, secures their indivisible unity. This third Relation may be conceived under the name

of the *Community*. I do not, however, propose to use the term in the sense of a mere bond, *vinculum*, or association of the relations in question. On the contrary, I see no reason to differ from the orthodox view of the Church, and am quite prepared to uphold her doctrine, that the relation under review is a like personality to the two personal relations out of which it proceeds under the name of the Holy Spirit. In other words, the Idea demands that we contemplate the *Godhead as Absolute Will thrice uttered and self-substantiated in tri-personal reality*; and the third Relation as unequivocally 'personal,' since it is the self-affirmation and hypostasis of the Absolute Will, though here combining the relative distinctions in that of the eternal *Life* of the One indivisible Godhead." And it is worthy of especial notice that herein we find the full intelligibility of the highest form of spiritual Will, namely *Love*;—not as if Love can be supposed to be absent from any one of the relations, though predominantly realized in that relation which is here named the divine Life. Here, namely, is expressed what is essential to the fulness of divine Being—the inseparable union of counterparts, considered as Persons: here the eternal Father and the co-eternal Son: who, in this relation, complete their being in and for each other, and find their plenary beatitude in the union.

Finally, in having thus stated the doctrine of

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the Spiritual Philosophy with respect to the Holy Trinity, I venture to add that I should be at a loss to point out any essential difference in it from that of the universal Church, except in so far as I have vindicated its claim to be a truth of Reason as well as of Tradition. I will not however withhold, or conceal, my doubt, whether the "Spirit of Truth," promised by our Lord (John, chap. xiv. verse 16) as "another Comforter," be rightly interpreted to designate the third person of the Trinity, and does not rather mean the Spirit of Christ as "the true Light," who, when His personal presence should be no longer needed, would continue to animate and inspire His disciples.* We might say the same of the Holy Ghost as spoken of in Acts, especially on the day of Pentecost. But when the Holy Ghost is elsewhere spoken of, as the bond of Fellowship, and as the condition of Sanctification, we may venture to suppose that the third

* But compare John xiv. 26, "*But the Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, He shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance, whatsoever I have said unto you.*" This might seem to be decisive against my interpretation: but it may make only this difference, that the Logos having acted specially in Christ during His earthly sojourn, now on His departure promises His disciples that He will not leave them comfortless, and will come to them (v. 18) as "the Spirit of truth," that is, as the Holy Ghost;—or, in other words, though He withdraws His personal presence, He will still actuate them; and this the more effectually, that His operance will be *through* the Spirit, which is that of the whole Godhead. Christ takes His leave of His earthly disciples as the Son of God, but He promises to return and to abide with them for ever (v. 16) with the whole power of God contained in and represented by the Holy Ghost.

Relation of the Trinity is intended; and that a spiritual and characteristic agency is exercised, of admitting true Christians to be, even in this world, partakers in some measure of the Divine Life, and to have a foretaste of its beatitude.

§ 9. In a work of this kind, of which the main object is philosophical, it would be out of place to devote any considerable space to *Theological Controversies*; and were it required, I should at once confess my inability to undertake the task, belonging as it does to the historian of the Church and its dogmatic teaching. Yet the subject cannot be wholly passed over, if the relation of Christianity to the Idea is to be made fully intelligible. And I have the greater inducement to make some observations of a philosophical character on the main points of controversial theology, in consequence of a striking remark of Coleridge's, to the effect that, in the progress of Christian teaching, "conceptions" had usurped the place of "ideas," and that it was reserved for our great reformer, Luther, to make the heroic attempt to restore the latter to their rightful supremacy.

Confining myself to those doctrinal controversies, in which the Idea of Christianity has been endangered by errors which it is the proper business of the Spiritual Philosophy to detect and confute; and omitting, as of insufficient interest, the earliest polemics of the Christian Church—such as the antagonism between Peter's tendency

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to judaize Christianity and Paul's grand and true view of universalizing the christian religion, and the otherwise interesting subject of the temporary influence of the Gnostic Systems ; I proceed, in connexion with the previous paragraphs, to a brief retrospect of the *Trinitarian controversy*.

In this controversy figure prominently the names of Sabellius, Arius and Athanasius, not to mention those of others, whose views, under the appellations Monarchian, Patripassian, &c. divided the Church, until the orthodox dogma was fixed and authoritatively promulgated at the Council of Nice, A.D. 325, in the well-known formula of the Nicene Creed which declares that the only begotten Son is *γεννηθεὶς, οὐ ποιηθείς*, and moreover *γεννηθεὶς ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ Πατρὸς, Θεὸς ἐκ Θεοῦ, φῶς ἐκ φωτός, Θεὸς ἀληθινὸς ἐκ Θεοῦ ἀληθινοῦ, ὁμοούσιος* (consubstantialis) *τῷ Πατρί*. This celebrated term *ὁμοούσιος*, associated as it unavoidably is with the doctrine of the "eternal generation" of the Son, was deemed the stronghold of the controversy ; and the proposal from the opposite party of substituting the term *ὁμοιούσιος*—of "like" substance instead of "same" substance—was indignantly rejected by the orthodox trinitarians. And it may be here observed, that the doctrine of the Spiritual Philosophy fully coincides with that which, since the Council of Nice, the Church universally recognizes as the truth ; and necessarily so,

since, if the Son is to be conceived as divine and essential to the Godhead, He must be conceived as "consubstantial" (that is, of the self-same Spirit or divine Will) with the Father; and God cannot be conceived as One in the Trinity otherwise than as the self-same divine Spirit self-hypostatic in each of the distinctions. And let it be recollected that this controversy is no idle logomachy. It is essential to the interests of our spiritual being to contemplate in the Godhead the distinctions which secure the Idea of a personal God; namely, the Absolute Will self-affirmed as the Father, who cannot be contemplated otherwise than as above and unconfounded with the world; but who in His only begotten Son is ever in the world, and in communion with the world, and is ever working for its heavenly restoration and integration; while all temptation to sever the idea of their absolute and indivisible union is forbidden by the contemplation of the one Spiritual Life, which they eternally enjoy. Hence, whatever harshness there may be in the damnatory clause of the so-called "Creed of St. Athanasius," I am disposed to regard it as meaning that, whoever does not hold the catholic faith in the Trinity cannot be expected to fulfil the obligations of a christian life, or to give such an account of his works at the final judgment as shall confer on him a claim to life everlasting.

I have already alluded to the fact that the

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early Church, as we see indeed by the Apostles' Creed, had not received from Scripture or tradition the expressly revealed doctrine of the Trinity; though, in assuming unavoidably the intimate relation or union of the three Persons or Hypostases of the Godhead, in whatever form of combination, the Church could scarcely avoid adopting the doctrine of their Unity, in order to a consistent dogma of the one and indivisible Deity. But in conceiving such unity, the understanding, judging by the forms of experience, felt a difficulty which may be logically expressed as follows :—

Whatever impairs the oneness of the conception
 impairs the conception of the one God ;
 a threefold of divine persons impairs the one-
 ness of the conception ; therefore
 a threefold of divine persons impairs the con-
 ception of the one God.

It is evident that the objection proceeds from formal and conceptual logic, and the difficulty felt by the understanding of conceiving One as Three and Three as One. One, or one-ness, is used as an abstract generic conception or term, in order to include under it a class of things, of which the term expresses the common mark ; as when we say that a horse, a house, or a person, are all ones, or separate individualities included in the class of one-ness. But it will be observed, as has been formerly explained, that the “idea” of Unity, not only does not require that the sub-

ject in question should be a *homogeneous* one, but necessarily requires that the subject should consist of a diversity or manifold of component parts, in order to constitute the organic Whole which may be the subject of contemplation.

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In order to remedy the supposed difficulty, or theological discrepancy, of conceiving One as Three, or Three as One, Arius and Sabellius took each a different course. Arius conceived "the Son" as a created being, derivative from and dependent upon God. But in ridding himself of the "eternal generation" and "consubstantiality" of the Filial Alterity, he introduced the further and insurmountable difficulty of rendering necessary the condition of *Time*. The creation of this Vice-gerent of the One God must have been at a certain and given epoch; and then the human mind, having to conceive God before He assumes his divine agency, recoils before the inconsistency of contemplating Absolute Will, causative of all reality, *sine ullâ potentialitate*, as having up to a certain or uncertain date remained utterly passive from all eternity. (Comp. Bretschneider's *Dogmatik*, vol. i. p. 643.) The cloud of divine perfection which Arius assigns to the *πρωτότοκος*, as the firstborn of all creatures, cannot conceal the radical fault in his reasoning, that, although the Son was produced by the Will of God before the world—*πρὸ χρόνων αἰωνίων*, there was a time at which He did not exist: *ἦν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν*. On the other hand, Sabellius had hoped to escape the

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difficulty by considering the Godhead as essentially one, but in agency and function threefold ; a Monad which unfolds itself into a Triad ; that, as in man Body and Soul and Spirit constitute one person, or as the one sun appears not only as a disc but also warms and illuminates, so are distinguished, in the One God, Father and Son and Holy Ghost,—so namely, that the Father corresponds to the luminary itself, and sends forth His Son as a ray of light again to return to its divine source, and is ever emitting the Holy Ghost in order to give warmth to the human heart ;—that God, as Father, had in the Old Covenant promulgated the Law ; that, as the Son in the New, He had become man ; and that, as the Holy Ghost, He had filled the Apostles. In short, Sabellius, and those of whom Sabellius may be considered the representative, contemplated the Deity as One Person with three modes of agency, or a subject with three essential attributes or qualities in and by which the subject is manifested.*

But here another danger arises. The management of the controversy in question, in order to bring out the orthodox truth, depends upon avoiding as much the Sabellian doctrine, as its opposite which lands us in Tritheism. For, according to the form of conceptual logic, just as the Sabellian may say, “whatever impairs the one-

* Lessing has given a very able exposition of the Trinity, for which see Strauss's *Dogmatik*, vol. i. p. 486.

ness of the conception impairs the conception of the One God," even so the Tritheist may shelter himself under the proposition, "whatever detracts from the reality of the distinctions detracts from the reality of the conception of God." But, it is easy to see that, if by the adoption of the Arian doctrine we lose the necessary reality of the distinctions of the Paternal Will as the self-affirmed personality of the Deity, and of the Filial Alterity, as the only sufficing ground of intelligibility for the work of spiritual regeneration by Christ in the redemptive process, so, by any approach to Tritheism the unity of the Godhead is, if not destroyed, yet endangered, to a degree incompatible with that faith in one divine universal Will which is the essential condition of Monotheism.

It was however the Arian heresy which had so pervaded the Church that it was deemed necessary to bring the moot questions to an issue. This was done at the Council of Nice, where Athanasius took the lead, and established what has since been regarded as the orthodox truth of the Catholic Church as embodied in the Nicene Creed. It may be remarked, nevertheless, that the meaning of the term "Substance" has been therein left unexplained; and that inadequate definition has been given of the nature (*ιδιώματα*, proprietates) of the Holy Ghost, as an essential hypostasis of the Trinity. The Spiritual Philosophy proceeds indeed upon other

grounds than those, which gave the victory to Athanasius ; but it may be safely affirmed that it has vindicated the Nicene faith by showing that the dogma of the Trinity is a speculative truth, that is, an Idea founded in the Reason and Conscience of man. If we then ask what is the Unity which the term “ Substance ” is intended to designate, the answer of the Spiritual Philosophy is, that it is Spirit, that is, Will, with a sphere of agency. If we ask what is the Threefold essential to divine agency, the answer of the Spiritual Philosophy is, Deity thrice uttered and self-substantiated as Relations, which are at the same time the highest Realities ; namely, the Absolute Will causative of all reality,—(1) Self-affirmed,—(2) Self-affirmed in Alterity,—and (3) Self-affirmed in the Community of the Ipsëity and Alterity. Without the first relation there would be no safeguard against Pantheism : without the second, there would be no manifestation of the Deity, and no power of spiritual regeneration : without the third, the relations of the Godhead could only be conceived as an antagonism without unity.

§ 10. And I repeat :—“ if we have obtained sufficient insight into the nature of the Godhead to enable us to contemplate the true relation of the Filial Alterity in the eternal self-sufficing beatitude of the divine Life, we may now consider the relations of the same *Alter Ego*, as the Logos, to the Non-Absolute and all derivative being :—

“According to the Idea, the Absolute Will causative of all reality is transmitted wholly and undivided from the Paternal Ipsëity to the Filial Alterity, the Power unabated and the relation only so far altered that the Son utters the Will of the Father, and as His Vice-gerent becomes the Author of all derivative being. Contemplate Him, however, once again as the self-affirmed Personality, in whom, as the only begotten Son, it hath pleased the Father that all fulness should dwell, and thereby become the all-sufficing Object of His paternal love. And viewing Him in the *moral relations* which the Idea implies, we cannot fail to acknowledge that the Son, so conceived, must realize in His own Person the Idea of perfect spiritual integrity; and that Holiness, Goodness, Righteousness, and Love can have no other standard, exemplar, pattern and author than the Son in His self-affirmation by the Will of the Father. He is indeed the eternal Idea, the act and perfect actuality of spiritual integration. But do we not want some word which may give life and reality to the conception, and bring it nearer to our own hearts and affections? And is not this word—which is to convey to us the conception of the living personal reality, who is the *hypostasis of absolute moral worth* and the “express image” of all that we reverence as divine in man—is not this potent word the *Idea of the Humanity*? And is not the only begotten Son the realization in Himself, and the

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power for all others, of the Humanity ; of that, namely, which man was destined to be, and which the divine Son is as the Archetype and Author of perfect spiritual integrity ?” And can we say less, in very truth, than that man, so far as he attains his spiritual destination, attains it by the operance of this power and pattern of the divine Humanity, and, by being divinely actuated, becomes divine and a Son of God ?

“ We say then that the Filial Alterity is *The Man*, the absolute exemplar of human perfection, the power of the Humanity, and its eternal realization.” And contending as I do that the Idea is an essential element of the original constitution of man, moral and intellectual, it is not unworthy of notice that the archetypal man has ever haunted the human mind. This may be seen in the representation of an Adam-Kadmon, and in similar doctrines, Gnostic, Zoroastrian, cabbalistic or Chinese ; and it is finely and philosophically alluded to in the saying of Schiller, that man

“ ——— Delightedly believes
Divinities, being himself divine.”

And in saying that the *Deus Alter* is to be contemplated as the divine and eternal Humanity, I may add that it is the necessary preconception for founding philosophically the Idea of Jesus Christ, as Mediator, Saviour and God-man ; that is, as eternal Idea, and implied already in the Idea of Will and spiritual regeneration.

Nor may we forget that the scriptural Idea of the Logos, who (as St. John teaches) was God, and is the life and light of every man, or in other words the indwelling power of the spiritual humanity in each and all,—that this Idea was familiar to the Fathers of the Church. Thus Justin Martyr says, “τὸν Χριστὸν πρωτότοκον τοῦ Θεοῦ εἶναι ἐδιδάχθημεν, καὶ προεμηνύσαμεν λόγον ὄντα, οὗ πᾶν γένος ἀνθρώπων μέτεσχε. Καὶ οἱ μετὰ λόγου βιώσαντες Χριστιανοὶ εἰσιν, καὶ ἄθεοι ἐνομίσθησαν, οἷον ἐν Ἑλληνισι μὲν Σωκράτης, ἐν βαρβάροις δὲ Ἀβραάμ.” Apolog. ad Anton. p. 38. So again Clemens of Alexandria:—“οὐκ ἀπεκρύβη τινὰς ὁ λόγος· φῶς ἐστὶ κοινόν, ἐπιλάμπει πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις.” Admon. p. 56. Again, “ὁ λόγος πάντα κεχυμένος.” Stromat. vii. p. 711. He expresses himself throughout that the Logos is the light of all men, and that as the Law led the Hebrews, so philosophy led the Greeks to Christ. Strom. i. p. 282:—ἐπαιδαγωγεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, ὡς ὁ νόμος τοὺς Ἑβραίους, εἰς Χριστόν.

Having then compared the Church dogma, which on scriptural and traditional grounds has received the sanction of the Churches of Christendom, Eastern, Western and Protestant, with the Idea of the Trinity which the Spiritual Philosophy propounds, it may be admitted, I believe, that in both cases one and the same doctrine is enunciated—namely, the Being of “but one living and true God.” “And in unity of this Godhead there be three Persons of one

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Chap. I. of Eng. And I add, as essential to the significance of the Idea propounded by the Spiritual Philosophy, that it is a truth, which contains its own evidence, when contemplated by the light of Reason, as the transcendent height and fulness of spiritual integration, and the absolute integrity of Will.

CHAPTER II.

THE FALL OF MAN, THE ORIGIN OF EVIL, AND ORIGINAL SIN.

§ 1. IN pursuance of the plan already indicated, I proceed to consider other noteworthy controversies which have disturbed the peace and unanimity of the Church, and the settlement of which has a most important bearing on the conditions of salvation. With a view to determine what may be the universal truth required, "*quod ab omnibus semper et ubique credendam est*," I shall, as before, compare the ecclesiastical doctrines with the Scriptures, and with the Idea of the Spiritual Philosophy; and I now solicit the reader's attention to the momentous subjects of the *Fall of Man*, the *Origin of Evil*, and *Original Sin*.

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In investigating the positions which these headings involve, I shall offer no apology for appealing to the collection of writings which are called *the Bible* or Holy Scriptures. And directing our attention to the Old Testament, it cannot but strike an unprejudiced reader, even from a cursory review of its documents, that it bears

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ample testimony to the working of "Ideas," and offers internal evidence of being the record of Facts which realize spiritual truths inalienably connected with the destination of man. Ideas, or truths of Reason are therein set forth with a force and evidence which we shall in vain look for in the records of other nations, even of those most distinguished by intellectual cultivation. And this justifies the usually received distinction of *Sacred* and *Profane* History.

The Scriptures tell us: "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." Such is the worthy opening of the first book. The human mind, enlightened by Reason, casts its look at once to the beginning and the end of all things, and cannot be satisfied with less than scanning the whole sphere of historic vision. It is the instinct of Reason that history should begin with Cosmogony. So it has been with all nations, and such we find to be the case with the Hebrews;—though it may be considered doubtful how far the earliest records of mankind belong strictly to that people, and may not rather be attributed to an ancestral race, who, having preserved the testimony to a primeval revelation, had transmitted it to their descendents. Be this, however, as it may, we cannot be far wrong in regarding the first chapters of Genesis as specimens of the earliest, perhaps hieratical teaching, or as a *Myth*—if without any intention of offence I may call it so—of religious and

philosophical import, in which Ideas and Causes are expressed by images supplied by the fancy. In the account of the creation, God is represented as the sole Creator of man, and of the world which is destined for the days of man's earthly sojourn and pilgrimage during his spiritual probation. It is evidently the purpose of the first chapter of Genesis to represent the creation of the world as the fiat of the Almighty, and the result of His divine Will. It is true that the term "Elohim" may leave us in doubt how far the concipient, even if an inspired writer, had distinct views of a personal God, but the context does not suffer us to doubt that he rightly apprehended the idea to which his rational instincts already tended. "Elohim" may perhaps be best translated "Powers;" but it is used in the document under consideration with the verb in the third person singular. "He said," "He divided," and so on. The acts described are those of a *personal agent*. And the truth of this observation is not invalidated by the change where it is said, "Let *us* make man in *our* own image." It is noticeable that the chapter in question, to be all that the orthodox imagine, must be supposed to have been *dictated* to the writer; but on this supposition how is it to be explained that the language is not:—"In the beginning *I* created the heavens and the earth"? If we turn to Isaiah, ch. xlv. 11, 12, it is written: "Thus saith the Lord—I have made the earth, and created

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man upon it. I, even my hands, have stretched out the heavens, and all their host have I commanded." Without, however, passing into unnecessary details, it may be safely affirmed that the ground taken is throughout ethical and spiritual, and precludes the possibility of any pantheistic confusion of the Deity with the powers and elements of nature. Unlike all other cosmogonies, it excludes all notion of any inexplicable self-development of a *prima materia*.

§ 2. In what follows, this relic of ancient wisdom states the facts, in whatever way they may have historically occurred, of the primeval state of man, and his lapse from the innocence and high calling which are implied by the "image of God" wherein he was created. That the imagery, chosen as the vehicle for the spiritual truths which are inculcated, is the work of the Fancy, is evinced by the childlike mode of conceiving the agents and events without any attention to the conditions of their real nature. Thus we find God described as walking in the garden in the cool of the day; the first woman formed out of the man's rib; in the garden a tree of knowledge and a tree of immortality; a speaking serpent, who is punished by being condemned to eat dust and to walk upon his belly; Cherubims and a flaming sword, to prevent access to the tree of life: not to mention that a later con-
 .
 cipient of the narrative is betrayed by introducing naïvely, and without any reference to their

newness and strangeness, matters and language, which though they would have been familiar to a subsequent generation, must have been wholly unintelligible to our first parents; such, for example, as the conception of children, painful parturition, the relation of husband and wife, of father and mother, and the curse which Adam incurred. All this has the appearance, at least to any one who has not made it a point of conscience to reject every mode of interpretation but the most anxiously literal, of being a mode of apprehending and representing which mark peculiar subjective conditions of the concipient rather than the character of a real narrative of facts. But if we find that the same truths are really conveyed which the religious reader would vindicate in the literal acceptance, we see no good reason why he should hesitate in ridding himself of difficulties which belong only to dress, language and accessories, but were probably suited to the childlike beings for whom the parable was intended. Yet, that the first three chapters of "Genesis" do contain spiritual truths of the deepest significancy to man, in aid of his moral destination, cannot be doubted by any one who has accompanied us in our previous meditations, and has convinced himself of the truth and reality of the first principles of all religion which has its requisite foundation in the Reason and the Conscience.

i. Thus, to commence with the Cosmogony,

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God is described as the sole Creator of a world, of which the end and purpose is the moral being who is made in God's image and after God's likeness. "So God created man in His own image, in the image of God created He him, male and female created He them." And though, as above noticed, the term here translated "God" is in the original a Hebrew plural which perhaps strictly means "Powers," it is quite clear from the context that the concipient meant to designate a supreme, single and personal Agent. It will be observed too that in the second chapter a different account is given of the origin of the first man and woman,—indeed in the first chapter the description of the origin of man is general and not specific. But whatever may be meant by a "living soul" in the second chapter, it cannot be doubted that some infusion of Deity, peculiar and appropriate to man, and differentiating him from other creatures, is meant; and that, in the formation of woman out of a rib of the man, it is intended to enforce a truth, similarly held by Plato, that male and female are the corresponding opposites of one and the same humanity.

ii. Man having been created in consonance with his moral dignity as the image and likeness of God, the apologue proceeds to represent him as originally in a *state of innocence*. The state is here conceived as *ideal*, and as that of a child before the causes and occasions of sin have pre-

sented themselves. The sequel shows that the innocence of man is conceived as the absence of sin, not because it is not *potentially*, but because it is not *actually*, present: the latter being a state, in which, consistently with God's goodness, man could not begin his earthly career. (Conf. Church Service, "Baptism of Infants.")

iii. The narrative represents man as holding intercourse with God;—and whatever may have been the mode of such intercourse with primæval man, it is a profound and undeniable truth, in respect of all men from the beginning, that the only title to the Humanity is that of the communion which man at all times enjoys, by the light of Reason and by God's indwelling Spirit, with his Maker;—and it is no less true that this intercommunion will be intimate in proportion to man's innocence.

iv. It represents man as naming the creatures. It shows that, whatever aid he may derive from that divine principle within which is the primary condition of all knowledge, he must be a co-operative agent; and that all the works of his mind will have a human character.

v. It represents man as forfeiting his innocence by disobedience to God's commands. The command was: "Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil thou shalt not eat of it:"—thou shalt not know, or willingly learn, the difference between good and evil; for to know the difference is to know and to be, evil. And the penalty of

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the transgression is announced : “ In the day* thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die.” “ The wages of sin is death.” The evil will is already, in and of itself, as we have seen, a state or an attempt to realize itself under self-contradictory conditions : it is a lie, a state of moral disintegration : and though by the goodness of God the necessary result may be delayed in this state of temporal being, yet the spiritual dying and perishing have already begun. I have already shown more at large that the primary disobedience to God, contemplated in the Idea, is the voluntary abnegation of the Divine Reason and its spiritual illumination, by which man knows intuitively his obligations to and dependence on God, and the assertion, by the aid of the intellect self-shorn of divine ideas, of his own selfish will and its evil concupiscence. This is at all events the spiritual meaning of the image, and without this inward the outward sign would be a mere husk ;—man disobeys the voice of God in his conscience : it declares to him that the good is the sole condition of his moral life : it warns him against Evil as his spiritual death : but he prefers his own will and its lusts, and falls under the inevitable penalty. Nay, considering the circumstances of man’s fall under the temptation offered to him, the intention of the myth before us would be unintelligible, unless

* Corporeal death could not have been intended, for they did not die in this sense after eating the fruit.

we supposed that the writer (stating as he does that the event occurred on the first temptation and the slightest provocation) meant that man's lapse from his first estate was by some inherent pravity of his nature. But it will be recollected that the truth, upon which man's morality and spiritual integrity are founded, requires, in consonance with the account of Adam's temptation, that the excitement to evil should be from without, and that the cause of the evil in man should be such as to assure us that evil is a foreign ingredient and finally alienable. Now it is true that we do not find in the myth any account of the *Origin of Evil*; but if this more speculative doctrine would have ill-assorted with the immediate object of practical teaching, we do find a *Tempter* introduced, as the originator of the mischief and moral ruin of man, and, remarkably enough, represented, not in the human form which his agency might imply, but as a *Serpent*, described as "more subtil than any beast of the field which the Lord God had made." We are at a loss even to say precisely whether it is intended to include the Serpent in God's creation; but taking the account in connexion with the mythology of the other ancient Asiatic religions, in which the serpent is an important symbol, it cannot be doubted that it is here meant to embody the *principle of Evil*. And it is noticeable that in the character of subtlety assigned to it, and in the sophistry employed by the "subtil"

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seducer, we find the counterpart of the mere intellect when deprived of moral aims, and which has been described under the pregnant name of the *φρόνημα σαρκός*. That knowledge of evil in its distinction from good was not intended for a moral being, and that this knowledge, practical as well as theoretical, is derived from the mere intellect or understanding apart from the Reason, and, actuating a sin-prone will, ministers to its selfish lusts,—may, I think, be unhesitatingly accepted as the truth intended by the myth. It is scarcely necessary to point out how the figure is carried out. That the knowledge of evil, presenting itself in the allurements of vice or seductions of pleasure, should be represented as enticing and “pleasant to the eye” but bitter in its effects, few of us, alas! will deny. The acquisition of the knowledge is also described as the *eating of a fruit*; and eating, tasting, assimilating and digesting, have ever been considered significant figures of appropriating a knowledge which is as yet alien:—but the fruit, which was the coveted knowledge, and which so far did not belie the lying and deceptive promise of the tempter, was not the divine knowledge expected, but an “apple of Sodom” filled with the bitter ashes of shame and remorse. Finally, that the temptation was first practised and succeeded on the woman, who then beguiled the man, is only to say, not that the woman, but that the feminine part of human nature, a con-

stituent common to male and female, is that which is susceptible, open, and yielding to the seductions of evil.

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vi. Then follows the *Curse*. Man is expelled from the happy cradle of his innocence, the congenial outward of inward peace, and the laborless abode of a fruition which, in the love and communion of his divine Father, could know no want; he is doomed to toils, privations, and sorrows; the return to his earthly Paradise is barred against him; and the way to the tree of life and immortality is cut off by a flaming sword, "which turned every way to keep the way of the tree of life." It is hardly necessary to make any other comment upon the view here offered than that the Garden of Eden, as the abode of man in his primæval state, is the idea, and not the fact, of a nature in harmony with the divine image in which man was created. That the spiritual impress of God which constitutes man's Humanity was and is the pledge and call to his high destination,—it is this fact and idea, which imposes on God the necessity of cursing the earth *for his sake*. That is, God's love has placed man under the circumstances of toil and difficulty which are best calculated to rouse those *virtues* under which he is to win his toilsome way to the more enduring Eden of his spiritual destiny. It is quite true that man required for the development of his humanity such favouring circumstances of soil, climate, and the like, as would minister to his immediate needs, and give

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scope to moral agency: "he was put into the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it;"—and so far doubtless the account is strictly historical;—but there is no ground in the sacred narrative for supposing that a revolution was produced in the creation, which "God saw that it was good," or that there was a "golden age" of innocence and of felicity uninterrupted for any given period by human pravity. The twofold nature of man, spiritual and natural, and its consequences in planting him on the earth as a moral agent, must be conceived both as idea and fact; but in the piece of hieratical lore before us it is treated most appropriately for those to whom it was addressed, as history, the supersensuous foundation of which is conveyed by imagery supplied by the fancy. And thus the consequences of the introduction of evil are represented by the expulsion of Adam from the abode of happy innocence, in fulfilment of the curse; and the "flaming sword" of God's displeasure against sin "keeps the way of the tree of life" (which is here, chap. iii. verse 22, first mentioned, and of which Adam had not been forbidden to eat) "lest he take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever." Or, in other words, sin and corrupt mortality can have no part in immortality; and evil and corruption, which are essentially death, are for ever and necessarily excluded from eternal life.

But, lastly, by the goodness of God, the Curse is provided with its Remedy. Adam is not cast

forth in hopelessness and despair. He has heard the remarkable words, in which the damnatory sentence of the serpent is pronounced. "And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed; it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel." In man shall arise the power by which the head of the serpent is crushed and the principle of evil destroyed; whilst the power of evil on man is limited, will be only effectual on his outward being, will fall innocuous on his inward life and spiritual being. If we admit any sort or degree of spiritual interpretation, it is scarcely possible to understand less or other than this in the passage just referred to. Are we however warranted in supposing the conception to have meant that the Destroyer of Evil is the Divine Humanity, and would appear as a descendant of Adam or primitive man? shall we suppose, in short, that we have in the passage a *prophecy of the Spiritual Messiah*? The text is too obscure, I apprehend, to permit any decisive opinion except to those who are already predisposed or prepossessed in favor of the interpretation. And yet in the mythology of the Gentile religions the Idea of a Restorer of all things is so clearly recognized;—in the Scriptures of the Israelites again so many passages bear testimony to this hope of Israel; *

* And I cannot but think that Gen. iv. 1 ("I have gotten a man from the Lord") in connexion with iv. 25, as well as the more striking passage, Gen. xxii. 18, in the Temptation of Abraham, ought to be taken in conjunction with our text.

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in the whole tenor of Hebrew Prophecy the same idea so invariably recurs;—and further the idea is so entirely in consonance with the truths which have been vindicated, not to say established, by the Spiritual Philosophy; and this in connexion with the postulates of a primal revelation;—that I do not hesitate to avow my conviction that, in the passage which now occupies us, we have that article which completes the summary of primal religious lore found in the book of Genesis, namely the doctrine of a Divine Redeemer in the form of man and under the conditions of human nature. What these conditions are must be reserved for future consideration; but it can scarcely be doubted that, if by the divine decree spiritual evil was to be finally vanquished in man, and if by reason of the pravity of man's psychical nature he was in and of himself unequal to the task, not only would he have infused into him, in aid of the work of his regeneration, the divine principle which we have called the Divine Humanity, but the capability of his restoration to the conditions of spiritual life would be proved by the fact:—namely, that the same power which actuates all men is effectual, and may be effectual in each, where there is a cordial co-operation of the individual Will with that actuating power which is no less than the Divine Will. Such we take to be, briefly stated, the character and nature of our Lord Jesus Christ, the perfect exemplar of men,

in every respect a real man, and differing from other men, not psychically nor spiritually, but in the act of Will by which He identified His will with the divine Will; an act within the power of every will, so aided, and only not effectual in man, because of his unwillingness; but effectual in the man Jesus, because His individual Will, and the divine Will, as the eternal Humanity, were absolutely and indivisibly One. He, therefore, was not only Man, but God.

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But shall we say that the *promise of Eternal Life* is contained also in the religious apologue of Genesis, when it is said: "For dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return"? Promise there is certainly none. And it is not a little remarkable that it was reserved to a late sect of the Jewish people to vindicate the doctrine of a future state; and that the Mosaic doctrine and legislation should be deficient, as we find it to be, in this fundamental article of religion. What the grounds of this deficiency were—contrasted as it is with the assurance of Gentiles on the point, and whether the subject was purposely left in abeyance in order to detach the people from the superstitions of the Egyptians, I stop not here to discuss. But, whatever Moses may have thought on the subject in connexion with this myth, I cannot help thinking that there are sufficient indications of a better doctrine to justify the opinion that the immortality of the Spirit was a tenet of the earliest and uncorrupted

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religion. And though I have here chosen the Bible as the most convenient mode of exhibiting the economy of Providence by Facts as the exponents of Ideas, it may not be forgotten, what we have elsewhere shown, that the religions of the world would be unintelligible without the assumption of a primal revelation to man—an assumption, which derives no little countenance from the remarkable fragment before us, while this differs so materially from the religious institutes of Mosaism that we can scarcely consider them as the same form and development of religious thought. Thus when we read (Gen. iii. 22) “lest he take also of the tree of life, and eat, and *live for ever* ;”—it is undeniable that the concipient contemplated a life eternal, and doubtless as an attribute of Deity ; and, in connexion with the words, “The man is become as one of us to know good and evil,” it may be presumed that the writer would conceive that in eating of the tree of life man would become also *immortal* as a God, or “as one of us.” The passage clearly implies that by “eating of the tree of life” (whatever may be meant by that figure) man, not being by nature unfitted, would obtain the power and privilege to “live for ever.” The endowment might not be intended for man ; but it was within his reach ; probably within the Garden of Eden, that is whilst he was still innocent ; and not beyond his power of attainment. Nothing indeed, when he is told “Dust thou

art, and unto dust thou shalt return," is said of the "living soul" breathed into him:—and the omission may open a wide field of conjecture:—but whether the first and third chapters were written by one and the same person, or different persons entertained the same opinion, we can scarcely entertain a suspicion that man, who was created in the "image and likeness" of God, would have been wanting in that essential point of resemblance which consists in being a living and deathless spirit. It may be argued, it is true, that the phrase "lest he eat and live for ever," might imply that man was not, unless he did eat, capable of everlasting life; but as I have said, the prevention here intended was that pravity and corruption should not inherit life eternal; and our view stated above is so far consistent, and may so far explain the consistency of the writer, that man had subjected himself to this death of Sin, and had become spiritually mortal, perishable and perishing, by incurring the threatened penalty: "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die:"—a threat, of which there would have been an absurd want of fulfilment, had it related to man's corporeal mortality. The reader may however well believe, that in considering an ancient document of doubtful import and authenticity, it can be only my purpose to yield to critical discussions as far as may be necessary to defend the position that spiritual truth is the birthright of the humanity, and

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that, although the light of Reason supersedes the necessity of proof, there is the highest degree of probability that the first books of Genesis are witnesses to the fact of a primal revelation, and, when spiritually interpreted, to the working of spiritual truth in primæval man. And I only, in completion of the subject, repeat, that since man, under all the advantages of an earthly Paradise and Garden of God, failed, as we have seen, to preserve his spiritual integrity, it became necessary to change the ground, and to place him under those conditions of existence in which he might shuffle off the coils of his mortality, together with the pravity and corruption which he had entailed upon it, and might be transplanted to the spiritual ground of a heavenly Eden, in which, in his regeneration to the image of his divine Father, he might attain to everlasting life and felicity.

§ 3. It will be seen from the foregoing interpretation of the second and third chapters of Genesis, how the Spiritual Philosophy proposes to deal with the *Fall of Man*. And it must be confessed that the spiritual view therein adopted differs widely from the Church theory; especially when the latter affirms the narrative to be a purely historical statement of facts, in spite of the manifest difficulties which such an assumption involves.

The theory of the Church, including the doctrine of *Original Sin*, may be stated *in genere* thus:

—“That Adam, having been created innocent and upright, was tempted to an act of disobedience, whereby he suffered a corruption of his moral nature, forfeited the favour of God which he had hitherto enjoyed, and brought upon himself the curse of guilt and death which he transmitted to all his descendants.” In short, according to the doctrine of the Church, the origin of the *moral evil* in the world is to be traced to this single act of disobedience to the divine command.

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Such, at least, seems to be, under various modifications of its tenets on this head, the significance which the Church attaches to the legend; and it remains to be considered how far the Church is justified in the interpretation which it has adopted. It is remarkable that on a subject to which so great an importance has been attached, no unequivocal reference is made in the canonical books of the Old Testament, nor can it be said to appear as a tenet in the religious system of the Mosaic legislation. And notwithstanding that in the Jewish Scriptures the corruption and iniquity of mankind is freely exposed: as in Psalm li. 7, “Behold, I was shapen in wickedness: and in sin hath my mother conceived me:”—yet in this and the like passages, more is not said, in respect of the nature and conditions of moral evil, than is recognized by Gentile as well as by Jew in the fact of the contrary disposition in mankind to

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good and evil. It is in the Apocrypha that we find the first distinct mention made of the narrative of Genesis. Thus in "The Wisdom of Solomon" (ii. 24), "Nevertheless through envy of the devil came death into the world;" and in Ecclus. xxv. 24, "Of the woman came the beginning of sin, and through her we all die." And it should be noticed that among the Rabbinical doctrines, which were later additions to Judaism, it was taught that the propensity to sin, though opposed by a corresponding disposition to the good, was innate and the consequence of the primary transgression of Adam from whom we are descended.

In the discourses of Jesus we shall in vain look for anything which would give authority to the doctrine which the Church has inferred from the narrative of Genesis. And had He, whose mission was to overthrow the power of Satan and to rescue the world from evil, attributed any like importance to it, it might have been expected that He would have made some allusion to an event fraught with such awful consequences as those assigned to Adam's transgression. On the other hand, it is the Apostle Paul, who not only maintains the universality of sin amongst mankind (Rom. iii. 9) but also (Rom. vi. 23) brings this universal sinfulness, with its wages which are death, into connexion with Adam's transgression. What was supposed to be vague, obscure, or incompletely

elaborated in the Pauline doctrine, was variously interpreted and explained by the early Fathers of the Church ; and the controversies thence engendered reached their height when St. Augustine brought forward, in opposition to Pelagius, his celebrated theory on the sin of Adam and its consequences to his descendants.

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It may be said that, during the first three centuries, the doctrine had acquired no such consistent form as to establish authoritatively any Church dogma. But it had been sufficiently consolidated to induce Pelagius to deny that Adam's sin had deteriorated mankind, or that it could be rightly imputed to his descendants as *original* and *hereditary sin*. He maintained that death was the original condition of man's mortal nature, not the punishment of sin ; that the "image of God" had not been lost, but that men are born as innocent as ever, and are as much in possession of free will, *liberum arbitrium*, as Adam was ; and further, that Adam could only be considered the originator of sin, inasmuch as he was the first sinner, and had induced others to follow his example : seduction and bad example being the only sources of sin.

This doctrine was vehemently opposed by St. Augustine, then Bishop in Africa. He taught that not only had death and moral corruption been produced by Adam's Fall, but they were the punishment inflicted on him for his transgression ; and that an irresistible propensity

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to sin had been originated, which had its seat in the soul and was propagated by generation. This original sin, *peccatum originale hæreditarium*, which shows itself in evil concupiscence and in the predominance of sensual appetites, draws down upon itself eternal damnation, in that it is imputed to man as sin, deprives him of divine grace, and subjects him to the power of the devil. He adds that even in the case of newborn infants, and of other unbaptized persons by whom no sin has been committed, the punishment awarded to us by God cannot be remitted; and he maintains, in fine, that man after the fall, being utterly incapacitated for aught good, had forfeited his free will, *liberum arbitrium*, and could only be converted by an act of God's grace.

§ 4. In order to the solution of the problem which this controversy offers, in which St. Augustine's great name gave weight to his theory, we have to take counsel with the "Idea of Spiritual Integrity" revealed by the Reason, and which has already aided us in interpreting the narrative of Genesis. With this view, we may put the following queries:—

- i. What is meant by the term "Adam?"
- ii. Was he created innocent and upright?
- iii. In what did "the Fall" consist?

i. In answer to the first question, touching the meaning of the term "Adam," and independently of its etymological import (אָדָם perhaps

from 7278 earth, conf. Gen. ii. 7, and iii. 19) it may be asked whether, on the supposition that my interpretation of the narrative in Genesis is correct, and after the removal of the drapery and figurative language of the myth, there is anything so specific in the events that they must be appropriated to a historical personage, and may not be attributed to a man as the representative of mankind considered in their moral relations? A candid review of such relations and circumstances of the so-called "Adam," cannot fail, I think, to convince any unprejudiced student of sacred writ that the history of this "Adam" is the history of mankind: the history, namely, of the process of degeneration from his spiritual destination which man through assignable causes underwent;—a process, which was not peculiar to any first man, nor the result of any supposed single act of disobedience to the divine commands, but the scarcely less than inevitable consequence of the universal propensity to pravity in the human race. The Spiritual Philosophy adopts the position, that "Adam" may be regarded as the *nomen appellativum* for primæval man, and as the representative of the whole race; all of whom would have been disobedient, and do continually sin, under like conditions; seeing that man has by nature a propensity to sin, under which he is prone to yield to his lower and fallen nature.

ii. In answer to the second query, "Was man

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created innocent and upright?" the answer may be as follows. In a certain sense the affirmative cannot be withheld:—for as children up to a certain time have committed no actual sin, they, like Adam, are innocent and upright, at least negatively. But if, proceeding from the maxim that nothing can have come from the hands of the Creator but that which is "good" and perfect, we infer that Adam was gifted with perfect spiritual integrity, we no doubt greatly err; as did Pelagius in attributing to him freewill; and as did the Arminian divine, South, when he says ("Adam in Paradise," p. 9) "The image of God" in man is "that universal reetitude (*justitia originalis*) of all the faeulties of the soul, by which they stand apt and disposed to their respective offices and operations." It is evident, namely, that perfect moral integrity cannot consist with the fact, that upon the first and slightest occasion Adam succumbs to the temptation proffered to him, and thereby incurs the guilt of disobedience to his Maker. But as it was with Adam, so it is with all men. It may not be gainsaid that the moral state of a man, who, not having sinned, yet readily yields to the temptation to sin, is best described as a *proneness, proclivity, or disposition to pravity*;—and this it is, which seems best to warrant the name and description of *Original Sin*. Although however it is a state of freedom from actual sin, it is still a disposition to sin, and partakes of the nature of

sin ; and although by the grace of God it does not entail utter moral corruption and eternal perdition, yet, in consequence of its being a state of proneness to evil, it justly provokes divine condemnation. This distinction, between the disposition to sin and the commission of sin, has an important interest in the rite of *Baptism* ; and in the service of our Church the twofold aspect of Original Sin, as above described, seems to be kept in view by holding up the innocency of children, which our Saviour Christ exhorted all men to follow, while in the previous prayer it is asked that the infant coming to the baptism “may receive remission of his sins by spiritual regeneration.”

But it may be objected that it could not be consistent with the goodness of God, having foreknowledge of consequences, to place in the new world a frail and fallible creature, with the prospect of his lapse and the consequent necessity that through Adam all his generations should be cursed ! The answer to this dilemma will be made apparent presently.

There is one question connected with man’s original state, which may be here conveniently disposed of. It will be recollected, namely, that Pelagius attributes to man *Free-will*, *liberum arbitrium*, both before and after the Fall ; and, on the other hand, that St. Augustine affirms that in connexion with the moral corruption, which had invaded man’s nature in his fall, he became

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totally deprived of the freedom of his Will. But if the view of the Spiritual Philosophy be correct, and that man was predisposed to sin, it is plain that under the proclivity to evil he at least so far lacked free agency as his Will was under the constraint and control of the dominant tendency or bias. And let it be borne in mind that, according to the Spiritual Philosophy, this inclination to sinfulness existed from the beginning, whether man had committed actual sin or not. Thus, what the Spiritual Philosophy considers to be the historical fact is, that, in consequence of the predisposition to evil, what may be called the "Fall of man" consisted in a more or less rapid *degeneration* of the human race; and that, as man became more and more corrupt, he became in the same proportion more and more enslaved to his lusts and evil passions, and brought under the dominion of Satan. This, I am fully persuaded, is the meaning of Holy Writ:—but it will be borne in mind, that, ever opposed to the propensity to evil, there is always the power and indwelling presence of the Logos, "whose service is perfect freedom."

It, therefore, may not be conceived, in conformity with the Church dogma introduced by St. Augustine, that a single act of disobedience produced through Adam a total moral revolution in man contrary to God's purpose;—unless, indeed, we can suppose that Adam's lapse was pre-ordained and this for the purpose of intro-

ducing evil into the world! And those, who have considered with favour the interpretation of the biblical account which I have ventured to offer, will see that no importance, as of historical fact, need be attached to the eating of the forbidden fruit of the tree of knowledge; not even when considered to be an act of disobedience; still less as the unpardonable offence in Adam, which should have entailed on all his posterity the tremendous curse of everlasting perdition. But we should belie our moral nature did we not believe that this venerable relic of ancient wisdom truly inculcates that, “in the day” when man becomes faithless to his higher nature, he will surely “die:” i.e., begin the process of his *spiritual* death:—for what ground have we for supposing that this creature of the dust should escape the common lot of mortality and the *natural* death assigned to all of earthly mould? The lesson taught in mythical garb is, that man from the beginning was partly spiritual, partly natural; and that, seduced by his lower nature under the subtle prompting of the “understanding” or *φρόνημα σαρκός*, he became unmindful of the higher light of Reason revealing to him the indwelling presence of God, and neglected the obligation of conforming his Will to that of his divine Maker in order to his destined spiritual integrity.

iii. Our third query was, “In what did the Fall consist?” And, if, following the biblical

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narrative, we ask how it is to be safely inferred that Adam by his transgression introduced, or originated, Evil, the answer is difficult. We find, as an essential ingredient of the event, a Tempter, a Seducer, brought forward; a Serpent, who, under the designation of "the old Serpent," seems to have been afterward recognized as the arch enemy of God and man. If then we would trace Evil to its origin and cause, we must delve deeper into this mystery of iniquity. Nor are adequate aids wanting to those who carefully study the grand Idea of which Spiritual Philosophy is the development. The student is referred to Part III. chap. iii. of this essay; where he will find the argument for assuming that, as the Absolute Will causative of all reality must be always and ever causative, God, in affirming Himself, affirms in the only begotten Son the eternal generation of "the Sons of God," and that, in consequence of the necessity of conceiving them as Wills, it is also necessary to adopt the postulate of the *eternal possibility* of their willing themselves to be independent of, and antagonistic to, the Divine Will. That this forbidden possibility was willed, notwithstanding the impossibility of realizing what in itself is self-contradictory—namely, the attempt to realize a being independent of the divine and sole source of being, is shown by the fact of the existence of the evil as the contrariety to divine Will. And the result was what

has been called the *Fall of the Angels*, the lapse of an undefinable portion of the heavenly host of humanities or Sons of God.

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What the Fall consisted in we have no means of knowing; but thus much we may consider certain,—that it was attended with the loss of the spiritual being of those who thereby fell into Hell or Hades. Moreover the conditions, under which the lapse has been necessarily conceived, warrant the inference that this *multēity* of spirits, self-deprived of true being and individuality, remained as an undefined *spirituality* without unity or distinction, and, whether described as one or many, only to be contemplated collectively as aliens from God, and, though unintelligent forces, the malignant foes that are ever ready to thwart His purposes. Such, shortly, are the grounds upon which rests the almost universal belief of mankind in the existence of “the Devil and his angels,” of fiends, demons and malicious spirits, at war with mankind: a belief, which, purged of its superstitions, and especially of the baseless notion of a *diabolical personality*, will assume in every sound moral system the necessary postulate of the reality of an *Evil Spirituality*.

Of the origin of evil little is said in the canonical books of the Old Testament. And as for any systematic development of the theory of a Satan and his demoniacal host, such as we find prevalent at the time of our Saviour, we must seek it in the doctrines of the Pharisees after the exile,

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formed by them, we can scarcely doubt, upon the opinions of the followers of Zoroaster with whom they had come in contact. It is unnecessary to say how much in the writings of the New Testament relates to demons and demoniacal possession. And in the Gospel of St. John, otherwise remarkably free from such narratives, our Saviour Himself is reported to say (x. 44):—"Ye are of your father the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do. He was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it." It may be observed on this passage, that not only does our Lord give His sanction to the doctrine of the Devil as the author of spiritual evil, but, by the remarkable expression "abode not in the truth," leaves us to infer that in consequence of his wickedness he had lapsed from his original state "in the truth." The doctrine of a fall of Angels is, however, sparingly referred to in the Scriptures, and the most striking passages on the point are those found in the Second Epistle of Peter, ii. 4, and in the Epistle of Jude, ver. 6: but, notwithstanding the conflicting accounts of the causes of the Fall, it may be safely taken for granted that, both by the Pharisees and the followers of Christ, the belief was general that God had created His Angels good, and that by the abuse of their free-will they had become corrupt and evil. Similar views subsequently

passed into the doctrines recognized by the Churches of Christendom.

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§ 5. But, as I had occasion to explain elsewhere, one of the leading tenets of the Spiritual Philosophy is, that God, contemplated as absolute love and infinite mercy, could not but will the restoration of the fallen spirits to their original state, and their reunion with Himself. And if such be the unavoidable conclusion to which the Idea leads us, who shall doubt that it was to this end and final aim that God undertook the work of Grace, possible only to Almighty Love, which we, with Angels, adoringly and in wonder contemplate in the *Creation* and *Providence* of the world? If the only reliable key to the history of fallen man be *spiritual regeneration*, where shall we find the explanation of the fact except in the Redemption of the fallen spirits by the grace of God through the only begotten Son, in our Saviour Jesus Christ?

But in this new creation of grace and mercy a well-spring of moral poison was left, to infect those under the operance of the Saviour, and to obstruct the redemptive process. The fallen spirits, though deprived of being, still remained as a spiritual though potential power, ready to seize and rob what those who had been raised from Hades had acquired,—remained as a diabolical and malignant spirit of evil, ever willing to destroy what it could not enjoy, and to reject the life and light which it could not obtain

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except under the hateful condition of dependence. Every portion of this spirituality, individualized by the divine Logos as a Humanity, has thereby the power to resist the evil by which it had been tainted ; but it still has its root in Hades, and by resistance to, or neglect of, the saving power of the divine Logos, it admits the Spirit of Evil. But, although Hades is and remains a pool of spiritual infection, the evil which it tends to generate cannot become “actual,” except by the consent of the individual Will or Spirit who allows himself to be “possessed” by it, and is powerless so long as the individual Will or Spirit opposes the *demoniacal possession* ;—a possession moreover, which, though it may disfigure, cannot wholly quench the impress of divinity originally derived from the hand of the Creator.

§ 6. There is a point, however, which, though more curious than practical, deserves a passing notice, as showing how “Ideas” haunt the human mind ; namely, the question of the *pre-existence of Souls*. Even amongst the Rabbinical teachers the notion prevailed that, in the generation of men, there was a great reservoir out of which their souls were taken, afterwards, when returned, to be dealt with according to the bad or profitable use which had been made of them. Amongst these *Præ-existiani* we find some of the Fathers of the Church. Another doctrine was that of the *Creatiani*, who maintained that the soul at the time of concep-

tion was immediately created by God and joined with the body. The third view, of whom the principal representative was Tertullian, consisted in the belief that the soul was derived from natural generation, as the body is, with the addition that the germs of Adam's whole posterity were contained in him as the sole progenitor; and the defenders of this doctrine were called *Traduciani*. Plato with better wisdom has assigned to the soul a remembrance of its divine origin and heavenly home : or as Wordsworth has said :—

“ Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God, who is our home.”

In the Spiritual Philosophy, the moral importance of the doctrine—and this is worthy of all attention—is, that evil can never be deemed as essential to, or inherent in, a Spirit created in “the image of God,” and is therefore a *remediable accident*.*

* It is always to be remembered that Will or Spirit is indestructible, and that, when deprived of being, though not annihilated as Spirit, it must, if contemplable at all, still be contemplated as recognisable by the impulses and tendencies of a potential existence, such as have been noticed in the psychological portion of this essay: Lust or Concupiscence, Resistance, Rage and Fear, *without intelligence or any deliberate motive*: and the phenomena of which we see daily in the brute creation, implying an agency, which is solely the result of roused and unconscious reaction or of instinctive volition.

It is only when the *light of Reason* has dawned from heaven, that deliberative intelligence begins to manifest itself in the destitute spirit, which wants but knows not its needs. In the “fallen spirits,” not yet touched by the sense of true being, the light of heaven, thus suddenly shed into Hades, disturbs, irritates and awakens into activity their lusts,

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§ 7. Having then carefully considered the dogma of the fall of Adam and Original Sin according to the Idea, I feel justified in placing the result before the reader in the following Propositions, viz. :—

i. That the narrative of Genesis may be truly interpreted by assuming that the name “Adam” is used as a *nomen appellativum* for primæval man, and that he is there spoken of as the ideal representative of the whole human race; all of whom would have committed the same transgression under like circumstances, and do sin under like conditions; namely, that all men have a *propensity*, or *proneness*, to *pravity*, under which they invariably succumb to their lower or fallen nature.

ii. That the *Origin of Evil* is to be referred to what is called the Fall of the Angels, whereby they forfeited their spiritual being, but nevertheless remained in Hades as a confused spirituality, without unity or distinction, in the predicament of a perpetual falsehood, namely, the vain lust of being absolute in selfish particularity—the fontal lie of selfish Will, and the parent of all the delusions of an evil Will.

iii. That the creation and moral order of the world is the *Redemptive Process*, instituted by God, through His only-begotten Son, to rescue

passions, and restless craving for self-asserted being independent of the divine Will, and at the same time under the fatal delusion and falsehood of realizing a particular as absolute.

and restore the fallen spirits from the perpetual death-throes of Hades; and that, more or less enkindled by the Divine Power now actuating the spiritual multëity, the powers, sometimes called "the Devil and his angels," were roused to wrath and malignant reaction against God and His work of mercy; but that, in their raging lusts of spite, envy and malice, to injure and frustrate the economy of redemption, the diabolical spirit, by reason of its self-contradictory nature, could not realize itself in individual being, and could not actualize itself, except in so far as it could "possess" itself of human beings who would voluntarily lend themselves to its sinful seductions.*

iv. That Man was, and is, created void of offence

* It may sound strange to call up the spirits of Hades to people the earth; it may seem paradoxical to have now for their spiritual enemies those who before-time were their associates:—but it is to be borne in mind that the argument rests upon the admitted character essential to Will and its agency; viz. that, wherein and so far as it realizes itself, it will be self-originated act, but so that it can only will concurrently with, or contrariantly to, divine Will. From this point of view the *human spirit*, that is, when born into the world, is enlightened and enlivened to will in conformity with the divine Will: but the *diabolical spirit*, remaining in Hades—i. e. a "state" but not a "place,") and blinded by selfish pride, wills what it is impossible to realize, to be absolute as a particular self, to will absolutely according to its selfish lusts, and the mere lust of self-will. Such a Will abandons itself to whatever it lusts after, and, regardless of aught but its own self-gratification, its tendency is to become cruel, vindictive, wrathful, spiteful, malicious, envious, jealous, a "murderer" and a "liar." It virtually affirms "Evil, be thou my good!" But, by the grace of God, the inherent self-contradiction and falsehood of all evil prevent its realization, and it must always remain potential and latent until the human Will, false to the light of Reason, permits and admits the *demoniacal Possession*.

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and so far innocent; but that every man born into the world is so far deficient in moral rectitude that he is tainted by original sin, that is, by the original fault of a fallen nature marked by a propensity to pravity and sin. Thus it appears that what is said of "Adam" relates equally to all his posterity:—but that man is not, on account of his propensity to sin, under condemnation, but is under grace; though, should he wilfully reject the gracious condition of salvation offered to him through Jesus Christ, he will assuredly subject himself to the penalty announced to Adam, namely "spiritual death;" and the sentence will unavoidably take effect "in the day" that he forsakes his Saviour, and welcomes the evil counsellor of sin.

v. Lastly, that, according to the Idea, the principle is to be steadfastly maintained that, in the economy of divine grace and in the process of Redemption, man is to be regarded as originally a "Child of God" in the family of heaven; and that, when raised from death and Hades, he was created as a denizen of earth with the impress of his divine lineage: "So God created man in His own image:"—whilst the taint of evil is to be looked upon as an accident, which is removable by the grace of God in the process of spiritual regeneration.

CHAPTER III.

ON THE MEANS AND MEASURE OF GOD'S FAVOUR.

§ 1. WE may now proceed to the remaining topics which belong to the means and measure of God's favour; and although I cannot pretend to bring before the reader all the details which a thoroughly critical discussion of the subject may demand for the purposes of scientific theology, yet the main points in dispute are sufficiently marked and defined to allow of their being adequately compared with the doctrines which may be safely maintained according to the Idea of Christianity which the Spiritual Philosophy upholds.

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In pursuance of the plan proposed, I beg to recal the reader's attention to the questions, raised by St. Augustine in the Pelagian controversy, upon the state of man after the so-called "fall of Adam," in order to consider them in connexion with the conditions of salvation. For it is evident that if, as Augustine alleges, man, as the penalty of his disobedience, lost wholly his moral will, and became utterly cor-

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rupt and damnable, the means and measure of God's favour must assume a very different character to that which may be assumed, as Pelagius affirms, in the case of man considered as undeteriorated and as retaining his free-will. In the latter case much will depend upon the self-originated efforts of man; but in the former case the whole business of salvation is thrown upon divine grace. And this we shall see was largely the view of Augustine and his followers in their argument on the economy of redemption.

It appears that the almost universal doctrine of the Eastern and Western Churches had been, that, in order to rescue man from the misery into which he sank by the transgression of his first parents, the exertion of his free-will and the aid of divine grace were the necessary co-efficients. But St. Augustine, as we have seen, in his controversy with Pelagius had introduced new matters of dispute, by denying free-will to fallen man, and by asserting the lost and corrupt state of man's moral being. But although the victory may be said to have been awarded to St. Augustine in this celebrated controversy, the Church still retained (under the name of Semi-pelagians, among whom were most of the Schoolmen) adherents to the ancient form of doctrine. It may be thus stated generally:—that man had inherited from Adam a certain deterioration of his moral powers with a disposition to evil, though not as a punishment for Adam's sin; but

that he still possessed free-will, and was capable of beginning his amendment on the strength of his own powers, though he needed the aid of divine grace for effectual progress. And so among the Schoolmen Original Sin was represented, sometimes as entailing merely a verdict of corporeal mortality, sometimes as a moral deterioration without innate guilt, and sometimes as a want of that original rectitude (*justitia originalis*) which, as a supernatural gift, constituted "the image of God." (Comp. Bretschneider, *Dogmatik*, vol. ii. p. 3.) It does not appear that in the Roman Catholic Church the dogma of the fall and its consequences had assumed any more determinate form, but that at the time of the Reformation it still remained Semi-pelagian. (Conf. Conc. Trident. Sess. 6.)

Luther, in his work *De servo Arbitrio*, maintains strictly the doctrine of Augustine. The Lutheran confession of faith is, that "by Adam's fall the nature and being of man became utterly corrupt." (See *Epitome formulæ concord.* art. 1.) And the Lutheran Christian is likewise bound to believe that man cannot free himself from this inborn corruption, except by the power, goodness and grace of God; though at the same time the freedom of Will is made an article of belief, with the condition, just stated, that it can accomplish nothing good but under the support and blessing of the Holy Ghost. Calvin and his followers adopted the doctrine of St. Augustine

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in its fullest extent. And it thus passed into the formulæ of faith of the reformed Churches; as may be seen in their universally accredited writings, such as the *Confessio Belgica*, the *Heidelberg Catechism*, and the *Acts of the Synod of Dort*.

§ 2. With this brief introduction, as a necessary preparation for the following discussions, I proceed to consider the main points of theological controversy in the most prominent sections of the Christian Church on "the means and measure of God's favour." And it appears to me that they may be best exhibited by placing the doctrines in question in opposite and contradictory relations, which, confuting each other, prove their origin from the divisive understanding, and show that their dialectic antagonism requires to be resolved and unity obtained, as in the polar logic, through the intervention of the Reason supplying the "Idea" of Christianity. See Part II. chap. iv.

In respect then of "the means and measure of God's favour" I venture to place before the reader, in pursuance of the proposed plan, the following scheme of theological controversies, arranged under their several heads as contradictory extremes:—

i. Predestination of a few to eternal life, and the reprobation of all the rest of mankind.	i. Predestination of all to eternal life.
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|--|---|
| ii. Christ the Saviour
of the few, the Elect. | ii. Christ the actual
Saviour of all. |
| iii. All men guilty
and damnable. | iii. Pravity contin-
gent. |
| iv. Effectual calling,
or Election, an act of
God's irresistible grace,
with which the Sinner
has nothing to do. | iv. Justification by
Works. Therefore nei-
ther the grace of God,
nor a Saviour necessary. |

These heads may be taken to represent the Dialectics of Theology on the point here proposed for discussion, and pre-eminently on the doctrine of Predestination and Election. It will be noticed that the extremes, presented in the propositions of the first column, exhibit the scheme of modern Calvinism, as it was propounded at the Synod of Dort. They state four of the five points, which were agreed to as the Canon of true Theology; the fifth being, "that those effectually called shall never finally fall from a state of Grace." As is well known, the party of the Remonstrants led by Arminius offered an unsuccessful opposition to the resolutions of the Synod; and for the most part the Calvinistic and Arminian doctrines are at variance with each other; but as the contrariancy is not perfect, and as other views require notice, I have selected in the above controversial statement the heads of the Anti-Calvinistic scheme from various sources hereafter to be mentioned.

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§ 3. The first theological antagonism, which has been proposed for examination, is thus stated:—

Predestination of a few Predestination of all to
to eternal life, and the eternal life.
reprobation of all the
rest of mankind.*

Now according to Calvin “God not only foresaw the fall of man, and by it the ruin of man’s posterity, but also of His own Will ordained it; for (says Calvin) it belongs to His wisdom to be prescient of the future, and to His power to rule and manage the works of His hand.” The position seems to be:—that God, as omniscient, must foreknow, and, as he foreknows, must also predestinate; that is, by an absolute decree, according to His will and pleasure. And so far

* The fruits of Augustine’s theory, to which we have just recalled the reader’s attention, may be gathered from Calvin’s Institutes in the following quotations:—“Deus non omnes promiscue adoptat in spem salutis, sed dat aliis, quod aliis negat.” Calv. Inst. p. 585. “Prædestinationem vocamus æternum Dei decretum, quo apud se constitutum habuit, quid de unoquoque homine fieri vellet. Non enim pari conditione creantur omnes: sed aliis vita æterna, aliis damnatio æterna præordinatur. Itaque prout in alterutrum finem quisque conditus est, ita vel ad vitam vel ad mortem prædestinatum dicimus.”—Ibid. 589. In answer to the question, why God did not elect all, as all are equally guilty, he answers, p. 611;—“Æquum est, ut (Deus) puniendo se quoque æquum judicem ostendat.—Potest Dominus dare gratiam quibus vult, quia misericors est, non omnibus dare, quia justus est; dando quibusdam, quod non merentur, gratuitam suam ostendere gratiam, non omnibus dando, quid mereantur omnes declarare.” At p. 609: “Nec absurdum videri debet, quod dico, Deum non modo primi hominis casum, et in eo posterorum ruinam providisse, sed *arbitrio quoque suo dispensasse*. Utenim ad ejus sapientiam pertinet omnium quæ futura sunt esse præscium, sic ad potentiam, omnia manu sua regere ac moderari.”

the proposition is sound; since it is inconceivable that God should know or foreknow what is contingent on, or derivable from, the will of another. The whole force of Calvin's argument appears to hang upon the absoluteness of God's Will as Omnipotent and Omniscient.

But in examining the premisses of this argument, it cannot fail, I think, to strike the reflective student that Omnipotence and Omniscience are merely abstract conceptions of divine attributes pushed into their logical consequences without regard, and indeed with reckless disregard, of the "Idea" of God.

First, then, there is a grievous error in ignoring or forgetting in the "Idea of God" essential attributes of the divine Being, who is not only omniscient and almighty, but is the plenitude and perfection of Goodness, Holiness, Justice, Wisdom, Love, and Mercy:—such are the essential properties of His divine Being; and what He is, He, of His divine goodness and spontaneity, communicates fully, without stint or grudge, to all dependent being. But what shall we say to Calvin's conception of God's wisdom, in affirming that "God not only foresaw the fall of man and therein the ruin of man's posterity, but also of His own will ordained it"? God in His goodness must, at all events, when He created "man in His own image," have willed him to be a moral Being. And can that be called "wisdom," which in willing an end ordains its failure? Again,

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what can we think of Calvin's conception of Justice? He says, indeed, apologetically, "that God may confer graces on whom He will, for He is merciful, and not on all, for He is just: He confers grace on some, though they do not deserve it, in order to show that the grace is gratuitous; He does not confer grace on all, in order to declare what all deserve." But is that to be accounted the exhaustless abundance of Mercy, implied in the Idea of God, that He withholds or denies His grace on any who earnestly and penitently seek it? For this again is one of the terrible effects of Calvinism, that it leaves nothing for the repentant sinner but an awful waiting for divine judgement. And is that Justice—"quod cuique suum tribuit," which assigns to every one his due with strictest impartiality,—is that Justice, I say, which in punishing the guilty saves some who are equally culpable? Reason and conscience are no better satisfied with the salvation of the guilty few, than with the condemnation of the guilty many, since all were equally guilty;—here justice and mercy are alike at fault; and, if a few were saved by an act of divine mercy, the salvation of many would have been more compatible with our belief in the all-merciful Being which the "Idea of God" unavoidably presupposes. It is not difficult to see that Calvin, seduced by his eagerness to vindicate the divine Majesty, attempted to answer all objections to the supposed failure

of the moral economy of the world by a "*Sic Deo placuit*;" but unfortunately he knew not how otherwise to accomplish the attempt than by setting up the abstract phantom of an arbitrary Will which acts for its own glory—or rather, to express more correctly what Calvin virtually affirmed, its own self-glorification. And it must be admitted that the great Reformer had not attained to the point of view, from which God's glory may be contemplated in the Redemption of man, not only compatibly with the strictest rules of Justice, but with the entire reconciliation of Justice with Love and Mercy.

But, secondly, it behoves us to consider with due attention what is really implied in Calvin's view of Prescience, or a knowledge before the event of what that event will be. It may be accepted as true that omniscience is a necessary attribute of Deity, and that God in His infinite wisdom beholds all the causes and conditions under which being of whatever kind, things, persons or events, individually or collectively, may be realized: and so Calvin's view appears to be that God by virtue of His Omniscience, foreseeing whatever will occur under any given cause, absolutely determines beforehand according to His Will and Wisdom the whole course of temporal events, and the destiny of every man. According to this view, the history of the moral world is to be regarded as a scheme of absolute *Predestination*, predetermined as a

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whole and in every part. The Will of God being the absolute cause of whatever is under all change of being, it follows that God cannot but foreknow what in each and every case will take place; and this is so far sound reasoning, that we cannot conceive how fore-knowledge is possible except under the condition of its derivation from the predeterminant purpose. But at the same time it is evident that human freedom is crushed under the overwhelming weight of the tenet; and that we are bound as moral beings to protest against a doctrine, which only the abstract conception of Omnipotence could have suggested. Accordingly we find that Arminius and the Remonstrants were steady opponents to the doctrine; as may be seen by their tenet, "that God has not fixed the future state of mankind by an absolute unconditional decree, but determined from all eternity to bestow salvation *on those whom He foresaw would persevere* to the end in their faith in Jesus Christ, and to inflict punishment on those who should continue in their unbelief, and resist to the end His divine assistance."

The origin of this doctrine may be traced to older theologians. Its peculiarity consists in its being the reverse of the Calvinistic dogma. The Calvinist asserts that God knows because He predestinates; and the Arminian, that God predestinates because He knows. In each the conclusion may be the legitimate consequence of

the premiss; but surely both are equally false, in assuming Will as conditional to Knowledge, or Knowledge as conditional to Will. The Arminian, it is true, saves the moral freedom of man, and so far supplies the indispensable need of our moral nature; but it is at the expense of the utterly unintelligible assumption, that God foresees what is contingent and variable, and forms His plan of the moral economy of the world by harmonizing the results of human agency. These schools of divinity leave us then in this unfortunate dilemma;—if we adopt the view of the Calvinist, that every human agency is predestinated and so foreseen, the human Will is reduced to a mere nonentity;—if, on the other hand, we believe with the Arminian that the history of man is the mere result of individual Wills, and that Providence adapts the plan of the moral world in conformity thereto, under the foreknowledge of what men will do, then we must consider divine Will as subordinate to human Will, or in other words give up the Supremacy of the divine Will and the omnipotence of an absolute Ruler and Disposer of the world.

But it is impossible for us, as rational beings, to give up either the absoluteness of divine Will, or the relative freedom of human Will. Unless God's Will be conceived as absolute, it could not be for us divine Will:—unless man be free to choose between selfish Will and obedience to the divine Will, man's Will would not be a

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moral Will, or, according to Reason and Conscience, a Will in any legitimate sense of the term. How then is the knotty problem to be solved, and the reconciliation of God's absolute supremacy with individual freedom of agency to be satisfactorily accomplished?

Now in order to clear the ground of some of the difficulties which have been needlessly blended with the question, it may be noticed that in the above schemes, Calvinistic and Arminian, "Prescience," as the term itself witnesses, is inextricably coupled with the notion of *Time* as a form of the Eternal, and omniscience is principally treated of as *fore-knowledge*. But if omniscience be an eternal act of knowing, of knowing that by inclusion which is in all time, it cannot be a memory or anticipation, or any form of knowing in the form of time;—it is an eternal act; that is, it is *above time*, the same yesterday, to-day, and for all future time. Thus we say of any truth, that contains its own evidence (such, for instance, as the mathematical truth that all the radii of a circle are equal) not that it has been, not that it will be true, but that it is so, absolutely and for ever, without regard to the time or times at which the truth may be observed. If indeed we apply our knowledge of the properties of a circle to the construction of a bridge, we are under the necessity of employing materials more or less perishable; and that particular circle or segment of a circle

used in the materials becomes a creature of time; but the "idea" or principle of the circle is everlasting. So in respect of the knowledge of God in its relation to Predestination. What He in His divine wisdom wills is willed once for all time, it is a divine law or legislative act, and is eternal and immutable. But in the world the legislative act of divine Will has to regulate, control and coerce an imperfect subject or subjects, yea, resisting and contrariant subjects. In this process—necessarily *gradative*—the legislative act never changes, but is always the same power and principle of agency with the same purpose and ultimate aim; though in consequence of the renitency of the subject, and its being gradually subdued, the successive or temporal is introduced; and what is an ever-present knowledge in respect of God in His divine act assumes the character of, and appears as, foreknowledge to human understanding. So far then a reconciliation may be effected of God's eternal Law, and what is called Predestination, with the exercise of human freedom, that, when man acts concurrently with God's Will, the human will is *assimilated* to the divine economy of the world, and, when it acts perversely and attempts to thwart the divine purpose, it strives vainly and comes to naught. God is an ever present power, and in relation to man is ever "turning the hearts of the disobedient to the wisdom of the just," and is ever bringing into the unity of the

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redemptive plan whatever may be assimilated to *the Whole* of which mankind are designed to constitute the *integral Parts*.

Although, however, this argument may be adequate for the purpose of showing that there is "no variableness nor shadow of turning" in the counsels of God, who, in His providence of the world, sees all affairs in the light of their ultimate purpose and aim, and conducts all things in conformity therewith, yet this same argument not only does not exclude, but implies the question, in what *the reality of the successive* in the history of man consists. This is true! But the generations of men are but variations of the same theme, namely, an Adam to the thousandth generation, prone to an evil selfishness, and, although enlightened from above and therein offered the conditions of salvation, nevertheless ever addicted to pravity, and always halting in his choice between obedience to the dictates of God's will or to the evil propensities of Self-Will. But is it possible to believe, according to the Calvinistic scheme, that the character and acts of each and every individual in the moral history were "predestinated" as the compulsory agents and blind instruments of a Providence, which may be conceived as little short of a petrifying Fate? When we read the lives and acts of the Patriarchs, for instance, should we not be tempted in various instances of their conduct, if supposed to be divinely predestinated,

to doubt of the holiness and moral integrity of the Governor of the world Himself?

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To this monstrous alternative, which would make shipwreck of our faith, we need not however be driven, in order to rescue the claims of moral freedom and reconcile them with the no less cogent requirement of a *Special Providence* regulating every the minutest particular in the affairs of the world in order to their perpetual unity. We have to recollect, namely, that in the Whole of which men are the integral Parts or Members, the Logos, as the Providence of the world, is (to use the Schoolmen's phrase) the *anima, quæ tota est in toto, et tota in quâlibet parte*. According to His design and ultimate aim, it is for Him in His infinite wisdom to raise up in the flux of generations Prophets, Teachers, Kings, Conquerors, Philosophers, Poets, every man in his vocation and calling; to promote the growth of civilized communities; to found mighty states with rulers and statesmen fitted to lead in council or war; to conduct the migrations of nations, whether in behoof of commerce, conquest, or religion, for fusing and blending the peoples of the earth; or to put down the mighty from their seat, and exalt the humble and meek:—nay, we need not doubt that His Providence extends to the smallest particular and minutest occurrence, even to the very numbering of the hairs of the head, or the fall of a sparrow. And all this without deviation from the eternal

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laws which are contained in the final purpose of His divine Will, and without infringing the conditions of human freedom. For, as we have seen, *moral liberty* (and it is for this that we have to contend) consists in choosing to concur with or to resist the divine Will. We are bound to believe, and to act under the belief, that in this world of trial and probation every man has such measure of grace that he may freely choose the way to eternal life and evince his choice by aiming at holiness; but assuredly there is nothing in the work of Providence, above briefly set forth, which is calculated to interfere with the moral liberty of the individual, in promoting the design, and providing the economy, of the Redemptive Process.

It is true that in things which appertain, not to the sphere of the senses, but to the *spiritual world*, a proof derived from experience is not to be expected. Only the eye of faith can behold them,—the eye of that sure faith, which is grounded and established on the Idea revealed by God, equidistant from chance and fate, that, in conformity with our spiritual needs, there exists on the one hand moral freedom for man, and on the other an over-ruling Providence in all his concerns. In the light of this Idea we may assume with unhesitating faith that Providence is the continual reconciliation of man's freedom with God's eternal and immutable laws, which are the exponents of His absolute Will.

And contemplating the problem as contained in the Idea, we are bound to believe that God knows the world only in His beloved Son, and that in Christ He is reconciling the world to Himself and providing for the salvation of man under the predicament of an inborn pravity which otherwise leads inevitably to spiritual death.

Thus then Providence is the continual reconciliation of man's freedom with the eternal and immutable legislative acts of God's supreme Will :—the eternal is that which is fixed and predetermined under all change, and the temporal that which is ever changing under the influence of an evil pravity. The temporal manifests in successive and varying phases that which is theme from the beginning ; namely, the conversion of evil into good ;—the actors change, but the divine process never varies. But in this process Providence, though acting upon an invariable design, and with a determinate aim and purpose, is an ever present power and working, which moulds as it proceeds, and is ever acting on the refractory ; inducing, persuading, dominating, and acting, as the principle of life acts in any of nature's growths. To organic life, though it asserts no claim to freedom, we cannot deny a certain amount of spontaneity in its misgrowths and faults of development ; but the principle of life, which presides over the organic evolution, ever remains as conservative and re-

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storative of the whole which had been intended from the beginning. Even in a machine or mechanical engine, the artist can forecast the corrections necessary for the work it has to accomplish ; but, although he cannot overcome the imperfections of the materials at his service, the “idea” is preserved amid all the wear, tear, and numberless contingencies which are ever tending to frustrate the achievement of his original.

And shall God’s Providence be deemed of less certain effect than the constructive skill of an engineer or machinist ? It may appear as if the knowledge of the acts of the individual were hidden from Omniscience ; which would be self-contradictory ; but God, in knowing His own laws, knows all the possible deviations from the same, and knows that all men have a propensity to violate them. But He will not know who will obey and who will disobey them. That knowledge would be possible only in fatal contradiction to His supreme Will ; for His Will cannot be other than that every individual should, if at all, willingly obey Him, “whose service is perfect freedom.” If this position be open to a charge of denying that omniscience is not absolute knowledge, and therefore self-contradictory, it must nevertheless be borne for the sake of our *moral interests*. But the case is not desperate :—for although God in His infinite mercy should withhold His judgment until man has finally decided his own moral destiny, yet it

cannot be affirmed that God's Omniscience does not adequately foresee what every man's decision will be, taking into the account that every man born into the world is born under circumstances and influences which constitute the germ of his individual character, and give a bias to his conduct. It may be admitted indeed that the species of knowledge here indicated is, if even of the most accurate and reliable kind, pre-calculation rather than foreknowledge; but still we are bound, in behoof of our spiritual being, to assume that God will not, and cannot, know, or foreknow, what an act of human Will is to be before the act has been originated; though, be it seriously remembered, He "unto whom all hearts be open, all desires known, and from whom no secrets are hid," cannot fail to know them in the act and very moment of their origination.

If then such be the solution vouchsafed to us, it would appear that from the first the notion of Time, introduced in the conceptions of Pre-science and Predestination, has been the means of leading theologians astray, and of turning their minds from the guiding light of Ideas. The Idea here in question is that of contemplating the act of redemptive mercy for the salvation of mankind as one invariable living principle, always alike operative in the economy of Providence; and, although it necessarily realizes itself in the phases, successive and simul-

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taneous, of the moral world, and is therein beheld in relation to time and times, it is nevertheless to be regarded as at all times and above the conditions of time the selfsame immutable operance and ever-present working to the end that human freedom may be reconciled with divine law in the unity of God's final purpose.

Thirdly, in considering the relation of Predestination to Election or effectual calling, the Calvinist must be reminded that he overlooks the essential point at issue, namely, that the Will of God and its ultimate purpose, in respect of the Salvation of man, are the *redemption and regeneration of the human Will*. In his scheme the human Will is a mere passivity, that is, no Will at all in any moral sense:—the subject of a *spiritual* influence is altogether removed or lost sight of, whilst a mere phantom of humanity is substituted, in order to preserve the Calvinistic notion of Absolute Power, and this phantastic Omnipotence is made to exert itself on a man of straw, a mere nonentity of Will. Surely, if there be any life or substance in Christianity, it must be a fundamental article of belief that the Will of God is that of a just, holy, and merciful Being, who condemns sin and iniquity in order to save man, and who to this end *spiritually* (that is, by his only begotten Son) acts upon and actuates the human Will, for the purpose of re-creating man's Spirit according to His own divine image, and of transplanting

him, by this mysterious operation, from the dark, barren, and evil ground, to the more genial soil of heaven, and to the spiritual and divine ground of the eternal Humanity. But it is evident that the inalienable condition, under which divine grace is offered, cannot be other than that man is a Will, and must willingly accept or reject the divine aid.

For, fourthly, it must never be forgotten that the end and aim of true religion is the attainment, as far as our imperfect nature permits, of Spiritual Integrity. And we, on our part, led by the practical interests of our moral being in improving and perfecting it, are to look up to the divine Idea in Christ, as the sole power and pattern of spiritual integration, and by Faith in Him, and in entire reliance on His aid, we are to invoke His power, and assimilate ourselves to His divine example:—for Faith is that act of the will by which the individual takes conscious possession of the truths or principles of religion, and resolves thereby to realize his spiritual integrity; and the main truth, upon which he has to depend, is that Christ the Saviour is the sole “author and finisher of his faith.” Now if we apply this important truth as a test of Calvinism, we see plainly that Predestination removes all motive for moral exertion, and extinguishes every incentive to self-improvement, since the spiritual agent is accounted wholly passive and his salvation is nowise made to depend upon

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himself. It is also evident that Calvinism, in assuming to itself a knowledge of the ways of God to man, and in adopting this pretended knowledge of His dealings as a sufficient guide for man's religious calling, instead of inculcating the doctrine of Faith, as an act of human Will responsive to God's grace and mercy, is calculated to beget pride and indifference to moral obligations in those who may plume themselves upon being favored by the divine decree of "irresistible grace;" and it requires only the aid of fanatical presumption, assisted perhaps by some delusive evidence of the senses, to become the bane and posion of all morality in those who believe themselves to be the Elect.

But let us now turn our attention to the antagonistic doctrine, which we have introduced under the head of "Predestination of All to eternal life." For the doctrine of *Universal Redemption* we cannot indeed appeal to the authoritative teaching of any important section of the Church; but that it has prevailed to a considerable extent in the Church may be shown by reference to the views of Origen in the third century, to the tenets of certain sectarians, and to the writings of many eminent and pious divines down even to the present days. The "Universalists," so called, are those who believe, "that as Christ died for all, before He shall have delivered up His mediatorial kingdom to the Father, all shall be brought to a participation

of the benefits of His death, in their restoration to holiness and happiness." The conditions, under which such final restoration shall take place, have been ingeniously accommodated to Scripture, but have not been so clearly stated, or definitively agreed upon, by the writers who have handled the subject, that I can venture with any hope of profit to the reader to discuss them within our prescribed limits; and I shall therefore content myself with inquiring, whether those, who adopt the tenet of Universal Redemption in its broad tendency and general aim, are entitled to rely upon it as teaching the sure and safe way to human salvation and eternal life?

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The Arminian professes, as we have seen, to steer a middle course between the Calvinist and Universalist, and, in respect of Predestination and Election, holds "that God has not fixed the future state of mankind by an absolute unconditional decree, but determined from all eternity to bestow salvation on those whom He foresaw would persevere to the end in their faith in Jesus Christ, and to inflict punishment on those, who should continue in their unbelief, and resist to the end His divine assistance." I have already stated the main objection to this view, which arises out of the introduction of the notion of "time;" and, notwithstanding that it apparently softens the asperity of the Calvinistic doctrine of "absolute decrees," it is as little tenable, since (to adopt the language of

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these schemes) it imputes to God a foreknowledge of human free-agency, which, if such foreknowledge could be affirmed, it would be contrary to God's Will to know, or if affirmed implies an antecedent act of God's Will and falls back into Calvinistic "predestination."

But we have now before us the very reverse of Calvinism in the dogma of Universal Redemption; and we have to consider its fitness to be adopted, as the principle upon which we are to believe that the economy of salvation is founded. And it is not a little remarkable to observe in this case how extremes meet:—the Calvinist, in order to vindicate the abstract conception of divine omnipotence, goes near to condemn the whole human race to everlasting torments; while the Universalist, preferring to maintain the conception of God's love and mercy, promises them unconditionally, or under certain conditions which contribute to their final result—the beatitude and felicity of eternal life. And, it must be added, both agree in rendering the doctrine which they severally espouse wholly inefficacious for the purpose for which all religious doctrine must be supposed to be intended; namely, amendment of life in its progress towards sanctification and holiness. The tendency of Calvinism cannot be other than to paralyze human exertions; that of Universalism cannot but create a false and delusive security in man's final destination; while both one and the other

are calculated to render fallen and corrupt man wholly *indifferent* to his moral interests and obligations. If then on due inquiry we find that Universalism, or any other tenet proposed for religious guidance, is calculated to be injurious to the interests of morality, it ought to be unhesitatingly rejected as an article of faith or instrument of spiritual regeneration: and though the doctrine of Universal Redemption offers a fair pretext for its acceptance by dwelling on God's love and mercy, and by alleging the possible or probable existence of conditions for the reformation of the reprobate sinner—specious arguments, no doubt, and seductive to benevolent persons, yet, so far as it holds out a promise of eternal life other than by practical holiness of life, of which Christ is the sole spiritual power, we are bound to denounce it as neither a safe nor reliable guide to salvation. This doctrine has however its golden side, if stated with due reserve:—for, though Universal Redemption can never be an article of faith consistently with the end and aim of religion, it may, and ought to, be a *hope* that all mankind will be saved. We must have the assurance that Salvation is possible for all, and that Grace is offered to all; and we know not but that salvation *may be* effectual for all. Who shall say that even the most reprobate of sinners, under all the influential circumstances of ignorance, temptation, example and vicious habit, aided by

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constitutional frailty and overpowering passions, may not have done, proportionably to his capabilities, what may render his calling effectual? Of this, indeed, we can have no knowledge, no insight: and judging men by the only test we possess, that of their actions, we find it difficult to believe: but we may and ought to refrain from a judgement, which should in charity be left to Him to whom "all hearts are open;" and we have to sanction only such rules of faith as are offered us in order to render man's calling effectual and his election sure.

In considering the possibility or probability of any moral reformation or spiritual regeneration which cannot be made evident to us in this world, we may safely dismiss the notion of any reformatory Hell or of any sort of penal state. What improvement of the moral being can be expected under the conditions of torment and suffering, inevitably associated with the wretchedness of guilt, unavailing regret, remorse and despair? Even Socrates, whose view of a future state of misery to the wicked has been lauded on account of its mildness, confesses that some malefactors are so irrecoverably bad that nothing can be done but to punish them, and to hold up their punishment as a warning example to other evil disposed persons. In short, taking the same moral test of religious faith as we have before laid down, we cannot but condemn all those figments of the fancy which would persuade us that the

crimes of this life may be amended in a future state, or that a period of pain and suffering will be accepted on a balance sheet as an equivalent for guilt and iniquity. We cannot indeed wonder that the doctrine of a *Purgatory* should have found adherents, addressed as it is to the corrupt nature and passions of fallen man ; but this circumstance is of itself sufficient to warn us against it as injurious and unsafe. But it is not perhaps utterly hopeless to vindicate the benevolence of the Creator in a manner calculated to countenance the aspirations of the Universalists. In former passages of this work I have had occasion to represent moral pravity as a spiritual death, commencing with the crime and self-abandonment of the criminal to his vicious course, and consummated, after the privation of bodily existence, by the loss of individual being, or of a self wherein to be ; the spirit, however, indestructibly surmounting annihilation, under the passion and lust of being, but under the self-contradictory predicament of being at once an absolute and a particular Will. Such may be inferred to be the essential character of Hades, a confused multëity of Will or Wills, without unity or distinction, subsisting *without individuality* under the restless torment and unappeasable craving of the insatiable and perpetually disappointed thirst of individual being. And if such be the state of those who, in consequence of their reprobate and obdurate sinfulness, have

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lapsed into the indistinction of Hades, and forfeited their individuality, it may consort with God's mercy to commence a new redemptive process, and to re-create a new progeny in His own divine image.

It may be not unreasonably expected that we should, here or elsewhere, compare the results obtained by Ideal Christianity with those derived from scriptural exegesis on the articles of Predestination and Election. Fully aware of the contending claims of biblical criticism to decide this much-vexed question, and without presuming to offer any authoritative opinion upon the literal meaning of the contested passages which refer to this subject, I do not shrink from the duty of considering the *dicta* of the Bible in relation to the Idea of Christianity vindicated in this essay.

Thus, as I venture to assume, the terms "Predestination" and "Election" have been shown to be irrelevant. The Redemption of mankind is a process. And although, as every process, it is under the condition of Time, it proceeds from, and is continually sustained by, the never-failing principle of God's will; itself immutable, except as permitting *diverse means* of accomplishing its own immutable aim; but manifested in and upon the ever-changing conditions of "the unruly wills and affections of man."

In the Old Testament we find little that needs

arrest our attention. The Hebrews were God's *chosen People*; but nothing is said upon the subject of the election of individuals to God's favour in the theocracy, except in relation to their character and conduct in the affairs of the theocratic kingdom, and certainly without reference to their eternal life or predestination to salvation. The Hebrew mind proceeded upon the faith that Jehovah ordered all things according to His will and all-wise pleasure "without variableness or shadow of turning," and was "not a man that He should repent" and change His counsels. But at the same time it is sufficiently evident that the immutability of the divine decrees, or the confines of God's unchangeable will and human freedom, had not been so defined and fixed, but that instances are perpetually recorded of Jehovah altering his intentions according to existing circumstances. Take as an instance Gen. vi. 6: "And it repented the Lord that He had made man on the earth, and it grieved Him at His heart. And the Lord said, I will destroy man whom I have created from the face of the earth;"—"But Noah found grace in the eyes of the Lord." Or consider the case of Ahab, 1 Kings xxi. 29:—after the severest denunciation the word of the Lord came to Elijah the Tishbite, saying, "Seest thou how Ahab humbleth himself before me? because he humbleth himself before me, I will not bring the evil in his days; but in his son's

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days will I bring the evil upon his house." And it may be observed generally that the prophetic warnings, threatenings, promises and assurances, are all *conditional* upon the conduct of those to whom they are addressed as persons free to choose. Thus Isaiah i. 19: "If ye be willing and obedient, ye shall eat the good of the land: but if ye refuse and rebel, ye shall be devoured with the sword: for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it." We have, however, no adequate reason to attribute this apparent inconsistency to a defective sense of the divine attributes. Jehovah reigned over the chosen people, not only as the omnipotent governor of the world, but as the King of the Theocracy whose laws and positive statutes were to be implicitly obeyed; but, guided by a right instinct, His people virtually apprehended the Idea that, although the plan and ultimate aim of the divine Ruler were fixed, He nevertheless could modify according to circumstances the mode of carrying them into effect.

In respect of the New Testament, it can scarcely be doubted that Jesus and His Apostles adopted the language of the Old Testament, but with a deeper and more spiritual meaning attached to the terms employed; namely, by considering Christians to be appointed to the privilege, hitherto enjoyed by the Jews, of being the Elect or chosen people of God; and by regarding "the kingdom of Heaven," with eternal life, as

the appointed substitute for a carnally conceived Messianic kingdom. Hence probably may be explained the introduction of the terms Election, Choice (*ἐκλογή, κλησις*) and the like, as applied to Christians by the writers in the New Testament ; but there is no reason to suppose that “ election ” is meant to signify a selection of particular individuals out of the collective body of Christians, who had been arbitrarily predestined to salvation on the one hand, and to condemnation on the other ; and we can scarcely suppose that the term was otherwise employed than in the sense of the “ Call,” addressed to Jews and Gentiles, to become Christians and members of Christ’s spiritual kingdom. Thus, notwithstanding the difficulties, which may be admitted to exist in certain passages of Scripture, and especially of St. Paul’s Epistles, and which may be accepted as an apology for those who find in the writings of the New Testament a foundation for Calvinism and its tenets on Predestination and Election, I venture to say that we may safely reject, as constrained and ungrounded, the Calvinistic interpretation of the passages in question, and substitute for it a more genial construction, one more consonant with the harmony of Scripture and with the Idea of Christianity.

St. Paul seems to have adopted to its fullest extent the theocratic principle of divine worship, and to have adored in God the absolute Monarch, whose honour, majesty and glory it was the

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design of providence to make known, to exalt, and to magnify. But it does not follow, nor can it be shown, that in any instance the salvation or reprobation of individuals had been predetermined without reference to their Will as obedient or refractory to God's commands. Looking at the subject from this point of view, it does not seem very difficult to explain passages in St. Paul's writings that have baffled the learning of commentators. Thus—bearing in mind that the main argument of the Epistle to the Romans is to explain to Jews why the privileges of “the chosen people” are no longer to be held as peculiar to them, but to be deemed blessings common to Jews and Gentiles, turn to the 9th chapter of that Epistle, wherein St. Paul vindicates the ways of divine Providence in the call of the Gentiles by a parallel case in their own Jewish history:—he reminds them of God's promise that Sarah should have a son, and that in Isaac the seed of Abraham, the true Israel, should be called; that God's providence in the election of Isaac and his progeny, and in preference of Jacob to Esau, did not depend upon the conduct of unborn children, who had not done any good or evil; and that we are not ignorantly to question His justice in thus ordering the world according to His purpose of mercy. And so, on the other hand (v. 17) Pharaoh is cited as the illustration of the destruction that cometh upon the enemies of God's people, when they vainly

contend against the dispensation of His irresistible Will :—though it may be noticed that in the original account of Pharaoh (comp. Exodus viii. 15 and 32) it is said that he hardened his own heart as well as that it was hardened by the Lord : but, whether God hardened his heart, or he hardened his own heart, nothing is to be inferred with regard to his future state of salvation or misery. St. Paul then expostulates with any one, who would question the dealings of Providence in his own case, as if a lump of clay were to wrangle with the potter about its future use : and, though by a harsh construction “ vessels of wrath fitted to destruction—*κατηρτισμένα εἰς ἀπώλειαν* ” might be interpreted to mean “ condemned to spiritual perdition ; ” yet it is far more reasonable to suppose, considering the illustration which he adduces of the backslidings of the chosen people, that he means Gentiles, who, from being vessels of wrath (that is, hitherto rejected from the conditions of salvation) had been converted into vessels fitted to receive the mercies of the Gospel, and whom God “ had afore prepared unto glory.” In like manner is to be considered the celebrated passage in the eighth chapter :—“ For whom He did foreknow, He also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of His Son, that He might be the first-born among many brethren. Moreover whom He did predestinate, them He also called : and whom He called, them He also justified : and

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whom He justified, them He also glorified ;"—a passage, which, if understood literally, may have its difficulties, but which it is not necessary to read with sectarian prejudices. For, after the explanations which I have given on the subject of predestination and election, I cannot think that the Calvinistic tenets will be attributed to St. Paul. No doubt he fully believed that no man could come to Christ except by the will of God ; and if we ask whom He could mean by those "whom He (God) did foreknow" and "also did predestinate," the answer is in the preceding verse : "Them who are *the called according to His purpose.*" Now, though I am willing to admit that in the above passage allusion is specially made to Saints or perfect Christians, of whom it is said, viii. 1, "there is no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit;" yet when I interpret it by Rom. i. 16 ("For I am not ashamed of the Gospel of Christ; for it is the power of salvation to *every one that believeth*; to the Jew first, and also to the Greek") I cannot but believe—unless I charge Paul with inconsistency—that, by "the called according to His (God's) purpose," Paul meant the dispensation of salvation through Christ, which, existing from the beginning of the world, was to be offered to all mankind without exception, though under a certain order of Providence ; and that, in accordance with this "purpose," God would *know* the

“called,” or Elect; that is, would recognize the claims of all, who would fulfil the conditions “of walking after the Spirit” of Christ, to the promises of the gospel.

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In support of the view here taken I may quote the opinion of Coleridge (*Aids to Reflection*, Ed. 4th, p. 123) viz. :—“In St. Paul’s writings the words *Elect* and *Election* often, nay, most often, mean the same as *Eccalumeni* and *Ecclesia*, that is, those who have been *called out* of the world: and it is a dangerous perversion of the Apostle’s word to interpret it in the sense in which it was used by our Lord, viz. in opposition to the Called, ‘Many are called but few chosen.’ In St. Paul’s sense, and at that time, the Believers collectively formed a small and select number; and every Christian real or nominal was one of the Elect.” Thus too Bp. Tomline, in his *Elements of Theology*, says: “But an infallible certainty of eternal life in consequence of a divine decree is not attributed to any number of Christians, or to any single Christian throughout the New Testament. Salvation is uniformly mentioned as conditional. St. Peter calls upon Christians by their own ‘diligence to make their calling and election sure.’ And thus in the Article of our Church on Predestination: ‘Those whom He hath chosen in Christ out of mankind’ are that part of mankind to whom God decreed to make known the Gospel; and it is to be observed that this expression does not distinguish one set of

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Christians from another, but Christians in general from the rest of mankind; and consequently to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation, does not mean actually saving them, but granting them the means of salvation through Christ."

But should any doubt remain in respect of passages which might seem to favour the doctrine of predestination to eternal life or death, we may safely appeal to the harmony of Scripture, and to passages which give us the most decided assurance that God has destined all men to salvation through Christ, conditionally alone upon their belief and conduct. Such are, 1 Tim. ii. 4—6. John iii. 16, 17. Mark xvi. 15, 16. Rom. i. 16; iii. 22—24; v. 12—21.

§ 4. Having thus disposed of the Article of Predestination and Election, we come next to that which considers the *efficient Agent of Salvation*: namely, the Logos in Christ as revealed in the man Jesus; and the dialectic extremes may, as above, be thus stated:—

Christ, the Saviour of	Christ the actual Sa-
only the few, the Elect.	vour of all mankind
	without exception.

Here again the Calvinist and the Universalist form the two contrariant parties. The Calvinist holds that Christ made atonement only for the sins of the Elect, of those who were already under the absolute decree of Salvation as has been explained under the former head; though

it is difficult to reconcile with rational belief that the atonement by the blood of Christ could be necessary to carry into effect what was already absolutely decreed. On the other hand the Universalist maintains that Christ's Cross and Sufferings were a full and satisfactory expiation for all sin and guilt, whatever their nature; and that through Him all men without exception would be finally saved. It is unnecessary to rehearse the objections that have been offered to both views, and we only repeat that the doctrines in question are self-contradictory, because subversive of all morality. And the same objection applies to those called *Antinomians*, if, as it appears, they carry the doctrine of the "imputed righteousness of Christ," and of salvation by faith without works, to such a length as to impair or destroy the obligation to moral obedience.

Before entering upon the immediate subject of this paragraph, it will, however, be convenient to the student to recapitulate shortly the grounds and principles, which have been throughout maintained by the Spiritual Philosophy in respect of the divine Redeemer and His work of mercy. And, after the preceding investigations, it is hardly necessary to repeat that the only intelligible ground of Religion, as it is the only living principle of Philosophy, is WILL—contemplated as the absolute cause of all reality. It is this principle which has enabled us to

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behold the Absolute Will self-affirmed eternally in the mystery of the Blessed Trinity, and to distinguish in the unity of the Godhead the Filial Alterity, who, as the eternal Word of the Father, is the Author of all communicated being in the pleroma of the Humanities who may be styled "the children of God:"—it is this principle, which has enabled us to conceive the possibility of the renunciation of their allegiance to God in the vain pride of self-dependence, and to account for evil by the postulate of a "Fall of Angels," with the inevitable consequence of the loss of "being," suggesting the abysmal state of Hades;—it is this principle, which has lifted our thoughts to the absolute integrity of divine Will as perfect Love, of which Reason is the Light, and which has been revealed to us as the Word in Christ; who is the Life and Light of the Humanity; and who, under the necessity of His divine nature, has freely devoted Himself in the process of Redemption to the regeneration of man in the divine image from which he had fallen.

Bearing in mind, then, that the sum and substance of Christianity, as the only true religion, is the work of Regeneration in order to the spiritual integration of fallen man by the actuating power and indwelling spirit of Christ, in whom the eternal Humanity was revealed, the student's attention may be profitably directed to the consideration of the following points,

essentially connected with the subject of our inquiry. PART IV.
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i. In order to contemplate Christ as the true spiritual ground of the Humanity we have to meditate on Him as the *Deus patiens* (see Part III. ch. vi.) that is, we have to consider Him in His *passive relations*, or, we might say, in the *feminine forms*, of that which He is eminently in act and agency. Indeed throughout nature, wherever there exists the antagonism of *agere et pati*, it will be found that they are inseparable co-efficients; so namely, that a subject cannot act without being acted upon, and, when acted upon, relatively acts, by yielding or consenting to the agency. So it may be conceived of Christ;—inasmuch as He through the Logos partook of the absolute Will of the Godhead, he was necessarily *actus purissimus sine ullâ potentialitate*; but He had to supply the ground of the Humanity, and in so doing became the Subject acted upon. We must never, however, forget that the divine Redeemer became passive only to His own act, and that He remained the sole agent and absolute act in the redemptive process, the eternal Word of God who ever acts and makes actual. Thus conceived, the Redeemer is at once Agent and Patient, the active principle and the base, the modifying power and the modifiable subject, the Active in the form of the Passive. The Spirit or Spirits that had fallen into Hades were in and of themselves merely *potential*, de-

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prived of all *actual* being, and without even the capability of being actuated to attain spiritual being, until the Redeemer condescended to act in and with the fallen spirit, and lent Himself to restore its suscipiency, by supplying the fitting ground wherein to receive the divine light and life which He shed upon the otherwise merely potential spirituality. (Comp. Part III. ch. iv.) In other words He admitted the Evil Will into His own spiritual agency, in order to correct, subdue, precipitate, and destroy the Evil; in order to reconcile the contradictory evil Will with itself, and so with Himself as the Mediator who was to reconcile the fallen spirit with God. Whatever then has *actual* being derives it from the divine Word in Christ by the Redemptive Process, and whatever has it not, is the potential evil will, which is not of Christ. (Conf. Rom. viii. 22—27.)

But now, pursuing the subject of the *Passive Relations of Christ*, or those which He superinduced upon the potential Will in constituting Himself the spiritual ground of the Humanity, let us contemplate Him as the *Deus patiens*, who represents the divine act and acts in their passive correspondents;—let us inquire what is the Spirit, which He is, and communicates to the fallen Humanities, in order to prepare them for the light and life He is about to bestow upon them.

For this purpose we have to contemplate Him in the light of the *Idea of Self-Sacrifice*; and

we behold in Him, instead of the Absolute Will, who by His omnipotence creates and rules all things, the passive counterpart, who is submissive and obedient in all things to the absolute Will of His divine Father. We have to consider further how the Idea of Self-Sacrifice is infused into the fallen spiritualities, and how the Idea is made to become, *consciously to them*, the power and pattern of their spiritual work.

We have seen in the earlier part of this essay (Part III. ch. iv.) how the fallen spirits are constrained, under the lust of being inseparable from Will, to accept the operance *de suprâ et ab extrâ* of an alien power, to acknowledge virtually the divine presence, in order to secure their own being, selfish as the desire is;—and they are taught the unavoidable lesson of obedience and submission to the universal—that is, the divine, Will; and they are made to feel, if not to know, that the only mode of attaining their spiritual being is by the sacrifice of self and its selfish lusts. But this practical lesson was the work of the Spirit, of the Logos in Christ; who was thereby revealing Himself in and by the Idea, which assigns to Him, as His relation in the Godhead to the Father, the passive, recipient and feminine character of the filial Alterity, towards Him who is eminently Act.

Thus if we meditate on the *Deus patiens*, who is the power and pattern of the Humanity, we cannot fail to find, as indeed has been already ex-

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plained, that, in His relation to the fallen spirits, He, of His great love to His lost children, became a sacrifice for their sake. Though love should consist in receiving whilst it reciprocates, and in reciprocating while it receives, He was content to resign Himself and to suffer for others, who had no thought of, nor desire for, reciprocating what He freely bestowed. The goodness of the Father to His beloved and only begotten Son conferred on the filial Alterity the absolute power of communicating without stint all good gifts and spiritual blessings : He received and accepted with grateful gladness the bounty and largess ; but His rejoicing was that He might communicate to others all that He received. The only begotten Son is the Lord of Righteousness : but it did not assume in Him the stern character of inflexible Law ; for He tempered the Law with Love, and converted it into Grace ; He did not abate one tittle of its holiness ; but, knowing the frailty of the fallen creature, He mitigates the sentence of inexorable justice, extends to the sincerely repentant sinner the mercy which accepts the Will for the deed, and carries him to the throne of grace under the shadow of His wings. Having for the sake of sinful creatures resigned the beatitude of the divine life, He contentedly exchanged its joys for the *sorrows* which their sins evoked, for the *pity* which their wretchedness excited, for the *saving help* which their utter weakness and prostration called for ; and finally,

in the fulness of time, He appeared in great *humility* on earth to be *the pattern of suffering man*, and to lead him by His example to win the way to eternal life.

Take then this account of Christ as the description of the spirit of the Saviour who is ever within you, aiding your infirmities, and enlivening and enlightening your weak and wayward spirit; ponder the spiritual affections, of which for you He made Himself the subject in His redemptive office; consider His spirit as the very ground of your spiritual life; let that spirit incite and guide you to pray for His aid, to relieve you from inordinate desires, evil passions and vicious propensities, to purify and elevate your affections in order to *your spiritual integration*, by ever aiming at sincerity, docility and love of truth for its own sake, by ever cultivating the love of God and man, by ever disciplining yourself to self-denial, humility, meekness, kindness, gentleness, patience, obedience to God and resignation to His Will: and Christ will be for your moral Will that which in you is your Humanity;—it will be the divine Humanity in you and for you; it will be the suffering Saviour, who dwells in you, and in whom you have, and alone can have your spiritual life and being; and it will be the Saviour, who died for you, who took death upon Himself in order that He might conquer death, and, for the fallen spirituality, might be the Light, the Way, and the Life.

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ii. For the following lucid account of the significancy of the *Redemptive Act* I am indebted to Coleridge; and in submitting the subjoined quotations to the reader I would recommend him to peruse the whole passage in the *Aids to Reflection*, beginning (4th edit.) at page 241. After saying, "The purpose of a metaphor is to illustrate a something less known by a partial identification of it with some other thing better understood, or at least more familiar," he proceeds thus:—"The article of Redemption may be considered in a twofold relation—in relation to the antecedent, i.e. the Redeemer's act, as the efficient cause and condition of Redemption; and in relation to the consequent, i.e. the effects in and for the Redeemed. Now it is the latter relation, in which the subject is treated of, set forth, expanded, and enforced by St. Paul. The mysterious act, the operative cause, is transcendent: *FACTUM EST*; and beyond the information contained in the enunciation of the fact, it can be characterized only by the consequences. It is the consequences of the Act of Redemption that the zealous Apostle would bring home to the minds and affections both of Jews and Gentiles. Now the Apostle's opponents and gainsayers were principally of the former class."

"It might, therefore, have been anticipated, that his reasoning would receive its outward forms and language, that it would take its predominant colours, from his own past, and his

opponent's present, habits of thinking ; and that his figures, images, analogies, and references would be taken preferably from objects, opinions, events and ritual observances ever uppermost in the imaginations of his own countrymen. And such we find them : yet so judiciously selected, that the prominent forms, the figures of most frequent recurrence, are drawn from points of belief and practice, from laws, rites and customs, which then prevailed through the whole Roman World, and were common to Jew and Gentile."

"Now it would be difficult, if not impossible to select points better suited to his purpose, as being equally familiar to all, and yet having a special interest for the Jewish converts, than those are from which the learned Apostle has drawn the four principal metaphors, by which he illustrates the blessed consequences of Christ's Redemption of Mankind. These are: 1. Sin-offerings, sacrificial expiation. 2. Reconciliation, Atonement, *Καταλλαγή*. 3. Ransom from slavery, redemption, the buying back again, or being bought back. 4. Satisfaction of a creditor's claims by a payment of the debt. To one or other of these four heads all the numerous forms and exponents of Christ's mediation in St. Paul's writings may be referred. And the very number and variety of the words or periphrases used by him to express one and the same thing furnish the strongest presumptive proof, that all alike were used metaphorically."

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“ Now John, the beloved Disciple, who leant on the Lord’s bosom, the Evangelist *κατὰ πνεῦμα*, that is, according to the Spirit, the inner and substantial truth of the Christian’s Creed—John, recording the Redeemer’s own words, enunciates the fact itself, to the full extent in which it is enunciable for the human mind, simply and without any metaphor, by identifying it in kind with a fact of hourly occurrence—expressing it, I say, by a familiar fact the same in kind with that intended, though of a far lower dignity ;—by a fact of every man’s experience, known to all, yet not better understood than the fact described by it. In the Redeemed it is a re-generation, a birth, a spiritual seed impregnated and evolved, the germinal principle of a higher and enduring Life, of a spiritual Life—that is, a Life, the actuality of which is not dependent on the material body, or limited by the circumstances and processes indispensable to its organization and subsistence. Briefly, it is the differential of immortality, of which the assimilative power of faith and love is the integrant, and the life in Christ the integration. But even this would be an imperfect statement, if we omitted the awful truth, that besides that dissolution of our earthly tabernacle which we call death, there is another death, not the mere negation of life, but its positive opposite. And as there is a mystery of Life, and an assimilation to the Principle of Life, even to him who is *the* Life ; so is there a mystery of Death,

and an assimilation to the Principle of Evil, ἀμφι-
 θαλῆς θανάτω! a fructifying of the corrupt seed,
 of which Death is the germination. Thus the
 regeneration to spiritual life is at the same time
 a redemption from the spiritual death."

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iii. Hence it should not surprise the reader if
 it be urged that the employment of metaphor
 may be detected in the well-known phrase, "*the
 blood of Christ.*" For if "regeneration" be
 without metaphor the redemptive act in the
 redeemed, and if "sacrificial expiation" be a
 metaphor, and represents something different in
 kind from the regenerative process, with which
 it is at least difficult to conceive a causative
 relation, we are bound to ask, what is meant
 by the saving efficacy of *the shedding of Christ's
 blood* on the Cross? The subject of expiatory
 sacrifice has been already handled at an earlier
 part of this essay (Part III. ch. viii.) and
 the reader may be referred to the explanations
 there given. But, although it would be a cul-
 pable remissness to pass over the frequent refer-
 ences to the saving efficacy of the Blood of
 Christ in the writings of the New Testament: as
 may be sufficiently instanced in the solemn words
 attributed to our Lord, "Drink ye all of it; for
 this is My blood of the new testament, which
 is shed for many for the remission of sins:"
 —and although it cannot be denied that the
 apostolical belief has been shared in all ages by
 the Christian Church, namely that Christ's death

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on the Cross was an expiatory sacrifice for the remission of the sins of mankind;—yet I am free to confess that I should be chargeable with a blameable inconsistency, did I not avow my deliberate conviction that the phrase “Blood of Christ” is used figuratively, when meant to signify the peculiar efficacy of the redemptive act and process, described in St. John’s Gospel as Spiritual Regeneration. It may be readily admitted that Christ’s death would be a lively and impressive figure both to Jew and Gentile, since it was acknowledged as an obligation by both that, in order to ratify a solemn league or covenant, the blood of a victim should be shed;—it may be willingly conceded that Christ might be truly represented by the Apostles as the victim, by whose blood the new testament, or covenant between God and Man, was sealed;—it may be safely granted that the death of Christ gave a reality and real significancy to the Atonement made by the Jewish High Priest in the expiatory sacrifice or sin-offering, when it was believed that the august victim, who offered Himself for the sins of mankind, was the divine Mediator and High Priest in accordance with His Father’s Will;—it may be further accepted, that Christ’s death, in connexion with sacrificial sin-offerings, was to show that the purification and separation of Good from Evil must be a destructive process, and perhaps to remind us that the death, which we have all to undergo,

even when under the most ignominious circumstances, will be no bar to our spiritual birth and regeneration;—lastly, it may not be denied that Christ's death was so far expiatory that it assisted in removing the hindrance to God's favour by reason of man's sinfulness and corrupt nature. But we dare only regard it as the "symbol," though crowning act, of the redemptive process,—that is, as a part of the whole which it was intended to represent—the whole, namely, of Christ's sufferings as "the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world;" whose uninterrupted self-sacrifice was the necessary condition of man's emancipation from the otherwise inevitable consequence of his spiritual death, and the free gift of his capability to become regenerate in order to life everlasting. It will be seen then that the Spiritual Philosophy nowise denies or impugns the apostolical view of the Sacrifice of Christ, but dwells with greater satisfaction on the words of our Lord Himself, as recorded in the Gospel of St. John, iii. 3:—"Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born again, he cannot see the Kingdom of God."

iv. Another point deserving consideration is the phrase, "Christ is the only *name* whereby man can be saved." This a true saying; but liable to be misunderstood, if used in the sense that salvation is only possible when Christ is addressed under the specific appellation by which

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He is known to Christians as Lord and Saviour, or when His gracious aid is invoked consciously in such formularies as the Christian Church has prepared and prescribed. Coleridge, in his *Aids to Reflection*, p. 167, has very happily illustrated the subject, and I offer no apology for inserting the passage. "The name of a thing, in the original sense of the word Name (*Nomen*, *Νοῦμενον*, τὸ intelligibile, id quod intelligitur) expresses that which is *understood* in an appearance, that which we place (or make to *stand*) *under* it, as the condition of its real existence, and in proof that it is not an accident of the senses, or affection of the individual, not a phantom or apparition, i.e. an appearance that is only an appearance. (See, in Gen. ii. 19, 20, and in Psalm xx. 1, and in many other places of the Bible, the identity of '*nomen*' with '*numen*,' i.e. invisible power and presence, the *nomen substantivum* of all real objects, and the ground of their reality, independent of the Affections of Sense in the Percipient.)" It is so then that we are to understand the Name of Christ, that is, as the noumenon, numen or *power* by which alone salvation is, was, and will be effected. And therefore, rightly interpreted, the phrase which we are considering does not mean that men are to be saved by this or that article of belief, nor even that it is necessary that men should *profess* the christian doctrine at all; — for, truly, he is already a Christian "that feareth

God and worketh righteousness," and will be accepted accordingly by God for the sake of Christ, who died as a propitiation for the sins of the whole world, and is the sole source, power and "noumenon" of all godly works and dispositions. Thus we may venture to believe that although "there is none other 'name' under heaven given among men, whereby we must be saved," yet that those who are animated by the spirit of Christ, even when unconscious of what spirit they are, and uninitiated in the truths of the Gospel, may be saved by His all-pervading power; and we would not withhold this charitable belief from those whom W. Law calls "Christ's heathen disciples." The rejection of these truths of the Gospel by those who have been acquainted with them, and to whom they have been offered in vain and rejected with scorn, may, and probably will be, the ground of their condemnation; but it is not, we may be assured, because the truths are hard to be understood, but because the blindness of the head arises from the hardness of the heart.

v. The attention of the reader may be also profitably drawn to another scriptural phrase: namely, "*that Christ's righteousness is imputed to us,*" that is, as Christians: and it is scarcely necessary to say that a right meaning should be attached to the phrase. Now we know from revelation that the divine Agent of Redemption "was made a quickening (*ζωοποιούν*, life making)

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Spirit," in whom alone "we live and move and have our being." It follows then that, in respect of our moral life and being, all that our imperfect Will is capable of attaining, in order to our spiritual integrity and to become righteous, belongs to God in Christ,—that we are righteous in so far, and so far only, as we draw our life from Him,—and that as far as we live in Him we partake necessarily of His Righteousness. And it is to be borne in mind that *the Lord our Righteousness* is not merely the pattern of righteousness, which every individual may claim to emulate in his own person as self-originated; but that He is the One only Spirit of Righteousness, that he must actuate every person who aims at righteousness, that he must supply the righteousness, that without him no one can be righteous. And by Righteousness is meant the perfect Will of God in its absolute Spiritual Integrity.

Hence then when it is said "that Christ's righteousness will be imputed to us," it is to be understood that, although incapable of ourselves to attain to a righteous and holy life, yet our desires and efforts thereto shall be accounted to us as if we had accomplished that towards which we strive. And this position is easily intelligible upon the principle above stated; since we are then parts of the whole which is Christ's spiritual sphere of act and being, and of which He is the spiritual head and total life;

and, as we have learnt, *ubi anima est, tota est, tota in toto, et tota in quâlibet parte*. It is not to be supposed that the imputation of Christ's righteousness rests upon any outward conditions whatsoever, but upon the inward condition that we approve ourselves to be of the same spirit as that of Christ our Righteousness.

It is in the same sense that we believe that true Repentance—that is, conversion of the soul with sincere faith in Christ's power to restore the sinner, will be an effectual abolition of Guilt; namely, of crimes actually committed. In treating of the mystery of Redemption, it was observed that the evil Will in and of itself is a mere potentiality, and that whatever is actual is derived from Christ. What essentially constitutes the redemptive act is, that the evil potentiality is enlightened and enlivened to be actuated by Christ and received into His sphere of spiritual being. And thus, in respect of man, Christ not only removes the effects and consequences of a sinful nature, but makes reparation for guilt: for the natural man has his actual or spiritual being only in Christ: if man wills evil, he falls necessarily from Christ's spiritual ground; but by repentance he re-assumes the privilege of Christ's ground, and becomes alive being before dead in sin. With these explanations, then, we do not hesitate to say that "the blood of Christ washes away all sin," that His Righteousness will be imputed to all sincere Christians, that

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by His sacrifice once offered He made atonement for all sin and guilt :—provided only that, where sinful, we bewail our sinfulness, confess ourselves to Almighty God with full purpose of amendment of life, and invoke with lively faith the aid of Christ the Saviour in order to our spiritual regeneration in Him. Our fallen Will of itself tends to self-destruction : it can realize itself only in and by Christ : and it is God in Christ, who alone supplies the inducements, solicitations, motives, or by whatever other term we express the disposition whereof Good is the final aim.

One final remark :—It may be objected that if Christ actualized the *potential* Will in the redemptive act, He could not avoid actualizing more or less the evil, which the potential Will must ever by its inherent nature strive to realize. And this is true, that without true being there can be no false being, no actual evil. (See Appendix.) And is it not a fact of our experience in this world that wherever there is Good the Evil follows it as its shadow, and seems to excite what it is intended to supersede ? But, blessed be God ! the evil ever remains subjective, or never attains objective reality further than in its transition from the potential to the actual, and in its conversion to good. Christ was obliged to draw out and expose evil, in order to overcome and finally to extinguish it. And may not this position be a sufficient explanation

of St. Paul's assertion that "the *strength of sin is the Law*"? The moral law in repressing sin makes it known, and, in relation to a refractory Will, becomes the incitement to resist and contravene the law's prohibition. In this sense Christ might be said "to bear the sins of all mankind," that is, to be responsible for them; for though He was not the Author and not the Cause of sin and evil, He was the *condition* of their reality so far as they can be realized.

vi. *Christ's Incarnation*.—Notwithstanding all that has been said on this subject in the earlier part of this essay, the importance of some explanations which I have still to give induces me to recur once more to its exposition. It will not be necessary to do more than remind the reader of the results we have earlier obtained in meditating on our blessed Lord's Incarnation. The Logos ἐγένετο σὰρξ, assumed a human body of flesh and blood, became really a man like unto us in all things, sin only excepted. He was tempted as one of ourselves, but He withstood the temptation, and drove away the Tempter. It was not to be said "*Christum non potuisse peccare*;" but it was to be affirmed of Him, as the pattern of redeemed man, *potuisse non peccare*;—and it was to be believed that the Logos condescended to assume the fleshly tabernacle of Jesus of Nazareth, in order to prove by the fact that, by the same divine aid, it is possible for every man to remain holy "in the flesh."

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It has been, I trust, sufficiently established that under no other condition than that of the Incarnation of the Logos could the Idea of Redemption have become historical (i.e. true in fact) or morally true—true, that is to say, in relation to the will and fallen nature of man. As has been already said, the facts, as the Gospel history presents them to us, may be safely admitted so far as they are consistent with the *Idea of the revelation of a supernatural order of events belonging to the spiritual world*. Thus, no damage to religion need be feared, though it be granted that nothing is certainly known of the life of Jesus until the commencement of His mission, supposed to be at the age which was required for the induction of a Rabbi to his sacred office: nor need it be resented as an unpardonable offence against the spirit of gospel history, if it be supposed that the account, given in the traditional gospels and sanctioned by that of St. John, means essentially that Christ was inaugurated by His Baptism into His earthly mission and ministry, and that when the Bath-kol was heard, “Thou art My beloved Son, in Thee I am well pleased,” the spiritual power of the Logos entered into Jesus and became incarnate in His person. How the descent of the Holy Ghost as a Dove is to be conceived, as at once a presentation to the senses and yet essentially supersensuous, it would be difficult to explain except figuratively; but, without denying what tradition reports, the descent

of the Dove may have been intended to signify the peaceful appropriation by the Logos of the prepared and receptive ground or base which already existed in Jesus, something wholly unlike the agitation which accompanied the descent of the Spirit on the Prophets, in whom the dark ground of the natural man resisted more or less as an alien the divine influence. Further, without impugning the truth of the facts narrated, or the truths which they may be meant to convey, it may be conjectured that in Jesus whatever there might have been of the "natural man" still remaining was in the act of precipitation, and that the superinduced "spiritual man" might have been more or less in a turbid state, when the Spirit drove Him into the wilderness to be tempted: that is, to combat with the thoughts and suggestions, which may perhaps have assailed the still lingering human nature: whether He should appear as a Prince of this world, and assume the character of the expected Messiah of the Jewish people, or, guided by a higher and happier inspiration, should submit to take the part of the suffering Christ, and to humble Himself even to death, in order to become the founder of that spiritual kingdom in and by which divine Truth was to be established and perpetuated:—but, whatever may be thought of these perhaps too curious speculations, we have no reason to doubt that, under the proof required of Him, Jesus resisted and overcame

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the temptation, that from that moment the Will of the Logos became one with the Will of Jesus, that Jesus was thenceforth pure in spirit, and that in Him was achieved the sanctification of sinful flesh (σαρκὸς ἁμαρτωλοῦ) into a *holy body* fitted to be a temple of the divine Spirit.

Thus we say then that the Logos as Christ was tabernacled in the human body of Jesus of Nazareth; but it can be scarcely less than the duty of the Spiritual Philosophy to take this opportunity of elucidating, according to its principles, what is to be legitimately understood by "*Body*." Now "*Body*" may be conveniently defined as "A Sphere of Being by which a Spirit acts and is acted upon, that is, becomes a phenomenon, and has its existence in the world of the senses." In a larger sense, and by a bold though not unpardonable catachresis, we might say that the Universe, Kosmos, is the "*Body*" of the Logos; the Universe, contemplated in the laws by which it is created, maintained, and governed, and by which His divine agency is everlastingly proclaimed in the marvellous order and infinite variety of nature. But we have to confine our attention here to the human Body; and, as we have just found, His body is the phenomenon which declares or attests His sensible existence. But, corresponding to the *phenomenon*, we conceive the Soul as the *noumenon*: the soul being that which, surviving the phenomenon, may be

resuscitated to a future being, and which includes all that we distinguish by the terms thoughts, feelings, affections, volitions, and whatever else may be comprehended in the name of *psychical life*. We speak also of a *bodily life*, as of a principle of vitality, distinguished by its peculiar laws of evolution and existence, and associated with the natural events of birth, growth and death. But if we consider the subject from a moral point of view, apart from the physiological, it will be found that Soul and Body differ only as *subjective* and *objective* relations of one and the same power or principle, namely Will maintaining its sphere of Being :—what is inward in soul is outward in body ; to psychical change corresponds corporeal change, and *vice versâ* ; the exertion of the intellect implies the function of an organized brain, and the state of the brain, especially as affected by the notices of the senses, reacts upon the intellect ; every feeling is made known to us by a corporeal change, of which the most prominent is in the breathing and circulation of the blood ; and every affection of the Will, roused either to obtain a desire or resist encroachment, immediately displays itself in the muscular instruments of volition. If then, apart from the unavoidable distinction of Soul and Body, you contemplate them as inseparable in the unity of their moral significance, you will no longer consider them as separable components of your being and temporary associates in your

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earthly career, or suppose that the Body is a sort of house in which the Soul is made to dwell for a time as a tenant or lodger; but, in admitting the propriety of the distinction, you will repel all disruption of the essential unity of soul and body.

It may be objected that this view would render the separation of the soul from the body inconceivable, and would be wholly irreconcilable with the christian doctrine of the survival of the soul after the death of the body. But the truth is otherwise. If, as sound physiology teaches, you consider the mortal body to be a constant flux and change of the materials of which it is composed ("as the column of blue smoke from a cottage chimney in the breathless summer noon, or the stedfast-seeming cloud on the edge-point of a hill in the driving air-current, which momentarily condensed and recomposed is the common phantom of a thousand successors"—*Aids to Reflection*, p. 303, 4th ed.) you will not fail to seek for what is permanent and enduring in the bodily life elsewhere than in its fleeting phenomena. You will be as little tempted to confound the living body with the corpse which is its transitory dendrite and memento, as to confound the *Iliad* or *Paradise Lost* with the paper and coloring stuffs by which these poems become the objects of your senses. And as little by any effort of the imagination can you bring the resurgency of the corpse into any necessary

bond with the resurrection of the body through the life of Christ, as you can imagine the reproduction of the poems out of the burnt or otherwise destroyed paper on which they had been written. For better instruction you will turn, I am persuaded, to the 15th chapter of St. Paul's first Epistle to the Corinthians, and will accept his indignant remonstrance to the question, "How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come?" when he says, "Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die," and afterwards proceeds to describe the resurrection of the dead by the words: "It is sown in weakness; it is raised in power: it is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body." And thus the Spiritual Philosophy is led to affirm according to the Idea that the Soul, or whatever may partake of life and immortality through Christ, will be raised in "power," with the life-making capability of realizing itself in a sphere of act and being, which shall correspond to what St. Paul expresses by a *Spiritual Body*.

What that heavenly and "spiritual Body" may be, we are incapable of predicting. But it is certain that, without a Body, Spirit is inconceivable under any intelligible relation of actual existence. For by "Body" we mean the indispensable condition, under which Spirit acts and is acted upon; and, in respect of man's temporal existence on earth, we see that it is an essential

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part of the redemptive process to provide the fallen spirit with the sphere of act and being which we call the "Body." Without it the fallen spirit must have ever remained *potential*, and could not have become *actual*: the Body is the platform for the rebound of the spirit from the potential state of Hades. But if, on the one hand, "Body" is the condition of actual being, so on the other it must be regarded, at least in this our earthly life, as that which, by negation and passivity, imposes *limits* to man's spiritual power. If we ask ourselves, what is it which limits and narrows our Spiritual Will, what deprives it of its free-agency? we can only answer that, over and above the fatal influence of an evil and unregenerate Will, it is our body and carnal life with all the lusts of the flesh:—we are bound within the limitations of a being, which is inseparably associated with the influences of outward nature, and with the needs and desires of a bodily life which ever tempts and incites us to forget or set at nought the sterner duties and obligations of a holy and spiritual life in conformity with the revealed Will of God;—the human Will, thus embodied, allows itself to be entranced by appetites and passions, and at length by evil habit loses its power to "renounce the devil and all his works, the pomps and vanities of this wicked world, and all the sinful lusts of the flesh." We have learnt however, notwithstanding that the carnal and the

spiritual are ever antagonists and contraries, that they are opposite tendencies of one and the same Will; and it follows that man, in order to achieve his spiritual integrity, must rid himself of all that is carnal in his bodily life. The bodily life he must indeed retain in the present state of his being: without it his human individuality would be lost: but, as we have seen, it has a spiritual ground in Christ—a finition and predeterminate sphere of act and passivity, which is subservient to redemption, and leads to the increase of spiritual power, and by His gracious aid may be ever made to approximate to the sanctity of His divine example;—and we believe, “in sure and certain hope of the resurrection to eternal life,” that, should the lusts of the flesh have been mortified, and the Body made a temple consecrated to God, then, whatever of the carnal may remain will finally be cast off, as the exuviæ of our mortality, and the very “Body” of the individual Self, thus defecated and purified, will be raised in power and glory as the “Spiritual Body” in which we are to dwell with Christ evermore.

vii. *Christ's Death.*—The process of the life-giving suffering of our blessed Lord, already contemplated in the Idea, and expressed by the noteworthy figure of “the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world,” could not have been realized for the mind and moral nature of man, unless He had died for us on the Cross. “The

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Word was made flesh (*ἐγένετο σὰρξ*) and dwelt among us." He became in every respect a human being, and one of us, sin only excepted. In the moral world the Logos had been acting from the beginning as a Power; but it could not have been effectual on the heart and conscious mind of man, without the revelation in the fulness of time of the mystery of Redemption by the life, suffering, and death of Jesus. The Idea then became a fact of history for mankind. The divine Word had then become as one of ourselves the perfect exemplar of Humanity in the flesh, and, after dwelling among us "full of grace and truth," offered Himself as the sublime example of self-sacrifice and as a sincere martyr to the cause of God's truth. He was disbelieved and mistrusted for the very truth, which He taught; He was hated and despised for the love, which He bore to mankind; and the meek and innocent man of sorrows was condemned to receive the wages of guilt, and was put to death as a common malefactor. But His death, with all its associated influences, became part and parcel of the history of the world: the rays of light, which had spread through all previous time were concentrated to a focus, which was from that moment to be a beacon for all nations, the symbol and consummation of the idea of salvation—"a light to lighten the Gentiles and the glory of Israel." And let it be borne in mind that this heart-stirring event was to work

on the will of man in order to the enlivening of his faith and the amendment of his life;— it was not only a sublime example, but it was the operative cause of imitation in others in behoof of the christian work of *Self-denial*. And although the efficacy of the fact does not depend upon its being merely a fact, yet it was the revelation in and to the world of that as *φαινομένον*, the *νοούμενον*, or efficient cause, of which was out of and above the world of the senses. It was at once type and symbol, part and consummation of the whole process of Redemption; and thus was revealed the power of the Saviour to act in and upon man;—and as the first Adam was the representative of *transgressing* Humanity, so was Christ, the second Adam the type of the redeemed and spiritual Humanity. But had not Christ suffered on the Cross, as one of us, whose sinfulness deserves no better reward, He would not have revealed the “Way” for us, and would not have been our pioneer and guide, in order to be raised with Him in power and glory. The whole moral lesson of His humanity would have been lost except under the conditions stated, for otherwise He would have been for us, as the Jewish Messiah, a Prince of this world and appealing only to the sympathies of our fallen nature; or He would have been a Divinity on earth so transcendently exalted above our spiritual capabilities, as to have been neither our example nor our guide.

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viii. *Christ's Resurrection*.—I add this article, since it may be objected that our Philosophy may be supposed to have made no explicit declaration, and to have furnished no sufficient evidence or authority, in the Idea, of the truth of the *Immortality of the Soul*. In order to remedy any doubt that may exist on so important a question, it may be proper to say once for all that, if not explicitly stated, it has been assumed throughout this work as a self-evident truth, or at any rate as a truth involved in the Idea which is the foundation of Spiritual Philosophy: that the Will, as the indestructible ground of all that is spiritual within us, is the continual principle of Life in any given form of existence, and may be considered to be the power of perpetual self-renovation, absolute or relative, of its sphere of act and being.

Thus we accept without any misgiving or doubt the promise of the blessing of immortal life, where according to Scripture “the sure and certain hope” of immortality is derived from the consciousness of a well-conducted life, and from the memorable announcement of our Saviour, in the words “I am the resurrection and the life.” And if any weight may be attached to what has been repeatedly urged in this essay, on the grounds both of Reason and Revelation, as voices of the same divine Spirit,—if, as has been established, the fallen spirit has been

raised from the state of Hades by a germinal principle of spiritual life implanted in him by the Saviour and Lord of life,—if the evolution of this germ be wholly due to the life-making Spirit, which the Saviour wholly and only is, and if the growth and evolution of the germ is that in which our spiritual regeneration consists in order to everlasting life—if, I say, the Logos in Christ is the sole cause and power of life to all, who acknowledge Him as their heavenly progenitor and parent,—then, most surely, it cannot fail to be their stedfast creed, that their immortality is as certain as that God is, and their eternal life hidden in the Christ of God.

When therefore it is said that by the resurrection of Christ were revealed life and immortality, I am not at all disposed to deny the assertion, and am quite willing to accept the fact as a necessary part of the evidence required for the conviction of men, who judge by sensible experience. But I cannot agree with those, who find in the resurrection of Christ the *adequate proof* of a truth which claims the antecedent Idea—that in Christ and in Him only are we made alive, as in Him, and in Him only, may we hope to live everlastingly in union and communion with God.

If then after this lengthened, though not unimportant, digression, we pass once more under review the tenets of Calvinists and Universalists, we shall be confirmed in our opinion, that the Calvinistic scheme, in adopting the notion that

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Christ is the Saviour only of the few, selected out of mankind upon no other assignable principle than that of God's absolute will and pleasure, that the Calvinistic scheme is, I say, harsh, narrow, and incompatible with the spirit of love which pervades Christianity. And on the other hand, we are constrained to reject the notion of the Universalist that all mankind without exception will be finally saved, because it defeats the primary intention of religion, by removing the inducements to amendment of life and conduct, and by subverting the necessary belief that we are upon trial in a state of probation. Under these considerations we might be prepared to adopt as the safer course the compromise, which the Arminian doctrine offers: namely, "that Jesus Christ by His death and sufferings made an atonement for the sins of all mankind in general, and of every individual in particular; that, however, none but those who believe in Him can be partakers of this divine benefit." To this statement we need not object; but if we examine the doctrines of Arminius and his followers more closely, it will be found, I fear, that their creed is neither adequate nor satisfactory.

The strength of the Remonstrants was shown in their controversy with the Calvinists and vindicated itself in their able refutation of the Calvinistic tenets; but if we turn from what they deny to that which they affirm, and which we may regard as the *positive* part of their

creed, we shall, I apprehend, be disappointed in the result. Passing by what is above stated to be the belief expected of a Christian in the atoning efficacy of Christ's death and sufferings, without other comment than that no attempt is made to reconcile the effect (namely, the salvation of mankind) with any sufficient cause,—passing by, I say, the want of depth evinced in treating this important question connected with the economy of Redemption, we find the following doctrinal position:—"that mankind are not totally depraved, and that depravity does not come upon them by virtue of Adam's being their public head, but that mortality and natural evil only are the direct consequences of his sin to posterity;" and further, in connexion with this position, we notice the assertion "that men have the power of doing the Will of God." It is scarcely necessary to make these positions the subject of controversy; but it may be remarked that, in the first, the substitution of "natural" for "spiritual" evil has no authority in Revelation or Reason, whilst the doctrine of Original Sin in the true sense of its being an original proclivity to sin, is ignored or but faintly echoed: and that, in the second position, the omission, though it may be unintentional, of the necessary and indispensable aid of the Saviour, as St. John's *φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν*, in order that men may do the will of God, betrays at least laxity or carelessness in the exposition of spiritual truth.

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It may be admitted that these objectionable passages are not to be found in the Catechism published by Arminius at Rotterdam; but if, as may be presumed, they express the opinions of Arminian divines, it is evident that the disciples of the Spiritual Philosophy cannot subscribe to a creed, which tends to lower spiritual evil to the standard of "natural evil," whatever that may mean, and which betrays so evident a tendency to enhance the value of human agency in the work of salvation. And notwithstanding the severe strictures on Calvinism which are found in this essay, I feel bound to say that it exhibits more awe and reverence in exalting the character of the Deity, and more earnestness and humility in prescribing the conditions of salvation by election, than can be claimed by Arminianism;—and where the Calvinistic Creed does not lead to the pride of self-assured election, and to the uncharitable conviction of the eternal reprobation of all but the few arbitrarily selected for salvation, it may perhaps be regarded as the truer and safer doctrine. We adhere then with undiminished faith to the tenet, firmly, I trust, established on the foundation of revealed truth: that Christ is the effectual Saviour of all mankind; and that every man may partake of the exceeding benefit of His great love and mercy by sincere faith in His redemptive power, and by willingly receiving in all humility the germinal principle of light and life, which He implants

and ever fosters to our spiritual regeneration and restoration to the never-fading joys of our heavenly home.

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§ 5. We may next proceed to consider *man as the subject of the redemptive process*, and how far the same must be accepted as the necessary supplement of his defective moral state.

Now the dialectic extremes may be thus stated:—

Universal guilt.

Universal, but guiltless, imperfection; the necessary effect of man being at once finite and progressive.

Or a mid-position may be taken, admitting in a certain sense the existence of guilt, but as contingent.

Here as before we find the Calvinist foremost in the sternness of damnatory judgment. Appealing to the Scripture, which says (Rom. v. 12) “As by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin; and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned,” or to similar texts which inculcate Adam and sanction the doctrine of Original Guilt, he translates them into the dogma, that Adam’s guilt in transgressing the divine command was inherited by all his posterity. On the strength of a physical act, namely that of generation, he converts guilt into a disease, the sin of the parents into

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the calamity of their offspring, and concludes that all mankind is actually guilty and merits equally the punishment of eternal reprobation. According to this view man comes into the world brand-marked as a felon: the present state of existence is but the condemned cell, into which he has been thrust after sentence has been passed, and from which he will be led forth to expiate his crimes, with the slender hope only of being an arbitrary exception to the almost universal consequence of God's retributive justice. In opposition to this the scheme of the *Optimist* has been placed;—a scheme to which man so naturally leans; believing that man is by nature pure and innocent, prone to good and capable by his own powers of moral perfection, but that uncongenial circumstances may and do prevent his moral development, and lead to evils, which, being caused by the circumstances in which he is placed, are to be regarded as venial errors or pardonable faults, which a merciful Providence, who has ordered all things for the best, will overlook or excuse.* But the creed of the Optimist falls so evidently below all the conditions of religious belief, that even the Universalist, who at least confesses the necessity of Redemption, cannot fail to reject it from his doctrinal convictions. And reverting once more

* Note by Coleridge “Optimism is the necessary refuge of a good heart, where, the intellect having been first deceived into the error of assuming necessity as the contrary of freedom, the theorist has adopted the scheme of necessitarianism.

to the Arminian, or religious eclectic : who seeks to reconcile faith with the understanding, and holds that mankind is not totally depraved, that what depravity there is is not from Adam, and that the consequences of Adam's transgression were only mortality and natural evil : we cannot fail to see at once what must be the consequence of such an attempt to accommodate the scheme of the Optimist to religious belief. If man is by nature morally perfectible or has "naturally" (that is, as a fallen creature) a capability of goodness, then his pravity may be ascribed to outward circumstances, which are beyond his control ; and the Arminian divine will be at liberty to pronounce inflated panegyrics on our first parents in their state of paradisiacal innocence, and to describe them as exemplars of moral purity and perfection, fitted to be immortal and happy without change of state in their terrestrial paradise ; but with the above premisses, the same divine is under the unavoidable necessity of glossing over the intractable subject of moral evil ; and accordingly it becomes in his hand a calamity, and evaporates into death and disease or other physical ills. In the account of the doctrine of Original Sin, we have already provided for the refutation of the Arminian view, calculated as it is to sap the foundation of religious truth, and to prove a dry-rot of faith, more dangerous, because more insidious, than open and avowed infidelity :—but

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it may be here remarked that if, on the one hand, the Arminian leaves unexplained the origin of moral evil, or varnishes it over, the Calvinist runs into the opposite extreme, and converts the tendency or disposition to sin into actual criminality—the sin-prone nature of man into positive crime and irretrievable guilt. I have endeavoured to show, in contradistinction to both schemes, that “Original Sin” means a proneness to sin,—“inherent” indeed in man’s *fallen* nature, but not belonging to his original and divine parentage; and that man’s sinful nature is always, and was from the first, counteracted by the redemptive act of the Logos:—moreover, that Adam’s sin-prone nature was necessarily transmitted to his posterity; but that the guilt, which Adam incurred by his transgression, was neither transmitted nor imputed to his descendents; and that they became subject to the consequences of his guilt, not as a punishment for his fault, but because, participating in his sinful nature, they would have fallen under like circumstances, and are ever incurring like guilt for similar offences. But I have also argued that “Adam” in this respect is the name intended to signify primæval man collectively, and that Adam’s transgression means truly the process of degeneracy and corruption which began in the earliest age of the world. It may be remarked too that the reputed history of the first man is profitable for our spiritual instruc-

tion, and plainly teaches us, that the merely natural ground, in which he had his earthly existence, could not be made, according to God's final purposes, the basis of an enduring life; but a redemptive process was needed, by which in due season the natural ground should be changed into an enduring and spiritual ground, and of which natural death and mortality were the necessary conditions, in order that what was mortal in man might be changed into immortal, and the corruptible put on incorruption. And it may be added, taking Adam as the representative of the race, that in him was shown that man cannot stand and remain upright in and by his own strength, even with all the aids and congenial circumstances which the garden of Eden offered in behalf of a life of innocence and purity.

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§ 6. We pass then to the fifth and last head, under which we propose to consider the main divisions of controversial theology. And the present article leads us to the examination of the part appropriated to *man as a moral agent*, that is, *as a Will*, in the process of Redemption. We may thus state the dialectic extremes :—

Effectual calling, or	Justification by works;
Election, an act of God's	and therefore neither
irresistible Grace; with	the Grace of God, nor a
which the sinner has	Mediator necessary.
nothing to do.	

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The Calvinist asserts :—" Whom God hath predestined He doth effectually call, Election being an act of God's irresistible Grace ;"—and he adds as a corollary, " that those effectually called shall never finally fall from a state of Grace." In this doctrine it will be observed that man, who is to be redeemed, contributes nothing :—he is a purely passive subject ; he altogether ceases to be a moral agent, person, or Will, and becomes a Thing, the clay in the mould of the potter. The positions of the Calvinist are apparently founded on some such argument as the following :—If God be Almighty (and how should He be less !) and wills the salvation of a certain number of individuals : and, as has been noticed, arbitrarily selected, because all men are absolutely guilty : that act of His Will must be irresistible in its operation, and must be effectual in its purpose. Now it is not necessary to repeat what has been amply discussed in the examination of the article on Predestination ; but I cannot forego the opportunity of remarking here, that the Calvinist takes the absolute subjectivity of the All-Will abstractedly from the eternal act of self-affirmation, the " I am," the supreme mind, and the divine life and love, and then attributes to his own abstraction the name of God : when in fact, if such an abstraction could for a moment be contemplated as real, if the ground of Being could be at once divided from, and yet confounded with, the Being

self-grounded, the product would be not God, but a blind Fate—it would be *Deus abortivus*. Leaving, however, the metaphysical argument, I desire to draw the attention of the student to man as the *subject* of the redemptive act, and to the question, whether the reasoning employed, or supposed to be employed, by the Calvinist, as above stated, is a sufficient ground for our faith. Now however unanswerable the inferences from the omnipotence of God might appear, it will be evident on reflection that the argument derives its apparent cogency from a false premiss, since the question at issue is, how may a *moral Agent* obtain and secure his salvation? Unless Christianity is to work on the conscience of the individual, that is, as a Moral Will capable of repentance, conversion, and amendment of life and conduct, it would be a mere metaphysical puzzle without aim or end for a rational being. But the Calvinist, wilfully shutting his eyes to the essential ground of the whole inquiry, denies that man is a moral agent at all, denies him even the measure of Will which is necessary to accept or reject the grace proffered to him. It is plain therefore that the Calvinist quits the firm ground of belief for the shifting sands of metaphysical speculation, or rather for the empty abstractions of the logical understanding;—and I emphatically repeat that the questions appertaining to the principles of religious faith and doctrine can have no rational meaning, unless in

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behoof of our spiritual integration, and in connexion with the ends and purposes of our moral Will. Speculative Reason does, indeed, empower us to contemplate God as far as He in His infinite goodness enables us to *know Him in ourselves*, and thence, by the light of His eternal truth, to assure ourselves of the Ideas or Principles upon which depends the work of our Spiritual Integration:—but where such Ideas are merely educts of philosophical speculation, the heart remains cold, and the Will benumbed, until the spiritual man, head and heart, enkindled by the light and life from above, be *willingly* actuated to that living act of the individual Will which we rightly call Faith—that is, firm reliance on, and fidelity to, God in Christ, and to the saving truths which He has revealed to us. But more of God we cannot know than that which He has graciously revealed to us in and by our moral consciousness. Reason was given to us in order to enlighten the moral Will, to give it insight and guidance to become a spiritual life of faith and practice: and so long as we are led by the needs of our moral nature, we can never stray from the direct road which will conduct us to God's Truth, and on which every step affords more and surer light for the guidance of our course toward Spiritual Perfection:—but the light of Reason was never intended to be disjoined by us from our moral Will; and such a use of our speculative faculties can only

mislead us into the vain and impious attempt to erect a Babel-tower of intellectual pride, from the pinnacle of which speculative philosophy might pry into the secrets of God's mysterious doings and purposes.

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We object then to the Calvinist that, in dealing with abstractions and abstract notions of divine Will and omnipotence, he misses the very point which his reasoning was intended to elucidate; and that, in depriving man of the *relative* free-agency which enables him to accept or reject divine grace, he removes the very ground for the belief in the necessity of any redemptive process and of the work of our blessed Saviour—he destroys, in short, the foundation itself of religious faith.

It will be, however, abundantly plain, by referring to our article on Original Sin, that, in contending for a moral Will in man, we are far, very far, from supporting the doctrine, which we placed as the opposite extreme to that Calvinistic tenet which in the preceding paragraph we have endeavoured to refute. We by no means hold that “man may be justified by his works, and that therefore neither the grace of God, nor a Mediator be necessary.” It has been shown, I trust with sufficient clearness, that, in consequence of the pravity induced by man's fallen nature, it is absolutely necessary that the ground of his fallen nature should be effectually changed and spiritually transmuted; that the whole moral scheme of the world essentially consists in the

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Redemption of man in and by God in Christ; and that it is no less necessary for the effectual achievement of the redemptive process that we, as fallen creatures, who of ourselves are incapable of righteousness, are without the means of justification by our own works, and are wholly undeserving of salvation on the score of our own merits, should be made partakers of that Righteousness of which Christ is the sole power and pattern.

The Arminian divines, as might have been foreseen, deny altogether the doctrine of "irresistible grace," and further maintain that "those united to Christ by faith may fall from their faith, and forfeit finally their state of grace." And thus far, it will be seen, we have nothing to oppose to their tenets. But should we adopt their views without further investigation, or adopt the results when taken in conjunction with their doctrine of Original Sin, as stated in our third article, it is most necessary to guard against the errors to which they lead, and which may, and do, strike at the roots of Christianity. The Arminian, namely, does not hold that man's pravity is an inherent necessity of his fallen nature, and that, although Christ made atonement for the sins of all mankind, the redemptive act was indispensable and necessary for all men. And although the Arminians may not be justly chargeable with the errors of the Romish Church: that good works are sufficient

for the attainment of eternal life, and that punishment in this world, or in the world to come, *in such degree* as may answer the demerit of our sins, will satisfy God's justice: yet it is evident that, as neither the disease nor the remedy is considered universal or necessary, a very dangerous loop-hole is left for the pride and arrogance of man, and that in consequence he may be seduced from the Truth. For the Grace by which alone we can hope to be saved is wholly from God in Christ; and, although "good works" are indispensable "and do spring out necessarily of a true and lively faith," yet whatever is good in our words and works is not originated by ourselves, but is ever and solely derived from Christ and from His operance in us; and our salvation depends wholly and solely on the merits of Christ Jesus.

§ 7. It may however be worth our while to dwell a little longer on the subject of the preceding paragraph. It has been generally and rightly deemed by Protestants that one of the chief benefits of the Reformation, due mainly to Luther, was the establishment of the Pauline doctrine of *Justification by Faith*. So strong, indeed, has been the belief in its importance, that it has been wielded as an effectual weapon against the erroneous doctrines of the Romish Church on the merits of works; and Luther himself ventured to disparage the Epistle of St. James as sanctioning similar views.

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In theological language "Justification" is that act of God, by which He imputes to man the merits of Christ, and considers and treats man no longer as a sinner but as a righteous and just person: and the person so treated, on the previous condition of faith in Christ, is said to be "justified," freed from guilt and absolved from punishment. The main object of the doctrine is evidently to disabuse the mind of man of trusting to his own merits, and to enforce the truth that man's salvation is due only to the work and merits of Christ. Dare we say, however, that the doctrine so stated—most wholesome truth as it is—is exhibited in all the clearness which it eminently deserves, or that we apprehend with the requisite insight in what the change consists which is wrought by "faith" in the sinner, when "justified" or made just by the merits of Christ? I suspect that the obscurity, if such should be admitted, arises from the use of legal figures and phraseology; and in the Confessions of Faith of the Protestant Churches we find that undue weight is attached to the distinction between being absolved from guilt and punishment, and being made or considered just or righteous: between a criminal *pardoned* and a criminal *converted*: though, under what intelligible conditions either takes place, it would be difficult to explain by means of their statements. But if we divest the case of the legal terms which encumber it, and have recourse

to the Idea in which is to be found the ground of its intelligibility: namely, that it is Christ's righteousness, which justifies by making man righteous: the argument, it will be seen, is in perfect accordance with our former reasoning, and is necessarily true, if, as we have repeatedly affirmed, God in Christ is Righteousness itself, and there is no other Righteousness in heaven or earth, whereby man can be saved, except by Him, who is "the Lord our Righteousness." Every man, as far as he is righteous, is so by virtue of Christ's indwelling power and operance; and no man can be accounted righteous, without having diligently sought the regenerative supplement of his imperfect moral nature at the well-spring of the water of life, even Christ Jesus. When then a man is said to be "justified by faith," it cannot but mean that he acknowledges with all sincerity the Christ of God, as the sole power and pattern of spiritual integrity, with a firm reliance on His gracious aid, and with a hearty desire to be enlightened by His Word and conformed to His Will. And in such case Christ becomes a principle of life to the individual, and the germinal seed of his spiritual regeneration. "Justification by faith," so understood, is essentially a ground of Christianity, and, rendered intelligible by the Idea of Christ, offers to us the requisite conditions under which man may not only be accounted "just," but may really become righteous. It is true,

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indeed, that man *individually* can never be deemed morally perfect ;—he attains to spiritual integrity as an integral part of the whole, in which Christ is all in all and all in each.

It is most certain that “justification by faith” does not preclude the necessity of “good works :” since the faith in Christ just described can only be evinced by a christian life of holiness ; and a christian life consists essentially in acts and works, such as those of which our Saviour’s life was the example, “insomuch that by them a lively Faith may be as evidently known, as a tree discerned by the fruit.” (Art. XII. Church of England.) It remains, however, to be observed that the term “good works” is equivocal, or is used without due attention to a very possible mistake in the meaning.

No one would hesitate to say that such and such works are “good,” that is, have the *outward character* of being “good :” such for instance, as works of charity, relief of the destitute, personal service to the sick and needy, the saving of another’s life at the hazard of one’s own, or various acts of fidelity, devotion, and self-denial towards persons who claim the love and respect of others. It is unnecessary to lengthen the list ; but however difficult it may be to distinguish the genuine from the false, it will scarcely be denied by any one that the test of a work that merits the name of “good” is the *motive or intention which prompts it* ; and that if done for the grati-

fication of *self and its selfish interests*, the act has been poisoned at the source, and, as far as the agent is concerned, forfeits all claim to the title of "good."

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Appealing then to the common sense of mankind, in aiding us to the right interpretation of this article of faith, I venture to say, on the authority both of Reason and Scripture, that "Justification by works" can form no part of the Christian's creed. If "good works" can only spring from a right motive, and if the only right motive be that of conforming our Will to His Will who is the sole and universal Righteousness, it follows that those works only, which merit the name of good, as springing from right motives, are those which are done *in and by the Spirit of Christ*; and that all others, which emanate from the Self and are for the gratification of its selfish interests, dictated, it may be, by the lusts of pride, vanity, power, ambition and the like, are immoral and sinful. And it may be here remarked that the doctrine laid down coincides with the principle of Ethics formerly enunciated: where the Logos is shown to be the universal light of divine Reason, and the Moral Law to be based upon the universal and self-evident truth of Reason—revealed by the same Light, *φῶς τὸ ἀληθινόν*, "that an act can be considered moral, or in conformity with the moral law, only when it may be universally willed under like conditions and circumstances." In

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the former mode of statement, the "Spirit of Christ" is represented as the indispensable ingredient of a moral or spiritual life; in the latter, is named the divine light of Reason which is necessary to reveal moral truth and enlighten the conscience of man; and in both modes of statement is implied the same divine Word who is life and light to His creatures.

But here a difficulty presents itself, which, on account of its controversial character and its important bearing on our estimation of moral conduct, deserves especial notice. It has been asked, namely, whether the acts and deeds of the heathen, though apparently bearing the genuine stamp of moral excellence, are not really sins—mere *splendida peccata*? Now it would be no difficult task to supply from heathen history instances of deeds and works, which, so far as the "character" of the acts is concerned, bear the undeniable impress which we attach to "good works" in the christian sense of the term: deeds of heroism, self-devotion, self-denial, and works of the noblest charity. How then shall we distinguish in such cases between heathen and christian morality? Can we say that the same virtues *differ in kind* when practised by a heathen and when practised by a Christian; that justice, honesty, veracity, temperance, sobriety, chastity, benevolence, are not virtues when practised by a heathen, and are virtues when practised by a Christian? The affirmative of this

proposition borders too nearly on self-contradiction to claim the support of conscientious persons, or of those Christians who accept the teaching of St. Peter and St. Paul. Thus Peter (Acts x. 34): "Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons: But in every nation he that feareth Him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with Him." So Paul (Rom. ii. 11 and 14): "For there is no respect of persons with God:" that is, of Jew or Gentile: "For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves: which shew the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another;"—need we go further for scriptural authority to show that virtue, or rather godliness, is one and the same for heathen and Christian? But it may be reasonably objected to me that I have said above, "Those only are good works, which are done *in and by the Spirit of Christ*." And I may be asked, how such works can be done by those who have never even heard the name of Christ and are utterly ignorant of gospel-truth? Now, in spite of the apparent inconsistency involved in my previous statement, I beg to remind the reader that he has the means of removing the difficulty, if it should exist in his mind, by a heedful reconsideration of the character of God in Christ as

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the sole power and pattern of spiritual integrity. I would seriously ask the student what "good works" can be done except under the actuation and guidance of the Spirit of Christ, or what works, that bear the stamp of goodness and godliness, can be other than such as proceed from the Author of all goodness and godliness? There is surely only an affirmative answer to these questions, if we are assured, as we cannot but be, that God in Christ is the one sole eternal and universal principle of all Truth and Righteousness, actuating "every man that cometh into the world," and by the light of divine Reason enlivening and enlightening the human Will or Spirit to become a Conscience. And if a lurking doubt should remain, whether works, not done consciously in the name of Christ, deserve the name of "good," or of having been done in and by Christ's spirit, I answer with the Apostle (bearing in mind that it is the *Conscience* which attests the indwelling presence of Christ) that the Gentiles, "when they do by nature the things contained in the law, are a law unto themselves; which shew the work of the law" (i. e. law of righteousness) "written in their hearts; *their conscience also bearing witness*; and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another."

§ 8. I have thus endeavoured in the exposition of the foregoing article of faith to avoid the errors which the dialectic extremes exem-

plify; that is to say, to maintain that man is a Moral Will, a responsible agent, though, by reason of the pravity of his fallen nature, he cannot of himself fulfil the conditions necessary for his salvation. And it has been the main object of this portion of the work to show that the process of Redemption consists in giving to the human Will a susceptibility and disposition to godliness by the free grace of God in Christ in order to salvation, and in providing the means and outward conditions necessary for its accomplishment;—briefly, that, man having by faith and repentance accepted the gracious aid of the Redeemer, this will be effectual to spiritual regeneration and eternal life in all who by diligence make their calling sure.

In the “Aids to Reflection” is the following quotation from Field (Church History, p. 58):—
 “The satisfaction of Christ is communicated and applied unto us without suffering the punishment that sin deserveth [*and essentially involveth, S.T.C.*] upon the condition of Faith and Repentance.” And to this Coleridge adds: “Without Faith there is no power of repentance; without a commencing repentance no power to faith; and that it is in the power of the Will either to repent or to have faith, in the Gospel sense of the words, is itself a consequence of the Redemption of mankind, a free gift of the Redeemer; the guilt of its rejection, the refusing to avail ourselves of the power, being all that we can

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Chap. III. act." Aids, p. 240, ed. 4.

To conclude the remarks, which the article last considered has called forth :—" Without good works, the power and opportunity existing, can no man be saved ; but yet it is not by the works, as acts of his own individual Will, that he can be saved, but by the ground and potentiating condition of those works, which he renounces as a product of his own act, and attributes to the Father through the Son : no man cometh to the Father but through the Son : no man cometh to the Son, unless the Father leadeth him." And that ground, that potentiating condition, what are they ? " I am crucified with Christ : nevertheless I live ; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me ; and the life which I now live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave Himself for me." (Gal. ii. 20.)

APPENDICES

REFERRED TO IN PART III. CHAP. IV.

I.

THIRD CHAPTER OF "RELIGIO LAICI."

The Disease and the Remedy.

The Origin of Evil and Redemption.

WE have in the former part of our investigation shewn, APPENDIX.
what unavoidably presents itself to any reflecting person, the defectiveness of man's moral will. But we did not there trace its causes, we simply stated it as fact and experience. And now we must follow this all-important subject to its ground and causative conditions;—we must consider the doctrine of *Original Sin* as it is taught in the Christian Revelation, which declares that Will, of which the Reason teaches man the imperfections, is a *Fallen Will*, a Will with an inherent defect, a defect by no accident, but of the nature of *Evil*. And this inevitably leads us to the question of the *Origin of Evil*, of a Fall or Apostasis from the *Absolute Good*.

We have seen that the Absolute Will is the Absolute Good. For it is absolutely causative of all reality; and this so eminently, that we cannot contemplate it otherwise than as eternally, unconditionally, and no otherwise than ever and infinitely, *actualizing*: *actus purissimus sine ullâ potentialitate*. But at the same time the idea no less requires the postulate of *Eternal Possibilities*; since the very idea of an absolute Will would clude us and the Will would be the very reverse of Absolute, were there anything conceivable or

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imaginable, which was impossible for a Will so conceived. The *possible* is however the potential, and the opposite or perhaps the contrary of the actual;—how shall we say then that the Absolute Will is *sine ullâ potentialitate*? This appears indeed like a contradiction, but the contradiction is apparent only, and the solution of this momentous problem may serve as a test of the truth of the whole scheme. The Absolute Will namely must as such actualize, or is the causative act of, all that IS and all that may BE; but it cannot will the reality of that which in order to exist must exist under impossible conditions, of an impossible being; since this is self-contradictory:—yet it is no less true that the self-contradictory may be willed, although we cannot attribute it to the Absolute Will, which, as absolutely causative of reality, is the source of Truth itself. We dare only assert then that a self-contradictory act of Will exists as an Eternal Possibility, which the Absolute Will, as the Source of the True and the Supreme Good, never could will. The idea of the Absolute Will requires the postulate of *Eternal possibilities*, which the Supreme Good demands *as possible*, but forbids to be willed *as actual*.* We say, and we truly say, that to God nothing is impossible; but it is equally true if we say that it is impossible that He *would* will that which is self-contradictory.

* The only possible condition of the impossibility of Evil is that the tri-une God should alone have been, without any distinctities in the Supreme Mind:—in other words that the Son of God, or only begotten Word, should have been the Supreme Mind and yet not the Pleroma, the Supreme Reason (that is, the Distinctity in the form of Unity) without any distinctities, and the God of Love and Life without the power of communicating life and love. But all these are impossible, and therefore the impossibility of Evil is itself an impossibility and a contradiction. How could the cleaving of a Will to the Absolute, the *willing* to be in the Absolute and of the Absolute, be an object of the love of the Absolutely Good and Holy Will, if this willing were in fact no willing at all, but a natural and blank necessity? If the child of God is the object of the Supreme Father's love, when to the eternal self-affirmation of the Father "I am in that I am," the child makes glad and free response, "Yea, Heavenly Father, Thou art, and therefore we are in Thee and of Thy infinite goodness,"—how could that be, unless it were possible for the answer to have been "And I too AM, and have the centre of my being in

dictory. The Supreme Reason cannot be unreasonable, the Supreme Good cannot be evil. APPENDIX.

Yet nevertheless these Possibilities were willed as actual. This involves the *fact of a Fall*, and constitutes the first *Apo-stasis*, which, so far from being necessary, *ought* never to have occurred. The possibility is necessary: the fact contingent. It is difficult to find words to embody for the mind an act so transcendent and mysterious; but the idea renders the assumption necessary that the Absolute Will, as the Supreme Good, should every way actualize itself, and manifest its being,—that it should generate in its own divine image *Wills* partaking of the perfection of its being: nor need we enquire whether they be fitly called Spirits, Living Ideas, or Angels, that constitute the Pleroma or Heavenly Host, and manifest the fulness of the Absolute Will. And it is equally true that to these must be attributed the inherent originaive power of Will: but this again only so far as may be attributed to Wills, derived from an Absolute Will, that is to Non-Absolute Wills; and as the Eternal Will or Absolute Subject is the ground and cause of all being, a Will conformed with that of the Eternal or Universal Will is a necessary condition of all true, i. e. *actual* being, and therefore of all non-absolute Wills. We have learnt too, in respect of actual being that *Distinction* is no less necessary than *Unity*,—that Distinction and Unity are the two co-eternal and co-essential forms of the self-manifestation of the Absolute. Now if we have found these conditions alone realized in the Logos or perfected Alterity of the self-asserted Absolute Will, the I AM, it follows that all non-absolute Wills, even the Spirits that stand round the throne of the Most High, have their being in Him who sits on the right hand of the Father, His only

my being?" And the latter answer, in substance, is that which Milton puts into the mouth of Satan:—

"We know no time when we were not as now;
Know none before us, self-begot, self-rai'd
By our own quick'ning power."—

Paradise Lost, book v. 859.

APPENDIX. begotten Son, that in Him alone they have true being, and can be recognised by the Supreme Good as at once other than and one with Himself, in Unity with His Holy Will. The Hypostasis or Personality of the Celestial Intelligences is the *echo* of the *I Am*, of the Word that soundeth from eternity to eternity, but is in the same instant disclaimed by them as original, begotten or proceeding,—disclaimed, I say, and acknowledged in the angelic antiphony :—“ Yea O Father ! Thou art,—and *we in the Word from Thee !*”

In what manner the Spirits fell we know not. It can be no subject of knowledge or of legitimate inquiry for us : it cannot be a fact of history or evolved from the idea : it is neither practical nor speculative, and therefore can neither be the object of philosophy or religion. Sufficient for us that such must have been the fact, and that in behoof of our moral being it is necessary to trace the effects and consequences. Now we have seen that the *Will* is the ultimate ground of all Reality, pre-supposed and implied in every form of Reality, even in the highest and most comprehending form, the Supreme Being,—that the absolute foundation of the system is laid in a *Will*, the Will in its own form, the antecedent of all, and in all other forms the absolute essence. We have seen moreover that, as the Eternal Will or Absolute Subject is the ground and cause of all being, a Will conformed with that of the Eternal or Universal Will is a necessary condition of all true, i. e. *actual* being, and therefore of the being of all non-absolute Wills. Now the *Fall* from the Absolute consisted in a determination of the non-absolute Wills to be, each in itself. The immediate consequence was the absence of an actual Self wherein to be ; the *Fall* and Hades as the result ; and as the perfection of unity is an essential attribute of the Godhead, so Hades, as the contrariety to God, must be a *contradiction*. Hades is that which is the contrary of God (the Absolute Good, the Will essentially causative of all Reality) to the utmost extent that is compatible with its being the possible subject of any predicate. We can in no other way obtain that laborious idea of Hades of which alone the subject is suscep-

tible, than by presenting to ourselves the several attributes and perfections of the Divine Will and predicating the contrary:—for essential Light we must substitute *Darkness*; for beatific Vision, the *Hades* i. e. τὸ ἀειδὲς, that which is below intuition; for the absolute Fulness, *Emptiness*; for the self-sufficing Fruition, *Craving*; for Being which has its ground in itself, an *Anguish*, and a *Striving to be under mutually destructive contradictions*; for that which is above number, for Distinction and Unity, that which is below number—indefinite blank *Multicity*: and, as in the Fulness and Unity there are co-eternal Light and Distinction, so in the emptiness are *Darkness* and *Indistinction*. It can have but one Symbol—*Chaos*; a mere and confused possibility of Being, a possibility in dependence on the Absolute Will and because God is, but from itself under impossible conditions.

Nevertheless by Almighty Power and Divine Love (and what less would suffice?) this Darkness is to be made translucent, this emptiness is to be filled, this incapacity of being is to receive Light and Distinction. But the “Light shineth in darkness, and the darkness comprehended it not;” and the evil Will of Hades is not merely passive to the divine light and life, but resisteth and striveth against the Good. We are therefore under the necessity of considering the fallen Will as in some sense or other *Positive Evil*, as a Fiendish Will creating itself to Evil:—“Evil, be thou my good.”

Difficult indeed is it to express the mystery of the evil Will that creates itself to Evil; since all the terms that we can employ to designate it convey some attribute of being; and we know that the consequence of the determination of the non-absolute Wills to be absolutely in a non-absolute self was the absence of an actual self wherein to be, and that the Will retained only a potentiality of being—a craving to be under impossible conditions. And yet under the impossible conditions of being, the Will, the indestructible cause of reality, still remains a Will, with the attributes of Will, though we can only contemplate it as the inverted and absolute contrary of the Supreme Will. It is evident then

APPENDIX. that in the terms we employ we must attempt to describe it as it is by what it is not, we must adopt the designations of falsehood in order to describe that which is essentially false and contradictory. In this unique instance, as we had in the highest to describe the *Supernal Will* as the absolute cause of reality, so here we must describe the *Infernal Will* as the absolute contrary, as the absolute cause of non-reality, of falsehood, the creator of positive nothing, the filling with emptiness: "He was a liar from the beginning;"—and herein not as *Act*, but as the dark tendency, as the Will of Hades; of which, as essential Evil, we can only predicate the contrariety to reality, itself under impossible conditions. We can only describe it *as Will or Spirit*; we can have no knowledge of it but as the contrary of truth, and borrow the light of truth to show it as that which itself, and of itself, is incapable of manifestation from its utter darkness;—nay, we could not even affirm of it that it is the contrary to Good, unless the Good existed.

Yet we must admit that Evil is a Power, tremendous in its effects and consequences. Evil—essential evil, must form an all-important article of belief in any system that merits the appellation of moral or religious. How then may we express its influences and operations?—As Will or Spirit it must still have the character of somewhat *Positive*: yet at the same time, as we have seen above, this Positive must be negative; and yet an *Active-negative* it cannot be called, since it cannot be in any sense of itself an Act. We are under the necessity then, for the purpose of rendering our meaning intelligible, of antedating the conditions under which it may appear, and we say that evil becomes positive as the *Passion of the Evil Will*. The imaginary Self is the phantom of the corrupt Will which proposed it as an object. The determination to be an Absolute non-absolute Self was an eternal possibility that ought never to have become actual, and the only possible effect or product of a Will thus corrupted was to actualize it as a phantom, an evil imagination, subjectively actual, objectively a non-entity. In this act first began the diversity of *Subject* and *Object*, and

their separability. Likewise in this act was first disclosed in the non-absolute the difference of *Act* and *Passion*. The act of the unfallen Spirit was the act of God, the Absolute Act, who is *Actus purissimus sine ullâ potentialitate*. But the Evil Will, giving a subjective false being to its products, becomes *passive* to its own creature, the image of its own imagining. And hence the Passions which, in the strict moral sense of the term, must still be defined "Affections of the Will of the Life, dependent not on Things but on the *imagination* of Things." Thus the Evil Will is only subjectively actual:—in and of itself it never can become actual; and whatever it has of a positive character we can only describe as the *transition from the potential to the actual*, a blind lust and fiery craving of being under impossible conditions.

To be absolutely in a non-absolute self is then the first act or passion of the Fallen Spirit. But the irresistible sense of its non-existence, simultaneously arising and blending with the former under the predicament of a contradiction, can be no otherwise expressed than as a craving to have another for a self, yet as the non-absolute self. This is indeed a contradiction; its very falsehood constitutes its reality; but it yet exists in every evil appetite and passion, namely, an imagination of that as a Self which the Spirit must go out of itself first to procure. Wollaston has successfully shown that every immoral act or desire is capable of being resolved into Self-destroying or mutually destructive positions.

Let us now thoughtfully retrace our path; and we shall find, by putting together the several results of our investigation, that we have obtained a philosophical insight into the nature and state of the Evil or Fallen Will, and that we have obtained a ground of intelligibility for a belief which has universally prevailed in immediate connexion with religious faith, though in too many instances the teeming parent of degrading and demoralizing superstitions,—the belief namely in *Evil Spirits*, and of their suitable abode, under the names of Hades, Hell, the Evil One, the Devil, Fiends, Demons, &c.

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Thus, if we pass in review before us the superstitions of the East, the Ahriman and Deevs of Zoroaster, Hecate and the Furies and infernal Gods of the Greek mythology, the Scandinavian Loki, down to the kobolds, elves, witches, and the dæmonology of later times, we shall find the same fundamental principle exhibiting itself in a variety of forms lent by the fancy, passions and sensuous imagination. Evil, sometimes assuming a more physical and sometimes a more moral character, is represented now as the Evil One, the Prince of Darkness, now as the Many, as the hosts of Hell, legions of Fiends or Demons, and the powers of darkness. But the difference is not essential; Fiend or Fiends, Devil or Demons, the evil Will, as we have seen, is a Multēity essentially *below* number, a negative one from defect of distinctity, a negative number from absence of unity. Then these spirits are believed to be the source of evil and destruction in the moral world and in nature—of Pride, Falsehood, Hatred, Obduracy &c.—of all those passions that arise (as we traced) from the imagination of the false and contradictory self. Hence again they are the malignant enemies and tempters of mankind; the evil imagination being made the exciting cause, and referred to the false allurements of Lust, Gold, Ambition and the like, that are offered as baits by the lying seducer. Again the presence of evil is explained by demoniac possessions:—the fiend possesses himself of the soul of his victim; marking in an especial manner the doctrine, which we have laid down of the evil will being essentially potential, incapable of self-actualization, and seizing being in another wherein to actualize itself. “He goeth about like a roaring lion seeking whom he may devour.” The restless craving of an evil will seeking another in order to bring it under the same contradictory and destructive conditions which are the penalty of his own disobedience!

I need not say that the supposed abode of these evil spirits is the symbol of the state of the evil Will. It is Hades, the Darkness, Hell, Hell fire, the place of torments, of pains and punishments, of anguish, of gnashing of teeth, &c.—And setting aside that which is evidently borrowed from the

sensuous fancy, we shall admit the propriety of the designations ;—Hades, without vision, below mind or consciousness ; Darkness, that which is without manifestation, below distinctity, Hell, that which is covered, secret, unutterable, below being, and under impossible conditions. Fire again is the symbol of that which cannot of itself be manifest, of the craving of fuel for its exhibition, and of the destruction of that by which it seizes its transitional life ; and it is no less the penal state to which the fallen spirits by their transgressions necessarily doomed themselves. It represents the transition from Hades or the mere potentiality to the actual, contemplated in the transition and as transitional, and further as the will of Hades for the destruction of the actual to which it tends. It would actualize itself ; and this, through the phantom nature of its own power, it cannot do, but by means of the actual. Evil can become manifest only in the Good. But then again, by its own fatal necessity as the Evil Will, it can only actualize itself as potential, or by the destruction of the actual, or the conversion thereof into its own potentiality. The Devil is a *Roaming* through a fierce hungering, next it is a *Seeking*, and last a *Seeking to devour*.

If we look more especially to the Christian doctrine of the nature and powers of evil, we shall trace the same fundamental Idea. We ought perhaps first to advert to the mythos of the 2d ch. of Genesis, in which the origin of evil and the fall, are symbolized in the drama in which our first parents are the actors ; and the traditional character which it assumes is admirably calculated to prevent curious and unprofitable speculations on a subject so conducive (as experience has proved) to gross and immoral superstitions. And we venture to suggest, as the idea clothed in this mythical garb (though there is no reason to doubt that it may represent an historical fact, as well as be an idea)—that, whilst the tree of the *Knowledge* of good and evil is the intellect for itself, separated from the moral will, and no longer in living union with it, this subjective is then by a very natural process converted into an objective. It is represented as the *Tempter* under the form of the Serpent, the low, base, grovelling and insinuating,

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who, flattering the pride, and representing as desirable the lusts of the flesh, is the mind of the flesh, *φρόνημα σαρκὸς*, the most subtil beast of the field, and seduces the Will from its allegiance by infusing false imaginations, the lust and phanton of a self-will alienated from God. The fall is effected; and the punishment at once begins in that process by which the Evil Will, or the lust of the flesh that is formed from “the dust of the ground,” is to be subdued and destroyed—that is, by painful labour, by trials of the Will in the flesh, and finally by death, that it may be quickened, and “this corruptible put on incorruption.”

It will be evident however that the Serpent here designated (although implying an Evil Will) gives no ground or authority for a dæmonology, whatever use may have been made of it in taking the Serpent for the form of the incarnated spiritual evil.

Indeed the person of the Devil, as it has been since understood, was unknown to the ancient Hebrews. One of the most ancient forms, in which we find the notion is that of *Satan* in the Book of Job,—an arabian story of very ancient date, perhaps brought with the Jews out of the captivity, and probably written, when the Arabic differed from the Hebrew only as a dialect, but at any rate very ancient, as it presents a system of pure theism without the law of Moses.* The notion seems to have arisen in a very simple form of society in the East, in which a travelling Steward † or *Circuitor* was sent round to inquire into the state of the domain, and to investigate offences against society. He hence became the Public Accuser. This is apparent from his appellations:—the term used in Hebrew was *Satan* which means *Circuitor*; and the after *Διάβολος* signifies Seducer and Accuser. The Satan assumed a new character when the Jews became acquainted with the more refined and metaphysical notions of the Persians concerning their Ahriman;

* It has been supposed to have been written, towards the close of the kingdom of Judah, by one of the Jews who had been compelled by the Babylonian invasion to migrate into Egypt.

† Compare Job ch. i. verse 7; but more probably *Adversary*. Compare Gesenius in verbo, Freitag p. 316.

whose character, under the name of Satan, together with the scheme of dæmonology of Zoroaster, was engrafted on the religion of the Jews; and we hear of Belzebeel, Belial, Samael, Lucifer, &c. The doctrine seems to have been handed down to the Jews as we find them at the period at which the Gospels were written. There is, however, a remarkable difference between the three first Gospels and that of John—a difference which at once explains the views of the Jews. Thus the persons, described as Demoniacs by the others, are spoken of by John as Epileptics. Christ's temptation in the Wilderness, very simply related by Mark, is converted by Matthew and Luke to the appearance of a Tempter, but is wholly omitted by John:—and it may mean nothing more than that the power of evil could arise in the mind of Christ, so that he could deliberate whether it were best to present himself as a Messiah, though the thought was instantly rejected.

It would appear then that the notions of the Jews went over in great measure to the Christian doctrine, though whatever of a superstitious or immoral character belonged to them formed certainly no part of Christianity. Perhaps we may safely state as the view entertained on this subject, that the Devil and his Host were originally Angels rebellious to, and fallen from, God, and incessantly occupied in counteracting the divine work of Redemption. Thus the Arch-fiend is represented as cunning and malignant, the author of moral evil, and Lord of those who by disobedience to God become his servants. He is the Prince of this World, and reigns over its disobedient children: he counteracts the redemptive work of Christ, and hence is the enemy and destroyer of man, his seducer and tempter, in order to deliver his soul to everlasting destruction; but so that, although partially successful, his defeat will be complete, and the triumph of the Good over Evil certain and final. It would be useless here to narrate how these views subsequently became the fruitful source of multitudinous forms of superstition and immorality, down to the very dregs in the revolting practices and cruel persecutions connected with *Witchcraft*, or to the almost volatilization of the idea in the ludicrous and absurd. The

APPENDIX. latter—as in the presentation of the Devil with tail and horns, we doubtless owe to the Mysteries, in which he was the jester and buffoon: and we cannot but admit that this is very naturally connected with spiritual evil, of which the essence is a contradiction, absurdity itself. So soon as we make the agent a mind, the absurdity becomes objective, and the evil spirit becomes the scorner and scoffer, the sly abettor and planner of mischievous pranks and practical jokes. In this point of view, as mere Will or Spirit, he is without the passions and appetites of life or the lusts of the flesh, but as Mind the *Adaptive* or *Addictive*.

It would be unprofitable to pursue this inquiry further. It is sufficient if we have shewn that the notions of evil, both popular and religious, have their root in the idea that we have endeavoured to present—the idea of the Dark Will striving to actualize itself, under impossible conditions, in that state of restless anguish which is the necessary result and penalty of its fall from the absolute Good. The consequence of this is that the Will, retaining, even in its contradictory state below all being, its indestructible character of causativeness, seeks to actualize itself wherever the conditions are given: that is to say, being, but which can only be derived from the Absolute Will: itself only existing (or rather existing as a striving) in the transition from the potential to the actual. It must be described therefore as a *Power*; one, indeed, from defect of number; but in no sense a Person; a tempting, seducing, and possessing of Souls, of Wills partaking of being, but no Tempter, Seducer, or Demon. It must have a sort of ubiquity in this world; that is, manifesting its presence wherever the conditions are present, but non-existent wherever these are absent; it is better perhaps figured to the imagination as a sort of diffusion, and in this respect has been aptly designated the *Prince of the Air*.* In short evil is in its character strictly *spiritual*: it is a power, and a tremendous power: but the power is none over the Will that is conformed to the Absolute Will.

* Take as illustration what a diffused poison, a malaria, a contagion might be described to be. But why suppose an outward cause of Evil,

In the unique and transcendent act of the Fall thus described we find then the Origin of Evil, of an Evil Will which we can only characterize as that which is to the utmost extent the contrary of God, the Absolute Good, itself a mere possibility of Being, in dependence on the Absolute Will, but from itself under impossible conditions. It is a state of *falsehood* and *contradiction*. And thus then we have the Absolute Will or the *Supreme Good*, and its contrary the *Evil Will* or Wills.

But the Supreme Good, the Absolute Will of essential and eternal Love, in whom desire and act are one and the same, who is all Act, must as such will the reduction of the Evil Will to its potential state, that of an Eternal *Possibility*, the Redemption of the Evil Will from Hades, the destruction of actual Evil, and the final restoration of the Will to distinctivity and union with God. And as this redemptive process is only possible in and by the *Logos*, who is the essential and subsistential act of Distinctivity, in whom all Non-Absolute Wills have their being,—it follows that the *Divine Logos*, doing the Will of the Father, must condescend to the refractory Wills that oppose and refuse the Good, in order to raise, redeem and glorify them. He must partake of their nature in order to render them participant of his divine nature, he must suffer the penalty of disobedience, in order to lead them to the Father, and make atonement. In this act of condescension the Son of God becomes the Suffering Christ, the *Deus Patiens*, the Crucified Saviour, *Deus Cruciat*, the Lamb that was slain before the foundations of the world were laid. He is by anticipation, and as containing it in his own fulness, the Son of Man, as the Divine Humanity and the antetype of that process by which the world might be rege-

if wickedness be the fruit of the human Will? The answer involves a very important point of Christian doctrine:—Man cannot be considered on the one hand as inherently righteous, nor on the other as inherently wicked or diabolical. What he is in the scale of creation is an animal nature with the *Logos* infused *de suprà*, and the capability of spiritual life through His operance, and the capability of being seduced and tempted *de infra*.

APPENDIX. nerate in Christ ;—whilst he condescends, he presupposes the completion, and contemplates it in his own eternity ;—He is the Captain of our Salvation, in Him are the means of Grace and the Hope of Glory, and “ when all things shall be subdued unto him, than shall the Son also himself be subject unto Him, that put all things under him, that God may be all in all.”

It would be foreign to our present purpose to trace the different steps of the redemptive process from the first act of the Divine condescension and Love, when “ the Spirit of God moved on the faces of the Indistinctions,” through the whole *actualizing* process, which, manifesting the Wisdom of God, sets forth the unity of the ultimate end, and the inexhaustible variety of means by which Evil was made to reflect the Good, and compelled to exhibit its own contraries. Thus Order, Harmony and Beauty—in one word, Kosmos, the World, arose out of Hades, the dark, the indistinguishable, the turbulent, the confused. It may be permitted me however to notice that the first act of the Divine condescension was to actualize the Potentiality as a Potentiality, to restore *Susceptibility of Being* ; and that whatever capability of a conversion into Good there was or is, so much of real or potential being must be admitted. And this is of God. On the other hand in respect of *actual* being we have learnt that *Distinction* is no less a necessary and eternal attribute of the self-manifestation of the Absolute than *Unity*. [Query—“] In the beginning was the Word, the Logos, the Distinctive Energy :—Distinction and Unity, I repeat, are the two co-eternal and co-essential forms of the self manifestation of the Absolute. Now we need only suppose a resisting yet recipient subject, upon which the energy should act, and the power of distinction with unity, a unific distinctive power, becomes the definition of LAW. The consequence is obvious. Unity with distinction is the necessary condition of all actual being, but these contemplated as Powers, are identical with Law. Therefore all things partake of true being only as, and in the exact proportion in which, they are the subjects of a *Law* :—but this law, we have seen, is the energy, the *Omni-presence*, of the *Divine Word*.”

“Law then is omnipresent by an eternal necessity. Or rather shall we say that Law, or an infinite sphere of power and a central source, are the necessary forms under which the finite intellect expresses for itself the unutterable transcendent idea of the One-ness of an Absolute Will:—the Almighty, the I AM or Personcity, the Law, the Sphere, the Glory, the Word, the Spirit, are all rays, effluences, from the divine instinct of Reason, which seeks to preserve for itself unwarped a faith in the Absolute I AM, unconfounded with the world and supermundane, qui potentia suæ infinitæ fines sine fine ipse dat. Or in other words, in a drier formula, World, *minus* God=Nothing: God, *minus* World=God, absolute, perfect, the Good.

If then what we have announced be truth, it is no less than this. All Nature is a redemptive process, of which the final end and consummation is the reunion of the fallen non-absolute Will with God; and this will have been perfected when through Christ, the Divine Humanity, man shall have become not only a living Soul but a Spirit made perfect, and shall have become in Christ the object of the Divine Love to his only begotten Son. [Query—”].

But whilst we acknowledge that the subject of this act of divine condescension and love can only have its being in and by God, we are constrained to admit that it has a contradiction in its spiritual ground. “This contradiction in its spiritual ground may be thus worded: A craving to be in itself without any true self wherein to be, and a consequent yet simultaneous desire to have, to acquire another for a self. Well is it written that the Evil Spirit was a liar from the beginning. This original lie, this appetite to be in a particular self, self-contradicted, and with a virtual confession of the false and phantom-like nature of this self by the accompanying restlessness to procure, to rob, a Self which is yet to be ours and not another’s,—this will be found to be the ground and essence of all Moral Evil in all its forms, even from the moment that the Spirit of God moved on the faces of the indistinction, of the yet unconquered relics of Chaos to the times in which we live.” Yet the Divine Will

APPENDIX. (and what less can we suppose capable of effecting it?) did communicate a capability of true being to the self-annihilative Spirit. But it behoves us to pause here that we may duly consider the conditions of the divine boon. The Good cannot give actuality to Evil; and the Evil Will, even as Will, must *willingly* receive true being. It cannot be compelled, forced or transformed into true being, or it would cease to be Will at all. Yet how shall we believe that the *evil* will receives *willingly* the good and the true? In no other way than in its own contradictory Spirit:—a susceptibility to actual being, a disposition thereto, is communicated by the divine love; the indigent Will, in its destitution and fiery craving, grasps and seizes that which it needs; but the Will still remains Evil—it *resists while it receives* and *receives in order to resist*, in order to actualize a phantom self, that is *in order to evil*; but receiving it the Evil Will becomes the subject of the divine Law, and, thus compelled to the service of the Good, to that bondage in which alone is perfect freedom. The immediate consequence of this is however that in Nature, or all that has its ground in Hades, the Evil Will is *subjectively actual*, but exists *only* in the *transition from the potential to the actual*. Hence with great propriety all that has its ground in Hades is termed Nature, as that which never *is* or has actual being, but is ever about to be, and of which we can only contemplate the actual being in the *Law*. This may be traced through the whole scheme of moral evil and its remedies. It is not the deed abstractedly from its guilty purposes that we can call evil; it is to the dark will that conceives, contrives and executes (the *quo animo*) that we attribute the guilt; we are often enabled to see that the effects and consequents are good; nay, we are bound to believe that in the moral order of the world the evil is subjective, and is actualized as the Good. Of the ways of Providence we must ever humbly acknowledge with the prophet “Shall there be evil in a city, and the Lord hath not done it?” That is, the evil, so far as it is actual, is by virtue of the Law; but the law is in order to the good, by quenching its effects. Hence then we must say

that the Law is itself evil, though it partakes of the evil in order to subdue it, admits a resistance in order to overcome it. In short this character goes through the whole process of *redemption* in the ascension which forms the process, and which is necessarily a *process* because of the resistance :—the Evil Will is never actual, the Law is actual, but as such includes and neutralizes the Evil.

It cannot be expected of us, as indeed it would be unsuited to our present purpose, to trace the Wisdom and Goodness of God as revealed in and by nature, as the light that shineth in the darkness which the darkness comprehended not; but we may profitably state in a succinct manner the conditions under which Man becomes at length the intelligible word and prayer for all nature that “groaneth for redemption.”

Now we have described the *resisting* potentiality as a craving to be under impossible conditions, and that the contradiction in the spiritual ground may be thus worded :—a craving to be in itself, without any true self wherein to be, and a consequent yet simultaneous desire to have, to acquire, another for a self. This is evidently self-annihilative; and in order to communicate a susceptibility of being, the antagonist strivings which necessarily quench and strangle each the other, must be *separated*, and so only can they be conceived and become possible objects of thought; but at the same time they must in some sense remain as one, since although contradictory they are the tendencies of one power, of the evil Will. And for this we find an expression in the term *Polarization*, which we use whenever a *One*, unmanifested as such, *appears in two correspondent opposites*, and we call these opposites *Polar Forces*, as the two forms in which a One Power works in the same act and instant. The act belongs to Nature, and is the antecedent condition to the divine Energist in the work of creation and redemption. But it implies something more. In order to actual being, the separation must exist only in and for the sake of the oneness of the power in its unity, a unity which the potential power cannot actualize, but which in order *to be* it must have :—it

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must be both distinct and one. But this is the essential character of Law, and the Divine Fiat in calling the Potential into Being hath also fixed its Law:—that the Will to be in itself an independent integer shall only have true being, so far as the other is in it:—and the Will to have, to go forth and seize, another for a self, shall only acquire actuality as the Will to be in and for another. I can only contemplate or affirm my Self as the Other, and the Other is for me what I affirm myself to be,—it is my other Self. But this Law is the Law of Life, it is Love as a Law, the bond of Love and Distinctity in Unity, and, as all in Christ have being, so it has been truly said “In Him was Life; and the Life was the Light of men.” This we affirm is the end and scheme of the Redemptive process:—the reconciliation of the contradiction of the evil Will; not indeed perfected from the defect of the subject which has its ground in Hades; but a progressive approximation to the same, and everywhere, so far as the subject permits, the evil ground made to reflect the divine life in its distinctity and unity.

The Evil Will, as the fiery craving to be, and containing in its dark womb the possibilities of infinite being, tends infinitely to every possible variety of being; the susceptibility and capability having been communicated by divine Love. And whilst the Spirit of God brooded on the darkness that was upon the face of the deep, the creative fiat of the Divine Word went forth “Let there be Light!”, “and God divided the Light from the Darkness.” And thus, if we may venture to interpret the mystery of creation or render it intelligible for ourselves, were separated and polarized the contradictory strivings of the Potential Will, as under the Law henceforth to become the main agents or forces of the birth and parturiency of Nature:—the dynamic Darkness as the

* The process of redemption is a continued *begetting*. So only at least may we symbolize that act by which a Will acts in another. It is not sufficient that the action should be *on* another, it must be *in* another, and this implies homogeneity of the agents and product. And thus in the Redemption, as the Paternal Will manifests himself in the only begotten Son, and *is in* him, so the divine Will *acts in* the non-absolute Will.

withholding, retractive, massific, unific and substantiative, APPENDIX.
 opposed to the dynamic Light as the differential, the separative, the evocative and manifestative. But whatever truly is, lives, and as the being so the life:—the polar opposites can only become actual in and by the other, by living interaction; and, in and by this universal life of nature, the flux of being reveals itself in all its multitudinous shapes, another and yet the same, to the inquiring and meditative mind, never sated with the contemplation of infinite Power made to exhibit infinite Good.

But it must never be forgotten that Nature is the dynasty of Darkness. The Spiritual Evil is mitigated and neutralized; but, as all Will that has its ground in Hades, it is essentially evil. Nay, more than this:—whatever of actuality it possesses from the true being which it has received, in proportion to the being actualized will be the power of evil; and if in the ascent of realization nature becomes capable and participant of mind, it is the mind that renders the dark striving intelligible to the Evil Will itself, rendering the Will conscious of its evil self, and revealing its hideous form to be itself hated and put away. But in this consciousness of evil, the evil will in disclosing its true nature acquires its highest power. It becomes *Moral Guilt*, and as such must be finally overcome and vanquished. In this decisive battle with the Powers of Darkness, man is both the warrior and the field of battle, and comes not unaided to the fight. Against the darkness of the evil nature, against the lusts of the flesh which the serpent, more subtil than any beast of the field, has made strong, man has received a spiritual nature for his armoury. The Divine Humanity himself is his fellow combatant, the Captain of his Salvation, and will finally come in power as the conquering Chief; that in the utter destruction of the Evil Will he may make everlasting Peace, and that God may be all in all.

[I think it certain that much of the above is in Coleridge's own words but I cannot identify the quotations; and, as I have marked in the text, some quotation-marks are imperfect in the manuscript.—J. S.]

II.

EXTRACT FROM FIRST BOOK OF "SPIRITUAL BEING."

The Fall, ἀπόστασις.

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§ 18. WE have seen in the preceding section how by the very necessity of Reason we are led to the adoption of the Idea of the Kingdom of Heaven, as the plenitude of Non-Absolute Being and the adequate correspondent of the Absolute reality of the Absolute Will self-affirmed in the tri-une Godhead. We have found this pleroma of communicated or non-absolute being to be the eternal act of the Divine Humanity, or Logos, self-affirmed in unity and distinction, as the community of Spiritual Humanities in union with God through Him.

But when, led by our moral interests, and guided by the light of Reason and our Conscience, we examine the state of our own moral being in relation to that Spiritual Integration which the Idea of the Humanity demands, we become conscious of the awful difference which exists between the spiritual conditions of those Humanities whose will is that of their Heavenly Father, and whose every act is the realization of moral love and goodness, and the spiritual condition of ourselves, self-willed and selfish, with a Will corrupt and tainted by caprice, passion and concupiscence. We are sensible of that need of spiritual integration which the light of Reason reveals to us; and therein we recognise our divine lineage, and ground our rightful claim to be members of the heavenly community in which the Humanity (our own included) is realized in union with a common Father of

Spirits. But we must needs confess the pravity of our Will, and in that pravity the insuperable bar to our communion with them, and to our reception where holiness and unselfish love confer the freedom of citizenship. APPENDIX.

But if, assured of our filial relation to God in common with the family of heaven, and if sufficiently sensible of our own pravity to feel and hate the degrading difference, we seek for the cause of our lost and ruined state, we are inevitably led to inquire whether any, and, if any, what, connexion exists between the humanity in heaven and the humanity on earth? We are led to inquire what is *the origin and nature of evil*? It has been indeed thought that a sufficient answer to this question is afforded by the account given in Scripture of the fall of our first parents; but on reflection it may be admitted that the fact there historically represented presumes what it has been made use of to explain. And without impugning the essential truth contained in the narrative, I would say, it warns us that here as elsewhere the intelligible ground of spiritual causation must be sought in the idea of Will. And I will add that the investigation rewards our pains by showing that Evil—the “first disobedience and all its woes”—had its origin in the very nature of Will.

The exposition of this mystery of Evil, and the all-important truths connected with it, will be found in *Philosopheme* [MSS.] on Will, p. 47, and in *Relig. Laici*, 3d chapter, entitled *Disease and its Remedy*. And we shall now occupy ourselves with some emendations and additions. It will be seen by a perusal of these papers that Man—the man of this world—is represented, though the crowning work of the resurgency from the fall, yet a part of the fallen spiritual world previous to his assumption of the humanity. This view is not a novelty, and, as may be seen, is the unavoidable result of the idea which forms the universal ground of our system; but it has been mixed up with irrelevant questions, which, as difficulties to its acceptance, are entitled to consideration. Thus it has been urged as a difficulty that man has no remembrance or consciousness of such a state. This would be a grave objection if it were pretended that each

APPENDIX. individual had formerly existed as that individual in heaven, and had been re-created to the same individuality. But, on the contrary, in the light of the idea, we say that the original humanity became lost in and by the fall, that the individual forfeited his individuality, fell into a state of no-being, and became an indistinguishable part of the Hades or spiritual chaos. And so, in relation to the connected question of the *birth* or *origin of souls*, here understood as the re-creation to and assumption of the Humanity in this world or sphere of being, we do not suppose any individual *pre-existence*, but consider every act of creation as an individualization of the one and universal Will :—the creative act is the production of an individual Will, man, or soul ; but it cannot but remain in the unity of Will, as the universal ground of being, and is only distinct as a manifestation of the same universal Will in individual act and being.

It may be convenient for the further review of our subject to consider it in relation to the consciousness of Man in his present temporal condition and in relation to his moral interests. And we may take for granted, in accordance with our previous investigations, that he will find within himself the twofold tendency ;—on the one hand, the need and corresponding desire of spiritual integration ; the image of God, as the idea of moral perfection, infused into his soul, and enforced as obligatory on his conscience by the Reason ; on the other hand, the pravity of his Will, and its proneness to evil, acknowledged and recognised in the consciousness of Selfishness or Wilfulness, in all the forms of selfish particularity ;—with the conviction, inseparable from the conscious knowledge, that in the first consists his moral life and true being, whilst the latter is the moral death of the soul—a perishing by the inherent self-contradictoriness of its conditions.

In saying however that there exists a *twofold* tendency in the Will of Man, I may give occasion to the imputation of inconsistency, or at least of paradox, since I have hitherto throughout maintained a unicity of Will which would admit of no double resolve, or twofoldness of agency. But the student will bear in mind that I am here speaking of causes

affecting the Will. These may be various, whether as influences, motives, affections, allurements, temptations, and the like; but they are still only the excitements or incitements acting upon the Will. Nay, they may actuate the Will, possess it, and force it into action: and yet we cannot say that the Will has been other than externally affected, until by a resolve it determines its agency, exhibits itself in its proper character, and thereby vindicates its oneness. The will is both passive and active, susceptible and reagent. So, in respect of the twofold tendency stated above, though it is true that the *desire* of spiritual integration and the *proneness* to evil are *inward* affections of the soul, and, under their appropriate incitements, are continually producing contrary currents of feeling,—yet the Will, the man in the man, has not pronounced and uttered itself in the dignity of Will till it has elected, chosen, decided, and in that act gathered up all its feelings, affections, and energies to the one determinate purpose. With how few this may be the case it is not necessary here to inquire; but, though the weakness and passivity of the will admits of this apparent inward self-contrariety, it is only the proof of its not being in any proper sense of the word a Will at all;—and the great difference in the character of different individuals lies in the difference of the energy and strength of the Will.

I trust then that I have obviated the objection to which I referred. But my principal motive in introducing the subject is to show that the Idea of moral will constrains us to consider the Will as absolutely *free* to choose, elect, decide; but that at the same time the human will, under the conditions which are recognised in our consciousness as imposed on it, though it retains the idea which is necessary to its spiritual integration, is practically *self-enslaved*. And as free will is really a pleonasm for Will (contained, as freedom is, in the Idea) to say that the will is enslaved or not free is to say that it is *no will* according to the Idea. How the will became so, we have endeavoured to explain in considering the condition of the fall of the non-absolute Will. And it is not only the postulate for the intelligibility of an

APPENDIX.

historical fact, namely the existence of evil, but is or may be brought into the experience of man :—a spiritual truth, or what relates to the will, is not proved by empirical facts, but is, or may be, or perhaps rather must be, *spiritually discerned*. In diving into the recesses of our consciousness, we cannot but know that there is a proneness to evil ;—since, the root of all evil being selfishness and self-will, we cannot but recognise the disposition in ourselves thereto. Our will, by the very condition under which it seeks its being, would be absolute ; but instead of seeking its true being under those universal laws by which alone it can be realized, it seeks it as a selfish *particular*—that is, would be absolute in its own selfish and lawless wilfulness, and thereby, as we have shown, falls into the destructive predicament of a self-contradiction which is incompatible with true moral being. And it is to be observed that the *potentiality* of this *self-assertion as absolute* (which is inseparable from all non-absolute, inclusively of human, Will : for otherwise it would not be properly Will) is always acting as *a temptation to its fulfilment*, as an actual potency of the Will which has the sense of the potential capability :—as thus : I am Will ; I cannot be Will unless absolute ; I *will be* absolute ; but as before said, willing the absolute *in its own particularity* is a self-contradiction, and forfeits at once the true moral being.

But if thus every human soul, as non-absolute Will, may find, by examination of his consciousness, the proneness to evil under which he labours, and the inalienable condition of the actual lapse of his soul into sin and evil, it may be asked whether any other causes need be assigned for the prevalence of evil in the world than the subjective conditions which are inseparable from the human Will ? It may be asked : What need of an angelic “ Kingdom of heaven,” which has at least a suspicious savour of neo-platonic and gnostic fancies ? What need of a Satan, of an arch-fiend and tempter of human souls, of a Devil and his angels, with their too probable train of superstitious fears, delusions and mockeries ?

With regard to the first :—the *Community of the non-*

absolute Spirits ("Spirits" meaning "Wills considered as personal agents") we trust we have satisfactorily shown that it is no other or more than the necessary educt of the idea of "Absolute Will, causative of all reality" and a truth seen by the evidence of its own light. But if, in addition, we are required to vindicate its necessity *in connexion with our moral needs and interests*, I answer that, amid the universal prevalence of evil in the human race which a candid consideration of the facts does not allow us to doubt, a prevalence such as no outward circumstances nor contingent causes can render intelligible, our moral interests require an assurance, which the world cannot give, of the realization of the idea of moral perfection in non-absolute Spirits, such as men essentially are. Without this contemplation, revealed in and by the Idea, of the fact and actual existence of a spiritual world perfected according to the divine operation, the very Idea of Spiritual Integration would escape us, or remain only as an educt, however glorious, of the human imagination or mere fancy; whilst any substitute derived from man's self-perfectibility would be inconsistent with our primal principle of Absolute Will, and incompatible with the assurance of God's omnipotence and goodness. The goodness of Almighty God requires the realization of the perfect humanity in the community of humanities of whom the filial alterity is the eternal idea; and the faith of man requires the reality in aid of his own spiritual integration in and by the same operation. The idea of God absolutely implies the reality of a spiritual world: the pravity of man absolutely requires, for its correction and removal, "the pattern on the mount." But no less the universal prevalence of evil in the world, and man's universal pravity, imply some universal cause, affecting all men and indeed the whole of nature, adequate to give intelligibility to the facts, and to explain the fatal proneness to evil which mankind universally exhibits. It is true, as we have said before, that a potentiality of evil must be conceived to exist in all non-absolute Wills, so far as they are non-absolute, or they would not be Wills at all, and that this potentiality is calculated

APPENDIX. to be a *temptation* to evil; but in man it is not a mere possibility, but a proneness, predisposition and bias, with which his will seems infected as with a disease, and which only requires favouring opportunities and circumstances, never absent in the world, to burst forth into the activity of self-will and its criminal consequences. How is it then that man comes from the hand of his Creator, stamped with the impress of His righteousness, equipped and destined for his spiritual integration, and yet with the lurking poison in his nature, and with the plague-spot of sin already on him? It will be sufficiently apparent that we adopt essentially the doctrine, which theologians have couched under the term *Original Sin*; though it may be well to observe that we cannot understand by it more than the proneness to sin, and carefully exclude from it the notion of individual *Guilt*. And this observation is the more important in connexion with the subject we are now discussing, since, as man's moral needs imperatively require a full sense of natural pravity, they yet as necessarily demand the conviction of a freedom from guilt—that is, from crime knowingly and wilfully committed against the judgment of the conscience;—though again, as we shall see, this pravity, though not individually criminal, may by its transcendent conditions be imputed to the human race as the crime of all. But with reference to the “Original Sin” of theologians—though freed from the objection of its implying Guilt—it may still be observed that it accounts for the universal pravity of man by the guilt of the first parents of the race, and by the propagation of the pravity, disclosed in “the fall of man,” to all their descendants; and that it is unsatisfactory on two important points, bearing essentially on the question before us. First, namely, it already presumes a pravity, a diseased state of the will, in the existence of a tempter, and in the facility with which man yields to the temptation; and secondly, it does not intelligibly account for the universal prevalence of evil in the progeny of our first parents;—it accounts for this prevalence by natural descent or propagation. It is very true that this philosophical myth (if I may

be permitted so to call it) permits the interpretation that man fell through the temptation, inherent in a non-absolute Will, of converting the potential self-will into the selfishness and particularity of self-will;—but it fails in giving us the assurance, required by our moral needs, that the condition of the origin of evil is grounded in an Idea, and is an universal and therefore *à priori* truth. Let it be taken for granted, as a fact historically certain, that our first parents became guilty of some capital disobedience to the divine commandment; but it is nowise explained by this empirical fact that the whole human race became amenable to the consequences. We want the assurance in and by the Idea, and not by an empirical fact, though the cause of the fact may be demonstrable, that in the fall of our first parents there existed the *à priori* condition of the universal prevalence of evil and of the pravity of will, not only in our first parents, but in the whole human race: and this, I say, the myth in Genesis, as the foundation of the theological hypothesis, does not give us. Nor, further, does it satisfactorily account for the assumed actual prevalence of pravity in the human race. It may be indeed safely alleged that all experience confirms the assumption; but, as is the case with respect to our uniform experience of the rising of the sun, to-morrow may contradict all our previous and hitherto uniform experience. We want some assurance that the confession of our conscience, in the unavoidable recognition of the weakness and pravity of our will, is guaranteed by some truth or reality which admits of no doubt. Now the hypothesis founded on Genesis or the “fall of man” does indeed, as before said, attempt the solution by alleging—and not without the *apparent* warranty of scripture (compare Paul’s epistles *passim*)—that the pravity of will, or perhaps rather the criminality and guilt, which Adam brought upon himself, was propagated to all his descendants. And it may be admitted that by the law of all generation a Will will be productive of itself in alterity, and consequently that a diseased and depraved Will will or may produce its similitude in *secula seculorum*;—as is the case, we will say,

APPENDIX. with respect to hereditary insanity, not to mention those physical conditions which are not so immediately or apparently connected with the Will: but we should grievously lose sight of the essential nature of Moral Will, if we believed that moral pravity, proneness to evil or actual guilt, did not in some way or other depend upon the animus, intention, and act of the individual personality, upon his self-determination and personal responsibility. It will be seen then that the *propagation by descent* of a natural pravity from generation to generation does not answer the purpose of making us feel that we are responsible for that which we have not committed;—a *diseased* will would be a calamity, but not a fault meet for repentance and remorse.

Now we believe that in the Idea of the Primal Apostasy in the spiritual world, or “Fall of the Angels,” we have supplied, or rather find the means of supplying, the needed requirements of our moral being. For, if the human race be the resurgency and resuscitation of the fallen spiritual or angelic world, it implies necessarily, *à priori*, and by force of the antecedent conditions, that every man born into the world must be tainted by the original imperfection of the nature out of which he was produced;—it accounts satisfactorily for the proneness to evil, which was exhibited by our first parents in and by the fact of their voluntary criminality;—it accounts for the universal prevalence in all their descendants, without any especial reference to an hereditary pravity, or still less guilt, propagated by natural generation;—but, above all, it accounts satisfactorily—and this satisfaction is eminently demanded by our moral needs—for the indispensable moral postulate, without which religion would be deprived of its substance, that, in the acknowledgment by our conscience of our pravity and proneness to evil, we confess our responsibility for evil which we havenot actually committed.

Thus, then, according to our view of “Original Sin,” the natural weakness and pravity of the human will sufficiently explains the universal prevalence of evil; but without at all impugning the opposite principle, that man, in the continual

aid and support of Almighty God, has adequate strength of will to resist the temptation thereto, and, where he yields, to make the evil his own act. We sorrow for Original Sin as for a wide-spread calamity, under which the human race is suffering,—a calamity, for which we are collectively, though not individually, responsible : individually responsible, however, in a degree which is recognized by the conscience of each as a moral fault, which cannot absolve us from blame or from the justice of the penalty. We contemplate in the Idea of the Spiritual World, as the necessary evolution of the Absolute Will into the reality of the Non-Absolute Will, through and by the Filial Alterity, as the Divine Humanity and causative Type of all communicated Being :—1st. the realized standard of moral excellence and of spiritual integration in a perfect community of perfect Humanities, the idea of the perfect Health and integrity of man :—2dly. in the Fall, the primary condition and origin of Evil, as the explanation of the universal calamity of the Evil under which man suffers in this world—the Disease, which, spreading from Hades, still infects all that has its root and ground in the fallen spiritual nature :—but, 3dly, we contemplate, in the idea of the Divine and Eternal Humanity and of His operance, the intelligible cause and explanation of the Remedy ; namely, by considering this world as the process of the restoration of a fallen spiritual world, and the “ Creation ” as a process of Redemption and spiritual regeneration. The idea implies Health, Disease, and Remedy—the last being the restoration of the Will to its pristine integrity.

But in considering this subject from the point of view of our moral and spiritual needs, it cannot but strike us that there are several other topics of paramount interest in relation to the conditions under which a lapse into sin and evil takes place, and to the light and insight which we derive from that supra-lapsarian doctrine of the Fall which the Idea inculcates. We have shown indeed that the theological hypothesis of man's fall, according to its interpretation of Genesis, is mainly defective, in accounting for the universal prevalence of sin in the human race, by substituting the

APPENDIX. empirical conception of natural generation and hereditary infection for the Idea—the only appropriate mode of conceiving spiritual acts : and in this case a pravity of will, which must be its own act, or ceases to be what it is intended to be, that is, a moral or spiritual state. But on the other hand we have also to show that, except in and by the light of the Idea of the “ Angelic fall and apostasy,” we should fail in obtaining insight of the conditions under which the lapse into sin actually occurs ; and that the bare assumption of the possible pravity of the human will neither agrees with the facts, nor satisfies our spiritual needs. Man cannot but feel that there must be a disposition to, or susceptibility of, evil in him : for otherwise, without the conditions under which evil may take place, no evil would occur in mankind, and this is evidently contrary to the fact :—but at the same time under the sense of God’s operance in him, and the sense or consciousness of bearing in his spiritual nature the impress of the divine image, the capability of spiritual integration and his destination to perfect in himself the idea of the Humanity, he feels that sin and evil are something *foreign* and *alien* to the spiritual being, to the privileges of which he has attained, and that as a moral will he is bound, and has the vocation, power and authority, to resist the invasion of evil. This I apprehend would be a fair statement of the result of the investigation, which any man would arrive at, in examining the facts of his conscience and consciousness :—“ I have a disposition to sin ; I have actually sinned ; but God’s grace and power are paramount ; and I cannot, with the knowledge of my spiritual destination as a *Man*, willingly, with the will of a rational being, which is my true Will, prove, except by *weakness and defects of my will* which I cannot control, a traitor to my high vocation ! ” And thus, without the disposition to pravity in man, no sin nor evil could be possible ;—and, without the divine Humanity working in him as the paramount power, man’s spiritual integration or regeneration would be inconceivable. The predominant character then of man’s spiritual condition in this world is a pravity of will, calculated to *yield to temptation* : while, on the other hand,

the predominant character of the Angelic guilt is *self-caused* pravity. APPENDIX.

But we have undertaken to show that the view, which ascribes the prevalence of evil simply to the inherent potentiality of evil in every non-absolute Will, and therefore considers the will of man as solely the cause and origin of evil, is not satisfactory. And it will be necessary to investigate the subject more fully than has been done above; since it cannot be denied that, even if the position taken in the preceding paragraph be admitted, yet temptation, as has been noticed before, may not only be *ab extra*, but may arise in the Will itself, *ab intra*;—and the question arises how far the latter may be predicated of the human Will. For, if it agree with idea and fact that the origin of evil may be man's own work and the result of his own self-determination, the idea of a spiritual fall becomes an hypothesis which might be spared, a mere superfluous accessory.

Now let me remind the student that, according to the Idea, the nature of the "Fall of man" consists in his renunciation as far as possible of his higher or rational being: I say "as far as possible," for it is impossible that man should wholly divest himself of the Humanity working in him by the power of God:—and the consequence, wilfully provoked by the transgression, is that man becomes a selfish particularity, with that delusive guide and servant as the pandar to its lusts which has been happily called in Greek *φρόνημα σαρκὸς* (see Art. of Church of England, IX.) and corresponds in many respects to the mere understanding. Now, as before said, the inducement thereto, or the *temptation*, already exists in the non-absolute Will—without which indeed the possibility of a temptation would be inconceivable:—the *potentiality*, namely which may be willed, and without the capability of willing which a will would not be a will, but which never ought to be willed, and which yet is the temptation to its being willed,—the potentiality of willing its Self, its selfishness and self-will, as absolute independently of the universal conditions of true being. It may be admitted, and must be confessed that this potentiality, with the

APPENDIX. peculiar incitements to render it actual, does exist in man and in the human will, and this may be distinguished as the source of *Spiritual Evil*. On the other hand we find, connected to the same root of evil, that which may be distinguished as *Bestial*, consisting in all the forms of *Sensuality* to which a will wholly giving itself up to the lusts of its selfish gratification would addict itself. To the latter the temptations would be necessarily *ab extra*, and are dependent upon the animal nature of which man necessarily partakes. The interpreters of the myth of Genesis have generally supposed that the fall consisted in the awakening of the lusts of the flesh; but we have according to our promise the more difficult task of solving the problem of a "spiritual fall," and, while acknowledging its consequences to man, of vindicating him from the charge of being as man the Author and Originator of Evil.

It may perhaps be well to consider therefore what we here intend by the term "Spiritual Evil." And it will not be doubted that it may appropriately designate those forms of evil which belong especially to the Will, under any outward temptation, or predominantly under no other temptation than that of its own Will and selfish wilfulness. Such forms present themselves in pride, lust of arbitrary power, obduracy, rebelliousness, hardness, and unscrupulous use of all means to its purposes, with lying, spoliation and murder in its train, hate, revenge, malignity, in all the hateful variations from which the last sweetening drops of love and charity have been ruthlessly extracted. That spiritual evil so described may, alas, exist in man who shall deny? But the question, be it observed, is whether man is the *Author*? I might appeal to the universal consciousness of man in all ages and countries, attested by their beliefs and superstitions, for a denial; though yet without giving up the acknowledgment of a pravity, which leads them to yield themselves to powers of evil which they at once hate and welcome, curse and obey, or even worship and tremblingly honour:—but for the reply I venture to appeal once more to the "Angelic Fall;" for it must be evident that, in determinin

the origination and cause of Evil, it must either be the work of Hades, or proof failing of this, the work of man himself. Now, according to our view, the guilt of the Angels or Spiritual Humanities who fell could only have been—that is, could have been no other than, the attempt, to actualize the forbidden Potentiality by a determined and deliberate act of Self-will, for which no outward inducement or “temptation” can be conceived. It was therefore the attempt, abortive indeed by its very conditions, to create self-wills independent, absolute, and detached from God and the eternal laws of His divine government and operance. And therein they became, according to the idea, the authors, originators, of *Spiritual Evil*, or (considering again the meaning of the term) exactly what we mean by *Diabolical*: spiritualities, indestructible powers, but powers of spiritual evil, the unquenchable contraries and malignant enemies of whatever is hallowed by God’s love. Thus it will be seen that the Idea provides for an appropriate origin of Spiritual Evil in the Spirits, in the spiritual realities of the heavenly community. It needs but little consideration to see that the root of all Evil must be purely spiritual, an act of the Will: such as that described by our immortal Milton in the Satan of the *Paradise Lost*, and uttered in the tremendous phrase “Evil be thou my good”!—an act, which, in its boundless daring and defiance, could only emanate from Spirits, to whom, if not infinite in power, nothing was denied consistently with the Will of God;—an act of Will, which, considered in its tremendous consequences and its wide-spreading infection in this world, cannot but have a higher source and more fearful power than can be explained by mere human conditions. And it is only as an act of the non-absolute Will in its highest potency that we can contemplate, what the Idea obliges us to do, that the Angelic Powers, who fell, in determining to be in a Non-absolute Self, lost a self wherein to be, forfeited the conditions of true being, and remained as the evil spirituality and spiritualities, which was the fatal necessity of their choice. But if we have been right in considering Man as the resurgence from the fall, as the head of

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a creation which is the redemptive process from the fall, we shall find convincing reasons for vindicating him from the too hasty imputation of originating the evil under which he suffers, that is a fallen spirit indeed but in his human estate and condition. If I am right, I say, in considering man under the conditions of a Redemptive Process, it is clear that it would be a remedy, or provision, against the death and perishing which had been self-inflicted in the spiritual heresy ; and accordingly we find that man's sphere of being is finite, determined and limited by the hand of his Creator :— he has received the form, the needs and appetites, of an animal, so far as they may be congruous with the requirements of his higher being ; and his Will is limited outwardly by the sphere of being which is constituted by his Body. He has indeed powers of will and intelligence which may extend his operance and influence ; but they are no longer to be considered as the immediate operance of uncontrolled Will, but as the laborious attainments of the skilful adaptation of means to relative ends. Man is a finite Being, and has been gifted with no such powers as would explain the origination and consequences of the direful and infinite causality of spiritual evil : evil, which we trace, not only in the moral condition of the whole human race from the beginning to ourselves “on whom the ends of the world have come,” but in the whole of the nature in which we are placed : evil, which is ever in the transition to actuality in order to be overcome, and of which, unless by the grace of God, we can discern no end. Seeing then the infinite potentiality of evil and the finite nature of man, we acquit him of the imputation of being the author of evil, with the assurance that spiritual evil could have had no human originator.

Man cannot however but be fully conscious of his proneness to a lapse into evil ;—he will know that it is only by God's indwelling presence and operance that he is capable of resisting the incitements to evil which assail him from within and without ;—he will acknowledge that the temptation from within of asserting his selfwill and selfish particularity is ever insidiously inviting him to foreswear his alle-

giance to Him, to whom only it is due ;—he must confess that in listening to this syren's song he may create in himself the diabolical spirit of evil which, once excited, grows by what it feeds on until the whole man is one selfish will of boundless rapacity, pride, hate and malignity. But he will also recognize the inward tempter as the still continuing working of Hades in him ;—he will perceive that it is only leading the way to the same spiritual death and perishing which there prevails. And relying on the operance of God, mighty to aid and save, he will feel satisfied in the assurance, consonant with his spiritual needs, that, notwithstanding the pravity of his will, his proneness to and actual commission of sin, he is, as a human being, neither the author nor originator of Evil, but that, having been created in the image of God he is destined and will be effectually aided to his spiritual regeneration in the eternal Humanity who is “with God and is God.”

I hope I may have convinced the reader that man's moral needs and convictions require, what the Idea contains, a *transcendent or spiritual ground of Evil*. Otherwise, considering the universal prevalence of evil, its infinity of potentiality ever in the transition to actuality, and its intimate and inseparable admixture with God's works both in the physical and moral world, we should attribute to Man, if deemed to be the author of Evil, not only what cannot be assigned to him as a Being under the process of Redemption and with an appropriate moral adaptation thereto, but what would stamp him with the impress of *Diabolical Spirituality* from which our moral feelings would justly revolt, instead of the Divine image which consistently with our moral needs he ought to possess. And this brings us to the question proposed at p. 384:—What moral need have we as men for the doctrine of a “Satan, of an arch-fiend and tempter of souls, of a *Devil and his Angels?*”

In answering this question, for which the preceding disquisition has paved the way, I shall take for granted, as fully borne out both by the truth of the idea and by our

APPENDIX. spiritual needs, that the Fall of Spirits or Angels from their heavenly state has taken place, has been their own act, and consisted in loss of being, and in a state of spiritual self-contradiction, not of existence but of continual dying and perishing, the state of Hades or Hell which has been described in the Relig. Laic. ch. 3 and elsewhere. Passing on from these topics, we have now to consider: 1. How this state of *mere potentiality*, into which the evil Will had been reduced by the goodness of God, was again raised into a potence, potentia, or power;—2. Supposing that this power of evil shall have been truly exhibited, why it must be accepted under such form as “the Devil and his Angels,” or some tantamount description essentially the same:—3. What the truth of the idea, in consonance with the reason and conscience, requires in respect of our belief and assurance in the nature and extent of their spiritual agency.

In applying ourselves to the first of these considerations, it will be apparent from the principles which we have throughout inculcated, that all true being and power must be derived from God: and this as the continual and eternal act, causative and unfalteringly continuous in all communicated being, of the Filial Alterity. We are then under the necessity of conceiving any revived activity of an evil Will as in some way or other dependent upon or connected with the Will and act of the Will of the Divine Humanity; and yet we are forbidden to conceive ought that is inconsistent with this eternal pattern of all moral perfection;—the notion of a *permission of evil* is only to describe the author of all good as a participator in the introduction of evil, and it is no less abhorrent to our moral feelings than contradictory in itself. This theological knot is however only apparent, and is only one of the instances of the entanglements, which the substitution of a conception for an idea produces. It is God’s eternal will and purpose that the evil Will should never be willed and ever remain a mere *potentiality*; but by the unalterable nature of Will, it is a possibility and was willed. The Wills thus lost might, it is true, have remained in Hades,

and with the loss the evil with them : and that loss of Wills never would have been felt where there is a perpetual fullness. But God is absolute Love ; and absolute Love by the very necessity of its nature cannot permit the loss. From the inherent necessity of communicative love, free grace, and preventive mercy, it must save to the uttermost every will and all spirits, though by their wilful disobedience they drew upon themselves the self-inflicted penalty of eternal death, and might have been for ever sinking from the presence of God in the process of annihilation below being—ever dying and never finally dead. Here rises upon us then the stupendous mystery of love and grace, realized in the divine economy of Redemption. Who the agent in the process must of necessity be is at once uttered in pronouncing the name of the only-begotten Son of God, the divine Humanity, the eternal act of the Spiritual Integration, of which He in His divine Person is the eternally perfected Exemplar. It is a divine necessity, but a necessity only by the necessary freedom of divine Love, in which the freedom and the necessity of love are inseparably one. That He, the perfecting act of the Humanity, should be Saviour and Redeemer of the Spirits belonging to the heavenly Community, of which he was the Progenitor and Type, is only to say that, as in all life and organic wholes, so too in Him we apprehend “an antecedent Unity, or *Law of Integrity*, which in all life having produced a whole ever tends to *preserve* and *restore* that which it had produced.”—Vit. Dynam. p. 86. It is true even that by the almighty power of God the lost wills might have been restored—it is true that the potentiality of evil might have been for ever prevented from being actual ; but it is evident that this could not consist with divine Love ; since they must have ceased to be Wills, and divine Love can only will Wills who reciprocate willingly the love which He offers and communicates.

Thus it will appear that the Redemptive Process consists essentially in offering the conditions of being, under which the lost wills shall willingly embrace the restoration to eternal life which is contained in the moral perfection of

APPENDIX. the divine Humanity. But it is equally apparent that — whatever the conditions of being might be, and whatever the nature of evil might otherwise be — the process, which was to transmute evil into good, must contain the evil which it is designed to transmute. It is self evident that the process must give activity to, and at least tend to actualize the evil, which it was intended to vanquish, overcome, and finally extinguish. In short the object of the process must be that of giving a sufficient definiteness to evil, and thereby a certain vantage ground, in order to subdue it: it must be known in order to be knowingly detested and willingly rejected. But, in connexion with the idea of the omnipotent conqueror of evil, we dare not believe that evil has ever become actually realized, or acquired the conditions of true being. It is self contradictory, incapable of true being, and requires only to assert its pretensions in order to be rejected and sink into its appropriate nothingness. Evil remains ever subjective, confined to the will in which it has its origin; and it is only in its *transition from potentiality into actuality* that it is recognised as a Potentia or Power, and is subdued under the unequal warfare which it is ever destined to wage with the Redeemer and the Almighty Power of Goodness. Be it remembered however that the potentiality of evil is *infinite*, and that we might see no end to the transition except in the assurance that by the divine Power it will be finally extinguished. Thus then we see that, by the very condition of the Redemptive Process, Evil is converted from a mere potentiality, or possibility, into an active *Power of Evil*; and that wherever and whenever, under all circumstances actual and possible, the Redeemer's Love is exerted in order to raise the lost will and to restore it to the conditions of its lost spiritual integrity, the evil of the will claims its share, is restored to activity, and disputes the possession. Throughout all the works of creation, which we use as another term for the redemptive process, Evil is resuscitated with the good, blends with it, is increased with it and by it, and throughout the whole creation is in fierce conflict with it, in order to wrest it from its ultimate destina-

tion. Vain indeed the struggle, but in moral man rests the choice of his victory.

The student will carefully guard against the intrusion of the fancy in supposing that the power of Evil, of which we are speaking, involves any notion of Place—that there is a heavenly “place” for the heavenly Community, and a “place,” called Hell for the fallen spirits.* No! we are speaking of spirit and spirits as Will, and under purely spiritual conditions. And we say that the Power of Evil is revived by the power of Redemption throughout the whole work of Creation; that it becomes more active and powerful in proportion to the actual evolution of the redemptive process, grows with its growth, and strengthens with its strength; that it has no power of itself to realize itself in act and being, except where the conditions are offered by divine Act; that it is always merely subjective in the transition from potentiality to the actual being which it tends to destroy; that it is in its very essence self-contradiction, death and falsehood—“a murderer and liar from the beginning;” and finally that though, by the necessary conditions of the idea of God’s

* The sensuous fancy is ever at work to represent Heaven and Hades as distant from us, as requiring for their communication with us some intermediation of space and agency; but these vain fancies may be corrected by appealing to the incontrovertible truth and intuitively evident contemplamen—that is, *One Indivisible Will* or Spirit in the whole universe, including Heaven, Earth and Hades, as the omnipresence of God. Compare Psalm cxxxix. Here there is no need of transmission, propagation, for there are no bars, impediments nor hindrances;—it is ex principio the immediate operance of Will and intelligence. It is true that this one spiritual ground is manifested in forms of being, varied indeed and infinitely multiplied: but they are forms of one and the self same Spirit—and “ubi anima est tota est, tota in toto, et tota in qualibet parte.” Sensuous phenomena too there are in this nether world of ours, under laws of space and time:—but these arise by defect of the will and its power of manifestation in the worldly “state,” and indicate a borrowed form of realization, a bodily presentment and corporeal being, with all the multiplication of means to relative ends, adaptive contrivances and instruments of mediate agency, which at once serve to actualize the weak potential will, but are bars, manacles and impediments to the free spirit, and substitutes for immediate operance. But still it is only One spirit in power and operance that breathes through the boundless Universe.

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love in the redemptive process, evil is resuscitated and acquires power, yet it is plain that so only and by such means the final aim of Redemption shall be achieved, and Evil be everywhere and throughout subdued, in order to the full and enduring triumph of the Good.

Having thus, I trust successfully, shown the truth involved in the first proposed consideration, we pass on to the second—the question of the form under which we name, and accept some designative appellation for, the Power of Evil, such as we have described it in the preceding paragraphs. And it is plain that we have here in view the various attempts which have been made in the religions of the world to express the idea, the truth of which we have vindicated;—and such we find in the Ahriman of the Zend religion, in the Loki of Scandinavia, in every form of religious belief and superstition, and finally in Christianity under the name of the “Devil and his Angels;”—in all the belief in a *Principle of Evil*, however variously designated and dressed by the fancy. Our interest however is mainly, if not entirely, confined to the Christian doctrine; and I need not say that I have so far successfully vindicated it on this point as to have shown and established, in connexion with the Redemption which it offers and the redemptive process on which it is founded, the reality of the Principle of Evil and its tremendous power;—not to say that, though obscurely expressed, a “fall of the Angels” is at least implied in the Christian doctrine;*—so that, in all these points, our scheme is in consonance with Christianity. There is, too, another point on which our scheme, in connexion with the Idea, claims agreement with christian teaching:—we say that in the Fall the fallen spirits sank below the conditions of Being: that in becoming a confused chaos of hostile and self-contradictory strivings, they passed into a mere *Multëity*, below number and distinction, at once a mere indistinguishable oneness without unity, and an indistinguishable multëity by defect of number and individual distinction; such as we may imagine under the figure of a heap of sand, the air, the

* See the passages referred to at pp. 402-3.

ocean, or perhaps Tohu Bohu, or any confused assemblage of atomic particles that are nowise parts—such a conception as in its negation forbids equally a whole and parts.

The idea implies—what can only be rendered intelligible by its contrariety, the contrary to unity and distinction: it is the oneness and multēity of confusion and indistinction. Hence we might with equal truth call it one or many, though in either case we should be describing that which in truth is neither, and is below the conditions of being. It is the *One Will* of Evil; but it is only One by being destructive of all unity, the spirit of falsehood, lying, disintegration, self-contradiction, death. But it presents itself also under the manifold forms of Evil—nay, the infinite potentiality of evil in all possible forms, and in the endless strivings of Evil Will to actualize itself as *multitudinous Wills*, manifold as the forms of being by which each seeks to actualize itself, in each of which it infuses as the subtle destroyer, and in each is vanquished, and in coming to the birth is self-strangled by the inherent self-contradiction which cannot endure the light. If need were to add to this attempt to give intelligibility to that which is only intelligible by its character of contrariety to all intelligibility, we might say that confusion or indistinction is the form or result by which the imagination strives to apprehend a Will striving, at one and the same moment and in one and the same relation, to be *One and Many*. Hence we see why the rational instincts of mankind have ever led them to represent the Principle of Evil, now as the Evil One, the Archfiend, Satan, the Devil; and now as many, his subordinates, angels, demons or devils;—or both comprised in one the “Devil and his Angels:” for their name is “Legion.” But it will be said there exists an irreconcilable difference between the philosophical view here propounded, and that of the Christian scriptures; and at all events it will be asked whether I mean that the “Devil and his Angels” are *Persons*. Certainly not; nothing can be more contrary to my meaning. I am bound to deny it. Personality implies true being, self-affirmation of the Will in and by the universal condition of true being, which is the eternal Reason, the

APPENDIX. living Truth, the Son of God: it therefore would make the Devil a child of God and evil a form of the Good. No! Evil is the contrary of all goodness, the power and tendency of disintegration, "catalysis," the death and destructive principle of all being, but a delusion, a lie, self-annihilative and destructive.

But before it be asserted that the view here offered differs from that of the Christian scriptures, it may be asked whether, if we abstract from the figurative and popular language without which a principle of so unique a character could not have been conveyed to persons unaccustomed to philosophical thinking and its requisite abstractions—whether, I say, the doctrine of scripture does really differ from the view here maintained: nay, whether the language, as must be expected if the truth be such as I have represented, does not really suggest the self-same idea?

The principal character of the principle of Evil given in the New Testament may be perhaps thus stated: Satan, *ὁ σατανᾶς, ὁ διάβολος, ὁ πονηρὸς* is the Author of all evils and of all ills—Luke x. 19; xiii. 16; xxii. 31. He is therefore the Adversary of the Kingdom of God—Matt. xiii. 39; Luke x. 18; John xii. 31; xiv. 30; xvi. 11. He is the Tempter, *ὁ πειράζων*, of the faithful—1 Cor. vii. 5; 1 Thess. iii. 5; 1 Pet. v. 8. He tempted Eve—2 Cor. xi. 3. He became the author and power of death—Heb. ii. 14. He and his Angels, Rev. xii. 9, were originally created good: as nothing could come from the hand of God but what is good, and no being could be originally opposed to the Creator of the universe: but they fell by their own fault—John viii. 44; 2 Peter ii. 4; Jude 6. They are now the rulers in the Kingdom of darkness—Eph. vi. 12; Coloss. i. 13; roam through the air—Eph. ii. 2; and have become the rulers over the whole of mankind who have turned from God (*ὁ κόσμος*)—John xii. 31; xiv. 30; xvi. 11; 2 Cor. iv. 4; Eph. ii. 2:—but will hereafter be the subjects of a terrible judgment—2 Pet. ii. 4; Jude 6; for Christ came into the world in order to destroy the power of Satan—1 John iv. 8; John xii. 31; xvi. 11; Heb. ii. 14. Then again

consider the various designations which the Devil receives : APPENDIX.
 Destroyer, Angel of the bottomless pit, Prince of the world, Prince of Darkness, a roaring Lion and an Adversary, a Sinner from the beginning, Beelzebub, Belial, Accuser, Deceiver, Dragon, Liar, Murderer, Serpent, Tormenter, the god of this world. (Compare De Wette, Dogmatik p. 213 ; Winer, Wörterb: in verb. "Satan;" Cruden, Concord. "Devil.") And I think that the candid student cannot but confess that the designations are for the most part those which might be fitly chosen to convey to the popular understanding the notion of a principle of evil, by figures expressing a vague, dark, indefinite, personal agency. And how indeed can moral evil, that which acts in the heart and mind of man, and consists essentially in the *animus* of the guilty, be otherwise than in some sense or other a *personal agency*, and be represented, as in Scripture is done, by an *impersonation* of Evil?—It is so far true, and it answers the moral purpose of distinguishing the author of evil, as the adversary of man and the enemy of God. But it would be a lamentable error to suppose that the figurative designations, such as a Prince, Ruler, a designation with the masculine prefix such as *ὁ πόνηρος*,* or the designation by a proper name, such as Belial or Beelzebub, were intended to mean a Person, a self-conscious Being, with high intellectual powers, adequate to thwart the designs of the Almighty, with the will and means to carry out a deliberate design of unmingled malignity and wickedness, and with the necessary accompaniment of attributes of ubiquity, of omnipresence in the very recesses of the human heart, and of indefinite spiritual powers, which could scarcely be less than divine.

It is, I venture to say, impossible to conceive such a being, except by means of such falsifications as are allowable only in poetry and works of the imagination. And I will add

* See Matt. v. 37 ; vi. 13 ; xiii. 19, 38. Eph. vi. 16. 2 Thess. iii. 3. Luke xi. 4. John xvii. 15. 1 John ii. 13, 14 ; iii. 12 ; v. 18, 19. Conf. Lücke ii. p. 448. In other passages, the neuter form (*τὸ πονηρὸν*) is used. See Rom. xii. 19. Luc. vi. 45. Compare De Wette, Dogmatik, p. 213 ; especially John viii. 44.

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that the notion of such a being is not warranted by the language of scripture, and where unconsciously derived from it, is as much a surreptitious work of the fancy as the horns, hoof and tail, of the mediæval Devil, who was the jester and buffoon of the mysteries and miracle-plays.

But it may be asked by some stickler for the letter—"How does this agree with the narrative (Matt. iv.) of the *Temptation of Christ*, in which the Tempter is introduced with unmistakeable attributes of Personality—no longer as a spiritual agency, vague and undefined, but, in whatever outward form and shape, addressing our Saviour in words, transporting Him through the air, and claiming His homage then and there as in the presence of an earthly and visible King? Now I might conveniently shelter myself under an apologetic view, sanctioned even by Fathers of the Church, that the narrative is not that of an historical fact, but a symbolical representation of the mysterious process which may be called the "temptation" of our Saviour. "Here then the cloven foot of this Spiritual Philosophy peeps out!" says an orthodox conceptualist—one who thinks that a thing is perfectly plain and intelligible when he has brought it under some sort or kind of his experience, sensible or psychical, and labelled it with a generic term. But—though I may agree that the narrative is not that of the historical fact of the appearance of the Devil *in propria personâ* and as a *phænomenon*, though I may agree to the symbolical character of the alleged event—yet, nevertheless, I take it as a fact, I accept it as a profound Truth, and admirably calculated to give intelligibility to the profound speculative doctrine here inculcated—at once instance, exemplification, and explanation. If namely it be true, as I have shown, that the principle of evil is an *infection* of the whole will of nature—just as a contagious disease may infect, pervade and poison the total life of an animated being; that evil is diffused, or dynamically affects the whole creation, physical and moral, is potentiated in the ascent of nature, is active and tends to be actualized in proportion to the realization of the conditions of being;—then it cannot but follow that it will have

its final struggle with the Good in the moral and spiritual being of Man, that the appropriate battle-field between the powers of good and evil will be *in the Personality of Man*, and that here evil cannot but assume a *personal character*, and cannot but be represented as a *personal conflict* with a tempter and seducer of souls.

Evil, I say, obtains a *personal* character ;—not so, indeed, that the principle of evil becomes a Person or Personality distinct from and opposed to the Person of the individual in whom evil is struggling for the mastery ; but it produces a duplicity and tendency to disunion, inward conflict and self severance, in the conscious I or will of the individual. It is an alien and hostile power which has intruded itself, and acts in and by the conscious being of the person attacked. Conceive it as—what is said to be the fact—one who whispers in the ear of a sleeper, and suggests to him the images and thoughts of a distressing dream ;—or as “in certain cases of mental derangement, where the unfortunate patient believes that he is ‘possessed’ by some other mind, spirit or agent, who is obtruding his thoughts into his the patient’s mind.” *Mental Dynam.* p. 50. But observe : the mental process which is going on under the temptation to be determined by evil is wholly that of the individual so affected : the alien tempter is only the ferment which sets the process in motion, the poison which gives activity to the disintegration of the moral being. Evil, as I have said above, tends to produce a duplicity of the I :—by the light of reason in me, as a conscience, I would that which is true and good ; but by the evil tempting me I would that which is false, unreal, and merely selfish. Bear in mind too the continual *polar distinction* in the self-consciousness of the subjective and objective self ; so that the opposite states may alternately predominate in one and the self-same Will. Thus the objective self when acted upon by evil temptation, may tend to the mastery of evil in the whole Will ; but meanwhile the whisperings of conscience may be acting on the subjective self, and rouse it into successful activity ; or, on the other hand, even in the moment of predominance and victory, the objective self may be again so

APPENDIX. actuated that the preparation for the defeat of the subjective and self-determinant self may be already taking place:—as for instance the consciousness of humility may be already the transition to pride.

The great agent in this process, which is going on in the self-conscious man in order to the introduction of, and his possession by, evil, is the *Understanding*, or what has been well called the *φρόνημα σαρκός*. We have elsewhere shown that as the light of Reason in the conscience is that which is ever directing the human will to those true conditions, which consist in their universality, so the understanding, which is the power of adapting means to relative ends in the absence of ultimate aims, is the ready pandar to man's selfishness:—it is the organ and ready instrument, by which evil becomes the wily tempter and subtle seducer; it suggests the means of gratifying the selfwill; it paints the attractions of alluring vice; it induces and persuades; it obscures the light of reason, and stifles the monitions and warnings of the conscience. Thus, though the principle of Evil be the principle of unreality, of delusions, mockery, lying, falsehood, death, of that which is annihilative by its inherent self-contradiction, it may be introduced, and ever tends to introduce itself, wherever there is a *susceptibility* and *disposition* to selfish particularity. But, as we have before said, we cannot conceive Man—man as such, that is a Will under the conditions of redemption, and created in the image of God—to be the author and originator of Evil, of the poison which affects the whole creation. Neither can we conceive him as the author of the evil which is in himself; since, as our moral needs assure us, he is destined to be a child of God and an inheritor of the kingdom of heaven, but would be, if the originator of evil in himself, a child of the Devil. A will at once capable of redemption and self-creative to evil, is a contradiction:—it would be the assertion of the possibility of willing at once good and evil, or the denial of God's power and love in the redemptive process. Nevertheless the fact is undeniable, that man, notwithstanding the gracious aid and continual support of redeeming mercy, is *prone to lapse* into

evil; and we assume, in consonance with our moral needs, that, though the disposition exists within, the *solicitation* is *from without*; and we are reminded of the awful fact, that, though man under the conditions of Humanity is by the grace of God absolved from the guilt of diabolical pravity, he nevertheless bears the marks of Hades.

Thus far we are satisfied that the Spiritual Philosophy is in accordance with the scriptures of the New Testament; and we cannot doubt it to be implied in the latter that Evil and the Evil One have not and cannot have the objective reality and self-dependent existence of Personal Being. We admit indeed that it countenances an *impersonation* of Satan; and this we maintain is so far a figurative prosopopœia that it cannot mean Personality in its proper sense—that is, as the being of a will self-affirmed in and by the eternal Reason or the alone true Being; but, as we have seen, Evil when it seizes and obtains possession of an individual Will or human personality, acts in and by the intellectual and moral being of the will which has willingly admitted it, and, becoming so far a *Personality*, works to the destruction of the Person it has possessed, and perishes with it.*

The view here adopted will be found also in accordance with the spirit of the New Testament in its account of those “possessed” by Demons, *δαιμονιζόμενοι, δαιμονισθέντες*,

* An unexpected coincidence here forces itself on my mind. It is clear namely that, without having had my attention directed to it during the reasoning, I have all along been describing the Devil as Hegel at least in this particular conceived God. If the doctrine be rightly attributed to him, he thinks that God becomes conscious in man “and apart from the universal consciousness of man there is no divine consciousness or personality” (Morell, Hist. of Philos. p. 189). Now this applied to the spirit of Evil or the Evil One appears to be a sound philosophical doctrine:—Evil is the universal principle of negation, annihilative of the moral being, by introducing into the Will the false, the delusive, self-contradictory principle of a self-will, absolute in the self-dependent particularity and wanton arbitrariness of its own mere wilfulness, detached from the universal, necessary, immutable, and eternal condition of Reason and true being. Now this principle is the Will of Evil throughout nature, the taint of corruption in all created being. So far as we can call it Will, it acts in unconscious nature, itself unconscious; but in man it bursts into consciousness and works, and can only work, by man's willing will and personality.

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Mark v. 18; *δαιμόνια ἔχειν*, Luke viii. 27; *πνεῦμα δαιμονίου ἀκαθάρτου ἔχειν*, Matt. iv. 24; viii. 16; xv. 22;—and I will venture to add, it might “not only aid us in discovering the law of the propagation and transmission by descent of malformation, disease and insanity, but might throw a light on the obscure problem of the human races, of degeneracy, and of the awful mystery of a life admitting, and becoming permanently possessed by, an alien and hostile power.”—Vit. Dynam. p. 83. In other words all diseases and causes of disease, psychical and physical, are to be explained by the Principle of Evil, one and yet multiform, which is actualized in the creation as far as may be necessary for its extinction. It is true that the cases in the N. T. may be classed with the ordinary forms of disease. (See Winer, “Besessene.”) But this explains not the cause, but our mode of apprehending a fact by the faculty judging according to experience.

And unless the doctrine we uphold be adopted in respect of the nature, origin, and operance of Evil, I see no middle course between the opinions—either the principle of Evil, or Devil, was raised from Hades after the fall, was commissioned and put in authority by God Himself for the purpose of bevilling God’s own creation—which is a self-contradictory proposition: or the Devil was a Being, self-created, self-dependent, self-potentiated, self-raised, as a rival to God’s power—a Manichean view, no less self-contradictory by the assumption of reciprocally destructive and contrariant powers.

Both these schemes will be equally abhorrent to the Christian. As on the one hand spiritual morality requires that we are not to consider ourselves the authors of Evil, so, on the other, in assuming a Power of Evil distinct from ourselves and alien to the spiritual life for which we are fitted, equipped and destined, we do not attribute it in any way to God’s will, nor, in abhorring and fearing it, are we induced to propitiate it and become Devil-worshippers.

The third consideration proposed at p. 396 was the inquiry how far the scheme offered of the nature and extent of the power of Evil is consonant with the Reason and Conscience. This part of the subject has been already in a great measure

anticipated; but this may be a convenient opportunity for a short review of our principal points, bearing on the inquiry in question. APPENDIX.

We maintained that Evil is Selfwill, the attempt to will a self independent of the conditions of true being; that it necessarily existed in all non absolute Wills as a potentiality which never ought to have been willed; that nevertheless it was willed; that the consequence to the Wills, so willing the being of an impossible self, was the loss of a self wherein to be; that they nevertheless remained as a spirituality below being, a potentiality and principle of Evil: the false will ever tending to realize a false self, but self-annihilative by the inherent self-contradiction of selfishness: ever tending to seize the being which it craves for, and ever tending to destroy the being which is possessed by it: like these poisons which generate false products incompatible with their own vitality and with the life of the animated being in which they are generated, and whose organic life they have usurped.

2. We have maintained the necessity, founded in the eternal nature of Divine Love, of the *Redemptive Process*, having for its object the restitution of the fallen Spirits, and their final reunion with God in the community of non-absolute Wills. And this process we have found realized in the *Creation* of the World: corroborated as the view is by facts which show that, whilst evil is a universal ingredient in the world, its only intelligibility, compatibly with the wisdom and goodness of the Creator, is that of a process for the extinction of evil.

3. But we have found an equal necessity for assuming that the revival of evil, and its potentiation, is *pari passu* proportionate to the ascent in the scale of being: and consequently that it will obtain its highest potency, and proper character, in the moral and personal being of man. It is here that spiritual evil is and can only have its final struggle; and it is in man that evil is to be consciously recognized, and in the recognition to be vanquished by the all-powerful aid of the Redeemer. The angelic Will had become corrupt

APPENDIX. under the self-destructive process of Evil. But the redemptive mercy of God by raising it from the death of Hades, and by renewing the Humanity in His own Divine Image, restored the capabilities of the angelic Will; and the corruption of Evil became an alien and terminable process in man, should he willingly submit himself to the divine remedy and curative process. Man's reason assures him that—whatever pravity his conscience acknowledges and deplores, he could not have become good, fitted to be a child of God, if he had been originally and radically bad and diabolical. The Church dogma, it is true, recognizes a pristine innocence before the fall of man; but it grievously errs in describing the state of man after the fall; first, by exaggerating the moral pravity almost to an utter and absolute corruption and wickedness of nature;—and secondly, by losing sight of the corrective, without which no susceptibility to redemption could have existed: namely, that man was created in the image of God, that the principle of spiritual being was implanted in him. Man's higher faculties might have been deteriorated; but he could not cease to be a Man.

4. Now, we have asked whether and how far these principles are postulates of the Reason and Conscience. And I have said that no man, conversant with the facts of his own consciousness and of the moral nature of his fellow-men, can deny the existence of evil, the weakness and pravity of human nature, the facile proneness to evil courses, and the ready yielding to the temptations which beset a sin-prone will. Both fact and idea assure us that there is already in the best of men, what theologians have called "original sin," and which, so far as the disposition to evil is concerned, we have found suitably explained in the Fall of the non-absolute Spirits. But we have said that it is the only mode of explaining the fact consistently with our Reason and Conscience. It is true that the fall of man, as described in Genesis, might be plausibly substituted for the idea; but in that fall we are unavoidably referred to some sufficient antecedent cause; and it leaves us wholly at a loss to account for the universality of evil throughout all generations of

men; for unless referred to some act of the will, for which man is in some way responsible, Adam's descendants would be pronounced guilty, whilst innocent of the imputed crime. It is true that in every man, inasmuch as he is a Will, the same potentiality of evil and evil selfishness may be assumed as in the non-absolute Spirits who fell; but this assumption would not entitle us to predicate the universality of moral guilt, as far as it is implied in human pravity, and of the inevitable consequences in actual sin, as they are justified by experience:—some men might have been pointed to as the patterns and exemplars of moral perfection, even as is required by our faith in the spiritual excellence of the heavenly community in their incorruptible kingdom. But moreover, considering the tremendous nature and universal extent of evil, we cannot believe that it was the mere contingency which it would be if evil first found its origin in man; and if we believe that man is in a state of redemption for the purpose of eliminating and extinguishing the pravity under which he suffers, it would be contradictory to suppose that the remedy had induced the disease—that Redemption had caused Evil. The Reason and the Conscience constrain Man to believe—what the Idea of Spiritual Integration gives us assurance of—that, destined for life and immortality, he must have been created good, and that he must have come from the hand of his Creator fitted to accomplish his destination. He knows however, by the experience of himself and his fellow-men, that the propensity to and adoption of evil is a fact no less undeniable than lamentable. He cannot believe that evil is a necessary part or condition of God's work; for so he would belie the ethical nature of himself and God and destroy the foundation of all morals. He must then assume that Evil is foreign, alien, contingent, intruded upon God's work, and contrary to His will; but at the same time he feels that evil is so universal and so inevitable, that it must depend upon some universal pre-condition, inseparable from human nature, which he as man would not have willed and could not have originated, but from the effects and consequences of which there is no escape by any means

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within his power. But then Reason and Conscience assure man that if the accomplishment of his spiritual integration, or perfect humanity, be his ideal destination, this alien and hostile impediment must be removed and Evil eliminated. And if evil be contingent, foreign, unnecessary, superinduced, intruded and nowise essential or even real, it may be removed and eliminated. And in the light of the idea of Redemption he rests in the assurance that Evil will be eliminated and expelled from his moral being. That man was created good in the image of his divine Maker, and should have defaced and blurred God's work by a diabolical propensity, is equally repugnant to reason, as that the pravity of his will should be a mere accident in individual men. Reason and Conscience alike pronounce and assure us—though the Idea may not be consciously possessed, that it must be by a universal and inevitable pre-condition of our spiritual nature we partake of a guilt and pravity of will, which as human individuals we did not consciously will, and which cannot be justly imputed to us as the intentional crime of the individual;—that the universal evil in the world and the wretchedness of man must have a far deeper source and a more potent causality than any contingent pravity of individual man;—and that we have a spiritual being, a power and principle of moral health and integrity, which may be and is the effectual antidote and remedy for the diabolical agency of evil—the eternal Humanity working in us, as the Redeemer, until the head of the serpent be finally crushed.

“Finally”—I say;—for it is not to be supposed that the will of God can be otherwise than fully achieved and perfectly accomplished. How then (it may be asked) shall the potentiality essential to the nature of a non-absolute Will be extinguished? and how, compatibly with the nature of Will, shall the *possibility of a relapse into evil be prevented?* The answer may be that we are not called upon to vindicate the position further than is required by the Idea of the full and complete accomplishment of a divine act—namely, Redemption and indivisible re-union with God. But we do find a striking analogy with certain *diseases*, which are

produced by contagion, and for which a susceptibility to the productive poison is necessary, but in which, after a certain process has been effected, the *susceptibility* is for ever *extinguished*. Now it is not for us to be led away by fanciful analogies, but still it is impossible not to be struck with the similarity, and to see illustrated what after all must be the truth :—that as Disease is material Evil, so Evil is spiritual Disease. With regard, for instance, to certain contagious diseases, recent pathology informs us,* that the *materies morbi*, produced in the disease, when introduced into the body of a person with more or less susceptibility, converts certain bodily materials (and probably those which are effete and waste parts which have become incapable of organic life) into identity with the poison ; that the poison, in assimilating to itself the spoilt materials, multiplies and generates itself, but becomes eliminated by the various channels of excretion ; and that, whilst the body is thus defecated, the susceptibility to another attack is indefinitely postponed or never re-acquired, and the integrity of health preserved.

It would be perhaps too fanciful to say that Evil, like the infantile diseases, is a process which must be undergone in order to rid the patient permanently of the morbid susceptibility which has rendered him primarily liable to the attack of infection :—but it will be acknowledged that the operance of Evil, as, *par excellence*, the Poison of the moral world, closely resembles that of its material antitype. It implies a *susceptibility* on the part of the human will or soul, such as we have designated “Original Sin,” or the proneness to sin derived from the potentiality and latent tendency to selfish particularity. It implies too a propagation by *contagion* : and were we wanting in our every day’s experience, which, however, too fully corroborates the fact of the invariable tendency of evil to propagate itself by imitation and assimilation, we could not fail to find the certainty of the conditions of contagion in the Idea—namely, that the Will, individually and collectively throughout the moral universe, is one and

* Compare Simon’s Lectures, p. 257.

APPENDIX. indivisible, and therefore that what affects a part affects the whole,—even that what affects man affects heaven, as we have already noticed, both as adopted by the Cabbala and Scripture, in saying “the powers of heaven are shaken.” The will collective or individual always strives to be absolute, and by its very nature tends to produce itself in alterity, to propagate itself and to assimilate all else to what itself is : and in the case we are here considering it is the Evil will, in its ceaseless striving to disintegrate the integrity of moral being, the false Will, the father of lies, who was a liar and murderer from the beginning. And we have before shown that this is not a Will different from the non-absolute Will, but essentially and identically the same Will, so far as it has its root in Hades and partakes therefore of the pravity and degeneracy of the fall.

Hence then in every individual will, as part and parcel of the will of Hades, the Evil Will seizes the peccant part of the moral will and being—that, namely, which corresponds to the decomposable and destructable materials in the organic body, constituting its waste, and incapable of incorporation with it in its true life and healthy integrity—seizes, I say, the potentiality and latent disposition of lapsing into selfishness and selfish particularity. The poison Evil, its wilfulness and selfish perversity, infects the self, induces a “catalytic” action like its own (op. cit. p. 279) of disintegration in the moral being, a state of incompatible conditions and self-contradiction, a lie, and a lapsing to death and distraction : it converts the Will into the same poison, which it is itself. As we have seen, in proportion to the food and fuel of actual being, the evil grows by what it feeds on, and the raging fire of evil consumes what it devours :—it continually augments, increases, and multiplies, and a single drop will be sufficient to poison the whole well-spring and waters of the spiritual life. But not only does spiritual evil augment and spread, but the dark root of self-will sends forth and multiplies its shoots in all the endless forms which the infinite potentiality of evil strives to realize ; in pride, rage, malignity, envy, lust of power, and in the never-ending catalogue of diabolical

tendencies, with the unscrupulous recourse to fraud, lies, APPENDIX.
deceit, or violence to compass its ends. In all there is the same spirit, idem et alter, one and the same though in varied and manifold modes,—a will that would be absolute in its own wilfulness, destructive to itself and all else by its own inherent impossibility.

But by the grace of God the evil must be eliminated, precipitated:—in order to the integrity of life, the spreading gangrene and mortification must be stopped by the separation and sloughing of the diseased parts;—and by the power of the Redeemer the vain attempt of the Evil principle must prove its cure. Whatever evil is made manifest by the power and light of Reason is, in its futile attempt to pass into actual being, quenched by its own absurdity and self-contradiction. And though the process can never cease while the world endures,* for the world is the process of bringing evil to light for its conquest and transmutation to good, yet, in the day of triumph and final victory, “when the last enemy shall have been subdued,” and “the number of the elect accomplished,” the non-absolute Will, fallen but now restored, will have passed through the “*crisis*.” Where the nature, effects and consequences, of evil have been brought to light, known, felt and acknowledged,—where the desire of absolute wilfulness and the attempt to realize self-dependency have been tried and signally failed, with full cognizance of the terrible damage endured,—Evil can have no longer any power. When that which tempts is seen in its own native ugliness and has become hateful to the seduced, evil has lost its charms and false allurements, and henceforth the Will, by *its own act*, will be secured in its perpetual allegiance to the True and the Good, as

* The Church has probably judiciously adhered to the belief of a day of final judgment—though the passages in Scripture are not such as to render this belief necessary—*because the process will not have been completed till that day*. The final judgment on the individual might be pronounced at his death, but he is only a part of the total community which is one in Spirit. And may we not believe that there is a redeeming efficacy in the lives of Saints for the advantage of sinners—even as prefigured in Abraham’s intercession? See Gen. xviii.

APPENDIX. the only condition of its spiritual being and everlasting life. Of man then, who has passed through the crisis, and in contradistinction to Angels, we might say in the words of our Saviour: "Joy shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth, more than over ninety and nine just persons, which need no repentance."—Luke xv. 7. And thus then by the idea of spiritual integration and integrity, which is and must be our final destiny, we are assured that the poison of Evil, for whose generation only the mighty power of unttempted Angels, or of Angels *whose only temptation was the Self-will** which prompted their downfall, can be a sufficient explanation—that this poison of evil was so far an *alien infectant* of man's spiritual nature that by divine love he was transferred to the vantage ground of the Humanity, fortified and invested with a divine panoply against diabolical assaillment; and that, though man may wilfully admit the subtle enemy and seducer, and reject obstinately the gracious aid proffered alway to his frail and fickle Will, yet, wher ever the light of Reason and the voice of conscience induce him to seek and accept the Redeemer's help and mighty power, the poison of evil, working to infect and to assimilate to itself his moral will, can only be destructive of itself and of his evil potentiality, and leave his moral being in its destined integrity.

In looking back on the arguments adduced in the account of the Apostasy, I may observe, for the sake of clearness on the point most essential to our spiritual interests, that man in his aspiration for spiritual integration craves for the assurance that he, neither individually nor collectively, is responsible for the "origin of evil." Facts of hourly experience convince him that he must acknowledge his proneness to

* This constitutes the diabolical character, and so long as it remains the distinctive character, consisting in obdurate Self-will—the will creating itself to evil, we cannot agree with Origen as to the redemption of the Devil and his angels. If we say that they may be brought under the redemptive process, we change the ground; they are then no longer Devils but Humanities. It is true that Evil cannot be eternal. Redemption necessarily supposes the final conquest: but the conquest supposes the continuance of a coerced potentiality.

evil,—that, if the origin of evil consisted in the pure act of Spirits, whose only temptation was the self-will which prompted their downfall to the diabolical state and nature, he too has the same principle of evil selfishness at work within him, and not without fearful proofs of its reality ; but he clings to the belief that, whatever of evil he may be charged with, it is the result of the weakness of his will in yielding to temptation, whether *ab extra* or *ab intra*, and not of a diabolical and premeditated self-creation to evil. He may believe that Hades is still working in him under conditions supplied by God ; and he may believe that the power of God is actuating him to resist the evil that is in him ; but how shall he have the assurance that he is under the conditions of redemption to everlasting life, if he may be charged with being the author of evil, and of a guilt meet for devils, and for their fate ?

Now in considering this question it will be seen that I have adverted to the views of those who would persuade us that man is not the subject of any original pravity, that whatever of evil there is in him is his own fault or the result of circumstances in which he is placed, and that evil, if indeed it deserve the name, is a mere accident and contingent failure in the designs of Providence. And I think that I have shown the utter failure of the scheme in its inability to explain the nature, origin and universality of Evil. I have also drawn attention to the Church doctrine of the fall of man ; and it will be found that the Spiritual Philosophy acknowledges its accordance with the theologians, who accept from the book of Genesis the fall of man produced by a Tempter or the Devil, and therein the introduction into the world of moral evil ; but, bating other points of no little importance for the intelligibility and efficacy of the doctrine of redemption, it will be noticed that our view of man's original pravity differs from theirs, though I trust not from the right interpretation of the Scriptures, and that we refer the pravity in question to the proper author indicated by the fact narrated, and its universality in man to its proper spiritual pre-condition.

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And here then we arrive at the principle, which is necessary for the assurance of man, trusting that he is under the conditions of redemption, and which the above schemes fail in establishing. It is namely by vindicating the reality of a *transcendent spiritual ground*, as the origin of evil, its continual cause and sustaining efficacy, until it shall be finally destroyed or rendered inoperative. And meditating on this principle, as founded on the idea whose light has guided us throughout, man feels the assurance that, though justly amenable to the consequences of an act in which he had spiritually participated, he is not individually and humanly guilty of the evil of the world and of its universal pravity; and that, although by the fatal necessity of an antecedent condition he is ever lapsing into sin, he is nevertheless under the conditions of an economy of grace and redemptive mercy, which, with his willing co-operation, will secure his final reunion with God. The only condition under which a lapse to evil can take place is *Temptation*. Man did not originate the condition under which this lapse occurs; he did not create himself to evil. Still less did God create him to evil; for this would be self-contradictory. On the contrary God created man in His own image, infused into him the principle of divine being, and remained present with him as the power of resistance to evil, and as the mighty auxiliary to the development of his humanity in truth and goodness. Nevertheless man cannot but have the susceptibility and disposition to evil; for otherwise there could be no evil nor pravity in man, which would be confessedly contrary to the fact.

The condition, then, of a lapse to evil and to depravity must be admitted:—and this condition is liability to temptation. And this temptation may be *ab extra* or *ab intra*:—it is not sufficient to say that wickedness is only produced by outward inducements, for the inducements could have no influence nor excitancy, except the disposition already existed;—and this susceptibility or disposition is the potentiality, that never ought to be willed, of realizing the self or selfish will. This is the ever present tempter and provocative to sin—the parent of the whole progeny of sin;—

but it is the still continuing work of Hades, the quickening of the spirit of evil which has Hell for its womb and birth-place. God indeed, in the creation of man, has supplied the conditions under which the revival and resuscitation of evil take place; but it is not man's work, for he was made man, and as man divinely gifted, in order that in him evil might be resuscitated and finally vanquished. Whatever of evil there is in man belongs to his antecedent spiritual state.

The Idea of the Fall supplies us with the antecedent Spiritual Ground of Evil. 1. It thereby explains the *à priori* necessary condition of the *universality* of *evil* in the world, and the universal pravity of man. 2. It explains evil as a calamity, and at the same time assures man that he is justly in the position of a *criminal amenable* for the penalty of his crime, yet at the same time *free from personal and individual guilt*. It imposes on the individual conscience the obligation of a new life and principle of conduct, but does not burthen his conscience with some unknown crime and unrecognized guilt of which he neither knows the nature nor the extent. 3. The idea furnishes him with the assurance of the *renewal* in him, as Man, *of his original divine nature*, as properly his, with its capabilities and privileges. 4. Hence it assures him that the *evil*, which is in him, is *not inherent and essential* to man and himself, but is in respect of his humanity contingent, temporary and *eliminable*—provided always that he *exert his Will*, so far as in him lies, to co-operate with the divine power working in him to his regeneration as a Humanity.

For: 1. Without some universal cause of Evil the fact of its prevalence would be unexplained and unintelligible. 2. But if it be a fact that all the generations of man past and present bear testimony to its existence and direful extent, and if human pravity cannot exist but in the Will conceiving and intending it, man must be responsible for it; and yet his conscience acquits him of premeditated guilt, so far namely as introducing the conditions of its existence in the world is concerned, and apart from the commission of actual sin. 3. But man has the needs and aspirations of spiritual

APPENDIX. integration, the consciousness and invincible assurance that his true, proper and original nature is divine, and that this divine nature is the same as his ideal Humanity. 4. And he feels and knows that pravity, sin and guilt, are irreconcilable with the divinity that stirs within him, and consequently that they must be remediable and eliminable from his spiritual being. He is however at the same time conscious of his own inability to renew himself in the spirit, and to eradicate, as the indispensable requisite, that which is inborn and inbred with his human existence.

It is under such thoughts and meditations as those described in the last paragraph that the Idea, coextensive with the gift of Reason, dawns on his mind, and, shedding the orient light of eternal truth, chases away the shadows and mists of doubts and perplexities from the realities of his spiritual being. There is a heavenly community of blessed spirits, born of the eternal and divine Humanity, who ever realize in Him their individual Humanity;—but there were those among them, who, yielding to the fatal temptation contained in all non-absolute Will, asserted with the mighty power of divine spirits the self-will, which should ever have been latent and potential;—they fell, lost the self wherein to be, and became the diabolical tenants of Hades. But the unquenchable love of the divine Humanity willed their restoration; and the mystery of Redemption became unfolded in the creation of the world, or in the process by which the lost Humanity is raised from the confused and chaotic multëity of Hades through all the ascensive grades of being to conscious Man, who is willingly to accept and co-operate with the gracious will of his Redeemer in order to his spiritual regeneration.


No theory of morals that does not satisfactorily explain the origin of evil; the universal prevalence of evil in all generations of men; man's original proneness to evil, yet without individual guilt; the coexistence of human pravity with man's capability of spiritual and moral integrity; the conditions under which evil may be eliminated as an alien to man's spiritual being; and the causes and conditions of the

renewal of man's spiritual integrity and original divine being : APPENDIX.
—no theory of morals, failing in this, can be true. Spiritual Philosophy alone is the theory of morals, that does satisfactorily explain these desiderata. Spiritual Philosophy alone can be true. But it must be observed that Spiritual Philosophy purports to be the right interpretation of the scriptures of the Old and New Testament, and of the universal rational instincts of mankind.

THE END.

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